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To N, the constant among many variables 
It is sometimes considered a paradox that the answer depends not 
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Published work (twenty research papers and two books) and 
two unpublished papers are presented within the context of a short 
commentary on the theme of statistical parametric modelling. 
A secondary theme is the stimulus brought to statistical theory 
through close attention to the requirements of particular 
practical problems. 
The developments discussed cover the main divisions of 
parametric modelling: model selection, model validity, estimation, 
hypothesis testing, experimental design, prediction, decision 
making, model fitting and complex modelling. In model selection 
and validity the presentation begins and ends with an intensive 
study of two important particular classes of models, the 
centenarian lognormal class and a new logistic-normal class with 
wide application in the analysis of compositional and probabilistic 
data. In estimation and hypothesis testing the main aim is the 
provision of routine methodology, to allow the basy consideration 
of non-standard and complex situations. The discussion includes 
multiple hypothesis testing problems, in particular the usq of 
restricted and confidence-region tests, and a problem of 
constructing optimum designs for certain comparative trials. 
The emergence of statistical prediction analysis and the central 
role of predictive distributions as an important tool in many 
practical situations, with advantages of realism and tractability 
over other methods, are explained. The necessary theory for 
applications in medicine, in particular to statistical diagnosis, 
is developed, and the more complex models required to take account 
of difficulties of calibration, imprecision and uncertain diagnoses 
are constructed. Methods of comparing human inferential judgment 
against statistical modelling are demonstrated, and the possibility 
of estimating the implicit utility functions used by clinicians in 
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PREFACE 
The works submitted in support of this candidature for the 
degree of D.Sc. are set out in chronological order in the lists 
immediately following this Preface. To help the reader to relate 
these twenty-four works to the theme of this submission I provide a 
short commentary tracing the practical motivation for the statistical 
concepts and principles introduced, outlining the development of 
appropriate statistical methodology, and indicating the relevance 
to other work. Again for the convenience of the reader, the twenty 
published and the two unpublished papers are reproduced in a standard 
xerographic format at appropriate places within the commentary rather 
than presented as an untidy appendix of differently sized reprints: 
these form volume 1. The two books presented have also been 
reproduced in xerographic format and form volume 2. 
In the commentary I have found it convenient to use the 
(Authors, Year) form of reference but in order to distinguish 
between submitted and other published works I have also quoted for 
any submitted work its serial number in the list of submitted works. 
Thus Aitchison (6:1965) refers to submitted paper no. 6, whereas 
Aitchison and Silvey (1957) specifies a published though not 
submitted paper, details of which are contained in the list of 
references at the end of the first volume. 
The main theme of this presentation is parametric statistical 
theory and practice, in particular the formulation of practical 
problems in terms of parametric models and the development of new 
statistical concepts, principles and methodology towards a sensible 
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resolution of these problems. A secondary, but in my view equally 
important, theme is the modest reiteration of a tenet, well expressed 
by Chebyshev in the Drawing of Maps, that 'the bringing together of 
theory and practice leads to the most favourable results: not only 
does practice benefit, but the sciences themselves develop under the 
influence of practice, which reveals new subjects for investigation 
and new aspects of familiar subjects.' 
This secondary theme stems from a realisation that all the 
statistical research presented here has arisen out of the needs of 
specific consultative problems for a variety of. departments in the 
Universities of Cambridge, Glasgow, Hong Kong and Liverpool and 
for teaching hospitals in Glasgow, Guangchou and Hong Kong. It is 
perhaps surprising that attention to the demands of the variety of 
practical probleith which arrive on a statistician's desk in a more 
or less arbitrary sequence should lead to the development of a 
statistically coherent body of knowledge rather than a hotchpotch 
of unrelated statistical exercises. The emergence of satisfactory 
mathematical statistical theory does, however, seem to quicken when, 
according to Chebyshev's dictum, the statistician travels hand in 
hand with practice. While the extent to which this has been 
satisfactorily achieved for the particular problems posed by my 
consultees can only judged by them, I hope that the statistical 
content of the works submitted, however theoretical some may appear 
in isolation, may be seen by the reader through the help of the 
commentary to be sensible means towards very practical ends. 
John Aitchison 
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1 INTRODUCTION: PARAMETRIC STATISTICAL MODELLING 
Suppose that for some experiment or observational situation f 
under investigation we have adopted a statistical description with 
record set Y and a class of possible probability models, say density 
functions p(y0) on Y, where 0 is an indexing parameter belonging 
to a finite-dimensional parameter set S. The true indexing parameter 
6* is unknown. Suppose further that we have obtained, or could 
obtain, data x from another related experiment or observational 
situation e with record set X, with describing class of density 
functions p(xIO)  indexed by parameters in the same parameter set S 
and with the same true, but unknown, parameter 0*.  For example, a 
common situation is where e is n replicates of f, providing data 
X = (x1, . . . ,x) on which to base inferences about f. 
From such situations there arises a whole range of statistical 
problems of which the following are some of the most important. 
Model selection. The problem of selecting an appropriate 
parametric form for p(y0) and consequently for p(x0). 
Model validity. Testing the validity of the form selected 
from the information in x. 
Estimation. Using x to obtain information on, or to 
estimate, O. 
Hypothesis testing. Using x to test some prestated hypothesis 
concerning 0*. 
Experimental design. When there is a class E of possible 
'informative' experiments available, the problem of how to 
choose e from E to serve best the practical purpose of the 
investigation. 
11 
Prediction. Using x to make some statement about, or to 
predict, the outcome y of the experiment f. 
Decision making. Relating the modelling to some decision-
making problem and using x to determine an appropriate 
course of action. 
Model fitting. Using x to assess the complete density 
function of f. 
Complex modelling. Using simple parametric models as 
components in the building of a model of a more complex 
system. 
We shall see how all these aspects arise, some repeatedly, in 
the course of this commentary on the works submitted. Our first 
concern is an intensive study of one important class of parametric 
models. 
12. 
2 LOGNORMAL MODELS 
2.1 A monograph on a single distribution 
In most disciplines where variability and uncertainty play a 
significant role workers almost inevitably encounter some data 
whose pattern of variability is adequately described by a lognormal 
model, with density function of the form 
1 	(logy 
= ya'(2x) exp{- 
	22 	} 	(y > 0), 
or its higher-dimensional counterpart. Such models have been known 
and applied repeatedly since their first explicit recognition and 
development a century ago by McAlister (1879). In the period 
1952-56 when Aitchison and Brown (1954a,b,c) were collaborating 
in studies of demand analysis, income distribution and the analysis 
of family budgets they realised that some of the necessary lognormal 
distribution results which they had independently developed had 
already been discovered, and indeed often rediscovered many times. 
Their own experience of such rediscovery, and the realisation that 
others in the future night unnecessarily tread the same well-worn 
path, had suggested the undertaking of a collation of the diffuse 
literature on the theory and application of lognormal models. 
Almost predictably the project grew beyond review paper dimension 
to monograph size, as the extent of the previous literature was 
realised, as deficiences in existing theory emerged, as under-
developed or new properties had to be investigated and as research 
into economic applications progressed. 
The resulting monograph, Aitchison and Brown (1:1957) was at 
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the date of its publication largely experimental, the first sub-
stantial work devoted to a single form of distribution. Some 
statisticians expressed doubts as to the wisdom of such a venture. 
That the monograph has been followed by others such as Haight 
(1967) on Poisson models, Lancaster (1969) on the chi-squared distri-
bution and Ashton (1972) on logistic models, together with a 
procession of encyclopaedic volumes having substantial chapters 
on individual distributions such as the revived Elderton and 
Johnson (1969), Johnson and Kotz (1969, 1970, 1972), Mardia (1970), 
Ord (1972), Patil, Kotz and Ord (1975), is some evidence in support 
of the experiment. 
Claims to original or significant contribution to knowledge 
cannot, of course, be based on collative ability and constant, 
though modest, sales and so what may be regarded as such contributions 
are now indicated. 
The generalisation of the moment distribution property (2.8). 
A clear statement of, and some variations on, models of genesis 
(Chapter 3). 
An extensive study of the relative merits of different 
estimation methods for the two- and three-parameter models, 
including, at that time unusual, assessment by simulation 
(Chapters 4,5,6). 
A quantitative response model with multiplicative lognormal 
error, allowing for heteroscedasticity (7.9). 
The relevance of lognormal models to the statistical analysis 
of income distributions, in particular the role of moment 
distributions in Lorenz curve analysis and of the o parameter 
in measures of concentration (Chatter 11). 
1+ 
6. 	The use of lognormal models in the statistical analysis of 
consumer behaviour, in particular the synthesis of Engel 
curve theory and the role of the lognormal convolution 
property in aggregation problems of demand analysis (Chapter 12). 
2.2 More recent development 
In the twenty-three years since the publication of the mono-
graph there appear to have been few new theoretical results of any 
apparent significance. 
Heyde (1963) shows that a lognormal distribution is not 
uniquely determined by its moments, a result of considerable 
theoretical interest, though not of any practical significance. 
Hill (1963) demonstrates that the likelihood function associated 
with a sample from a three-parameter lognormal model tends to 
as the parameter vector (-r, p, a), in the notation of 
Aitchison and Brown (1:1957), tends along a certain path to 
(x0, -, co), where xO is the minimum sample value. Thus the 
clearly ridiculous estimate (xQ, - 	of (-r, p, a) is a 
maximum likelihood estimate, providing the absolute maximum 
- 	of the likelihood. This unfortunate feature of maximum like- 
lihood estimation had gone unnoticed by earlier writers, in-
cluding Aitchison and Brown (1:1957), who mistakenly identified 
relative or local maximum likelihood estimators as providing the 
absolute maximum of the likelihood function. This feature is 
theoretically irritating rather than practically awkward since 
the relevance of the local maximum to most practical problems 
is readily restored by the mildest of prior assumptions about 
the parameters, giving negligible prior probability to parameter 
vectors in this absurd region at infinity. 
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Since 1957 there have been two streams of development in 
testing model validity which provide extra opportunities for 
testing the lognormality of data. The first stream has 
produced new tests of univariate and multivariate normality, 
and hence of lognorniality: see for example, Box and Cox (1964), 
Shapiro and Wilk (1965), Healy (1968), Andrews, Gnanadesikan 
and Warner (1973), Cox and Small (1978). The second stream 
has been concerned with problems of testing separate classes 
of models, and so allows the testing of a lognormal model against 
specific parametric alternatives such as the exponential model 
and the gamma model: see, for example, Cox (1961, 1962), 
Atkinson (1969, 70) 
Mosimann (1970, 1975a,b) gives some characterisations of 
multivariate lognormal distributions in relation to biometric 
analysis of shape and size. One characterisation in particular 
has played an important deterrent role against the use of log-
normal distributions in such analysis. If y,.. 'd,l has a 
multivariate lognormal distribution and shape (xl,...,xd), 
defined by 
x 	= y1/ (y1 + 	+ 	(i = 1,...,d), 
is independent of additive size z = Yl + 	+ d+l then the 
distribution of y is degenerate, being concentrated in a 
straight line in (d+1)-dimensional space. We shall see later, 
in §13 and Aitchison (24:1980), that this result, while correct, 
need not be a deterrent since a slight modification in modelling 
allows full exploitation of all the tractable features of 
lognormal distributions in this area of application. 
Brown and Sanders (1980) provide a new insight into lognormal 
1.6 
genesis by their representation of a classification procedure 
in terms of the relative density of two mutually singular 
distributions. This is of particular interest since it 
confirms a conjecture of Aitchison and Brown (1:1957, p.27) that 
'it is a curious fact that when a large number of items is 
classified on some homogeneity principle, the variate defined 
as the number of items in a class is often approximately log- 
normal.' 
2.3 Some new applications 
The combination of appropriateness and tractability continues 
to prove attractive to model-builders in an ever-increasing variety 
of disciplines. Any revision of Aitchison and Brown (1:1957) would 
involve substantial enlargement of the chapters on applications, 
where model selection leads naturally to lognormal distributions. 
Only a few of the more interesting additions can be singled out 
here. 
In economics, Hart (1960) uses the measure of concentration 
analysis of Aitchison and Brown (1:1957, Chapter 11) in the 
- 	study of business concentration; Cramer (1962) extends the 
cumulative lognormal Engel curve approach of Aitchison and 
Brown (1:1957) to the ownership of major consumer durables with 
the effects of income and wealth studied through the use of a 
bivariate lognormal model; Bain (1964) in his analysis of the 
growth of television ownership in the United Kingdom makes use 
of both cross-sectional and time series data through a 
cumulative lognormal growth model. 
In the study of language and langage behaviour Somers (1959), 
Rapoport (1964) and Carroll (1968) have all studied the effect- 
17 
iveness of lognormal models in word-frequency analysis. 
In climatology Thom (1963) uses a bivariate lognormal model to 
describe the variability of path width and length of tornadoes, 
and exploits the multiplicative reproductive property in 
investigating tornado path areas. 
In palaeontology MacGillavray (1965) uses lognormal modelling 
in relation to the variability of larger Foraminifera, and is 
particularly concerned with the choice of the threshhold of 
the three-parameter model. A similar form of application is by 
Schoener and Janzen (1968) in their study of environmental 
effects on the pattern of variability of insect size. 
S. 	In metallurgy SchUckher (1966) uses lognormal models in a wide- 
ranging study of one-, two- and three-dimensional grain size 
of metals. 
6. 	For a recent strong advocacy of lognormal models in chemical 
applications see Siano (1972). 
AITCHISON, J. and BROWN, J.A.C. (1957) 
The Lognormal Distribution 
Cambridge University Press 
A copy of this book is reproduced in volume 2 
3 GENERAL TECHNIQUES OF PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION AND 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
3.1 Background 
A popular and usually effective method of statistical esti-
mation is the method of maximum likelihood. In the setting of §1 
the likelihood function L(. x) for given observation x in e is 
defined as the non-negative function on the q-dimensional parameter 
set 0 specified by 
L(ejx) = p(xIo) 	(0 6 0). 
A maximum-likelihood estimator is then defined as a function 
0 : X - 0 such that 
L{8(x)lx} = max L(8 x). 
OeO 
When an explicit solution is not available there are numerical methods 
of iterating towards a specific estimate (x). Of these by far the 
most popular has been the Newton-Raphson method. For expository 
purposes here one particular version will be sufficient background 
to indicate the nature of the developments in methodology. Let D 
denote the q-vector derivative operator with ith component 
and D2 = DDT the qxq matrix second-derivative operator with (i,j)th 
component a2/oao. Write 
£(Ojx) = D log L(0x), 
B(s) = Ep(!O){D log L(Ojx)}. 
Then the Newton-Raphson scheme for generating successive iterates 
£0 
0(r) 	(r= 0,1'...) to 0(x) is: 
0(r) = 0(r-l) + B 1(0)(0 	Ix) 	(r = 1,2,...) 
with the value of B'  at convergence providing an estimate of the 
covariance matrix of 0. 
In the area of hypothesis testing a common technique for 
producing a test of a hypothesis w (C S) against the alternative 
®-w, or within the model 0, is the generalised likelihood ratio 
criterion, using a critical region of the form 
{x 	: A(x) : max 0L(0Ix)/maxL(0Ix) > 
where the critical value c has to be determined to ensure the 
prescribed significance level. When w is specified as the null 
space of some vector function h with r functionally independent 
components, so that 
= {e c 0 : h(0) = 01, 
then c can be determined approximately 'for large sample sizes' 
as x2(r;1-), the (1-a) fractile of the chi-squared distribution 
with r degrees of freedom (Wilks, 1938) 
The difficulty in applying such a test procedure is the need 
to determine not only the unrestricted maximum likelihood estimate 
0 but also the restricted maximum likelihood estimate Ô which 
maximises L under the restriction 0 E w. Wald (1943) had presented 
a method of avoiding this by devising an asymptotically equivalent 
test which required the evaluation only of 0. The test, which 
essentially asks if 0 approximately satisfies h(0) = 0, is based 
on the critical region 
.21 
Lx : {hT(HTB 1H) 1h} > x2(r;1 - a) I, 
where H is the q x r matrix of first derivatives of the h functions 
with respect to the parameters, with (i,j)th component 2h(0)/81. 
At this stage of the development of maximum likelihood esti-
mation and these associated tests of significance there were a 
number of important questions remaining to be answered. 
Suppose that the Wald test fails to reject w. We shall then 
naturally wish to proceed with the estimation of 0* under w. 
For this restricted or constrained case is there any counter-
part of the valuable Newton-Raphson method which will provide 
a systematic, reliable and easily programmed means of reaching 
What if w is most simply specified by freedom equations, 
setting 8 = g(a), where a is a vector of lower dimension than 
q? From this specification of w as the range space of the 
vector function g it may prove difficult to arrive at the 
corresponding constraint equations h(0) = 0 and so apply the 
Wald test. In such circumstances it is clearly relatively 
straightforward to evaluate the maximum likelihood estimator 
of a, say a, and hence the restricted maximum likelihood 
estimator ê=g(ct) of 0. We are thus led to the question: 
Just as the Wald test of w requires only 0 is there a counter-
part which requires only the evaluation of ê? 
What if the natural specification of w is in terms of a 
mixture of constraint and freedom equations? What aids to 
maximum likelihood estimation and hypothesis testing can be 
devised? 
.22. 
The answers to these questions were provided in Aitchison and 
Silvey (2:1958), Silvey (1959) and Aitchison and Silvey (3:1960), 
with later developments to aspects of multiple hypothesis testing 
in Aitchison (4:1962, 5:1964, 6:1965). The immediate motivation 
for these developments had arisen from an awareness by these authors 
that in their consultative work there was an increasing number of 
problems of this type, and.that a general procedure that became 
automatic once the problem has been formulated could considerably 
ease the burden of the consulting statistician. For example, 
Aitchison had seen the need for such proceduresin the simultaneous 
use of cross-section and time-series data in family budget analysis; 
see Aitchison and Brown (1:1957, Chapter 12) and Stone, Aitchison 
and Brown (1955), who indicate the need for attention to such 
problems. Also some aspects of a consultative problem of Silvey, 
reported in Aitchison and Silvey (1957) and concerned with a gener-
alised probit-type model for the life cycle of a certain insect, 
would have been greatly simplified had such a theory of testing been 
available. Thus there was considerable incentive to obtain an easily 
applicable system. 
The following is a summary of what was achieved in Aitchison 
and Silvey (2:1958), Silvey (1959) and Aitchison and Silvey (3:1960). 
3.2 Contributions to estimation 
Aitchison and Silvey (2:1958) concentrate on the problem of 
maximum likelihood estimation through the Lagrange-multiplier 
technique, maximising 
log L(OIx) + xTh(e) 
with respect to (8,X), that is over OxRT,  where X is an r- 
23 
dimensional vector of Lagrange multipliers. The results apply to 
the situation where e consists of n replicates of f. 
Under certain carefully specified regularity conditions on 
the parametric form and on the constraint function there 
exists a solution of the first derivative equations 
2,(OIx) + H(0)A = 0, 
h(0) = 0, 
and the solution is a consistent estimator of 0*. 
This solution provides not just a local maximum of L but an 
absolute maximum, and so a maximum likelihood estimator of 0*. 
From (1) and (2) the consistency property of the maximum 
likelihood estimator is established. 
The asymptotic distribution of 5, X is obtained: 	and 	are 
asymptotically independent with normal distributions 
N[0*,{BlBlH(HTB lH) lHTB l}O 1 and N[O,(HTBlH)01, 
respectively, under the hypothesis w. 
S. 	A simple iterative procedure similar to the Newton-Raphson 
method is available for the determination of a sequence of 
(r) 	(r) 
iterates 9(r), A 	leading, with convergence, to 0, A: 
B -H 1-1 F 
(r-l) 1 0 	Ix) 
= 	 + 	 I 
[rj 0 ] 	
[HT 0 j(r-l) [h(0(r-1)) ] 
6. 	Finally, the paper indicates that as an alternative to the 
generalised likelihood ratio test and the Wald test of w 
within 9 the Lagrangian multiplier test statistic 
(HTB lH)X = 
may be used against, asymptotically, x2(r;l-a). 
.2+ 
3.3 Contributions to hypothesis-testing 
No attempt is made to justify the use of the Lagrangian 
multiplier test in Aitchison and Silvey (2:1958). The asymptotic 
equivalence of 
the generalised likelihood ratio test, 
the Wald test, 
the Lagrangian multiplier test, 
is established by Silvey (1959), •who also considers the adjustments 
necessary for the important case where the information matrix B is 
singular. This singularity reflects the presence of unidentifi-
ability of parameters, requiring the introduction of identifiability 
restrictions as part of the constraint equations h(0) = 0. Suppose 
that h = {h1,h 2} with h1 the constraint function for identifiability 
and h2 the constraint function defining the hypothesis. Then 
Silvey (1959) shows that all that is required i to replace the 
matrix B by B+H1H, where H = [H1,H 2 ] with an obvious partitioning, 
and to replace r by r-r1 where r1 is the dimension of vector 
function h1 . 
These two papers, Aitchison and Silvey (2:1958) and Silvey 
(1959), made available easy-to-use practical tools for the consulting 
statistician faced with a parametric estimation or hypothesis 
testing situation. All that is required is to identify the likeli-
hood L and the constraint function h. Once this formulation is 
complete the rest is straightforward technical mathematics (some 
differentiation) and computing. Now Aitchison and Silvey (3:1960) 
set out the practical application of the methods, discussing care-
fully the relative merits of the different tests in relation to 
the practical situation. In addition to its expository and 
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illustrative role this paper provided three new aspects. 
Identification in any multinomial situation of the Lagrange-
multiplier test statistic with the familiar chi-squared goodness-
of-fit statistic E(observed-expected) 2/expected. 
A discussion of the case where the constraints are specified 
in terms of freedom equations. 
A method of dealing with a mixed specification, some 
constraint and some freedom equations. 
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MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION OF PARAMETERS 
SUBJECT TO RESTRAINTS 
By J. AiTcursoN AND S. D. SILVEY 
University of Glasgow 
Summary. The estimation of a parameter lying in a subset of a set of possib] 
ptramcters is considered. This siilset is the mill space of a vell-behaved functio 
and the estimator considered lies in the subset and is a solution of likelihoo 
equations containing a Lagrangian multiplier. It is proved tin-it, under cem-tai 
conditions analogous to those of Cramer, these equations have a solution whic 
gives a local maximum of the likelihood function. The asymptotic distribution c 
this 	maximum likelihood estimator' and an iterative method of solv 
in-,  the equations are discussed. Finally a test is introduced of the hypothesi 
that the true parameter does lie in the subset; this test, which is of wide appli 
cability, makes use of the distribution of the random Lngrangian multiplie 
appearing in the likelihood equations. 
I. Introduction. Quite frequently in statistical theory the natural way o 
building up a mathematical model of an experiment leads to the description 3 
the experiment by a random variable X whose distribution function F depend; 
on s parameters 01 , 	, . . . , 0, , which are not mathematically independeni 
but satisfy r functional relationships lm(G , 0 , 	, 0,) = 0, j = 1, 2, 	, 
r < s. In many eases where such a natural description arises it is possible tc 
solve the r equations h,(01 , 0 , 	•, 0,) = 0 for r of the parameters in terms o: 
the remaining s - r, to express the distribution function F in terms of thes 
remaining parameters only and, given observations on X, to estimate thes 
S - r unrestricted parameters by the method of maximum likelihood. Thi: 
procedure has two disadvantages. First, it may be impossible to express r of thE 
parameters explicitly in terms of the remaining s - r and second, interest ma) 
lie in estimating all of the parameters simultaneously, in which case a sym-
metrical procedure for so doing is cert.ainlydesirable. The natural symmetric 
method for maximum-likelihood estimation in this case is achieved by the in-
troduction of Lagrangian multipliers and it is this method that we will eonsidex 
in this paper. 
2. Formulation of the problem. In this section we will formulate more pre-
cisely the problem to be considered. 
We will denote rn-dimensional Euclidian space by rn", rn = 1, 2, 3, 
A point in G', denoted by 9 = (O , 0.. , . . , 0,) will represent a value of a param- 
eter. There is a particular point 0. 	(90) 	. . , 0 ° ) in R' which is the true, 
though  unknown, parameter value. Corresponding to each 0 in some neighbour- 
Received February 18, lOoT. 
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hood of 0o  ,.say in U = {0: 8 - 0I 	a, is a probability density function 
f8 defined on ' and we will denote the value of f, at the point I c PL1 by J(t, 0). 
The probability density function fe0  defines a probability measure on (R and we 
will assume that,.with respect to this measure, for almost all I, the partial deriv- 
atives 3 logJ(I, 0)/a0•, i = 1, 2, 	, s, exist for every 8 in 
There is given a continuous function h from V into Gi, r < s, defined by 
h(0) = (h(0), h2(0), . . . , h(0)), which is such that, for every 9 in U , the par-
tial derivatives ah 5(o)/3e1 , i = 1, 2, . .. , s,J = 1, 2, . . . , r, exist. The function 
h has the further property that h(00) = 0. 
A point in " denoted by x = (x ,x2, . . . , x) will be regarded as represent-
ing a set of n independent observations on a random variable whose probability 
density function is Jo, and we use the fact that points in G" are being so regarded 
to define, in the usual way, a probability measure on 61, for each n. Subsequent 
statements regarding the probabilities of sets in 	will refer to this particular 
probability measure. 
It will be convenient to use also matrix representation for points in 
m  and 
for linear operators from one Euclidian space to another and we will use the con-
vention that, for example, 0 is the s X 1 column vector representing the point 
0 in V, and H. an s X r matrix, represents a linear operator If from 61r  into ' 
The log-likelihood function L is defined on a subset of Gi' X ' by - 
L(x, 0) = j log  f(x1, 0). 
If He denotes the s x r matrix (ah(0)/a0), and if X is a Lagrangian multiplier 
in r  then Ave propose to estimate the unknown parameter Oo by a solution, if 
such exists, of the equations 
(2A) 	 (Cx, 0) + H0 X 0 
(2.2) 	 h(0) 	0, 
where ((z, 9) is the point in V whose ith component is 3L(x, o)/aO, 
We will show that, under certain fairly general conditions, if x belongs to a 
set whose probability measure tends to 1 as n -* , these equations have a 
solution O(z), X(x), where O(x) is near Oo and (x) maximises L(x, 0) subject to 
the condition h(0) = 0. The definition of O and 	will then be extended in a 
natural way to the whole of 	and we will show that the random variables thus 
defined are asymptotically jointly normally distributed. We will then consider 
an iterative procedure for solving the equations (2.1) and (2.2). Finally tests of 
the adequacy of the model will be introduced. 
3. Existence of a solution. The proof that we will give of the existence of a 
solution of the equations (2.1) and (2.2) is based on the same principle as a proof 
given by Cramer [21 of the existence of a maximum likelihood estimate of a 
parameter in R'. However the presence of the restraining condition h(0) = 0 in 
the situation we are discussing makes our proof more intricate in detail than a 
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straightforward generalisation of Crainr's proof to a parameter in (R' would 
be. And we start by indicating the main lines of the proof. 
We set out to show- that, under certain conditions, if ô is a sufficiently small 
given number and if it is sufficiently large, then, for a set of x whose probability 
measure is near 1, the equations (2.1) and (2.2) have a solution (x), X(x), where 
O(x) c Ua . We will demand that in U the function log f(x, .) should possess 
partial derivatives of the third order and the components of the function h 
should possess partial derivatives of the second order. Then it Avill be possible, 
by expanding the components of f(x, 0) and Ii(0) about 6o to express the equa-
tions (in matrix notation) in the form 
(3.1) 	l(x, Oo) + M , e(O - O) + vW(x, 8) + HA = 0, 
(3.2) 	 H0(O - o) + v(8) = 0, 
where 
M , , is the matrix (B2L(.r, e0)/aoa0), 
v1"(x, 8) is a vector whose inth component may be expressed in the 
form (O -. 00)'L,,,(O - On), L. being the matrix (33L(x, o")/a9aoao), 
i, j = 1, 2, . , s, and 0" 	a point such that 11 6°" 	- Oo I! < 	9 - 0u1. 
v° (0) is a vector whose rnth component is (O - 00)'H,,,(O - Os), H, 
2 	(".2) 	 . 	. (m. 2) being the matrix (a h,,(o 	)/aoae), 2, J = 1, 2, • 	, s, and 8 	a point 
such that! 0°"' - G1 < U - 
Further conditions imposed on f, which are almost a straightforward generali-
sation of Cramr's conditions [2], will ensure that, for large enough ii, there is a 
set of z whose jrobability measure is near 1 such that, if .r belongs to this set, 
II (l/n)((x, 0) I1 is small, 
- (1/0M , 6 is near a certain positive definite matrix Be, and 
the elements of (1/n)L,,, are hounded for 0 c Us . By dividing (3.1) by 
ii we will then be able to express this equation in the form 
(3.3), - 	• 	—B80(O - O) + H8 I + 5v132 (x, 8) = 0 
where I! v° (x, 0)! is bounded for 0 e Cj . In addition Ave will demand that, for 
9 e U. the second order derivatives of the components of h should he bounded. 
Then we will be able to express (3.2) in the form 
(3.4) 	• 	 H;0(0 - O) + v 4m (0) = 0 
where 11 v"(0) 11 is bounded for 0 e 
If the equations (3.3) and (3.4) have a solution, then by pre-multiplying (3.3) 
by H 0B and substituting for H,(o - Oo) from (3.4) we find that the values 
of 0 and X satisfying these equations also satisfy an equation of the form 
(3.5) 	 H 0 BH8 () + 52V151 (z, e) = 0. 
We will impose conditions on h which ensure that the matrix H 0BH6 is non- 
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singular and the elements of its inverse are bounded functions of 0 for 0 s 
Then it vi1I be possible to solve equation (3.5) for X in terms of 0 and on sub 
titution• in (3.3) we will obtain the result that any value of 0 in U3 for vhicJ 
equations (3.3) and (3.4) are satisfied is also a solution of an equation of lb 
form 
(3.6) 	 —B4O (O — 0,) + v(x, 0) = 0 
where J1 v(x, 0)! is hounded for 0 e U,. 
Conversely it will be shown that if the equation (3.6) has a solution (x) s 
then 0(x) leads to a solution O(x), (x) of equations (2.1) and (2.2). We will the 
use the fact that Be, is a positive definite matrix to prove that, if 6 is suffIcientl 
small, (3.6) has a solution in U, 
This outline of the method of proof to he adopted provides the motivation fo 
the introduction of conditions on f and le winch we now discuss. 
Conditions oaf. The following conditions on the function f appear complicate 
and restrictive from the mathematical point of view. In fact they will be satis 
fied in most practical estimat.idn problems. 
For every 0 e U. and for almost all I fft' (almost all with respect to lii 
probability measure on R' defined by f,,), the derivatives 	 - 
a log f(t, 0) 	a ! log •i 	d 3 log f(t, 0) 	
k - 1 2 ao 	' ____a6_0391 
(hi 	
ao 001 ao ' ' 
exist, and the first and second order derivatives are continuous functions of 0. 
For every 0 t U and for i, 1 = 1, 2, ... , , af(t, o)/ae < F,(t) 
a3f(t, o)/aao1  I < F(t), where F3 and F2 are finitely integrable over (— oc, 	) 
53. For every 0 e U and i, j, k = 1, 2, . . . , s, a3 log f(t. 0)/a03O00 I 
F3(I), where fP3(t)f(t, 0,) cli is finite and equal to i, , say. 
ff4. 	 b1., 
= 	
a ij(i, 00) a logf(t, 	00) 
f(t o) (it 
Is finite for i, i = 1, 2, . . . , s, and the matrix Be. = (b 1) is positive definite witi 
minimum latent root po 
The conditions ff3 and 54 are apparently less stringent than a straightforwan 
generalisation of Cran&'s corresponding conditions would be. In §6 we retuh 
to this point. 
If f satisfies these conditions then for any given positive numbers 6 < a am 
< 1 and for sufficiently large n, say n 	n(â, £), there exists a set X, 
with the properties 
11 1 
V. 11 1 t(.r, 0,) < 61, if x s X. 
3. 	M, ., can be expressed in the form —B,, ± öm g,, 
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where 	is an s X s matrix the moduli of whose elements are bounded by 
1, if .c t X. 
V. For every 0 c U. and i, j, 1; = 1, 2, 	, 
I aL(r, 0) 	, 
aoIo)aok 
< '-'c'  
if .r c X.. 
The proof of these results is similar to the proof of the corresponding results 
given by Cramer [2J in the case of a parameter in Gt' and we merely remark 
that the conditions 1-4 imply (as they are designed to imply) that 
(I/n)f( , O) converges in probability to 0 e 
(1/n)M. ,e, converges in probability to —Be., and 
if G(x) = 1/nt1 F(x), then the random variable G converges in 
probability to Ki and 	 - 
1 	3L(x, 0) = ä logf(x,, 	
< G(4, njz= dO8OjäGk 
by &3. 
In future when we refer to a set X we imply that a is sufficiently large for the 
existence of a set in G." with the properties 1-4 and that the set X refrred 
to has these properties. 
As has already been indicated, one of the main purposes of the introduction of 
the conditions a was to ensure that (3.1) could be expressed in the form (3.3). 
Now if the conditions 9 are satisfied, if x s X. and 0 e U , it is easily verified 
that 
by Ir2,(1/na2) €(x, 0) 	< 1, 
by X3, (l/5) mr,80 (0 Oo) 	S2, 
by tt4, (i/nâ 	v'°(x, 0)! <  
It follows that (3.1) can then be expressed in the form (3.3) and 
p 11  0)(x,O) 11 1 <1+82 +s3Kj, when XEX and OeUs. 
Conditions on h. We impose the following conditions on the function h. 
M. For every 8 e U the partial derivatives ah(o)/ao , i = 1, 2,.. . - , 
k = 1, 2, . . . , r, exist and these are continuous functions of 0. 
3d2. For every 0 s- U the partial derivatucs ahk(o)/aeao1 , i, J = 1, 2, . 
s, k = 1, 21 . 	, r, exist and 0VIk(0)/8088J I < 2K2 , a given canstant, jor all 
i,j and k. 
3C3. The s X r matrix H e. is of rank r. 
The condition c2 is introduced to ensure that when (3.2) is expressed in the 
form (3.4), 11 u(B) is bounded for 0 e 	. It is clear that it does ensure this 
since, as is easily verified, by 3C2, v(0) < s3 	U - U, and so v"'(0) = 
(1/6) vL(0) 1 < S'K2 if 8 IF 
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Also the condition X3 implies that the matrix H 0B6-1H00 is positive definite, 
since the matrix .13-3,' is positive definite. Since the elements of H0 are, by 
continuous functions of 8 it follows that there exists a neighbourhood of 8 
in which det (H 0Bi °H0 ) is hounded away from zero, and we may assume that 
this neighbourhood is Ca . (This assumption merely involves choosing a small 
enough initially). This means that when 0 c Ca we can solve the equation (3.5) 
for X in terms of 0. Furthermore the elements of the matrix (H 0B °H)_' are 
then continuous functions on U. since the elements of He are continuous and 
dot (HB6-11-l0) is bounded away from zero. Since U. is a closed set it follows that 
the elements of (H 0Bi'H6Y' are uniformly bounded on Ca . This result, t o  
with the results that 1 Vm(X, 0) and v° (0) are bounded on [Ti ,  enable us to 
prove that when 	is eliminated from (3.3) and (3.1), and (3.6) is obtained, 
then in (3.6) 11 v(x, 8) is bounded on U , if XE X,, 
We have now gone a considerable way towards proving the main part of the 
following lemma. 
LEMMA 1. Subject to the conditions and JC, if 3 < a and k < I arc given posi- 
tive numbers and if x s 	, then the equations (2.1) and (2.2) have a solution 
(x), X(r) such that O(x) s U0 , if and only if Ô(z) satisfies a certain equation 6.f the 
form —B00(8 - 0) + 3
2u(x, 8) = 0. In this equation v(x, •) is a continuous func-
lion on U0 and 11 v(x, 0) is hounded for 8 s- U4 by a positive number K3 , say. 
PROOF. The fact that the condition is necessary has virtually been established 
already. On eliminating X from (2.1) and (2.2) by the method outlined at the 
beginning of §3 we obtain, in matrix notation, the following explicit expression 
for (3.6) 
—B40(U - O) - H9(I-I 0Bi'}I 8i' {V 2)(0) 
(37 
+ H  B60  v ° (x, O) 1 + v °0 (z, 0) = 0, 
where 
(3.8) 	V (6)  (x, 0) = 3v'30 (x, 0) = 	l(x, 0) + B00(0 - 
and 
(3.9) 	 V m(0) = 15Y(0) = h(0) - H(O 	On). 
Hence in (3.6), 
v(x, 0) = 	 + 
HBi'v 3 (x, 8)J + v 3> (r, 0). 
The fact that v(x, •) is a continuous function on U4 and that v(x, 0) is bounded 
for 8 U0  follows from (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10), in virtue of the discussion of 
ut3m (x, 8), v 4> (0) and (HB tHoY' above. 
Turning to the sufficiency of the condition we now suppose that the equation 
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(3.7) has a root. (x) e U1 . Then, writing O instead of (x) for hrrvily, Ave obtain 
on premuitiplication of (3.7) by HBO', 	S 
(3.11) 	 —H 0 (ö 	O) - v° (0) = 0, 
i.e., by (3.9), 
h(0)=O. 
Substitution for v12 (0) from (3.11) and for v
(6)  (x, ê) from (3.8), in (3.7) gives 
1(x, O) = 	do XyO), 
or, if we write Qj  for (11B 0 H) H90139, 
(3.12) 	 l(x, O) = I-IeQel(x, O). 
If we now define I(x) by 
= 	O), 
then 
1(x, O) + Hai(x) = 0, 
and O(r), (x) satisfy the equations (2.1) and (2.2). 
In order to prove that the equation (3.6) has a root in U1 , if 6 is sufficiently 
small, we will require the following lemma. 
La 	2: If g is a continuous function nwpping (R' into itself with the propi'rty 
that, for cecry 0 such that 118 = 1, O'g(0) < 0, then there cj-isi it point 0 such 
that 0 < 1 and g(0) = 0. 
PimooF. For the proof of this result we are indebted to Mr. -T. M. Michael who 
has proved that this result is equivalent to T3rouwer's fixed 1uiimit theorem [4]. 
A direct proof from the latter theorem is as follows. 
We suppose that g(0) X 0 for any 0 such that 0 II 	1. 'Jh'it the fujictioli 
defined on the unit sphere in Gt' by 
g1(8) 	
g(0) 
is a continuous function mapping this unit sphere into itself. I hi're by the fixed 
point theorem there is a point O  in the unit sphere such that fillgi (0*). Also 
since g1(0) 	= 1 for every 8 in the unit sphere, it follows tht O 	1, 
0* gi(8*) = OO = 1 >0. But this contradicts the fact. LILZLt O'g(U) < 0 
(and consequently that. O'g1(0) < 0) for every e such that 11 	1. 
Hence there is a point A in the unit sphere such that g(0) 0. It is obvious 
that U - 1. Hence j 	< 1. 
We are now in a position to prove the following existence theorem. 
THEOREM 1. Subject to the conditions if and 3C, if 6 is a svffirirnhl!j s-mall qiFfl 
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positive number, t is a given positive number less than I and if .r c X then i/u 
equations (2.1) and (2.2) have a solution (x), (x)  such that Ô(.c) c 
	
PRooF. We suppose < a and x e 	. We consider (3.6) and define a func- 
tion g on the unit sphere in 61' by 
O-0 
g 	= 	B4O (0 - Co) + v(z, 0). 
By Lemma 1, v(z, •) is a continuous function on Uj . hence g  is a continuous 
function on the unit sphere in ii'. Also 
(0 -00)'g 
(a - oo) 
= _ ( - 00)'B00(0 - o) + (o - 03)'V(x, 0) 6 	 6 
- POI!  o - 80112 -1 	110 - 
if 0 s U , since B8, is positive definite with minimum latent root go and, by 
Lemma 1, 11 v(x, 0) 11 < K3 when 0 c U4 . Hence for every 0 such that 0 - 04 II = 
, we have 
(o
- 
 0o)'g (0 - - 	& 
<0, if 8PO <. 
K3 
Hence if ô < p0/K3 , it follows by Lemma 2 that there exists a point O(x) such that 
e U4 and g((O(i) - e) / o) = 0, i.e., O(x) is a solution of (3.6). The result 
follows by application of Lemma 1. 
4. Existence of a maximum of L(x, 0). In this paragraph we will show that 
for sufficiently small 6, if z c X,, , any solution of (3.6) in U4 maximises L(x, 0) 
subject to the condition h(0) = 0. 
We suppose that x 	, that 6 is small enough for Theorem 1 to apply and 
that O(x), written ê for typographical brevity, is a solution in U4 of (3.6). We 
let 0 be a point in a neighbourhood of O contained in U4 , such that h(0) = 0. 
(Such a neighbourhood exists since O is an interior point of U4.) Then by expand-
ing L(x, 0) about O we have 
(4.1) 	L(x, 0) - L(x, ) = 1'(x, )( 0 - Ô) +(0  
where M 9 . = (aL(r, 6*) / ao,a01) and 0* & U4 . 
We now consider separately the two terms in the tight hand side of (4.1). 
By (3.12) 
1'(z, )(0 - O) = l'(x, )QH(0 - 
Now 
0 = h(8) - h(0) = H40 - ó) + r(0), 
where, because of 3C2, by the same argument as was applied to u(0) in (3.2), 
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içx, ô. = —B50 (6 - o) -j- v16 (x, O), n 
and so 
II ((x, O) II < 	+ K5 62, since 	c 
where ,c4 is a positive number depending only on the elements of B80 , and, as 
above, Ks = 1 + s + s3K1 . Also the elements of Qa are bounded by a number 
independent of 3, since O e 	. hence 
(4.4) 	 jj Q6 1(X, ô) II <6 + K, 62,  
where K6 K7 are positive numbers independent of ô. From (4.2), (4.3) and (4.) 
it follow that 
(4.5) 	 Il'(x,O)(o — O) <(6 5 + K 	 — 
We now consider the second term of (4.1). By expanding the elements of 
M8. about 80 we find that 
1 	1 	 * 
-= -- M 0 + rn., 
n n 
where, as is easily shown using c4, the moduli of the elements of the matrix 
mr.o.. are less than 28K15. Also by C3, 
= —B90  + 
and so 
= —B90 + ôm, 
say, where m is a matrix whose elements are bounded by a number independent 
of 5. Hence 
(4.6) 	(0 — O)'Mr8 (0 - O) = _ (& — )'Bg (0 - O) 
+ s(o — )'ni(0 — O) <— P0 8 - II! + K& 8 - iI's 
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since B80 is pcisitive definite with minimum latent root p , and the elements of 
m are hounded. Here K, is a positive number depending only on the elements of 
in. Using (4.5) and (1.6) in (4.1) we find that there exist positive numbers 
K10 independent of ô, such that 
[L(x, C) - L(x, 
O)) <(- 
0 + 	± K10) ii a - ô 
It follows that if 3 is sufficiently small then L(x, 0) < L(x, O), i.e., L(x, ê) is a 
maximum value of L(x, 0) subject to h(0) = 0. 
We have thus established the fact that, if the conditions Y and ic are satis- 
fied, there exists a consistent maximum likelihood estimator O of oo satisfying 
the condition h(0) = 0. 
6. Asymptotic distributions. We return now to consideration of (3.1) and (3.2). 
We suppose that x e X and that O(x), (x) is a solution of these equations with 
b(c) e U , being small enough for such a solution to exist. Then, considering 
the equations frorn a slightly different viewpoint we have, 
(5.1) 	l(z, Oo) - [B8, + (x)][O(x) - o] + [H8, + E(x)] £(4 = 0, 
(5.2) 	 [H, + *(4]I6(x) - 01 = 0, 
where (x), i(x) and fi*())  are matrices whose elements tend to 0 as 3 (and 
hence 11 O(x) - C, ) - 0. We now prove the following lemma. 
LEMMA 3. The partitioned matrix 
F Be, 	He, 
L- H'8, 0 
is non-singular. 
PROOF. For brevity we omit the suffix Co . Then we wish to find a matrix 
[PQ 
[Q' R 
such that, in the usual notation, 
[ B — H1[P Q1_'1 0 
L- H' 0 JLQ' 	
[ 
RJ - [o I, 
and this requires 
(5.3) BP - HQ' = I,, 
(5.4) BQ - HR = 0, 
(5.5) 	-- H'P=O, 
(5.6) —H'Q ,= J. 
These equations are easily solved since B is positive definite and H is of rank 
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r so that H'B'H is non-singular. We obtain 
R = - (Ii'B 1Hy', 
Q = —BH(I1'B'H)', 
P = BjI, - H(HBHyhHBhJ. 
We note at this stage, though we do not require this result immediately, that 
the matrix P has rank s - r. For, from (5.5) since rank (H') 	r, rank (P) 
- r. While from (5.3) we have s == rank (P - HQ') ~ rank (P) -f- rank 
(HQ') 	rank (P) + r, and so rank (P) > s — r. 
We return now to equations (5.1) and (5.2). If 6 is sufficiently small then the 
matrix 
.[
B90 + £(i) 	- [H80 + fi(x)] 
- [H;, + *(4] 0 	5] 
also will be non-singular and we will write 
[ 	Be,, + (x) 	— 11-100 + (x)}1' - [(x) 	(x) 
J 	Lc (z) 
Hence, from (5.1) and (5.2), for sufficiently small 6, if x c 	, we have 





If the functions O and were defined for the whole of M'we could now dis-
cuss immediately the asymptotic distribution of these functions. However this 
is not necessarily so, and we go through the formality of extending the defini-
tion of these functions to the whole of 61.". We will then show that the random 
variables thus defined are asymptotically normally distributed and, in this 
sense, we may say that a consistent maximum likelihood estimator O of Oo is 
asymptotically normally distributed. 
We let (&), (or,) be decreasing sequences of positive numbers, such that 
€ < 1, 	< p/o (see Theorem 1), and 	- 0 and , - 0 as on —o co We 
then define an increasing sequence (n,,) of integers such that, if n 	n, , there 
exists a set in " with the properties C1 to 4 for o = , and = 5,,, . For 
rn = 1, 2, • . . , if n,,, :5 n < n,,,.0 we choose a set X,, with the properties fCl 
to r-t for 	E. and S = 5,,,. Hence Pr 	- 1 as 	----* 	and if n.,,, 	n 
< n,,,+1 and x e X,, , the likelihood equations (2.1) and (2.2) have a solution 
&,(r), U.0 such that. 	,,(.r) - 	< L. Moreover for sufficiently- large on, 
O(x) is a rna.rimuon likelihood estimate of 0 , by §4. We now extend the defi-
nition of &, and k, to (R" by letting 
- 	
[o(1)
- 001 - 
I 
P 	1[ l(r, Oo)j 	z 
 
(') 	Q' R][ 0 
j 
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We have thus defined sequences (0), (), n = n, , n,, + j , 	of random vari- ables which have the pruprty that G converges in probnhthtv to 8 and with 
probability tending to 1 as n — ci, 	, X 
and (2.2). 	
satisfy the likelihood equations (2.1) 
TnEonEr 2. The randwn to riables i'(O - 0), n 1' 2  are asymptotically 
jointly normally distributed with raroance-cotarjancc matrix 
[p 0 1.  
Lo —R 





  RJL 
The elements of the matrix 
' 
IQ2 R 
are random variables which converge in probability to the corresponding ele-
ments of the matrix 
[P Q1 
LQ' RJ' 
since in (5.1) and (5.2)b, h and 	tend to 0 as —* 0. Also the s-dirnensjoia 
random variable n't(, 00 is asymptotically normally distributed with zero 
mean and variance-covariance matrix B (Crnmr [l]) and the (s + r)-dirnen_ 
sional random variable (n'€(., 0)), 0) is asymptotically normally distributed 
with zero mean and varia rice -covarjtncp matrix 
[B9, 0 
[0 o 
It follows by an extension, to a multi-dimensional random variable, of a theo- 
rem of Cramer 2], that /i(&. 	0w), n' 2A0  are jointly asvniptoticaJ1v nor- 
mally distributed with zero xne:rn and variance-covariance matrix. 
I 
P 	Q1 [B90 01[) 
Q1—[Q'Ba., 
PB60 P %,o Q 
Q' RJ [ 0 0j [Q' Rj  	P 	60 Q 
(We omit details of the proof of this extension though this result, in contrast 
to Cramer's result for real-valued random variables, is best obtained by con-
sidering characteristic functions). Now from (5.3), PB 0 P — PH,0Q' = P. 
Since P is symmetric, PIL, = P'H = 0 by (5.5). Hence PB.P == P.ini-
larly PB00 Q = 0 and Q'Be0Q = R. 
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This completes the proof of the Theorem. We note, however, that, as might 
be expected, the asymptotic normal distribution of the s-diineusioiml random 
variable n' 2(& 	U) is improper, being by the note in Lemma 3 of rank s - r. 
6. Numerical solution of 11e1thood equations. In this section We will diSCUSS 
an iterative procedure for solving (2.1) and (2.2) numerically, which yields an 
estimate of the matrices P and R. 
In any practical situation we do not know O, and the only way in which we 
can verify that the conditions S and JC are satisfied is to find that, for every 0 
belonging to some set U, in which we know Oo lies, the folloing conditions V, 
are satisfied. 
s'l, 5'2. For every 0 e U, 51 and 52 are satisfied. 
9'3 For every 0 c U and 1, j, k = 1, 2, ... , 
3 log (0, 0)1 
oao;J <F3(t) 
and 
/ 	F.3 0.i,  0) dt 
a finite number. 
5'4 For every 8 c U, 
bij 
- I 	logf(t, 0) 0 log f0,o) At, o) dl, OOj 	ao 
1, j 	1, 29 . . . , s, are finite, the matrix B6 = (b1 (0)) is positive definite and, 
if ps is the minimum latent root of B9 , then p 	po where p is a given number 
greater than 0. 
3C'l, 3C'2. For every 0 e U, .31fl and 3C2 are satisfied. 
3C'3 For every 0 U, Ha is of rank r. 
The conditions 5' are a straightforward generalization of Cramer's condi-
tions [2]. 
We will now asstimb that the conditions V and JC' are satisfied, that x is such 
that the likelihood equations (2.1) and (2.2) have a solution O(x), (x) and that 
is an initial approximation to Ü(.r) such that O - (z) is small. Then 
to a first order of approximation 
1(z, O) = l(x, 0'") + Mx ,e(t)(O 	0'), 
Also if n is large, (l'ii)() is near 0 for "most" 2. We assume that r is a point 
for which (1/n).(r) is near 0. Then we also have to a first order of pproxinia- 
tion 
ME 
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= 
n 	 n 
Since O(z), (x) satisfy (2.1) and (2.2) then, approximately, we have 




II 	j= —H;(1) 	JL n 	L h(0°) j 
The normal situation, if n is large, is that ô(r) is nczlr 00 . Consequently since 
0)1) is near O(x) the matrix - (1/n)M.ou approximates - (1/n)M.o which in 
turn approximates B0, . Then B0  approximatesB, and we propose to replace 
- (1/12)M,0 ' in (6.1) by B( I) and to obtain a correction to 
0)0,  and an initial 
approximation to (l/n)X, by solving the equation 




—Ii0 	0 J I  
L flJ LhtO) 
The idea of replacing - (1/n)M.8(u by Be ( l) is not original though the authors 
do not know where it originated. 
Because of '4, 3C'3, by Lemma 3, the matrix 
[ Be n 	-119(I) 
L-H;1 0 
is nomsingular and we will denote its inverse by 
[P1  Q 
LQRI 
We define e, X (2)  by 
[02) 





)[0 J 	Rj  [ h(8'°) 
and, more generally, g)r), x by (with the obvious definition of P,_1, Q 














If the sequences (0), (X) converge then they converge to a solution of the 
likelihood equations, as is easily verified. We do not attempt to give rigorous 
conditions under which these sequences do converge. However the fact that 
we may expect them to converge in most practical situations follows from the 
heuristic argument leading to (6.2). 
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We have thus established an iterative procedure for solving the likelihood 
equations. The heaviest part of the computation involved in this method is the 
inversion of a matrix and computation will normally be reduced by considering 
the sequences. (Ô'), ()) defined by 
1~1- i In In 
[P0 Q1 - 1( r, 
(r_I))
+ H(r-1)
1= +1 u 	 n II F I
I 	LQ' ±(iJ 
J 	 J  
r = 1, 2, 	, where 6°1 = 0(2) and 	Xm. Again if these sequences con- 
verge, they converge ton solution of the likelihood equations since 
IQ, R 
is non-singular. And again we do not attempt to give conditions under which 
they do converge. The main justifications we put forward for this computa-
tional procedure are 
the similarity between this method and Newton's method, and 
the fact that similar modifications of Newton's method have been used 
successfully elsewhere, for example in probit analysis [3]. The main advantage 
of this method of solving the likelihood equations is that it involves inversion 
of only one matrix. 
7. Tests of the model. In a situation such as is outlined in §1 two natural 
questions arise in practice regarding the adequacy of the model introduced to 
describe an experimental situation. 
Does the true parameter point Oo satisfy the condition h(00) = 0? 
Is the true parameter point some hypothetical point 0 such that 
h(e*) = 0? 
And this is the natural order for these questions since the second would be 
asked only if the first were answered in the affirmative. We now propose a pro-
cedure for answering these questions in this order 
(1) The most natural approach to the first question would be as follows. We 
would calculate an unrestrained maximum likelihood estimate &(r) of 00 , and 
for &(.r) we would have ((x, &(x)) = 0. If h(&(x)) were in some sense "near 
enough" 0 t Rr then we would decide that in fact h(0o) = 0. Dually, we might 
calculate a maximum likelihood estimate (x) subject to the restraint 
h(O(x)) = 0 
and then decide that h(00) = 0 if €(z, (x)) were "near enough" 0 e '. And the 
test we propose is based on the second possibility. We note that, by (2.1), 
Hi(x) = —l(x, O(x)) 
and it seems reasonable to decide that h(00) = 0 if (z) is in some sense 'near 
enough' 0 E 
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We have sceb in Theorem  2 that when h(00) = 0, n" is normally dis-
tributed asymptotically with variance-covariance matrix —R, which is of rank r. 
Consequently - (1/n)'R 	is asymptotically distributed as X2 with r degrees 
of freedom, when h00) = 0, and, in obvious notation, _(lrn)'R;.  also is 
approximately, for large n, distributed as x  with r degrees of freedom. We 
propose to choose as a region of acceptance of the hypothesis that h(00) = 0 
the set of x for which 
- 1'(4Rr .(x) 
where k is determined by 
Pr {x 	= 0.95. 
This gives a test of size 95% of the hypothesis that h(0o) = 0. 
(ii) The natural corollary of using the asymptotic distribution of 5 in this 
way is to use the asymptotic distribution of b as established in Theorem 2 to 
answer the second question. If O = Oo then n(O - 0*)tB(6 - 0*) is approxi-
mately distributed as x2  with s - r degrees of freedom if n is large. This is 
easily established by noting that a consequence of equations (5.3)—(5.6) is 
that B' = PBP - QR'Q', and hence that 
11B1 = n(O - 00)'B(6 0) - _ 
We use this fact as in the previous paragraph to establish a region of acceptance 
of the hypothesis that the true parameter point is C. 
Here no attempt is made to justify this test on other than an intuitive basis. 
Since the Lagrangian multiplier test seems to be of wide applicability and of 
considerable importance in practical statistics, it will be fully discussed both 
from the theoretical and practical points of view in subsequent papers. 
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SUMMARY 
The essence of many statistical problems, including most standard techniques, 
is to test whether or not the unknown parameters of an appropriate statistical 
model satisfy certain restrictions; and the outcome of such a test dictates 
whether it is necessary to provide estimates of these parameters which also 
satisfy the restrictions. In this paper we discuss and illustrate the relative 
merits, as practical tools for the consulting statistician, of two large-sample 
techniques of wide applicability to such situations: (i) unrestricted maximum-
likelihood estimation with its associated Wald test, (ii) restricted maximum-
likelihood estimation with its associated Lagrange-multiplier test. The 
discussion falls into two main sections corresponding to two methods of 
specifying restrictions, as constraint equations in the parameters, or as 
freedom equations expressing the parameters in terms of a second smaller 
set of parameters. The methods are modified by a simple device to apply to 
the case where constraints on the parameters are necessary to allow their 
identification. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
WHEN translated into statistical terminology many of the problems put to statisticians 
by experimenters are of the following nature. Underlying distributions are known, 
except for a finite number of parameters, and the experimenter wishes to test a null 
hypothesis which states that the unknown parameters satisfy certain functional 
relationships. When this question has been answered he normally wishes estimates 
of some, or all, of the parameters and standard errors of these estimates. It is natural 
to demand that, when the null hypothesis is accepted, the estimates also satisfy the 
functional relationships; if, however, the null hypothesis is rejected, this demand 
would be absurd and estimates unrestricted by these relationships would then be 
appropriate. 
Most of the problems which involve the use of standard techniques, such as the 
t-test, analysis of variance, the X2-test of homogeneity, fall into this category. Thus 
the I-test for the comparison of two means is used to answer the question whether 
two unknown parameters 0 and 09 satisfy the relation 01 — 02 = 0. If the answer is 
in the affirmative, then an estimate of their common value is usually required. In a 
two-way classification analysis of variance the question "Is there no interaction?" 
is equivalent to the question "Do unknown means 0 (i = 1, 2, ...,p; j = 1, 2, ...,q) 
satisfy (p- 1)(q-1) conditions of which a typical one is 0— 0, = 	O,?" 
Of course, the more usual way of posing the latter question is to express it in 
terms of freedom equations: can 0 be expressed in the form +cx+, where 
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= 0 and i+•..+Pq = 0? If so, estimates of fL, the cx's and the 's 
are desired. Similarly, the question: is there homogeneity in a 2 x 2 contingency 
table? may be translated into: do two unknown probabilities 0 and 02  satisfy the 
condition 0k — 02 = 0? There is no point in multiplying such familiar examples, 
though it is interesting to note that almost every standard situation that comes to 
mind yields a problem of the nature that we consider in this paper. 
There are two large-sample techniques which, in the experience of the authors, 
allow the consulting statistician to face with more equanimity the approaches of an 
experimenter with an unfamiliar problem. The theory underlying these methods is 
given elsewhere, by Wald (1943), Aitchison and Silvey (1958) and Silvey (1959), but 
as so often happens, practical details of the methods are there obscured in a morass 
of mathematical conditions which are usually easily satisfied in practice. In this 
paper we will not be concerned with these conditions but will concentrate on the 
features of the methods which are of most interest to the practising statistician. 
From this point of view, the main outcome of the theory is that both methods yield 
tests which are usually large-sample equivalents of the likelihood-ratio test and 
estimators whose distributions are almost always asymptotically normal. Further-
more, standard tests are usually either exactly the tests given by one or other of 
these methods or small-sample refinements of these tests. While the techniques thus 
provide a unification of standard methods, it is in their application to non-standard 
situations that their primary interest lies. 
As has already been indicated, the functional relationships among the parameters 
on which the null hypothesis is based may be specified in two ways: (i) in the form of 
constraint equations, (ii) in the form of freedom equations, or indeed even as a 
combination of constraint and freedom equations. The freedom equation specifica-
tion involves new parameters which are of interest only if the null hypothesis is 
accepted. Which'is the natural specification depends on the particular situation. 
Thus in the I-test discussed above it is natural to specify the single relation between 
01  and 02 as the constraint equation 0— 02 = 0. But in the situation where we are 
asking whether the regression of y on x is linear, i.e. whether y-means 0, 02. ..., 01,, 
corresponding to different values x1,x2,...1 xp of x, lie on a straight line, it is much 
more natural to express the functional relations in terms of freedom equations and 
to put the question in the following form: can 0 be expressed in the form 0 = cxx1 + ? 
The last question is of course equivalent to: do the U's satisfy the p-2 restrictions 
(01+1-01)I(x141 —x1) = (01+2-  011)/(x12 —x11) (i = 1,2.....p-2)? To any, freedom 
equation specification there will correspond a constraint equation specification. 
However, it is not always easy to derive the latter from the former and, as the 
methods we are about to discuss are not equally suited to these different ways of 
specifying our functional relationships, we will deal separately with the different 
forms, discussing first the constraint equation specification. 
2. CoNsrp.,Anrr EQUATION SPECIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS AND 
THE WALD METHOD 
The basic idea of this method, proposed by Wald (1943), is as follows. We 
calculate unrestricted maximum-likelihood estimates of the unknown parameters 
and then test the null hypothesis by asking if these estimates (which for large samples 
are likely to be near the corresponding true parameters) nearly enough satisfy the 
relationships which specify the null hypothesis. In this section we set out the practical 
details of the method. 
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Suppose we are given n independent observations 	 (which may be 
real or vector-valued), and the common underlying distribution of the x's is known 
except for s parameters 01, 02, . .•, 0. We denote by IogL(x, 0) the value of the log-
likelihood function for given x = (x1, x2, ... , x) at the point 0 = (01, 02, ..., 0). To 
find a maximum-like1ihood I estimate 0* = (Ox, 0e, 	O) of the true unknown parameter 




Normally, in practice, these equations have to be solved numerically by an 
iterative process and generally a reasonably economical such process is as follows. 
We denote by Be the information matrix, i.e. Be is the s x s matrix whose (i,j)th ele- 




where E. denotes expected value with respect to the distribution corresponding to 
the point 0. If 0' is an initial approximation to the solution of equations (2.1), 
then usually a better approximation 0(2)  is given by 
0(2) = 0W+B ) D log L(x,0(1)) 
12 
in matrix notation. Here DlogL denotes the s-dimensional column vector whose 
ith component is dlogL/a01. 
Successive approximations to 0*  are 	 where 
= 0+-BLD 1ogL(x,0(")). 
12 
The heaviest part of the computation involved in solving the equations (2.1) is 
the inversion of the matrix 	We emphasize, however, that the inversion of only 
one matrix is required because Bi) is used in all iterations. Also the matrix Bi,/n 
may be used as an estimate of the variance matrix of O, 02, ..., 08, though B/n is a 
better such estimate. 
All this is standard maximum-likelihood theory which we have reproduced for 
the sake of completeness and in order to establish the notation of the paper. 
We now suppose that-our null hypothesis _Xfo  states that the unknown parameters 
satisfy r(<) well-behaved relationships which we write in the form 
h1(8) = h0(0) = ... = h(0) = 0. 
We denote by h(0) the r-dimensional column vector whose ith component is h1(0) 
and by He the s x r matrix whose (i,j)th element is 0h(0)/a0. If the restrictions are 
sensible ones which involve no redundancy, He will be of rank r and we assume this 
to be the case. Wald's method of testing Z10 uses the statistic 
nh'(8*) [H. 
00 B' H8.]—' h(O*). 
Under the null hypothesis this is distributed as x1 and we accept or reject 
according as the value obtained is less than or greater than an appropriate upper 
percentage point of such a X2-distribution. 
For typographical reasons it has been necessary to use an asterisk in a sense different from 
that of previous papers on this subject. 
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3. CONSTRAINT EQUATION SPECIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS AND THE 
LAGRANGE-MULTIPLIER METHOD 
This method of testing the null hypothesis is based on the idea of asking if 
restricted estimates of the unknown parameters nearly enough give an absolute 
maximum of the likelihood function. The initial part of the computation consists of 
finding estimates 0 1  02, ..., O which maximize logL(x, 6) subject to the conditions 
Ii(0) = h2(0) = ... = h(0) = 0. Normally this involves solving the restricted likeli-
hood equations 
	
1 a log L(,o) 	,.bh(0) = 0 (1 = 1,2......c) 
n 	06i 	, 
123(0) = 0 (j= 1, 2, ...,r), 	 (3.1) 
where Al, ), ..., A,. are Lagrange multipliers. 
Again, in practice these equations generally have to be solved numerically and 
there is an iterative method of solving them similar to that used for solving the 
equations (2.1). 
Suppose 0 1> is an initial approximation to 6 = (0, 02, ..., 03). Then if 
0(2)1 	[OWl F B0 ,, —H 	{(l/n)D logL(x, 8(1)) 
1=1 	1+1 	 I 
A(2)] 	[ 0  J L—H 0 	L 	h(011) 
it is usually the case that 0(2)  and A 21 give a better approximation than 	and 0 
to the solution of the equations. Successive approximations (0 3),X 3)),(0 4),X 4)), 
are given by 
[O'1+ 1  [ B
8 	—11 	1 [(I/n) D log L(x, Ohld>)  +H6(k ) X( Jc)l 
1 	 I I 	 . (3.2) 
LX(±1)J LAi I — H 	0 J h(0') 	j 
It is worth remarking here that if any restriction h(0) = 0 is linear in 0, then 
h-(0 )) = 0 implies that /'(O1'1) = 0, i.e. if at any stage a linear restriction is satisfied, 
it is satisfied at every subsequent stage. 
As before, the main computational task in solving equations (3.1) is the inversion 
of a matrix, this time of order (s+r) x(s±r). Only one such inversion is involved, 
however, and again the process of solving the equations yields as a by-product an 
estimate of the variance matrix of 0, 02, ..., U. For if 
Be —'11 	rPo  Qe 
o J -- [Q Ra j' 
then P8,1,/n estimates the variance matrix of O, 02, ..., 0, though Pet/n  is a better 
such estimate. 
The Lagrange-multiplier method of testing the null hypothesis is based on the 
statistic 
—n. 	
—'(Hot  n(Het).)' B(HOt 	[D logL(x, 0)]' Bat [D logL(x, et)). 
For large samples this is distributed, under ., as X21, and we accept or reject ofo 
according as the value of this statistic is less than or greater than an appropriate 
upper percentage point of a X2 distribution. 
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4. A USEFUL METHOD OF MATRIX INVERSION 
Seldom in practice is there difficulty in inverting B01>  because of its low order 
or its simplicity, e.g. it may be diagonal. We therefore concentrate on describing a 
computational routine for the inversion involved in the Lagrange-multiplier method. 
Computational routine. To compute 
B _H]'[P Q 
-H' 0 	[Q' R 
we first obtain B-1  and then carry out the following steps: 
Compute H'B' and H'B-1H. 
Invert H'B'FI, obtaining a matrix -R. 
Compute Q' = R(H' 13-'). 
Compute P = B'+Q(H'B-'); the symmetry of this last matrix provides a 
useful partial check on the computation. 
Apartfrom step 2 the method involves only the relatively easy operations of 
matrix multiplication and addition. The matrix H' B-1  H is of order r x r and is 
easily inverted in many applications since the number r of restrictions is often small. 
When we feel it is necessary to improve our first estimate of the variance matrix 
we may, as an alternative to the above method of matrix inversion, use an iterative 
scheme, starting with our initial inverse based on ØU), to obtain the final inverse 
based on Ot. One such scheme uses T, as an approximation to S' to generate 
successive approximations T,T3, ... to S' by Ti,.,, = Tk(21-STk), a process which 
requires only matrix multiplication. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE Two METHODS 
Before attempting to compare the methods we provide a simple example to 
illustrate what the two tests yield in a standard problem. 
Example 1: test of a proportion. In a given population the proportion 0 of indi- 
viduals possessing a certain attribute is unknown and we wish to test the hypothesis 
that 0 = p, so that 	is specified by h(0) 
= U-p = 0. In a large random sample 
(with replacement) of n individuals m are found to possess the attribute. Here the 
common distribution of the x's involves one unknown parameter 0 and is specified 
by pr{x = lj 0} = 0 = I -pr{x = 0101. Also m = x1+ ... +x. Then 
logL(x, 0) = const+nzlog 0 +(n—rn) log (l— 0), 
rn—nO 	 1 
DlogL(x, 9) = 	B8 =-6-(1   	
H0 = I. 
We also clearly have O = rn/n and 9 = p. 
The Wald test statistic is then 
(m - np)2  
0(1-0) - n(in/n)(l—rn/n) 
and the Lagrange-multiplier test statistic 
I (rn - n9)2 - (m - np)2  
; 9(i-9) 	np(l—p)' 
iim 
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and both are to be compared with 	points. The latter is a familiar large-sample 
binomial test and the former is an obvious large-sample equivalent. 
The question of which of the two general methods is more efficient for dealing 
with any practical problem is a nicely balanced one, and it is impossible to give any 
hard and fast rule in this connection. The computation involved in applying Wald's 
test automatically yields unrestricted estimates of the unknown parameters and their 
variance matrix; and this is what we want if the null hypothesis is rejected. On the 
other hand, the Lagrange-multiplier test yields restricted estimates and their variances, 
which we want if 	is accepted. If we knew a priori whether or not eYfo were going 
to be accepted, then we could obviously choose between the methods. This we never 
know in any given situation, though it may be possible to make a good guess based 
on a careful scrutiny of the data. Moreover, particular situations may have aspects 
which make one approach easier than the other. For instance, it is possible, and in 
fact happens quite regularly, that the unrestricted likelihood equations can be solved 
directly to obtain explicit formulae for the unrestricted estimates, whereas numerical 
solution of the restricted equations is necessary. In this case Wald's test of _X̀0 is 
relatively easy to apply and it seems economical to use this test and then, if e.0 is 
accepted, to solve the restricted equations. Indeed, the work employed in carrying 
out Wald's test can form the basis of the matrix inversion involved in solving these 
restricted equations. For we would have already computed H. B and (H B  
and so, if we take 01) = 8* as our initial approximation to Of, we would have already 
carried out the first three steps and hence the most difficult part of the suggested 
matrix inversion routine. Another slight advantage is that D logL(x, 0(1)) =0.  and 
so 6(2),?.(2) can be obtained as soon as '0") and Q0 ,- have- been found. 
Thus often in practice a judicious combination of the methods involves the 
minimum of calculation. It is of some interest to compare the relative efficiencies of 
these methods and the direct application of the generalized likelihood-ratio test, 
which uses the statistic A(x) = L(x, 0*)1L(x, Of). For large samples, in the type of 
situation we have been discussing, 2logA is distributed, under YL,, as Xi approxi-
mately. Thus to apply the likelihood-ratio test we have to calculate both 0*  and Of, 
whereas either the Wald test or the Lagrange-multiplier test involves the calculation 
of only one of these estimates. It is true that either of the foregoing techniques for 
testing d1fo with subsequent estimation may involve calculation of both 
fi*  and Of. 
But since under either of these techniques we sometimes have to calculate only one 
estimate, and since the calculation of estimates usually forms the heaviest part of the 
total computation, both the present techniques seem preferable to straightforward 
application of the likelihood-ratio test. 
To illustrate these points we will consider two applications. The first is straight-
forward and the second involves a mild extension of the techniques designed to meet 
a difficulty encountered in practice. 
Example 2. The mean of 50 independent observations from a normal distribution 
is 4-6 and their standard deviation is 4-0. A null hypothesis . 	states that the 
standard deviation of the distribution is equal to its mean. If . is accepted, an 
estimate of the common value of the mean and standard deviation is desired, together 
with the standard error of this estimate. 
This is a very simple problem and we introduce it in order to illustrate the tech-
niques without extraneous difficulties. 
50 
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There are two unknown parameters, the mean 0  and the standard deviation 02  
of the underlying normal distribution. The hypothesis 	says that the true values 01° 
and 0° of these parameters satisfy the single restriction 81— 82 = 0. Now 
logL(x, 0) = const —niog 02— 
ii 
- 	[s-+(x--- 0)2], 
U 2  
where n is the number of observations 	is the mean of the observations x, and s2  
is the variance of the observations, (x-5)2In; and it is not difficult to verify that 
(- 0)/0 
W -.DlogL(x,0)= _._+{se+(_8i)2} 
(ii) B 1 = 0 
[ 10 0.5]' 2 
	He 
= [ 1• 
Here we can easily apply Wald's test immediately, for we can write down O = 
and 02 = s. We then have h(0*) = —s (a scalar because there is just one restriction), 
and 	B H0, 	52  From this it follows that 
n h'(O*) [He. Be—.' He.]—' h(O*) = 
11(—s)2 
= 075 
for the given values of and s. Since this is smaller than the upper 5 per cent value 
of a Xj distribution, we accept 	. 
To obtain an estimate of the common value of Oj°) and 0 0 we have to solve 
the restricted equations 	 R_  
62 
 [s2+(- 01)2}-.A1 = 0, 	 (5.1) 
and 	 01-02 =0. 
In this very simple situation one would usually eliminate A,. and 02, and obtain the 
quadratic equation 	 0+201_( 2+s2) 0, 
of which 6, = 2 is the positive root, 421 for = 46 and s = 40. However, for the 
sake of illustration we will carry through the iterative process of solving these equa-
tions outlined in section 3. As indicated earlier, we can simply take as initial 
approximations to the restricted estimates the unrestricted estimates already found. 
Hence, with 	= 46 and 0k" = 40, we have 
[
B6 1 -H0 
	
	
128 128 —161 l) ]__l 	
1 	
128 128 	8 
H,) 0 	24 
— 	 L-16 8 —ij 
rol [.!D1ogL(x,om) 
= ° I. 
h(0') 	I L06i 
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Hence second approximations 012), 	and ?(12)  are given by 
0(2) 	46 	128 128 —16 	0 	42 
40 + 	128 128 8 	0 = 	42 
0 	—16 8 —1 	0•6 	—0025 
r —0-0023 
Then 	 1 = j 0.0050] 
h(02) 	] 	L o 
and 
OM 	42 	 128 128 —16 	—00023 	421 
OW = 	42 	+128 128 8 	00050 = 	421 
—0025 	—16 8 —1 	0 	—0022 
which is a sufficiently close approximation to the exact solution of the equations (5.1). 
We note, in passing, that the value of the statistic on which the Lagrange-multiplier 
lest is based, viz. n(1-J6)'B(H9 ), is, in this case, 064, a value which, as we might 
expect, results in the acceptance of 7; and, for the likelihood-ratio test the value 
of2logfl is 069, again resulting in the acceptance of. 
Finally, the variance matrix of 0, 02 is estimated by the leading 2 x 2 submatrix of 
1 	 -1 
—1 
50 0 i2  I 
—1 	1 	0 
which is 
1 4.212[1 11 
-- j.  50311 
If we compare this with an estimate of the variance matrix of 01, 62. which is 
1 	1 Fl 0 - 421 
I n 50 j0 05 
we obtain an idea of how use of the knowledge that the unknown parameter satisfies 
the restrictions specifying the null hypothesis reduces the variance of estimates. 
This is always so. We can use the property that restricted estimators are asymptoti-
cally normally distributed to obtain in the usual way an approximate confidence 
interval for e° = O°; with confidence coefficient 95 per cent. this is (354, 4-88). 
6. SINGULAR INFORMATION MATRICES 
Both of the foregoing techniques depend essentially on the non-singularity of the 
information matrix and this non-singularity is related to identifiability of the unknown 
parameters. Generally, in a situation where the unknown parameters are identifiable, 
52 
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the information matrix is non-singular and so it would seem that in practice singu_ larjt of the iflfomatjon matrixwi 
sometimes convenient 
in 	
ll not arise. However, this is not so, because it is 
describing an experiment to introduce Unidentifiable para-
meters and then to impose restrictions on these parameters so that the restricted 
parameters are identifiable Thus in a two-way classification analysis of variance situ tion with no interaction it 
is usual to express the mean of the 
(i;j)th class i 
the fomi 	
and these parameters are not identifiable Unless Some restric tions such as 	0 and 	
0 are imposed Similarly, 
when the underlying distribution multinomjal (a fertile Source Of Problems Of tile nature we are discussing) 
It is natural for reasons of symmetry, to use the following description. Supp0 there are s classes in 




meters 0, O, ..., 8 and denote by 
0,./(O + 02 -F... + 
O) the Probability that a result 
will fall in the ith 
class. With this description the 
s Parameters are not identifiable 
and the matrix B0  is 
singular. If we impose the restriction 
	
I, the 
resulting restricted parameters are identifiable but 
B0 	Ion 
singular and the 
techniques so far developed break down. 
In any particular case we can obviously overcome this difficulty by using the 
restrictions necessary for identifiability to eliminate certain of the parameters from 
the model, leaving a smaller number of parameters which are identifiable and an 
information matx of correspondingly smaller order which is flOn.singUj 
	Thus j the multinoniiai case we might say that the probabilities associated with the 
s classes 
ar  0J,02- --, 0,-:l     and l_81_020 	
We then have s—I parameters Which are identifiable and the information matrix of these parameters 
is non-singular. But 
this Solution 
 is unsatisfactory if only because of its lack of symmetry; and there is a 
much tidier method of Overcoming the difficulty Which we now discuss. In 
general, we Suppose that we have 
s unknown parameters 01, 09,... 0 and a 
total of r restrictionc /z(0) /i(0) ... h(0) 0. Now, however, exactly 
t(<r) of 
these restrictions are necessary to make all 
s 
parameters identifiable and the remaining 
r—t 
restrictions define the null hypothesis. Usually the fact that 
t restrictions are 
necessary for 
identifiability coesponds to the fact that 
the information matrix is 
of rank s—t. 
Without any loss of generality we may Suppose that the 
first £ restdc tions are necessary and sufficient for identifiability. This is normally reflected in the fact that if the matrix H. (i.e. the 
s x r In 	 is whose (j)th element is 
is partitioned into 	
B9e1, where }J is of order 
s x t, then B0  + H10  1-11,0 will be 
non-
sitigular. This is the key to the method of adapting our techniques Roughly
Spea king, all we need do is to replace the matrix B wherever it appears in the pre-cedui, theory by B0 +j-j10 ' 
L'ing at this in more detail, we have to alter Our interpretation of unrestricted mmum4ikellhod estimates 0, 82, ..., 0. 
These are now estimates which maximize the likelihood function subject to the identifiability Co ditions 
and emerge as a Solution of the equations 
l3logL(x,9) 	h(0) 
a 	00i 	j.:i J cii, 
h(0) 0 (j= 1, 2, 
 
where v1, Yv ..., v0  are Lagrange multipliers 
53 
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Restricted maximum-likelihood estimates will, as before, usually emerge as solu-
tions of the equations 
I 	logL(x,0) 	
h(0) =0 (1= 1,2,...,$), 
11 
/(0)=0 (j=I,2,...,r). 	 (6.2) 
Both sets, (6.1) and (6.2), of equations, are of the type considered in section 3. The 
method of solution there considered depends on the positive definiteness of Be and 
so it is not directly applicable in this new situation. But the device of replacing Be  
by B8 +H10 F1 0 is the only adaptation required to overcome this difficulty. Thus 
successive approximations (0(c),p(k)),  k = 2,3,..., to the solution (0*,)  of (6.1) are 
given by 
[




RIO" 	 0 
 
where h1(0) is the (-dimensional column vector with ith component h2 (0) (1 = 1, 2, ..., t). 
Similarly, the equations connecting successive approximations to the solution (°t,3) 
of (6.2) are simply the equations (3.2) with B8() +H16) H 0) replacing Be,,,. 
The modifications required in the tests of cWO are no more complicated. We 
recall that Ye, now says: the unknown parameter 0 satisfies the r—t restrictions 
J'HI(0) = h2(0) =... = h(0) = 0. The statistics used for testing . 	are obtained 
from those previously used by replacing Be by B0 +H1011 0 and now they are distri-
buted, under ., as x.-1• Thus the Wald test statistic becomes 
nh'(O") [I-1(B9+I-I }r' 10.)-1H0J_lh(0*) 18 L 
and the Lagrange-multiplier statistic is changed to 
H' ' ietj At  5') 
= 	[D log L(x, Ot)]' [Bet +H8 '-i'  LjetJ '' [D1ogL(x,0)J. 
Finally, estimates of the variance matrices of 0,, 
	
, ..., £ and 	, 02, ..., 	are now 
obtained as follows. Suppose 
{ B0 + H18 H 0 -H 
 '6 
H10 1 	I U8 V6 1 
—H' 	0 10 j =lve wj 
8 1 	I and 	
{ Be +H10 H 0 - H 1— 
= [ 
r 
8 ' Q 1 
—H' 	0 J 	Q' Rj 8 
Then U,/n is an estimate of the variance matrix of 1, 62, .•. , and Ph/n is an estimate 
of the variance matrix of êj, O. .... O. As before, approximations to these variance 
matrices arise automatically in the iterative procedure suggested for solving the 
restricted likelihood equations. 
Example 3. Each individual in a population possesses one of the possible com-
binations of three attributes which we denote by a, b and c; i.e. each individual is 
+ 
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in one of seven classes characterized as a, b, c, ab, bc, ca and abc. We are interested 
in testing the null hypothesis that the attributes are independent in the sense that, 
for example, the probability that an individual chosen at random will fall in the 
class ab is the product of the probability that lie will fall in a and the probability 
that he will fall in b. If we represent the probabilities associated with the classes (in 
7 
the above order) by 0JZ 0 (1 = 1,2, ..., 7), then we are interested in the following 
restrictions: 
7 
h1(0)= 7 0—1 =0, 	/12(0)= 04 01 02 _0, 
1 
h3(0)=05-02 03 =o, 	h4(0)=06-03 01 =0, 
and 	 h5(6)= 01-01 02 03 =0. 
Of these the first is necessary and sufficient for identifiability of the seven para-
meters and the remainder are genuine restrictions which specify the null hypothesis 
of independence. Note that we make use of l() = 0 in specifying the remaining 
restrictions; e.g. we take the simple form h(0) = 04  01 02 = 0 rather than the more 
direct form /2() = 04/ 0i_ 0 0/( 0 = 0. 
We suppose that a large random sample (with replacement) of n individuals yields 
in class a, n2 in class b, ..., n7 in class abc. Then 
7/7 
log L(x,0) = con st+ nlog—n1og( 
i=1 	 i=1 / 
a log 
and it follows that 	
0) 
i 
= ---- (i = 1,2, ...,7), 
17i 1 
1 01 	Oi 
21 0i
:o 
and that 	B=!ej 
 k 1; 	:::Yoi 
I 	i I I 	ii 
6j zoj 07 zojJ 
1 1 iii1 
—02 —01  0 1 	0 0 0 
Also 	H = 	0 —03 —02 0 	1 0 0 
—03 0 — 01  0 	0 1 0 
03Gj 
L_ 0203 	-6361 - 
0102 0 0 0 
55 
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from which 1-1 0 = [1111111], and, for any 0 satisfying h1(0) = 01  
B0 + H10 H 0 = diag ITT.,,  ... , 7) 
For the purpose of illustration we will suppose that n = 100, n1 = 46, n2 = 24, n3 = 7, 
n. = 15, 115 = 3, n6 = 4 and 127 = 1. 
In this example unrestricted estimates are again easily obtained and Wald's test 
easily applied. We have 
0* = ('46, -24, -07, .15, -03, 04, .01) 
and 	 h'(O*) = [0 '03960 -01320 -00780 .00227]. 
1-04 0-29 —0-10 0-35 0.98! 
0-29 4-57 —180 —0-27 —1-59 
Also [H.(B0+H10+H6.)1H0.]_' - 
	
Ø.Ø —0-80 2968 —359 _4.77 
0-35 —0-27 _3.59 18-58 5'49 
[_ 
0-98 •-1-59 ...4.77 	5.49 	94.2, J 
so that \Vald's statistic, nh'(O *) [H.(l36. + H10. I-I,)' 116*1 11(0*), has value l'l. 
Since this is less than the upper 5 per cent, point of a x distribution, we accept 
the null hypothesis of independence. 
We now turn to the problem of finding restricted estimates. We recall that to do 
so we have to obtain initial approximations 0 1), 6 1), ..., 0 to them, invert the matrix 
{ B
0 + 1110(1)  H81( -116(1)  
0 
and use this inverse to obtain successive approximations to the restricted estimates. 
If we use as initial approximations the unrestricted estimates 0, 02, ..., 07 and the 
suggested routine for matrix inversion (with B0. + If,,. H 6 as B), then again by far the 
heaviest part of the computation has already been accomplished in applying the 
Wald test. Also, since h1(0 1)) = 0, this linear restriction will be satisfied at all 
subsequent stages and provides a useful partial check on the computations. We 
find that to two decimal places 
[T0.43  —021 —0-06 —0-20 —003 —0-06 -0.01 
0-35 0-41 —0-05 —0-73 0-02 0-00 001 
—0-19 040 0-35 0-13 —0-89 015 0-05 
037 —0-22 0-47 —0-01 010 —0-76 0-05 
[__0.07 0-24 040 009 0'11 0-18 _0.9j 
56 
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and 
0-21 —0-14 —0-04 —0-01 —0-02 0-00 0-00 
—0-14 0-14 —002 0-03 000 —0-02 0-00 
—0-04 —0-02 0-04 —0-02 001 0-02 0-00 
PV = 	—0-01 003 —0-02 0-01 0-00 —0-01 000 
—002 0-00 0-01 0-00 0-00 000 0-00 
0-00 —0-02 0-02 —0-01 0-00 0-01. 0-00 
0-00 0-00 0-00 0-00 000 000 0-00 
The correction vector for our initial approximation O 	to Otis 
PV D logL(x, 0*) + QV h(0*) = Q) h(O*), 
and so a second approximation 0(2) to Otis 0(2) = (47408, 26035, -07721, -12294, 
-02007, 03646, 00931). Also with 0 as our first approximation to 3, the corre-
sponding correction vector is 
Q0(l)*' D logL(x, 0*)+R)h(0*) - WUh(0*) - 0* 
and so 	= (--01512, --16470, --32127, ---07438, --04517). On continuing this 
iterative process we eventually find that, to five decimal places, 
Of =(46903, -26265, -07824, -12319, -02055, -03670, -00964), 
- 	= (--03357, - -18405, --42629, --05637, - -00378). 
Such accuracy is, of course, seldom required in practice. 
It only remains to obtain a better estimate of the variance matrix of Of than is 
given by P )/n. This better estimate is P )/n and either of the methods of section 4 at 
may be used to obtain Pa); the authors used the first method, finding 
-21480 --14271 --03750 --01052 --01787 --00078 --00544 
--14271 	-14298 --01580 	-02958 	-00416 --01858 	-00037 
--03750 --01580 	-04253 --01726 -00712 	01702 -00389 
at =J --01052 	-02958 --01726 	-01112 --00274 --00892 --00126 J. 
--01787 -00416 	-00712 --00274 	-00674 	-00194 	-00066 
--00078 --01858 -01702 --00892 -00194 -00792 -00140 
	
[-00544 -00037 -00389 --00126 -00066 	00140 	0004j 
Comparison of corresponding elements of PV and P shows agreement to two at 
decimal places and suggests that it might have been worthwhile to calculate PV to 
more significant figures. Then PV/n might have been used as an estimate of the 
variance matrix of 61,  9, - - -, 9, good enough for most practical purposes, and we 
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could have avoided the rather tedious final computation of p)•  In general, if an 
initial approximation O to O- is fairly good, P'/n will provide a reasonable estimate 
of the variance matrix of 011 021 ..., 
Though strictly unnecessary, yet for the sake of completeness, we again calculate 
the value of the Lagrange-multiplier test statistic, which in any multinomial situation 
can be expressed as the usual 
., (observed —expected)2 
expected 
this value is 135, which is again smaller than the upper 5 per cent. point of a (41 
distribution, and again confirms the acceptance of. Also the statistic 21ogA of 
the likelihood-ratio test has value 129 and again we would accept 	. 
7. FREEDOM EQUATION SPECIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS 
As we have noted above, the restrictions on' the parameters 01,  O, ..., 0 specifying 
are quite often given in the form of freedom equations rather than of constraint 
equations. The null hypothesis then reads "the unknown parameters 011  02, ..., 
can be expressed in the form 
Oi = 0j(1, CY 21 	°—r) (i = 1, 2, ...,$)", 	 (7.1) 
where , , ..., c s_,. are "freedom" parameters. To say that 0 can be expressed in 
this form is equivalent to imposing r constraints which, theoretically at least, can be 
found explicitly by elimination of c from the equations (7.1). However, in most 
cases in which such a specification of Oro is given it is at best inconvenient to express 
the restrictions in the form of constraint equations, and the Lagrange-multiplier 
method, based as it is on restricted estimates, is much more easily adapted than is 
Wald's technique. 
The natural approach in this case is to obtain restricted estimates as follows. 
We think of the likelihood function as a function of 	••, 	and obtain 
maximum-likelihood estimates &11 62,...,  &Sr' i.e. a value of c which gives a maximum 
of the likelihood function when it is so regarded. The estimates Oi = O(&, &2, •• 
(i =1,2, ..., s) are then restricted estimates of the basic unknown parameters and the 
statistic [DlogL(x,8t)]'Bof  l[D1ogL(x,0)]/n is, as before, distributed under 	as 
X211. Thus the Lagrange-multiplier test is very easily applied when B9 is non-singular. 
We see how this test applies in a familiar situation in the following example. 
Example 4: quantal probit analysis. The probability that an individual will 
respond to a dose d1 of a stimulus is 0 (i = 1, 2, ...,$). A null hypothesis 	states 
that 0 can be expressed in the form Oi = 4){(d1 - c)/}, where 1) is the standardized 
normal distribution function. In an experiment where n individuals are subjected 
to dose d1, m1 respond and n—ni1 fail to respond (i = 1,2, ...,$). 
By the usual probit analysis methods we obtain maximum-likelihood estimates 
, &2 of the freedom parameters cx,, a2. These yield restricted maximum-likelihood 
estimates 9 = 0{(d1 _&,)f&2} (i = 1, 2, ...,$) of the unknown probabilities associated 
with the different doses of the stimulus. We also have 
logL(x, 0) = const+ 	[m1  log 01+ (n—rn1) log (I - 
a log L(x, 0) - m1 —n01  
06i -  O(1—O) 
MT 
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and 	 B'= diag{01(l - 0k), 02(1 - 02), ..., 0(1 - 




Under 	, according to the foregoing general result, this is distributed, for large ii, 
as X2]'  a very familiar result. 
If B3 is singular there are two possibilities. First, and most commonly, it may be 
necessary to impose additional (usually obvious) constraints on the U's and hence 
on the 's in order to ensure identifiability of the parameters. For example, in 
investigating blood-groups (0, A, B, AE) with corresponding probabilities 
'4 
01, 02, 03, 04 / 
I :=j 
we impose the identifiability restriction Z0j = 1 along with, say, the familiar freedom 
equation constraints 01  = , 0 = + 2o a, 03 = a+ 2 2  3, 0, = 2a1 	The identi- 
3 
fiability constraint, of course, implies the identifiability restriction 	ai = 1 on 
i 1 
the ci's. Since the technique required in this situation is covered by that of the next 
section, we delay its consideration. 
Secondly, certain of the constraints on 0 implied by the freedom equations (7.1) 
may be necessary for identifiability of 0. The adaptation of the Lagrange-multiplier 
technique is then less elegant for it seems necessary to find explicitly from equations 
(7.1) constraints on 0 which are necessary and sufficient for identifiability. If these 
are h1(0) = h2(0) = ... = 1i(0) = 0, and 1-110 is, as before, the s x £ matrix  
then the modified test statistic is 
[D logL(x, Ot)]' [Bet + Hlet Hloti' 11[DlogL(x,  Ot)] 
and is distributed as 	_tj under .). Ir 
8. MIXED SPECIFICATION OF REslalcrnoNs 
It may indeed be natural, or convenient, to have mixed restrictions on 0, the 
null hypothesis being specified partly by constraint equations and partly by freedom 
equations; identifiability restrictions may also be necessary in this case. Let 0 = (4:, 4)) 
where 4: = (/i, çl'o, ..., &) and 4) = (i' 02, 	be the set of parameters under 
investigation. Suppose that the restrictions are expressed partly as constraint equa-
tions h1(0) = h(0) = ... = h(0) = 0, of which the first t are necessary and sufficient 
for identifiability; the remaining r1 - t constraints, together with the restrictions 
specified by the freedom equations ç& = çtx1, cia, ..., c,.) (i = 1, 2, . . ., sr), determine 
the null hypothesis 	. 
In this case we again appeal to the Lagrange-multiplier method and hence, in the 
usual notation, employ the test statistic 
[DlogL(x,Ot)]' {Bet +Hiet ALletI i—I [DlogL(x, Ot)], 
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Where Otis the restricted estimate of 0. This statistic is, under 
	, distributed as The restricted estimates o t are obtained by the following La- ran  technique. Using 	 ..., 	) (1 = 1,2, ..., s2), we consider the likelihood 
	
function as a fu ction of and a 
= a, , as,-r,), express the constraint equations in terms of and a also, and then find by the method of section 
6 the corresponding restricted estimates , and & of qi and a. Then Of 
	) where 
2' ••, 	0 = 1, 2, ..., 
We now Consider an application which makes use of this general technique. Exarnpf 5. In 
a population the proportion of individuals Possessing a certain attribute is known to be p. The probability 
d) that an individual possesses the attribute depends on d, 
the measurenient of a Specified characteristic of the mdi-dua1. The possible values of this characteristic are d
1 , d2 , d3, but the proportions 
in which these values occur in 
the populatj11 are unknown We wish to test the hypothesis that the probability relation is of the form 
(d) = d/(d+ ). To achieve this  we have available a large sample (with replacement) of ii individuals; of the 
111 in the sample who are found to have value d1  of the characteristic, in1 Possess the attribute We let 	
be the proportion of individuals in the population having value 
d1 
and write () (i 
1,2,3). Our set of unknown parameters is then 0 = (, In forming our null hypothesis 	
we must remember that we know p and any model proposed must be tested for consistency with this fact. We impose imme-
diately the necessary and sufficient identifiability restriction (as in Example 3) 
3 
f=1 
the remaining restrictions then form our null hypothes  by our knowledge of p is 	 : The restriction imposed 
h2(0) 	 0, 
and by the proposed probability relation we have the freedom equation restrictions 
di 
We have 	
1, 2, 3). 
/ 	\ logL(x, 0) COflSt+h 	 3 E jlogj_n0g f + {mi1ogj+(fl._fll) log  (1 - \i1 / 'I and, when h1(0) = 0, it is easy to show that 
B8+1110H; = diag 	 02 	03 
and 	 a log L(x,e) ni—nVj 31ogL(x,0) m1— ni . 
Hence the Lagrange-inultipher statistic can be expressed as 
3 (n1 	
(in1 - n ---- + E 	r-, ii n01 
 
and, since in this case r1 2 r2 = 2 and t 1, it is distributed as X
1  under 	. 
M. 
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To obtain ii,& and hence Of = ( ui,c) we use the usual iterative procedure with, 
when !— I = 0, 
1 	1 	1 	0 
di d3 ____ 
d1+a d2+a. d3+ct 	j .j (d+ci)2  
H, 0 =[1 1 1 0] 




_I 	("i_ nidi )]. 
To illustrate the theory we consider the case p = 0-545, d1 = 1, d = 2, d3 = 4, 
with the sample having n = 200, n1 = 53, n2 = 103, 113 = 44, in, = 21, rn2 = 54, m3 = 23. 
A convenient initial estimate of yl is 4,(1) = (n1/n, 112/n, ii3/n) = (265, '515, '220); on 
inspection &1) = 2'0 is seen to be a reasonable initial estimate of a; as usual we 
take X 1 = (0,0). We can quickly find by the matrix inversion method of section 4 
that 
	
(1) + 1-11(), (.) Iij4,(), () 	II*(),a()] 1  
r 	—H,(,)(,) 	 0 	j 
-188 —'136 —'052 —'338 —'348 	.1691 
—'136 •250 —'114 	'031 —:507 —'015 
—'052 —'114 	166 -301 —'145 —'153 
—'338 	'031 '307 	-909 —3'940 	7999 
I 
—'348 --507 —145 —3-940 —1-969 1-968 
L
.169 —'015 —153 7-999 1'968 _3.99_j 
Also 	 .[D1ogL(x,1),a(1))]P = [0 0 0 0-0012] 
and 	 h'(4i 1), (x 11) = [0 -0-0525], 
so that, using the iterative method of section 6, we have 
i4i(2) ==-(256, 	516, '228); 	= 1'581; 	X(2) =(--108, '2191. 
If we continue this iterative process we find that, correct to three decimal places, 
= (256, '516, '228); 	& = 1-621; 	1=(--121, -222); 
so that the value of the Lagrange-multiplier test statistic is 7-88. This is greater than 
the upper 5 per cent. point of a X2 distribution, so that in this case we reject 3, 
and there is no need to proceed further. 
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It is interesting to compare this with an alternative procedure. We might carry 
out a test of .f in two stages: first testing the hypothesis .f that Oi = 
(1 = 1,2,3) by a Lagrange-multipliertest, and then 0402 that 17 2(0) = 0 by a 12 
Wald Xt test. The first test yields a non-significant value 528 and so we would 
accept .Y; the second test, also, yields a non-significant value 242, and so we 
would accept .;42.This procedure would thus result in the acceptance of .?. 
Thereason for the discrepancy with the result of the preceding test is that here we 
are subjecting the model to two partial tests which separately are not sufficient to 
result, in the rejection of 	, whereas the former subjects it to a single complete 
test of the hypothesis ;fo. 
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4 MULTIPLE HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
4.1 Introduction 
The developments described in §3 refer to the testing of a 
single hypothesis within a model. In many practical situations there 
may be more than one hypothesis of interest, and sometimes a large 
number of such hypotheses. In linear modelling it is precisely 
towards such multiple hypothesis testing that the package of 
techniques known as analysis of variance and analysis of covariance 
is directed. Similarly in multivariate normal modelling there are 
corresponding methodologies such as analysis of dispersion for 
dealing with multiple hypothesis problems. Where the parametric 
modelling does not fall into these special categories the natural 
follow-up question to the successful development of methods for 
single hypothesis investigation is whether it is possible to develop 
methodology appropriate to the problems of multiple hypotheses. 
The purpose of the three papers of Aitchison (5:1962, 6:1964, 7:1965) 
was to answer this question in the affirmative. 
First, it should be emphasised that the only non-controversial 
solution to multiple hypothesis testing is probably through a full 
decision-theoretic approach. In particular applications it is 
seldom, at least in the author's experience, that the necessary 
loss or utility structure is available. This is, of course, as 
true of the essentially ad hoc practices adopted in linear and 
multivariate normal theory as of the general parametric case. Our 
concern must be to ensure that the ad hoc procedures developed 
are sensible, and to achieve this, counterparts of such linear model 
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concepts as nesting, orthogonality, partitioning and simultaneity 
have to be found for the general parametric model. Three basic 
concepts, restricted parametric tests, separable hypotheses and 
confidence-region tests, are developed in the three papers and we 
now outline the role these play in supplying the necessary 
methodology. 
4.2 Large-sample restricted parametric tests 
If in constructing a test of w2 within a model wç =0 we take 
the alternative to be W1 - 	where w2 C w1 C w0 instead of the full 
and natural alternative W0_ we say that we have a restricted 
(generalised likelihood ratio) test of w2 against W1- 2 within 
w0. After showing how to construct critical regions and power 
functions for various general parametric specifications of w0, w, 
and w2 Aitchison (5:1962) then presents the following developments. 
A simple relation T21 = T20 - T10 is obtained between test 
statistics, where T1 is any large-sample equivalent test 
statistic for testing w. against w. -w. . This can be used as 
1 	 3 	1 
a computational device when T21 is difficult to evaluate directly. 
The effect of restriction of the alternative hypothesis on the 
increase in power is quantified. 
For nested hypotheses a systematic form of investigation, 
analysis of discrepancy, is devised with a systematic tabular 
form of computation similar to analysis of variance. 
4.3 Separable hypotheses 
If interest is in two hypotheses w1 and w2 which are not 
nested, there may be some doubt as to which of the nested sets, 
(w o, wi, w, fl2) or (w0, w2, w1 flu2), to investigate. In such 
circumstances it is obviously advisable to examine both sets, being 
particularly careful about the interpretation of the results. 
There can arise, however, an important relationship between the two 
hypotheses which makes the double inspection unnecessary and so 
eases the interpretation. This occurs when the restricted tests 
of w1 fl w2 against w2 - w1 fl w 2 and of w1 n Lj2 against w - w1 
 n W2 
use the same critical regions as the unrestricted tests of w1  
against w0 - w1 and of w 2 against w0 _W2 respectively, so that 
examination of the two nested sets involves the application of the 
same three unrestricted tests, of w1 against w 0 - w1, of w 2 against 
and of w1 fl w2 against w 0 -w flw2. Aitchison (5:1962) 
terms such hypotheses separable with resepct to the type of test 
used, points out the analogy with orthogonality and devises a simple 
criterion, in terms of the III and H2 matrices associated with w1 and 
W2 and the information matrix B, for recognising when two hypotheses 
are separable. It is then shown that when hypotheses are separable 
it is possible to partition the statistic associated with the 
testing of their intersection into a sum of two statistics appropriate 
to the testing of the hypotheses separately. Thus for the-general 
parametric case there is a counterpart to linear model partitioning, 
by which we can follow up the rejecting of the intersection hypothesis 
by investigation of the larger separable hypotheses. 
A recent review with some developments of the concept of 
separability is to be found in Mathieu (1978) 
4.4 Confidence-region tests 
The motivation underlying the concept of confidence region 
tests introduced in Aitchison (6:1964) and further developed in 
Aitchison (7:1965) is to try to place some overall control on 
65 
significance level in multiple hypothesis testing. The rationale 
is based on the following important points. 
In multiple hypothesis situations the concept of significance 
level after the first test has been applied has no real meaning, 
and is little more than an arbitrary set of rules. 
In hypothesis testing the rejection of a hypothesis is a much 
more positive act than its 'acceptance', which may be merely 
due to weakness in bringing enough evidence to bear against 
the hypothesis. Thus any testing procedure which proceeds by 
investigating hypotheses larger (regarded as subsets of the 
parameter set) and containing an already rejected hypothesis 
is to be preferred to one which moves from an accepted 
hypothesis to the examination of proper subsets of that 
hypothesis. 
Much of hypothesis-testing is a search for an appropriate 
model as a basis for further activity, such as estimation or 
prediction. Thus acceptance of a hypothesis is in a sense a 
license to introduce a higher-dimensional parameter. It seems 
reasonable therefore to start with 'low-parameter' hypotheses, 
rejection being the requirement for moving to a 'higher parameter' 
hypothesis. In other words, things are simple or simply random 
until we have real evidence to believe otherwise. This is 
in accord with one of the principles of inference propounded by 
Jeffreys (1961,p.47) 
All this suggests that we should look for a system of testing 
controlled by a single 'significance level', which proceeds from 
the smallest hypothesis through to the largest only by the process 
of rejection. The method of Aitchison (6:1964) provides such a 
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tool and is best explained initially in relation to a nested 
sequence of hypotheses wk C  wkl  C ... C wj C w o = 0. It is shown 
that a confidence region C(x), with confidence coefficient 1-a, 
can be constructed in such a way that it can be used for testing 
wk within 0 at significance level a instead of a critical region 
R C X, in the sense that 
wk fl C(x) = 0 iff x c R. 
With this confidence region C(x), based on appropriately testing 
the smallest hypothesis wk, we can proceed to test other hypotheses, 
rejecting w (i <k) if 
wfl C(x) = 0, 
that is if w has no parameter points in common with the confidence 
region originally set up for testing wk.  Thus testing is under 
the control of the single significance level a, or equivalently the 
confidence coefficient 1-a. For a non-nested collection of hypotheses 
the basic hypothesis on which C(x). is built should be the intersection 
hypothesis. Then testing proceeds in exactly the same way.as set 
out above. 
Having established the principles of the confidence-region 
testing of multiple hypotheses, Aitchison (6:1964) then proceeds 
to turn the above criterion for rejection into an easily operable 
system for linear models and the general parametric model. Only 
some of the more important aspects need be indicated here. 
1. 	The test procedure is shown to be equivalent to use of the 
standard (F for linear; chi-squared for general parametric) 




value larger than that associated with significance level a. 
In other words the standard test statistic is used but at a 
smaller, sometimes much smaller, 'equivalent significance 
level' than a. These equivalent significance levels are shown 
to be easily computed. Thus if w is rejected at level a the 
procedure makes it increasingly more difficult to reject larger 
hypotheses. 
The method is shown to agree with, and indeed to be a 
generalisation of, the Scheffé (1953) S-method for the linear 
model, and of the Goodman (1964) method of multiple comparison 
in contingency tables. 
The practical implications for such activities as data 
snooping introspection of an accepted hypothesis and 
enlarging rejected hypotheses are discussed with examples. 
It is shown that a disturbing feature may arise in standard 
practice in linear models, that rejection of Wi n W21 if  W1 
and w2  are orthogonal, automatically means the rejection of 
at least one of the wider hypotheses w1 and w2. If there are 
a priori grounds for believing that rejection of w can only 
arise through the rejection of w1 or W2  or both, then we cannot 
object to this feature, although we may ask if the purpose of 
the initial test of w has been clearly thought out. Often, 
however, there are no such a priori grounds and indeed the 
testing of w1 and w2  may arise as an afterthought to the 
rejection of W. How sensible is it then to use the above 
procedure in which enlargement of w almost automatically 
follows its rejection? Confidence region testing protects 
against this disturbing feature. Rejection of w does not now 
imply automatic or nearly automatic rejection of one or other 
 
of w1 and w2, and again we have the feature, desirable in 
many practical situations, of much more stringent assessment 
of data when larger hypotheses are under consideration. 
In Aitchison (6:1964) although appropriate confidence regions 
for the linear and general parametric model are obtained no general 
principle for their construction is considered. In Aitchison 
(7:1965) such a principle of construction is presented, relating 
the confidence-region tests to generalised likelihood ratio tests. 
Specifically if A(x;a) is the generalised likelihood ratio test 
statistic for testing the hypothesis w(a) = {O : h(6) = a) with 
critical value c 
Ot  (A) for all a then 
C(x) = [6 : A{x;h(0)} <c(A)] 
is a suitable basic confidence region for investigating multiple 
hypotheses containing w(a). In particular it is shown that the 
confidence-region method uses the usual generalised likelihood ratio 
test statistic for testing w1 within the model, but at a more 
stringent significance level. It is thus shown that the method 
is equivalent to fixed-odds likelihood-ratio testing, which has been 
separately advocated as a simultaneous test procedure by Gabriel 
(1964) 
This availability of a principle of construction allows Aitchison 
(7:1965) to treat a multivariate normal problem in an exact form 
rather than through the asymptotic theory associated with the 
general parametric form. 
4.5 Discussion 
The developments described in this and the previous section, 
particularly for the general parametric model, provide a set of 
powerful tools for the facing of new problems. It should perhaps 
be emphasised that just as their strength is their generality so 
their weakness may be that they are rougher tools than more precise 
ones devisable through the particularity of the problem. It should 
always be the duty of the statistician to produce as exact methods 
as possible for his particular parametric situation and only when 
this proves intractable should recourse be made to the general 
tools.. Their usefulness continues to lie in the undoubted fact 
that intractability is a persistent intruder in the real world of 
practical problems. 
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Large-sample Restricted Parametric Tests 
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SUMMARY 	- 
Restricted tests are designed to examine a hypothesis not against the natural 
complete alternative but against some subhypothesis of that alternative. 
The theory of such tests provides a unification of many aspects of large-
sample tests—the analysis of nested hypotheses, the, possibility of using 
tests of increased power and of easing certain computational procedures, 
the notions of separable hypotheses and of partitioning a test -statistic. 
While many standard results can thus be brought within the framework of 
this theory the emphasis throughout the paper is on providing the consulting 
statistician with manageable tools for non-standard situations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To define a restricted parametric test we require the following setting. An experiment 
is described by a k-dimensional random variable I whose unknown distribution 
belongs to a known class of distributions, indexed by an s-dimensional parameter 6. 
The set of possible parameters is a given subset a 0  of s-dimensional Euclidean space 
R5, and the restriction of 0 to w leaves the s components of 0 independent. We 
denote by 00  the true parameter value associated with X and assume that I is either 
discrete or continuous so that the class of distributions can be specified by a class of 
elementary probability laws {J. 0): 0Ew 0 }. We can thus refer to a distribution 
with probability law f(', 0) simply by its label 0. Also if üj is a proper subset of ü jo (written coo zD w) it is convenient to refer to the hypothesis that O Ecu shortly as the 
hypothesis cu or simply as w; a basic hypothesis, here w, assumed to be true we call 
the model ojo. A set x of n independent observations on the random variable I is 
available as the basis df any test we may consider. 	 S 
Suppose that COO=) (O j DUJ2 and that we wish to test the null hypothesis W2. If we 
construct a test of cu2  restricting the alternative of interest to wj - w2 rather than to the 
complete alternative cv - W2 the resulting test is termed a restricted test of w2 against 
0)1W2 within the model w0 to distinguish it from an unrestricted test of CO2  against too -w2. For example, if, under w0, the likelihood of U for given x is 
L(x, 0) = flf(x;, 9) 
then a test which uses a critical region of the form 
supL(x, 9)/ sup L(x, O)>c} 
7Z 
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isa restricted generalized likelihood ratio test of w2 against u1 —w2 within coo whereas 
'the unrestricted generalized likelihood ratio test would use a critical region of the form 
{x: supL(x, O)/ supL(x, O)>cI- 
6Eø 
To construct such restricted tests we could, of course, apply the available theory 
of unrestricted tests to obtain an unrestricted test of w2  against all alternatives within 
the adopted model w1. Thus, to provide proper motivation for the development of a 
theory of restricted tests we must not only respect the customary demand to demon-
strate usefulness, but must also examine why and where the available theory of 
unrestricted tests is deficient. These two aspects we now consider in turn. 
2. USES OF RESTRICTED TESTS 
2.1. Nested Hypotheses 
The experimenter may be fortunate enough to have ihought out his theory 
sufficiently clearly and designed his experiment so well that he can frame his problem 
as one involving a set of nested hypotheses a, w21 ... , w 	within the basic model Wo 
in the sense that w0 w1 w2 ... 	He then has to decide how far along this path 
of specialization the results of his experiment will allow him to go. One rational 
method of procedure for this essentially multiple decision problem is the following. 
First test co, against w0 - 0j1. If w1  is accepted proceed to the next step. 
Test w2  within the accepted model w1; that is, carry out a restricted test of w2  
against cu1 —w2 within the model w0. Also, as a precaution against proceeding along 
the path of specialization by near significant steps, carry out an unrestricted test of w2  
against w0 — w2. Only if both tests yield non-significant results accept w2 and proceed 
to the next step. 
Carry out restricted tests of 	against u2 - w3 and against w1 - cv31  and an 
unrestricted test of W3  against w0 —w3. If all three tests produce non-significant results 
accept w3  and proceed to the next obvious step. 
Thus at each stage of this analysis after the first the experimenter meets the need 
for restricted tests. 
It is clear that we have avoided the difficulties of the original multiple decision 
problem only by tacitly neglecting the problems associated with the multiple significant 
tests in the above analysis. In the absence of any really satisfactory theory for either 
problem we have adopted the above practical procedure because it has a certain 
intuitive appeal. A fuller investigation of optimum properties of the suggested 
procedure, possibly in relation to realistic loss functions, seems desirable but is not 
considered in this paper. Such nested hypotheses and similar analyses occur in 
standard statistical problems, particularly in analyses of variance. For example, if w0 
is the model associated with a fixed-effects two-way classification design with n rep-
licates in each of the (At, B,) treatment combinations then w1  might be the hypothesis 
of no interaction and co2  the hypothesis of no interaction and no A-treatment effect. 
Our aim in this paper is to provide a course of action in non-standard situations, and 
to Illustrate this we shall make repeated use of the following simple examples. 
Example 1. The experimenter knows that Xis N(01, 0)with coo  = {0: 02
>0}, and 
is interested in testing the specializations w = {8Ew0 : 0102 = 01, the hypothesis of 
equality of mean and standard deviation, and w2 = {Oew1: 0 = l}, the simple 
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hypothesis that X is N(l, I). Since w0 co w2  the problem involves the testing of nested hypotheses. 
Example 2. The experimenter is dealing with k independenfnoaj distributions 
and his successive specializations are w1, the hypothesis of equality of coefficients 
of variation, that is of proportionality of standard deviation to mean, and CQ21 
the hypothesis that the k coefficients of variation are equal to a specified constant c. Here X_- (X1,X2......Xk) with independent components, X being N(02 _1, O) ii  (1= 1,2,...,k). The parameter 0 thus has 2k components and the model and nested 
hypotheses of interest are 
coo = {0: 021 >0 (i = 1, 2, ..., k)}, 
Wi = 
 
foe COO : 02/01  = 04/03 = ... = 021J02k1}, 
(02 = {OE Col : 02/0.= ,}. 
Example 3. The experimenter is concerned with the emission rates of particles 
from p independent radioactive specimens, but can count the number of particles 
emitted from a specimen only together with those arising from an independent 
background "noise". His experiment consists of p+ I independent counts over equal 
intervals of time from the following sources-.—(i) background noise alone (described 
by a discrete random variable A'1), (ii) the first specimen and background noise 
(described by X), (iii) the second specimen and background noise (described by A'3), and so on. This experiment, described by A' (A'1, A'2, ..., X,), is replicated n times. The hypotheses of interest are w1, that the  specimens have been arranged in sequence, 
the ith containing i units of radioactivity; a 2, that the unit of radioactivity in a corresponds to a specified emission rate; and w3, that W holds with a specified 
emission rate for background noise. If a Poisson type model is a satisfactory 
description of this experiment then the independent components of A' are such that X is distributed as a Poisson random variable with mean parameter 0. Then 
coo {0: 0>0 (i= 1,2,...,p+1)}, 
and the nested hypotheses are 
= {Oew0 : 02 0 = 	2 = = 0P+i 0p}, 
w3 {9E(02 01 =a}. 
Example 4. The individuals in each of k independent populations possess either an attribute A or B or both A and B (denoted by AB). The random sampling with replacement of n individuals from each of these populations can thus be regarded as n replicates of an experiment described by a random variable A' = (A'1, X2, ..., Xk) whose components are independent, X having a trinomial distribution with class probabilities 	0j2' 0 3)/(0 j+ 0j3+ 0 3) (i = 1, 2, ...,k). Here w = (8: all O.>0}. The first hypothesis w1  to be considered is that the attributes are independent in each 
population in the sense that the proportion of individuals with AB in a population is the product of the proportions with A and with B separately, that is 
- 	coo:  	0j3 	- 	oil o12  (i=I2...,k)}, -  oil+ Oj + 00 - (0 + 012 + 02 
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-? (z=1,2,...,k-1; =r1,2) 0,  
	
jj+ 22+ j3 11+ i2+ 0j3  
the hypothesis that in addition to independence the k populations possess the attributes 
in the same proportions; and 
0 	1 
(03 	E 	
011+ 012 + 03 - 2 
the hypothesis that in each population the proportions in the three categories are 
This is a situation where, of course, it is necessary to impose identifiability 
'conditions, for instance 
3 
	
-  - 
EO=l (i=1,2,...,k). 
J-1 - 
2.2, Increasing Power by Restricting Alternatives 
While the experimenter is aware that all alternatives to w2 in v0 —w 2 are possible, 
he may be especially concerned about a certain subset of these alternatives, say 
w1 —w21  where C001D Wl =) W2.This subset may contain those alternatives which the 
experimenter considers most likely or most important or whose rejection, when true, 
are expected to prove most costly. He may then decide, in constructing his test of 
2 against a 0 —w 2, to concentrate attention on those alternatives in w1—cv 2 in the 
hope that the resulting restricted test will have appreciably greater power for these 
alternatives than an unrestricted test constructed against the wider class of alternatives. 
By so doing, of courser  he allows the alternatives in too-cal to fend for themselves. 
The idea is an old one. For example, the familiar one-sided 1-test is designed to meet 
the need for a test of the hypothesis that a normal distribution mean 00 = c against 
the restricted alternative that 0> c, say, as opposed to the set of possible alternatives 
that O0 rA c. 
The technique has been considerably exploited as a means of improving the 
chi-squared. test of goodness-of-fit. Recent work on this subject, together with a 
short survey, has been undertaken by Fix, Hodges and Lehmann (1959), who 
introduced the term restricted chi-squared test. The device has, however, a wider 
application than in their particular multinomial situation; indeed we shall see that the 
theory presented later includes these restricted chi-squared tests as special cases. 
Examples of non-standard situations are again given by reference to our simple 
illustrations. In Example 1 the experimenter may wish to test the hypothesis that Xis 
N(1, 1) and have strong grounds for believing that in any alternative the mean and 
standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution are equal. In such 
circumstances a restricted test of w 2 against o1—u2 within w0 is called for. Similar 
considerations also apply to Examples 2-4. For instance, in Example 3, in constructing 
a test of the hypothesis a 2 that the emission rates for the specimens are d, 2d, . . 
the experimenter may be fairly sure that these emission rates are proportional to the 
first p integers, that is that w1  holds, and so will want a restricted test of w2 against 
w1 —w2 within wo. 
2.3. Easing the Evaluation of a Test Statistic 
For an unrestricted test of a hypothesis w2 against all alternatives within a basic 
model w1  it may well prove a computational advantage to introduce a more basic 
16 
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model co0 and to construct a restricted test of w2 against w1—w2 within the wider 
setting of this model. The reasons for this will be seen early in the next section, where 
we examine the computational difficulties that may arise in a direct application of 
unrestricted tests. 
2.4. Separable Hypotheses 
The experimenter may be interested in two hypotheses w1 and ai2 which are not 
nested, and so may be in some doubt as to which of the nested sets, (, w1, v1 fl w2) or 
(a0) 2' w1  fl o3), to investigate. In such circumstances he would be well advised to 
examine both sets, being particularly careful about the interpretation of the results. 
There can arise, however, an important relationship between the two hypotheses 
which makes the double inspection unnecessary and so eases the interpretation. This 
occurs when the restricted tests of cu 	against w2 u2 —w1flw 2 ànd of cv1fl w2 against 
Owl — co, flco2 use the same critical regions as the unrestricted tests of w1 against 
co— cv and of CO2  against 	respectively, so that examination of the two nested 
sets involves the application of the same three unrestricted tests, of ü 1  against w0- 1, 
of Co. against COO—w2, and of w1 fl w2 against a0 — w1 n w2. We shall term such hypo-
theses separable with respect to the type of test used. Such a notion occurs in analysis 
of variance where, for example, orthogonal designs are aimed precisely at such 
separation of hypotheses. It is important to be able to recognize easily when two 
hypotheses are separable and we shall see later that this can be done by the application 
of a simple criterion provided by the theory of restricted tests. 
Example 5. The three dimensions of cuboids produced by a certain process are 
described by a random variable X = (X1, X2, A'3), with independent components 
and where X has probability density —' exp (— x/0)/(0 F(p)} (x>O) with known 
p. 	Here w0 = { 0: Oi >0 (i = 1,2,3)). If the experimenter wishes to test 
= {0 E cu0 : p3 01  02 03 = a3), the hypothesis that the average volume is & and 
= foe COO : 01 = 0 = 03)1  the hypothesis that the three mean dimensions are equal, 
then the question of the separability of a1  and CO2  may well arise 
Example 6. A random sample with replacement of ii individuals is taken from a 
genetic population whose individuals belong to one or other of the three types----
dominant, hybrid, recessive. We thus have n independent observations on a trinomial 
random variable Xwith probabilities (01, °2, 03)/(01+ 02+ 03) for dominant, hybrid and 
recessive types respectively, and w0 = { 8: 9>O (i= 1,2,3)}. The experimenter 
wishes to study w1  = {0Ew0 : [0/(0+ 02+ 03)]+ [031(0 1+ 9+ 0011 = l}, the hypo-
thesis that the population is genetically stable, and W2 = {9 E cv: 0 = 03}, the 
hypothesis of equal proportions of dominants and recessives, and so the question of 
the separability of these two hypotheses may arise. In this case we must again impose 
an identifiability condition 01+02+ 03 = 1. 
2.5. Partitioning a Test Statistic 
The theory of restricted tests is also useful in the situation where the experimenter 
has found a hypothesis w 3 unacceptable and has turned his attention to an examination 
of components w1 and w 2 such that W3 =  w 1flw 2. We have then to investigate the 
possibility of partitioning the test statistic for w 3 against - w3 into components for 
testing w1  against w 0 —w1  and a 2 against w0—w 2. We shall see that such partitioning 
is possible when the hypotheses w1 and w are separable. The familiar partitioning 
of a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test statistic arises as a particular case of the general 
theory which indeed in this multinomial case provides an extension of the results as 
76 
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usually presented. Illustrations of the uses of partitioning can be provided by 
Examples 5 and 6. In Example 5 if the experimenter has found 
= [0c..: 0 = 02 = 03 
= P) 
unacceptable he may wish to investigate the composition 0)3 = (JJ1nC1J2 where 
and w2 are as previously defined. Again in Example 6 the rejection of 
(1)3 = { Oew0 : 01 = 0 	, 0 = } may be followed by examination of 	and OJ2 
since 0)3 = (L.J fl w2. 
3. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING AVAILABLE UNRESTRICTED TESTS 
To clarify subsequent discussion and to establish notation we first recall briefly 
the available large sample unrestricted tests as developed by Wald (1943), Rao (1948), 
Aitchison and Silvey (1958, 1960), and Silvey (1959). 
3.1. Assumptions and Notation 
We assume that all functions and sets introduced satisfy certain regularity 
conditions, such as differentiability, compactness, etc., required for the results of this 
and subsequent sections to hold. To attempt to introduce these conditions, almost 
invariably satisfied in practice, in order to provide a fully rigorous treatment would 
cause considerable embarrassment in a paper which seeks to alleviate the lot of the 
experimenter and consulting statistician. For convenience we drop from the notation 
the dependence on sample size n; this should cause no misunderstanding in the 
context of this paper. What must be emphasized is that all the properties we 
investigate are asymptotic, valid for large n, and from, now on we suppose that n is 
always large. 
3.2. The Likelihood and Associated Constructs 
The likelihood of 0(E w0), given x, is denoted by L(x, 0). We suppose that a 
maximum likelihood estimator 9i  of 0 under any hypothesis &Ji considered exists, 
that is a function Oi from the sample space to W can be defined for each n such that 
for every x we have O(x) E wi and 
L(x, 01(x)) = supL(x, 0). 
6e 
We denote by DlogL(x, 0) the sx 1 column vector whose ith component is 
ølogL(x, 0)/a0, and by B0 the s x s information matrix based on 0) whose (i,j)th 
component is —(l/n)E8(32 logL(., 0)/0a0), where E0 denotes expectation with 
repect to the distribution with elementary probability law L(, 0). The matrix B0 is 
assumed non-singular for all OEw0; the minor adjustments necessary to the theory 
in the contrary case are indicated in section 3.9. 
3.3. Hypotheses and Associated Constructs 
We confine attention to the wide class of hypotheses constraining 00 to He in the 
null space of some specified vector function. For instance, the discussion of this 
section will involve two nested hypotheses 
= {0: h1(0) = 	= {0 h2(0) = 
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where h, = [h,, h2, ..., he]' and h2 = [] = [h,, h2, ..., j']' with r2> r,. Three matrices 
of derivatives are defined: 
H10 of order s x r1 with (i,j)th component lz(0)/30 
(i==l,2,..,s; 	1, 2, 
1120 of order s x r2 with (4j)th  component h3(0)/30 
(i=1,2,...,s; j=1,2,...,r2); 
11210 of order S x (r2-  r,) with (i,j)th component h(6)/ £1 
(i = 1, 2, ..., s; j=r1+1,...,r2), 
so that 1126 ='[Hlo , H2101, and the matrices are assumed to be of ranks r1, r2 and r., - ri 
respectively. To simplify the notation we use [- ]6 to denote that the matrix expression 
in the square brackets is evaluated at 6; thus [H B-1  H,J 1  denotes [H 5 B' H,5]-'. 
We can then introduce three real-valued functions A10,  A201 A21,each defined on w0, by 
= n[h(HB'H1)'h,]5, 
1120(0) = n[h(H B-1112)'h2151  
'21() = n[14,{}1, B' H21 — H, B-' H,(H B' H,) H B-' 21}'  h21J0. 
3.4. Chi-squared Points 
The upper cx point of the X2[r] distribution is denoted by C g so that 
Pr ( 2 [r] > c} = Lx. 
Also we use X2 [r, A] to denote a non-central chi-squared random variable with r 
degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter A, that is a random variable with 
moment generating function (1 - 2t)T exp i\t/(l -2t)) (ft 1< ). 
The details of the three large sample equivalent tests of size cx of the hypothesis w1  
against the complete alternative w0 —w1  are as follows. 
3.5. Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test 
This test uses a test statistic T,0 = 2 log L(, 0°)/L(, 01)} and critical region 
{x : T10(x)> c} of size c. For its application we have to compute both 00  and 01, 
and to do so generally requires the application of at least one iterative procedure 
involving the evaluation of some 
3.6. Lagrange-multiplier Test 
Here the test statistic is V, = (l In) D'logL(, 61)Bj'DlogL(., 01) and the critical 
region {x : V10(x)> c 1 }. The main quantities to be computed are 01, which generally 
requires an iterative determination, and 
3.7. Wald Test 
The Wald test statistic is defined by W10 = A{O°()} and the corresponding 
critical region is {x : W,0(x) > c}. The computation of 0° and B-0 '--is often simple 
in applications and provided r1  is not too large the evaluation of [H B' H,]' may 
be easy. 
10 
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3.8. Discussion 
The three test statistics are distributed as ,y{r1] when 8 Ew1, as is evident by the 
form of the critical region, and as [ri, 	6)] when 6ew0 — oil. The power function 
fi of the tests is therefore given by fl(00) = Pr {X2 
The advantages of the last two tests over the generalized likelihood ratio test from 
the computational point of view, and also the relative merits of these two tests, have 
recently been the subject of a rçview by Aitchison and Silvey (1960). When we attempt 
to apply the Lagrange-multiplier and the Wald techniques to derive tests of w2 against 
w1 —(02 within w0 we can encounter difficulties not usually met in the application of 
the procedures to straightforward unrestricted tests. Both techniques require us to 
derive and invert the information matrix associated with the adopted model w. This 
involves the recognition that the specialization of w 0 to w1 effectively reduces the 
number of independent parameters from s to s—r, and so a reparametrization of the 
model in terms of such a set of s—r1  parameters is necessary before we can proceed. 
This in itself may be a formidable task. Even when it is possible, as it is in all our 
illustrations (chosen for their simplicity rather than their reality), further snags lie 
ahead. For not only can the components of the information matrix associated with 
col  be awkward to derive and compute but this information matrix will seldom possess 
as simple a form as that associated with the corresponding unrestricted test. In 
Example 2, for instance, probably the easiest way of reparametrizing is to introduce 
the set of k+1 new independent parameters 61,02,  ..., qPk+l by 02j-1 = Oil 02i = 'f'I'I'k+l 
(i = 2, ...,k). The information matrix associated with co,, expressed in terms of , 
is no longer diagonal as is the information matrix associated with w0 but is of bordered 
diagonal form. The fact that the order of the matrix has been reduced from 2k to k+ 1 
does not compensate for this complication at the inversion stage. This extra complexity 
of information matrices associated with restricted tests adds considerably to the 
computational effort required in the direct application of the two techniques. 
For the Wald technique there is at first sight a compensating feature in that the new 
matrix of form H'B' H is of smaller order, and so may pose an easier inversion 
problem, than the corresponding matrix for the unrestricted case. This is almost 
certainly countered by the need to obtain 81,  whose evaluation, as compared with that 
of 60, generally requires computations of greater difficulty; very likely an iterative 
procedure will be required. Even in the extremely simple case of Example 1 we have 
60 = (2,$), where n5 = Ex1 and ns2 = (x -R)2, whereas 6' = (a, a), where a is the 
positive root of the quadratic equation c 2+2—( 2+s2) = 0. As an alternative, 
which avoids reparametrization, to the above Wald procedure we can show that the 
Wald statistic W, for testing w2 against a - w2 within coo can be expressed in the form 
= 	{01(.)}, but again this does not present easy computations. 
These difficulties, the necessary reparametrization of the model, the more intricate 
structure of the information matrix and the necessity to employ more involved 
computational procedures to obtain maximum likelihood estimates, indicate that it 
may be fruitful to re-examine the techniques. This is undertaken in the next section, 
where we aim to provide a whole variety of equivalent tests; which is used is then a 
question of which is computationally most convenient for the special features of the 
particular problem under discussion. 
3.9. Note on Singular Information Matrices 
When B9 is not non-singular for all 6 e co0 the question of the identifiability of 
parameters arises. Usually, then, if the first r0 constraints h,(8) = h2(6) = ... h(0) = 0 
7 
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Of h,(0) = 0 are just sufficient to identify the parameters and 146, is the corresponding s x r0  matrix of first derviatjves associated with these constraints, the matrix 
[B+H0 H]5  is non-singular for all Oew0, and all that is necessary in the above tests of w1  against coo —oil  is to replace B by B+H0 H and the number of degrees of freedom r, by r,—r0. These changes in no way affect the discussion of difficulties 
above; indeed they will usually make the application of the techniques, as they at 
present stand, more involved. 
- 	 4. BASIC RESULTS ON RESTRICTED TESTS 
Theorem I below, by establishing the large-sample equivalence of a number of 
critical regions, provides the basis for a choice of computational routines in carrying 
out a restricted test of 	against wi — (02  within w. Theorem 1. Let TO, J', W (ji = 10,20,21) be respectively the generalized likeli-
hood-ratio, the Lagrange-multiplier and -the Wald statistics for testing w3 against w1 — w1. If A3 and Bji denote any of 2, J'.1, 1T, then the twelve tests, of which three have critical regions 
and nine have critical regions 
{x : A21(x)> Cr,_ ,,(y} 
 
{x A(x) - B4O(x)> 
are large-sample equivalent restricted tests (of size x) of (V 2 against W,W2 within The power function g of these tests is given by 
fl(00) = Pr (2[r2 - r1, A20(00)] >  
Proof. The equivalence of the three tests based on T,, Vs,, W21  is an established result of unrestricted theory. 
Clearly from the definition of Tji we have T21 = "20 7 and thus to establish the 
equivalence property all that we require to prove is that A—B4O and T20-7 have the same asymptotic distribution when 90 EW1. To establish this, methods of proof 
similar to those of Silvey (1959) give us, for each 00  c- col, 
plim(J'-7)=O, 
0, 
from which we have 
plim {(A - B10) - ('20 - T)} = 0, 
and the required equivalence of the asymptotic distributions of A90 - B10 and T - Tlo 
follows immediately, for example, by the results of Mann and Wald (1943). 
From unrestricted theory, we know that 
9(00) Pr{ [r2—r,, '\21(O0)]>c,_} (00 E101 1-2), 
and so the result of the theorem follows if we can show that (0) = ?t(0) for O0e oil  —w2. Now for 00E col  —(V2  we have 
= [I4(H B—' HJ—' h2]0 
[HB—'H, HB—'H]—i f 0 i = [0h,(O0)] 	 21 LHB'H, H,B—'Hj8 	h21(O0)J 
= h(00) [H'21 B' H. - H, B—' H,(H B' H)—' H B—' H21]' h21(00) 
= 
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In any application we naturally choose the test statistic which can be most readily 
computed. Frequently this turns out to be fl 0 - IIJ, for often 60  and B are easy to 
evaluate and the remaining calculations. are not too heavy. In Example 1, for instance, 
W(x)—W10(x) = n(+2s-3)2/s2 and this is more easily computed than any of the 
other equivalent statistics. Again, in Example 2, 60 and B' are easily obtained and 
although the use of W20 - W10 requires further the inversion of matrices of order k and 
k+ 1 this statistic, if k is not too large, is probably easier to calculate than any of the 
others which require iterative evaluation of maximum likelihood estimates. In 
Example 4, however, for the restricted test of w3 against w— w3 the statistic V30 —J' 
would seem a sensible one, since O = (, , ) requires no determination and V, 
being in this case the usual chi-squared goodness-of-fit test statistic of w3 against 
00 —w3, is easily obtained; also the calculation of W, avoiding reparametrization, 
is probably the easiest way of handling the adopted model co,.
To provide a numerical comparison of the twelve test statistics we have evaluated 
them for the cases: 
Example 1 with  = 100, = 12, s = 11; 
Example 1 with n = 100, = 115, s = 105; 
Example 3 with p = 2 and observed mean counts over 100 replicates from the 
three sources of 17, 48, 83. In hypothesis a 2 we suppose d = 3. 
TABLE 
Values of equivalent test statistics 
Test statistic (i) (ii) (iii) 
7= T20 —T10 542 217 314 
T20 — V10 5.44 224 315 
T00 — W10 5.39 214 3I4 
V 1  675 252 319 
V20 —T10 660 229 3I9 
V20 —V1,, 663 236 3-20 
V 0 — W10 657 226 3-20  
424 184 311 
W20 —T10 444 192 305 
W20 — V10 447 199 3•06 
W20 — W10  4-41 1.89 305 
There is little variation in the values of the test statistics in case (iii). In cases (i) 
and (ii) while there is agreement between statistics based on the same leading statistic 
the values may vary from group to group. Whether this will often in practice result 
in the tests yielding different decisions is still an open question which is not, however, 
peculiar to restricted tests but to the whole field of large-sample equivalent tests. In 
the absence of any definite answer to this question the only sensible advice to give to 
users of large-sample equivalent tests is to use whichever is computationally most 
convenient and to treat with caution borderline decisions. 
5. APPLICATIONS 
The wide variety of equivalent test statistics provided by the theorem of the previous 
section is the necessary apparatus for the handling of the applications of the restricted 
tests as outlined in section 2. 
0(r0)f 	1(r) 	 -- 2(r2) 
1(r1) W10(x) 
2(r2) V20(x) 	JV20(x)- W10(x) 
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5.1. Analysis of Discrepancy for Nested Hypotheses 
For the analysis of a sequence of nested hypotheses w0 	W2 ... wk, where 
= {O : h(6) = O} with h = [h1, h2, ..., hr j]' and r5 > r1 for j> j. Wald test statistics 
of the type M' - W (j> i) for the restricted test of w against w - are admirably 
suited. For, by using these statistics we base all the tests on 60  and the inverse B.' of 
the information matrix associated with w0, and although we require a matrix inversion 
in the computation of each ft 0 x) the work involved is generally slight compared with 
TABLE 2 
Analysis of discrepancy layout 
Hypothesis to, of comparison 
t The number of restrictions in each hypothesis is shown in brackets, and r0 = 0 if B9 is non-
singular for all 6e 0 ; otherwise r0  is the number of restraints required for identifiability. 
the otherwise necessary reparametrization and the calculation of other maximum 
likelihood estimates and information matrices. The results of an analysis may be 
displayed in an analysis of discrepancy table, the jth row of the table presenting the 
values 0(x) and H'.0(x)— W10(x) (i = 1,2.....j- 1), which we may regard as measures, 
supplied by the data, of the discrepancies between the hypothesis wi under test and the 
hypothesis cv of comparison. Only if all the values in a row are non-significant (the 
assessment being made at the appropriate number of degrees of freedom easily noted as 
r5 —r2  by reference to the margins of the table) do we accept hypothesis w and move 
to the next row. Only one computation, namely that of 0(x), is necessary for each 
row of the table, the other values being obtained by simple subtractions. We remind 
the reader at this stage of our earlier remarks about the multiplicity of significance 
tests involved in this analysis. 
TABLE 3 
Analysis of discrepancy table 
Hypothesis of comparison w9 
0(0) 	1(1) 	2(2) 
	
Rypothesisw1 1(1) 	055 
wider test 	2(2) 360 	305 
3(3) 	721 666 	361 
Illustration. The method is amply illustrated by constructing the analysis of 
discrepancy table for the nested hypotheses w0 D w1 m2 w3 of Example 3, where 
a = 2, d = 3, p = 2. We suppose that, as in our previous illustration, the mean 
counts from the three sources over 100 replicates are 	= 17, Z, = 48, x3 = 83. 
The computations are very simple in this case since B. = diag{01, 02, 03} and 
60 = { 	2}. It is perhaps worth noting that the evaluation of W can be greatly 
simplified by rewriting cv3 = {0: 0-2 = 02-5 = 03-8 = 01, a device which is often 
rewarding. 
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In the table the only significant value at the 5 percent. level is W(x) - W10(x) = 666 
which is greater than c3_1,0.05  = 584. Thus we would be prepared to go no further 
than to accept 	on this data. The lengthier process of carrying out the analysis 
using statistics other than this Wald type leads to exactly the same conclusions. 
5.2. Increasing Power by Restricting Alternatives 
The power at 00 €w1—w2  of a restricted test of w2 against W1_CO2 within coo is 
Pr{,[r2— Ti, (0o)]> 
as compared with the power of the corresponding unrestricted test of CO2  against 
WO CO2 which is given by 
Pr{x2[r2, A20(00)]> cr }. 	-. 
The two expressions differ only in the degrees of freedom involved, namely r2-r, 
and r2. A similar result is established by a geometrical argument for their special 
multinomial case by Fix, Hodges and Lehmann (1959). Their conclusion, reached 
from graphical considerations of the power functions, also holds here, namely that 
for fixed 00 Ew1 —o-' 2  the restricted test power is greater than the unrestricted test 
power and the difference increases as r1 increases. Thus when r1  is small the increase 
in power may not be great whereas when r1  is larger the increase may be more 
appreciable. This point may be illustrated by our examples. 
Example 1. For n = 100 and 00 E 1- 2 with 01 = 02 = 09 we have 
;6(00) = A21(00) = 370 and the restricted test of w2 against w1 —w2 
 within coo has 
power 048 compared with the unrestricted test power of 038; for 0 E - w2 with 
01 = 02 = 12 we have i\(0) = A(00) 
= 833 and the corresponding powers are 
083 and 074. Here r1 = 1 and the increases in power are not very marked. To illus-
trate the fact that the restricted test may have the smaller power for alternatives in 
we consider the case n = 100, 01 = 11, 02 = 12, when the powers for the 
restricted and unrestricted tests are respectively 029 and 062. 
Example 3. For p = 8 the powers of the restricted and unrestricted tests of size 
005 of w2  are respectively 081 and 053 when 00 Ew1—a12 and A(00) 
= 4. Here 
r1  = 7 and the increase in power is more noticeable. 
5.3. Easing the Evaluation of a Test Statistic 
If the information matrix and maximum likelihood estimates associated with o 
are difficult to handle it may well be a legitimate computational device in carrying 
out an unrestricted test of w2  against all alternatives within the basic model w1  to use 
a restricted test statistic such as W20 - W10, where wo is a model such that w0 w1. 
For 
instance, in Example 1, if we know that X is N(0, 02), or that the basic model is w1, 
and wish to test the hypothesis w2 that Xis N(1, 1) the introduction of w0 and the use 
of W(x) - W10(x) = n(+ 2s— 3)2/s2  leads to simpler computations and an equivalent 
test. 
5.4. The Multinomial Case 
When X is a k-class multinomial random variable with class probabilities 
0/E05 (1 = 1,2, ...,k) and w0 = {0 : all 0O} with the identifiability condition 
= 1, the Lagrange-multiplier statistic V10  for testing w1  against w—w1  is then 
just the usual chi-squared goodness-of-fit test statistic based on the familiar 
{(observed— expected under w1)2/(expected under v1)}; see, for example, Aitchison 
M. 
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and Silvey (1960). If in applying a restricted test of o2 against o1— w2 within coo we 
use the test statistic V - V10 we then have essentially the restricted chi-squared tests 
of Fix, Hodges and Lehmann (1959). The multinomial theory thus forms a special 
case of our more general theory. Moreover, the alternative test statistics provided by 
Theorem I may give easier means of computation than the Fix—Hodges--Lehmann 
	
statistics. In testing w2 against 	in Example 4 we have an instance of this, for 
Wx) - W10(x), although involving the inversion of matrices of order k and 2k, 
requires less computational skill than the iterative procedures of finding 01 and 0 
necessary for the V20 - V approach. 
6. SEPARABLE HyponrEsEs AND PARTITIONTNG OF TEST STATISTICS 
- 	 6.1. Criteria for Separability 
Our remaining task is to demonstrate the application of restricted test theory to 
the related problems of recognizing separable hypotheses and partitioning test 
statistics. We state our two results—Theorem 2 for non-singular, and Theorem 3 for 
singular, information matrices associated with the basic model o0—as sufficient 
conditions for two hypotheses w1 and cu. to be separable with respect to the equivalent 
large sample tests of Theorem 1. These give easily applied criteria for separability and 
at the same time provide the necessary basis for partitioning a test statistic. The theory 
is most easily developed in terms of Wald statistics, but equivalent statistics can be 
substituted in the applications whenever convenient. 
6.2. Case of a Non-singular Information Matrix 
We suppose, that cu, = {O E 	h1(0) = O} and ai 2 = {O E w h2(0) = O}, where 
= [Iz h12 h11.]' and h2 = [h21 h20 ... h2j', are no longer nested and let H10 and 
H20, the s x r1 and s x r2 matrices of first order partial derviatives of h1 and h2 with 
respect to 0, be such that [H1 11210 is of rank r1+r2 for all Oeo. We then have the 
following theorem for the case 'where the information matrix based on coo is 
non-singular. 
Theorem 2. If B0 is non-singular for all 0 E a then a sufficient condition for w 
and w2 to be separable with respect to the equivalent large sample tests of Theorem 1 
is that [H-, B-1 H21,9 = 0 for all 0Ew1flw2. 
Proof. Let CO3 = ü ' cu2, assumed to be non-empty. To establish the theorem we 
have to show, for example, that the large sample critical region for testing (03 against 
w1—co3 is the same as that for testing w against w0 —a 2. (The equivalence of the 
critical regions for testing (03 against CO2— CO3 and w against 	is proved in a 
similar fashion.) This will be so if we can show that plim (W31 - W) = Oil O€ ca, n CO2,  
Now 
= [h hJ8. 
11]~B-1111 
H B-1 H1 H B-1 H2] 1 
HB'H2j, Lh2J8 
and 
11H B'1 1IJ, [}I B 1 H2]0] —1 plimW 
= 	[hi 2 	 6. [HB1H2]0,j 	h.] 8. 
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Thus, for 00 Ew1  fl 2, 	plim W = plim(W—W1o) 
=pllmW 
by Theorem 1. Hence the theorem is established. 
The practical use of the result requires some explanation. When faced with two 
hypotheses w1 and w2  as above, the first step, in examining the two nested sequences 
(0j0, w1,  01 fl w9) and (w w2 , w1  fl w1) as indicated in section 2, is to test to, against 
and U)2 against U)0 —U)2. Only if these tests accept w1 and U)2 do we inquire 
whether we should then also accept ü 3 = w1  fl w2. We would then want to test w3  
against each of Col—w3, 0u2 —w3 and w0 —w3. The above theorem shows that when 
w and w2  are separable we can omit the tests against U)1 —0O3 and w2 —w3 and concen-
trate on w3 against COO— CO3'. Indeed there are further implications. For acceptance 
of cu - and w2 separately means that W10(x) < c 	and W20(x) < 	and SO 
W10(x) + W20(x) < c,.,, + Cr. Also under the separability conditions of Theorem 2 
the critical region 
{x : W10(x) + W20(x)> Cr+ra} 
may be used for the test of w3 against w0 - w3. Now since Cr  + c,
,'
,is never greatly in 
excess of 	the ready acceptance of w1 and w2 will usually result in the acceptance 
Of w3. Thus the final test is little more than a safeguard against the too eager 
acceptance of co3 after the near rejection of w1 and w3. 
This point can be illustrated by a familiar situation in regression analysis. Suppose 
that we have n observations on (X1, X2, ..., Xk), where the components are independent 
and X is distributed as N(01a+02 b,a2) (i= 1, 2, ...,k), the a j and bi being known 
constants. If to, = {0 0 = 0) and w2 = {0 02  = 01 then the separability condition 
is easily seen to be Y2a b = 0, the familiar orthogonality condition. In such circum-
stances acceptance of co1 and co2 separately will usually result in acceptance of 
w1nw2 ={0 : 0= 02 =0}. On the other hand, if Eab0 the interpretation 
becomes more difficult, for acceptance of co, and co.separately may not lead to the 
acceptance of co, nw2; both the controllable variables a and b may separately give a 
reasonable fit to the dependent variable x because of their own interdependence. 
As in the illustration of the preceding paragraph our result, applied to the general 
linear hypothesis model, leads to the usual orthogonality conditions. Our main concern 
is again in non-standard situations of which we give the following illustration. 
Illustration. In Example 5 we have 	 - 
B1 = diag{02  02  0} 1' 2' ' 
H 8 =p3102 03 03 01 01 021, 
H={ 
and so [IB'H2I0 =p2 01 02  03[01 02 01 — 031 = 0 when 0 cu, flw2. Hence cv and 
are separable. Also p& = (, . x3), where R1, 92, x3 are the means of the three 
linear measurements of the n cuboids, and it easily follows that 
W10(x) = np( X2 X3  — a3)/(x1 -2  x3), 
I
(1 1\ (T11  1\2 	 1'
W(x)np1--) 	 +_
\XjX21 	X31 \X2 X 	X 
EM 
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and 
W(x) = np(i 	
)2 (i _)2+ (i a)2) 
We display in Table 4 the results of the three tests of size 005 for the cases 
i)n = IOO,p = 3, a = 1; 1== HO, 12 = 105, x3 = 095; 
(ii)ii= IOO,p = 3, a= 1; 1= F14, £2 = 12,23 = 096. 
TABLE 4 
Values of test statistics 
Case Case Corresponding 
(i) 	(ii) . 	values of 
Test W10 (r1 = 1) 079 340 384 
statistic I 	
W20 (r2 = 2) 343 5.59 5.99 
W30 (r1+r2 = 3) 399 830 781 
Case (i) shows the customary acceptance of w1  n w2 after the ready acceptance of w1  
and w2 separately; case (ii) shows how near rejection of o and w2 can lead to the 
rejection of w1 n w2. 
6.3. Case of a Singular Information Matrix 
Suppose now that B5 can be singular and that the necessary r0 constraints h0(8) = 0 
for identifiability of the parameters have been imposed, with as before the s x r0 matrix 
1- 0 of first order partial derivatives of the components of h0 such that [B + H0 H]5 is 
non-singular for all OEw0. The hypotheses co, and a are as for the non-singular case. 
We then have the following criterion for separability of v1  and v2. 
Theorem 3. In the singular case col  and CO2  are separable with respect to the 
equivalent large sample tests of Theorem 1 if, for all CE w1  1) w21 	- 
[H(B+H0 H 1H2]0 =O 
and either 	B+H0 Hy 1  H1]5 = 0 or [1KB+H0 H)—'H2]5 = 0. 
Proof. The proof follows a pattern similar to that of Theorem 2, and we omit the 
details. The sufficient conditions are introduced at the same stage (together with the fact 
that h0(610) = 0) in the establishing of the basic result that plim W30 = plim (W10 + W) 
if 9ew1 flw2. 
Again through the equivalence of the Wald and the Lagrange-multiplier statistics 
the result covers the existing theory of the multinomial case; for instance, in a 2 x 2 
contingency table the hypothesis cv that the two classifications are independent and 
the hypothesis a 2 that the marginal probabilities are specified numbers are separable. 
The result applies, however, to more than standard cases. For example, in Example 6 
it is easy to show that {H(B+1I0 H 1 H1]5 = 0,  
[I1(B + H H.)—' H2]5 = 0 for all 0 E a fl w and so the two hypotheses are separable; 
we could then proceed to investigate the three tests as in the non-singular test and 
again we would find the same pattern exhibited. It is worth noting here that if we use 
the identifiability condition in w1 and so consider the equivalent hypothesis 
= {Ow0 : 0+ 01 = l} we obtain the same results via a different route. Although 
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fH(B + HO H)-1  1I11 is now no longer 0 for all 0 e o1 flw2 the remaining two proper-
ties are sufficient to establish the separability of w, and a 2. 
It is clear that the notion of separability can easily be extended to more than two 
hypotheses but neither here nor in dealing with partitioning shall we enter into the 
details of such extensions. 
6.4. Partitioning a Test Statistic 
The results of our three theorems may now be applied to the problem of partition-
ing test statistics into component statistics. If in investigating v3 against w0 - w3 we 
have found W(x), say, significant and if w3 = co, fli2 then we may be interested in 
asking whether this significance is due to departure from a or from w2 or from both 
and 	should be emphasized that the attitude of the experimenter is here 
different from that of the experimenter of the last section. Here the experimenter, 
having found a significant test statistic, has realized that it may be possible to investi-
gate in more detail the source of this significance by partitioning the test statistic. 
The interpretation becomes relatively easy if W30(x) can be expressed as the sum of 
two components, one testing w1 againstcoo — col  and the other testing w2 against 
WO — CO2. Such is the case if w 1 and w, are separable. For, by Theorem 1, we know 
that W30(x) is approximately W10(x)+ W31(x), and, by Theorems 2 and 3, we have that 
W31(x) which tests w3 against w1 - (03 serves, in the case where w1 and CO 2 are separable, 
as a test statistic for examining w 2 against w 0 - w, or equivalently can be replaced by 
W20(x). Thus when w1 and CO2  are separable we do have this possibility of partitioning 
(at least in an asymptotic sense) IV(x) into components W 0(x) and W 0(x) for the 
study of departures from cut and a 9 separately. Familiar examples of this technique 
are the linear form partitionings of a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test statistic (see, 
for example, Cochran (1952)), and the breakdown of asum of squares into component 
sums in an analysis of variance. 
Illustration. If in Example 6 the numbers falling into the three types are (n1, n2, n3) 
in ii replicates then we have 
W10(x) = 2n(n + n - nf{n - (nI + ,4)2} 
W(x) = n(n1 - n3)2/{n(nj + n3) (n - 
(n - 
W(x) 
= 	n)2 + (n2 - n)2 + (z - n)2  
nl 	na 
Suppose that we find that w3 is unacceptable as it is in the case n = 100, n1 = 20, 
= 40, n3 = 40, when W(x) = 938 to be compared with c205 = 599. Then 
W10(x) =254 and W20(x) = 6-67, each to be compared with c10.05 = 384. Our 
conclusion then is that the rejection of w3 is not due to genetic instability of the 
population but entirely to the inequality of the dominant and recessive proportions. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I wish to thank the referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
REFERENCES 
ArrcujsoN, I. and SILvEy, S. D. (1958), "Maximum-likelihood estimation of parameters subject 
to restraints", Ann. math. Statist., 29, 813-828. 
- - (1960), "Maximum-likelihood estimation procedures and associated tests of 
significance", J. R. statist. Soc. B, 22, 154-171. 
WA 
250 	 AITCHISON - Large-sample Restricted Parametric Tests 	[No. 1, 
COCHRAN, W. G. (1952), "The x2  test of goodness of fit", Ann. math. Statist., 23, 315-345. Fix, E., HODGES, J. L. and LEHMANN, E. L. (1959), "The restricted chi-squared test", in Probability and Statistics, The Harold Cramer Volume; editor, U. Grenander. New York: Wiley. 
MANN, H. B. and WALD, A. (1943), "On stochastic limit and order relationships", Ann. math. Statist., 14, 217-226. 
R,.o, C. R. (1948), "Large sample tests of statistical hypotheses concerning several parameters 
with application to problems of estimation", Proc. Comb. phil. Soc., 44, 50-57. 
SILVEY, S. D. (1959), "The Lagrange-multiplier test", Ann. math. Statist., 30, 389-407. 
WD, A. (1943), "Tests of statistical hypotheses concerning several parameters when the number 
of observations is large", Trans. Amer. math. Soc., 54, 426-432. 
AITCHISON, J. (1964) 
Confidence-region tests 
Reprinted from J. R. Statist. Soc. B26, 462-76 
462 	 [No. 3, 
Confidence-region Tests 
By J. AITCHISON 
University of Liverpool 
(Received April 19641 
SUMMARY 
To test a hypothesis that a parameter has value O we usually ask whether an 
observation falls in a critical region of the outcome space. It is well known 
that, by a suitable choice of confidence region, an equivalent test is to ask 
whether 0 lies outside the confidence tegion. In this paper the concept of 
such a confidence-region test is extended in directions which are relevant 
to the study of data-snooping and multiple-hypothesis testing. These 
problems are investigated for linear models and, in the asymptotic case, 
for more general parametric models. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
SUPPOSE that the family of distributions, which form the possible probabilistic 
descriptions of an experiment, is indexed by a parameter 0, and that ü is the para-
meter space. It is not known what the true value of the indexing parameter is. For 
convenience we identify a subset w1 of w0 with the hypothesis that the true parameter 
value is a member of w1; in particular the hypothesis 0*  states that the true parameter 
value is 0*.  Let  A(0*)  be a critical region of size a for testing the hypothesis 0*, 
and let C(x) be a confidence region for the parameter, based on the observation or 
outcome x and having confidence coefficient I -a. Then it is well known (Neyuian, 
1937; Lehmann, 1959, pp.  78-83) that, under favourable circumstances, the following 
two statements are equivalent: 
xEA(0*), and so hypothesis 0*  is rejected; 
0*C(x). 
This equivalence can, in fact, always be arranged by selecting 
C(x) = (0: xA(0)}. 
In such circumstances we can carry out a test of the hypothesis * according to the 
following procedure: 
If{0*}n  C(x) = 0, then reject 0*; 
If {O*}  n C(x)5 0, then conclude that there is no evidence to justify the 
rejection of 0*. 
Expressed in other words, a confidence region for the parameter and critical regions 
of tests of simple hypotheses are here so related that points outside the confidence 
region correspond to simple hypotheses which would be rejected under the tests. 
Such an equivalence may also hold when the hypothesis concerns 6 in a simple sense 
but when there are other nuisance parameters involved. A familiar example is the 
following. Let the observation be the set x = (x1, ...,x) of outcomes of n independent 
replicates of an experiment described by some N(0, a2) distribution, and let interest 
be in the hypothesis that 0 = 0, so that a is a nuisance parameter. If and s are 
90 
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defined by ni = Ex, (n— 1)s2 = 	we have the usual critical region A(0*) 
of size a for testing 0* given by 
A(e*)={x:nfl2.O*I/s>g(n_1; l-3)}, 
where t(d; p) denotes the p-probability point of the i-distribution with d degrees of 
freedom; and the usual confidence interval for 0 with coefficient 1—tx is given by 
C(x) = {0: 2—sn 4 t(n— 1; 1 —)< 0<+srr4(n-1; l—a)}. 
It is clear that xe A(0*)  if and only if 0*  0 C(x), as required for the equivalence of the 
two procedures. 
In this paper we consider some of the consequences of regarding an extension of 
the confidence-region procedure set out in (a) and (b) as the basic method of testing. 
Our method of bringing experimental - evidence x to bear on a possibly composite 
hypothesis w1  will be to ask whether a confidence region C(x), based on x and selected 
with the experimental setting in mind, is such that 
w1 n C(x) = 0, in which case cv is rejected, 
w1 fl C(x) 0, in which case cal  is not rejected. 
This approach to testing by way of confidence-region tests has repercussions mainly 
in two aspects of statistical hypothesis testing, namely in the problem of data-snooping 
and in situations where more than two hypotheses (a null and an alternative) come 
under scrutiny. Thus a main consideration of this paper is to show the relevance of 
the technique to these two statistical problems. The other important consideration 
is the purely mathematical task of transforming the procedure laid down in (a) and 
(b) into one which is computationally operable. We shall see that the result of this 
transformation leads to a useful interpretation in terms of common practice. 
The use of confidence-region tests is certainly not new in linear statistical analysis. 
In the analysis of variance they form the basis of the S-method of multiple comparison 
(Scheffé, 1953; 1959, pp. 68-83) for discovering which estimable functions of a 
specified linear space of estimable functions are significantly different from zero. 
Our reappraisal of the S-method involves certain new features. Whereas the standard 
method of application consists of asking whether individual estimable functions are 
significantly different from zero, it is necessary, and mathematically no more difficult, 
in a general study of the properties of the tests, to ask whether a given linear subspace 
of the space of estimable functions contains any functions which differ significantly 
from zero. The resolution of the computational aspect of this problem leads to an 
exceedingly simple test procedure. Moreover, the theory allows a comparison to be 
made between the S-method and the still prevalent "fixed-level" test procedure, by 
providing a measure which can conveniently be interpreted by the fixed-level tester as 
an "equivalent significance level", at which the S-method appears to operate. Besides 
this extension of the results of Scheffé we also advocate a more extensive use of the 
method. 
Confidence-region tests have also recently (Goodman, 1964) been made the basis 
of multiple comparison in contingency tables, and H. Stone, in the discussion on 
Beale (1960), indicates how the S-method can be applied to regression models which 
are non-linear in the parameters. These applications are in fact particular cases of 
a very general theory of large-sample multiple-hypothesis testing in a parametric 
model,, the large-sample analogue of the S-method. The essentials of this general 
theory are presented in this paper. 
91 
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2. SOME REMARKS ON DATA-SNOOPING AND MULTIPLE-HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
2.1. Testing of Hypotheses 
So that the reader may more readily evaluate the procedures we advocate later, we 
first comment on the philosophy of hypothesis testing adopted in this paper. We 
regard hypothesis testing as an attempt to reduce the set w0 of uncertainty about the 
true parameter value by contriving to use the observed data to dismiss from the 
field of possibility subsets of a 0, that is to say, hypotheses. This process can usefully 
be looked on as an interchange of views between an experimenter and a statistician. 
The experimenter presents the statistician with w1 and x and asks whether he can now 
reasonably limit his attention to the set w0—w1. Valuable conclusions are most 
likely to be drawn when this null hypothesis col—selected prior to experimentation—
is not so "large" that it is almost impossible to reject it, and not so "small" that to 
dismiss it is to leave the field of uncertainty scarcely narrowed. This is essentially the 
outlook adopted by the Neyman-Pearson school who, by using test procedures 
which protect the null hypothesis through limiting the liability to commit an error of 
the first type, ensure that rejection of a null hypothesis is a relatively positive action. 
An experimenter who is delighted when a hypothesis a, suggested by him, is not so 
rejected should be cautioned to study the power function of the test. We know that 
often "acceptance" of col does not imply dismissal of ü — c, but rather that the 
experimenter has still grounds for hoping that the true parameter value may be in w1. 
If the experimenter really wants to convince himself that w1 is acceptable and use the 
customary type of statistical test, he would be well advised to treat a—w1 as null 
hypothesis. Procedures are also logically less soundly based when it is not clear that 
the experimenter selected w1 prior to experimentation, or when an answer to the first 
question of the experimenter is followed by further questions about other hypotheses. 
We shall see that confidence-region tests have a contribution to make in this troubled 
area of statistical activity. 
It is a generally accepted tenet of scientific method that it is incorrect to use 
experimental data either to support or refute a hypothesis suggested by those data. 
Yet we as statisticians, in a variety of ways and to varying degrees, break this tenet 
unwittingly in much of our routine work, especially when more than one hypothesis 
is concerned. We mention here a few situations where tests cannot be interpreted 
in the way that the experimenter is often led to believe that they can. 
2.2. Data-snooping 
Most statisticians, who have been involved to any extent in advisory or consulta-
tive work, are familiar with the type of client who first turns up after he has completed 
his experiment. He has taken no previous advice on how to design his experiment to 
test previously posed hypotheses. He has already browsed through his data in an 
attempt to "sort out the facts" and in this browsing may well have noticed something 
that "looks significant". The statistician is being consulted to verify that the signifi-
cance is real. Can the experimenter reasonably expect the statistician to use data to 
test hypotheses which could well have been suggested by these data, and to carry out 
the same test as he would have employed in conducting tests of properly postulated 
hypotheses? The answer is clearly that he cannot. Is it possible with honesty to do 
anything for such experimenters? One answer is that we can at least provide a method 
for the guidance of the experimenter—possibly for the purposes of hypothesis-
formulation for subsequent experimentation—but that he must expect to pay a 
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penalty, and sometimes a heavy penalty, for his break with scientific mçthod. This is 
an extreme, rather obvious form of data-snooping. Unfortunately it comes in subtler 
forms. There is the well-intentioned experimenter who sets out to test quite a specific 
hypothesis and who, finding that his experiment is inconclusive in that he cannot 
reject this hypothesis, then looks at the data again in the hope that a significant 
effect may be spotted. 
2.3. Multiple-hypothesis testing 
There is little doubt that the only satisfactory treatment of a multiple-hypothesis 
testing problem is to regard it in terms of decision theory and to encourage the 
experimenter to attempt to specify an appropriate loss function. Statisticians have 
been particularly reluctant to develop this, probably because of the inherent difficulties 
of decision theory and the vagueness of the notion of loss function to the experimenter. 
The most successful attempt so far is probably that of Lehmann (1957a, b). The 
usual substitute for such a complete specification is to lay down some intuitive 
procedure for testing, and to examine its properties. All such procedures of multiple-
hypothesis testing are to some extent ad hoc, and a proponent of one procedure 
attempts to make a case that his is less ad hoc than that of his rivals, or to justify it 
by the reasonableness of its properties. It is this unambitious aspect of examining 
the properties of the ad hoc procedure of confidence-region testing of many hypotheses 
that we undertake in this paper. 
2.3.1. Introspection of an accepted hypothesis 
Frequently an experimenter has under consideration a number of nested hypo-
theses Co., Cu21  ..., wi., where cuD W1 D w 2 '... WJ. A standard statistical procedure, 
common in regression and analysis of variance, is that sometimes termed "fitting-
the-models"; see, for example, Fraser (1958, pp.  266, 304-308). First, we test CO, 
within ai at the 5 per cent significance level, say. If co, is rejected our analysis ends 
there; if it is not rejected we proceed to carry out some test of Co. within w1 (or 
possibly within w0), again at the 5 per cent level. If we reject w2 at this stage the 
analysis is terminated; otherwise it continues along the obvious path. We finally 
dismiss as unreasonable the first hypothesis rejected by this procedure. The interpre-
tation of significance level is, for such procedures—as it is for all multiple-hypothesis 
testing—entangled in the web of conditions attaching to tests in the hierarchy of tests. 
What does it mean, in teims of liability to error, to reject w 2 at the 5 per cent signifi-
cance level when in fact we carry out this test only if a previous 5 per cent test has 
given a particular result? How sensible indeed is it to persist in the use of 5 per cent 
at every stage of the analysis? There is no blatant overthrow of scientific principle 
here, but in a sense there is a latent departure from it since our particular use of the 
data can hoodwink us into a kind of placid acceptance of a use and interpretation 
of significance levels which can hardly stand up to careful scrutiny. 
Since statistical tests are designed more for the rejection of hypotheses than for 
their acceptance we note that it would be more appropriate to start our investigation 
with wk, the smallest region of the parameter space to come under scrutiny. We 
first ask if we can reject Cuk; if so, can we become more ambitious and regard wk 
as a candidate for rejection, and so on? This equivalent view of the problem really 
falls into the category of "enlarging rejected hypotheses" which we now consider 
informally. 
0 
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2.3.2. Enlarging rejected hypotheses 
It is common statistical practice, when a test rejects a hypothesis w1, to investigate 
wider hypotheses containing cv in the hope that one or other of these may be also 
rejected. For example, in analysis-of-variance work, the partitioning of a significant 
sum of squares, associated with a hypothesis Wj, into components is an attempt to 
explore with each component some hypothesis wider than w1; see, for example, 
Goulden (1952, p.  87). Similar action by partitioning is also taken in contingency-
table analysis; see, for example, Rao (1952, pp. 192-196). Such follow-up tests are 
often carried out at the same significance level as the basic test and again we may 
question what interpretation, if any, can be placed on this significance level. Should 
we not be much more cautious in discarding these wider hypotheses than we are in 
our rejection of the smaller hypothesis first tested? 	-. 
3. DATA-SNOOPING IN A LINEAR MODEL 
The extreme case of uninhibited data-snooping in a linear model sets the scene 
for subsequent analyses by providing most of their important ingredients while 
retaining mathematical simplicity. 
We suppose that x is a vector observation on a N(0,a2i) random variable and 
that the experimenter and statistician are agreed that the 0-parameter space—which is 
the one of main interest, a really being an unknown nuisance parameter—is not the 
whole of R', but some linear subspace w0 of 
Rn of dimension d0. It is usual to refer 
to this basic parameter space as the model. This is the natural setting for any fixed-
effects model; the choice of the linear space w0 is often simply dictated by the 
experimental design. We suppose that the experimenter has not made up his mind 
what hypothesis he wishes to test. Let 00(x) denote the maximum-likelihood or 
least-squares estimate of the true parameter value 0*, say, so that 00(x) is the 
projection of x on w0. Then, denoting distance in Rn between x and y by 11 x—yIII 
we recall that 0°(x)— 0*112/(do s2) is an observation on an F(d0,n—d0) distribution, 
where S2 = 11 
X — 00(x)1I2/(n_d. Hence it is natural, in the absence of any indication 
of interest in particular hypotheses, for us to take, as a neutralist confidence region 
of confidence coefficient 1— cx, the region 
C(x) = {0 :11 0—  00(x)I12/(dos2) F(d0,n—d
o; I —o)}, 	 (1) 
where F(v1, v2; p) denotes the p-probability point of an F(v1, v2) distribution. If the 
experimenter suggests a linear hypothesis w1  of dimension d1 <d0, then we use C(x) 
as the basis of a confidence-region test as defined in Section 1. The consequences 
of this are most readily assessed by the construction of the equivalent critical region 
A(w1) defined by 
A(w])={x:wlflC(X)0}- 	 (2) 
(Note that we do not here restrict cul  to be a homogeneous linear hypothesis; the set 
w1  is, of course, at least parallel to some linear subspace of wo and is a subset of 
w0.) 
Now 
w1  fl C(x) =0 
if and only if, for all 0 e w, 
ll8_00(x)112>do s2 F(do,n_do; 1—t), 
or, equivalently, 
11 0min  e— 60(x) III >do s2 F(do,n_do; 1—cx). 
01 
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467 Since O'(x), the least-squares estimate of 0* O°(x) ono we have immedi 	 on hypothesis col, is the projection of ately that 
mini! 0—  0°(x)1j 	ii 0'(x) - 00(x)112, 
and so 
(3) [x : 0'(x) - 01(x) 1121t(d0 - d1) s2} 
?{'4I(ddo i)) FRO, n_do; 1—a)]. 	
(4) 
A feature of critical region (4) is that it is defined by means of the usual statistic for testing co against coo —c 
but that the critical value for comparison is 
{dO1(di)}F(d.do; 1—cr) 
instead of the customary a significance value F(a - d1, n method can thus be interpreted in terms of t 	
c; I - a). The proposed 
he penalty that it imposes on the data- snooper by reducing the significance level a 
(corresponding to confidence coefficient I—a)  to P, determined by 
F(dd,fl_do; '-fl)= 	 1—a). 	(5) 
Table I, which serves both the present Section and Section 
5, gives the solution fi of 
the equation 	- 




of the equivalent significance level 	corresponding ,6 - to a = 005, for the linear case 
C 	a b 
c 	a 	b 
2 	2 1 
3 
0-025 	 40 	10 	9 0038 0034 
I 0013 	 S 00040 
I 0000049 
5 	5 4 20 	19 0034 0039 
1 0-0040 	 10 0-0015 
10 9 40 	39 0041 0-044 
S 0014 	 20 0-00052 
1 00010 100 	10 	9 0-034 
10 	5 4 0-031 	 S. 0-0032 
I 20 	19 0-0022 0-038 
10 9 0-038 	 10 0-00086
49 S 0-0083 50 0-042 
1 0-0Oo2 	 25 0-000085 
20 19 0-043 100 	90 0-017 
10 - 0-0062 	 50 0-0000071 
I 0000022 
95 
468 	 AITCHISON - Confidence-region Tests 	 (No. 3, 
for a selection of values a, Li, c and for a = 005. Values of arc easily determined 
since 
= IQc, b) = 1 - I1_(b, 4c), 	 (7) 
where I(c,  b) denotes an incomplete beta ratio (Pearson, 1934) and 
x= c/{c+aF(a,c; l—o)}. 
The equivalent significance level P of the confidence-region test of the linear hypothesis 
w1  is obtained when the table is entered at a = d0, b = d0 —d1, c = n—do. 
The application of confidence-region testing has been reduced, in (3) and (4), to 
a test which involves exactly the same basic computations as are required for standard 
tests of linear hypotheses. We are now in a position to indicate ways in which this 
procedure has intuitive appeal. By choosing C(x) as confidence region we effectively 
regard as implausible any parameter value that falls outside C(x), and so we would 
expect the confidence-region test based on C(x) to reject such a parameter value, or 
simple hypothesis, at the significance level a corresponding to the confidence 
coefficient I -a. This follows from the fact that a simple hypothesis has dimension 
d1 = 0 so that b = a and fi = . As long as the experimenter confines himself to 
simple hypotheses he incurs no penalty. If, however, he becomes more ambitious 
and thinks he can reject a larger hypothesis w1  of higher dimension then we should 
proceed with more caution. The larger the region of the parameter space that is 
involved the more stringeht we ought to make our assessment of the possibility of 
rejection. This is precisely the feature of confidence-region tests. If d1 >0 we have 
Li <a and so g <; the greater d1 is, the greater is the difference between a and b and 
so the smaller fi is, that is, the more reluctant we are to discard the hypothesis. It is 
clear from Table 1 that the equivalent significance level can be very small when the 
experimenter is really ambitious. A further property is that if d<<d0  then g is approxi-
mately equal to oc. This again seems very reasonable since, by attempting to discard 
a hypothesis of dimension d1, the experimenter is not being very ambitious when the 
original model has high dimensionality. 
We also note that, should the experimenter offer successively all the simple 
hypotheses in the parameter space, he would succeed in rejecting the whole of 
w0 —C(x). There is no anomaly here; by asking about the plausibility of each para-
meter value the experimenter turns his multiple-hypothesis data-snooping problem 
into the respectable one of estimation, and the statistician offers him a confidence 
region in return. 
4. DATA-SNOOPING IN A GENERAL PALr1uc MODEL 
We suppose that the experiment has outcome space T and is described by a 
density function of the formf(•, 0) on X, where 0 is d0-dimensional with components 
that remain independent under the restriction 0 e w0. Corresponding to parameter 
value 0 the information matrix B5 of the experiment has (i,j) component 
- E8132 logf(, 6)10 Oi a e,}, 
where E5 denotes expectation with respect to the density function f(, 0'). We further 
suppose that we have available a set x = (x1, ..., x) of the outcomes of a large number 
n of independent replicates of the experiment, and that 00(x) is the maximum-likelihood 
estimate (under a) of 0*, the true parameter value. To deal with a data-snooping 
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experimenter we may reasonably take, as our asymptotic neutralist confidence region 
with coefficient 1— a, the region 
C(x) = [0: n{0— 0°(x)}'Be.(Z){O— 00(x)},(d0; 1 -o)1, 	(8) 
where x2(d; p) denotes the p-probability point of a chi-squared distribution with 
d degrees of freedom. If the experimenter then suggests a hypothesis ai x, which places 
d0 —d, functional restrictions on the components of the parameter, so effectively 
reducing the dimension of the parameter to d,, we would use C(x) as the basis of a 
confidence-region test. Our first problem here is again to devise a simple means of 
investigating whether or not co, fl C(x) = 0. 
The fact that 00  is asymptotically distributed as N{O*,(nBe*)_l} can be made the 
basis of a development which exploits the asymptotic equivalence of the theory to 
that of a linear model with known covariance matrix; Lehmann (1959, pp. 303-311) 
indicates the appropriate technique. We omit the tedious details of the argument 
which leads to the result that, for large n, 
min n(O— 0°)'B(0— 00) = n(O'— 00)'B8.(01' —'00)1 
6E1 
where 01 denotes the maximum-likelihood estimator under hypothesis w1. Now the 
statistic n(O'— 0°)'B0 0(0'— 00) is asymptotically equivalent to any of the usual 
asymptotic test statistics for testing w1 within the model 0—the likelihood-ratio 
statistic T10, the Lagrange-multiplier statistic V10 and the Wald statistic W10 ; see 
Aitchison (1962) for the definition and notation of these test statistics. It follows 
that, for large n, 
min n(0— 0°)'B00(0— 0°) 
and so, following an argument similar to that of Section 3, we have the critical region 
A(co) of the confidence-region test of w1 given by 
A(w1) = {x: 7'10(x) ? x2(do; 1— x)}, 	 (9) 
or one of the other two asymptotically equivalent forms. 
We recall that a large-sample test of a properly postulated hypothesis w1 would 
use as critical region of.size 
{x:T10(x)x2(do —d,; 1—a)}. 
Thus we again see that the confidence-region test forces us to use the same test 
statistic as we would have used for a properly posed hypothesis, but at a different 
significance level. The equivalent significance level g is here given by 
2(4 	d1; 1— P) = x2(do; 1— x). 	 (10) 
Table 2, which is also required for Section 6, gives the solution fl of the equation 
(b; 1—fl)=(a; 1—cx) 	 (11) 
for a selection of values of a, b and for a = 005. The solution is easily obtained as 
(12) 
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where I(u,p) is the incomplete gamma ratio, as defined by Pearson (1922), with 
p = 4b —1, u = (a; 1— cx)/(20. 
TABLE 2 
Values of the equivalent significance    level P corresponding to 
= 005, for the asymptotic case 
a 	b 9 	 a b 
2 	1 0-014 	 20 19 0-036 
15 00078 
5 	4 0.026 10 000050 
3 0011 5 00000078 
2 00040 
1 000088 	40 39 0-040 
30 0-0029 
10 	9 0032 20 0000032 
5 00026 
1 0000018 
The confidence-region test here displays all the features of the test of Section 3. 
For example, for small d1 (for which a is near b) the experimenter is considering a 
small part of w0 and so g is not too far below c. If d1 is large then Table 2 shows 
that the experimenter may have to pay a high price for being initially unsure of 
what the direction of his investigation should be. 
5. MULTIPLE-HYPOTHESES TESTING IN A Liit MODEL 
5.1. The Basic Confidence-region Test 
The analyses, to which we now turn our attention, stem from one basic type of 
confidence-region test, which can conveniently be developed in the following setting. 
An experimenter, before he conducts his experiment, puts forward quite a specific 
hypothesis which he wishes to test. Once he learns the result of this test he may wish 
to consider other hypotheses. With this experimental setting in mind we look for a 
confidence-region test which provides the experimenter with a satisfactory test of his 
original hypothesis, and which serves as the basis of his subsequent tests. We suppose 
that the experiment is described by the linear model w0 of Section 3 and that the 
hypothesis of first interest is w, a linear subspace of a; a typical follow-up hypothesis, 
in the applications we consider, is a subspace w1 of w0, where w1 contains w. The 
most convenient specification of w0, w1 and a for our purposes is in terms of the 
mill spaces of certain matrices. Since w0 	w we can find a matrix [H H H] 
with orthogonal columns such that 
coo ={O:BOO}, 
w1 =w0 n{O:H1 0'O}, 
w = oil fl{O:H2 0=O}=wo Cl{0H90}, 
where H'= [H'1  H1. If the dimensions of w0, w1, w are d0, c!,  d, then the matrices 
H0, H1, H2, H are of full ranks n - d0, d0 - d1, d1 - d, 4 - d. 
i I 
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To test w within the model w0  it seems reasonable to construct our confidence 
region by way of the restriction on HO. Noting that HO° is distributed as 
N(HO, cr2 	we see that the confidence region 
C(x) = [0 {HO - HO°(x)}' (HO - HO°(x)} 
,s2(d0 _d)F(d0 _d,n_do; 1—ct)], 	 (13) 
where s2  = lix- (x)jI2/(n—do) has confidence coefficient I—a and 
C(x) seems a 
natural region on which to base our confidence-region test procedure. The region 
C(x) is essentially a reinterpretation of the type of confidence ellipsoid used by 
Scheffé (1953; 1959, p. 69) as the basis of his S-method of multiple comparison. 
We have chosen to imbed our region in the full parameter space w0 rather than 
introduce the Scheffé concept of spaces of estimable functions—such as the set of 
linear combinations of the elements of HO—which are an unnecessary complication 
in our analysis. It is interesting to note that Scheffé (1959, p. 82) substantially suggests 
a type of confidence-region test based on spaces of estimable functions, but does not 
develop it along the lines studied here. We advocate in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below 
more far-reaching applications of the confidence-region procedure than Scheffé 
envisages in his multiple-comparison technique. 
For C(x) to be a satisfactory region it is, of course, necessary that the test of CO 
within w0  based on it should be the standard F-test of size x. This property is verified 
by Scheffé; there is no need to give an independent proof here, but we shall note the 
result as a special case of our analysis of Section 5.2. 
Note that if oi is accepted then 0 E C(x) and so any (homogeneous) linear hypo-
thesis can never be rejected. This may seem harsh to the inveterate data-snooper 
but records little more than the fact that justice has been done. For the experimenter 
clearly stated that he pinned his hopes on rejecting w, and expressed no interest in 
any other subspace of w0. It seems not unreasonable therefore that, on not being 
able to achieve this minimum ambition of rejecting w, he should be placed in a 
position which forces him to accept for the time being the whole of w0. Data-snooping 
is not allowable subsequent to acceptance of a considered hypothe:is. 
If cv is rejected our attention is directed to the study of the confidence-region test 
of a larger hypothesis w1  and to the question of whether an equivalent significance 
level interpretation, on the lines of Section 3, is possible. 
5.2. Testing a Wider Hypothesis; Equivalent Significance Levels 
Our first task is to find the critical region 
A(cv)={x:w j flC(x)—ø} 
associated with the confidence-region test of cv1  within w0, based on C(x). We show 
that 
A(cv) = [x :11 01(x)_ o(x)iI2>s2(do _d)F(do_d,n_do; 1—a)]— 	
(14) 
This result is readily established since 
cv fl C(x) =0 
if and only if 
min (9— 01(x)}'H'H(O— x)}>s2(do _(I)F(do d,fl_ do; 1 	(15) 
RE 
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The fact that H1  0 = 0 for 0 w1 reduces the left side of (15) to 
{01(x))'HH1  0°(x)+ min {0— 00(x)}'HH2{0— 0(x)). 
8EW 
Now if 01(x) is the least-squares estimate of 0*  under col, then 01(x)ecal and 
01(x)-00(x)=IIH1x 
so that 
H2{01(x) — 00(x)} = 0. 
Hence the minimum of zero is attained by the semi-positive definite form at 01(x), 
and so (14) follows since 
H H1 0°(x) = 01(x)— 0°(x). 	- 
The region (14) can be expressed as 
A(w j) = [x :11 01(x)_ 00(x)/{s2(do _d)) 
>{(d0 —d)/(d0 —d1)}F(d0--d,n—do; 1—cr)], 	(16) 
and so we have a situation similar to that of Section 3, for the confidence-region test 
uses the test statistic of the standard F test of w within coo but compares it against the 
critical value 
{(d0 —d)/(d0 —d)} F(d0 —d,n--do; I —) 
instead of the usual 
- 	F(d0 — dl, n—do; 1—o). 
The test procedure is thus again very easy to apply. We can again define, as in 
Section 3, an equivalent significance level g related to a by (6), where a = d0 - d, 
b = d0 - d1, c = n - d0. Typical values of fi can again be obtained from Table 1. For 
the special case where w1 = w we have d1 = d and g = cx, which is the Scheffé result 
that the confidence-region test is equivalent to the standard test as far as w is concerned. 
We note here also that, in presenting his S-method, Scheffé (1959, Theorem of Section 
3.5) is concerned essentially with hypotheses involving one restriction and so of 
dimension d+ 1. He prefers to retain a confidence-region form for his results rather 
than convert to equivalent critical regions, as we have done here. 
The confidence-region test here displays features similar to those of Section 3. 
In particular if the experimenter wishes to test a hypothesis w1  of much, greater 
dimension than co then d1 is appreciably greater than d, and g will be correspondingly 
much less than cx. The test guards against over-ambition by applying more stringent 
criteria than the usual test. 
5.3. Introspection of Accepted Hypotheses: the Nested Method 
The logical procedure for the "introspection of accepted hypotheses" was indicated 
in Section 2 to be the examination in sequence of nested hypotheses 
WkWk_jC ... C: (1)10  
a wider hypothesis being examined only if its predecessor is rejected. The first test 
is therefore of wk within w0  and so we advocate the construction of a confidence 
region C(x) as in Section 5.1 for this purpose; further we make C(x) the basis of a 
confidence-region test procedure for testing all subsequent hypotheses. It seems sound 
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sense to build up our region of plausible values of 8 relative to wk, for the rejection of 
0k is our least ambitious aim. With this procedure we obtain a standard test of 
wk but as we become more ambitious and try to reject wider hypotheses we become 
more stringent in our assessments, essentially adopting lower significance levels than 
the fixed-level tests often advocated. 
5.4. Enlarging a Rejected Hypothesis—Partitioning 
The analysis of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 allows us to compare the application of the 
commonly used fixed-level procedure and the confidence-region test procedure to 
the testing of wider hypotheses by partitioning of test statistics. As a typical study 
we consider how the rejection of ai is followed by the partitioning of the statistic which 
tested w into two components for the separate testing of the larger hypotheses w 
and w2, where w = oil w2. Now for the partitioning to be possible in the analysis-
of-variance setting, a and w2 must be orthogonal subspaces of CV. So, without loss 
of generality, we may take the hypotheses to be, in the notation of Section 5.1, 
oil = w n {O: H1 0 = O} 
as before, and 
= wo n {O : ''2 0 = 0}, 
with dimension d2. If 00(x), 01(x), 02(x), 0(x) denote the least-squares estimates of 
0 under coo, col, w2,w, respectively, and a = d0 —d, a1 = d0 —d1, a2 = d0 —d2, then the 
commonly used critical regions for testing w, w1 and w2 within w0 are based respectively 
on the following inequalities: 
T(x) 110(x) - 0°(x) 112/s2 > aF(a, n - d; I - c) = aF(a), say, 
T1(x) II 01(x) - 0°(x) 11 2/52 > a F(a), 
T2(x) 1102(x) - 0°(x) 11 2/s2 > a2, F(a2). 
The orthogonality of w1 and w2 within co( gives 
T(x) = T1(x)+T2(x), 
a = a,+ a2, 
so that the three inequalities can be written as 
T1(x)±T2(x)>(a1+a2)F(a1+a), 	 (17) 
(18) 
T2(x)>a2 F(a2). 	 (19) 
Standard practice, if (17) holds so that cv is rejected, is to ask which of (18) and 
(19) holds. If (18) holds we enlarge the region of rejection from cv to w1, if (19) holds 
we enlarge the region of rejection from cu to w2, if both (18) and (19) hold the region 
is enlarged from cu to w1 Ucv2. 
Now if 
(a1  + a?.) F(a1  + a2) > a1  F(a) + a2 F(a2), 	 (20) 
then inequality (17) implies at least one of the inequalities (18) and (19). While (20) 
does not hold for n—d0 >2, examination of tables of F percentage points shows 
that (a1  + a) F(a1  + a2) is never much smaller than a1  F(a2) + a2 F(a2), so that the 
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structure of the above procedure almost guarantees that evidence which rejects cv 
will automatically reject one of the wider hypotheses cv1  and w2. If there are a priori 
grounds for believing that rejection of cv can only arise through the rejection of 
wjL or co2  or both, then we cannot object to this feature, although we may ask if the 
purpose of the initial test of co has been clearly thought out. Often, however, there 
are no such a priori grounds and indeed the testing of w1  and w2 may arise as an 
afterthought to the rejection of cv. How sensible is it then to use the above procedure 
in which enlargement of' cv almost automatically follows its rejection? For a case 
where (20) holds, the question just posed can be strengthened by the removal of the 
word "almost". Such a case 'occurs when a1  = a2 = 1, n—d0 = 2, for which, at the 
5 per cent level, 
(al +a2)F(ai+a2) = 38, 
aF(a)+a2 F(a) = 37. 
The confidence-region test procedure uses a region based on testing ca and, 
corresponding to the three inequalities (17), (18) and (19), we have 
T1(x) + T2(x) > aF(a),  
T1(x)> aF(a),  
T2(x) > aF(a). 	.  
Rejection of co does not now imply automatic or nearly automatic rejection of one 
or other of w1 and cv2, and again we have the feature, desirable in many practical 
situations, of much more stringent assessment of data when larger hypotheses are 
under consideration. 
A complementary problem—when do standard tests of w1 and cv2 "induce" a 
good test of cv = w1  fl co,--is the subject of an interesting, paper by Darroch and 
Silvey (1963). 
6. MULTIPLE-HYPOTHESES TESTING IN A GENERAL RkIwvrErRrc MODEL 
The procedures in Section 5 have asymptotic analogues in the general parametric 
model of Section 3. These we now record briefly using a notation as similar as possible 
to that of Section 5. 
The hypotheses cv1, cv2 and cv are conveniently defined in terms of the null spaces 
of vector functions h1, h2 and h, with domain coo, by 
cv1 =w0 fl{O:h1(&)=0}, 
cv2 = coo n (O:h2(0)0}, 
cv = w1 flcu2 = cv0 fl{O : h(6) = 0}1  
where /z = [14h]. We suppose that the dimensions- of h1, h2 and h are d0 —c11, d0 —d2  
and d0 —d. The corresponding matrices H, H and H', which consist of first-order 
partial derivatives of h1, h and h and which are of orders (d0 —d) x d0, (d0 —d2) x d0 
and (do —d) x d0, are assumed to be of ranks d0 —d1, do —d2 and d0 —d, respectively. 
If the experimenter intends first to test ca within the general model w0 then the 
natural confidence region C(x) on which to base a test procedure is defined in terms 
of the inequality 
n[h(G) - h{6(x)}]' (H'B—' H) 	[h(0) - h{(x)}] 	(d0 - d; 1— ), 	(24) 
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where 00(x) denotes, as before, the maximum-likelihood estimate under cv,. The 
test of w based on C(x) can be shown to be the standard Wald test of size a or one 
of its asymptotic equivalents. The confidence-region test of a wider hypothesis w1, 
say, can be shown to have critical region—in the terminology of Aitchison (1962)— 
{x:T10(x)>(d0 —d; 1—at)) 	 (25) 
as compared with the standard asymptotic test of size a with critical region 
{x:T10(x)> (do —di; l—c)). 	 (26) 
The equivalent significance level g is therefore given by (11), where a= d0 —d, 
b = d0 —d1, and displays the kind of features discussed in Section 5.2; again Table 2 
provides typical values. 	 - 
The analysis of nested hypotheses follows the line of development of Section 5.3. 
The analysis of partitioning—which includes as a special case the partitioning of 
statistics associated with contingency tables—follows a pattern similar to that of 
Section 5.4. The orthogonality requirement of hypotheses w and v2 is replaced by 
a separability requirement (Aitchison, 1962) with the condition 11 H = 0 replaced 
by the condition 
H1 B-1H=0 (OEw1 flcv2). 
The awkward feature of standard practice, indicated in Section 5.4, persists in its 
less acute form with x2(a1; 1 - ), etc. replacing a1 F(a), etc. in the argument. In 
contrast the corresponding confidence-region test displays more caution as we move 
to wider hypotheses-. 
The fact that contingency tables and their associated asymptotic tests constitute 
a special case of the general parametric model and its tests (Silvey, 1959; Aitchison 
and Silvey, 1960) ensures that the Goodman (1964) method of multiple comparison 
in contingency tables can be derived from the above theory. 
7. DiscussioN 
The basic feature of a onfldence-region test is that, once the experimenter has 
stated his objectives in terms of the testing of hypotheses and has obtained the result 
of his experiment, a set of plausible parameter values is chosen and made the basis 
of all judgements. This seems to the author a most reasonable, and, in his more 
optimistic moods, a highly desirable, procedure, which takes some account of the 
"dimensions" or "sizes" of the hypotheses under consideration. 
The two types of confidence region used in this paper appear natural choices in 
the linear and asymptotic cases, but it must be admitted that a natural choice may be 
far from obvious in other cases. For example, what is the natural confidence region 
for testing the hypothesis 81+ 02  63 = 0 and based on observations from each of 
three negative exponential distributions with mean parameters 0,1 021 03? Again, the 
question of how, in practice, to choose the confidence coefficient 1—cs has been left 
unconsidered. Where the first hypothesis to be tested seems to be unnaturally 
restrictive, a choice of a greater than the customary 005 would be sensible, say 010 
or 0-20. For example, in a polynomial regression situation in which it can be assumed 
that degree k is certainly adequate and cai is the hypothesis that a polynomial of degree 
k—i will suffice, then clearly we may be so sure of rejecting wk  as to risk a coefficient 
based on a = 0-10 or 020. A similar kind of point is made by Scheffé (1959, p. 71) in 
relation to his S-method of multiple comparisons. 
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We deliberately leave this practical question aside here. The aim of the paper 
has been, by providing an alternative to some standard procedures, to provoke 
statisticians into considering these existing procedures more critically. There are 
dangers in assuming that practices are of necessity soundly based just because they 
are long-established in practice. Even if this paper has done something to make 
clear the interrelations of hypotheses it will have achieved something, for even 
among experienced statisticians the author has found peculiar misconceptions. 
For example, it is not always realized that the components of a partitioned statistic 
are aimed at testing wider, and not narrower, hypotheses than the hypothesis tested 
by the original statistic! 
We have also left aside the considerable problem of comparing confidence-
region testing with other proposed procedures, such as those of Duncan (1955). 
Such comparisons would probably be more ad hoc than the procedures being 
compared. 
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SUMMARY 
A previous paper (Aitchison, 1964) proposed a method of confidence-region 
testing for multiple-hypothesis situations and developed the theory for linear 
univariate situations and for the asymptotic parametric case. The present 
paper shows that the results for these situations are in fact special cases of a 
basic relation between confidence-region tests and likelihood-ratio tests. 
This relation allows the easy extension of confidence-region testing to 
multivariate analysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tm method of confidence-region testing, as defined by Aitchison (1964), involves the 
construction of a confidence region C(x) of size 1 - a for a parameter 0, based on the 
experimental observation x, with the subsequent rejection of any hypothesisVj  
(subset tv of the parameter space cv) if a1 n C(x) = 0. The method when applied to 
problems of testing many hypotheses w11  w2, ... was shown to lead, in the case of 
linear univariate analysis (regression analysis, analysis of variance, etc.) and in the 
asymptotic parametric case, to the use of the standard test statistic, such as an F or 
test statistic, but against a critical value in general differing from that of a direct test 
(of size a) of the hypothesis. One interpretation of this is that the effective size of the 
confidence-region test based on C(x) is less than, but simply related to, a. The purpose 
of this paper is twofold. First, we show that these results are in fact derivable from 
a general relation between the method of confidence-region testing and a class of 
likelihood-ratio test statistics. Secondly, we indicate briefly how the general theory 
applies to multivariate situations, and provide an illustrative example. 
2. GENERAL CONFIDENCE-REGION TEST THEORY 
Let L(x, 0) be the value of the likelihood function for observation x e T and 
parameter 0 Eai0. In what follows it is to be understood that in addition to .0 there 
may be nuisance parameters involved and that all suprema are to be calculated over 
the product of the stated 0-set and the nuisance parameter set. The general result 
will concern the type of situation described in Aitchison (1964), where the experi-
menter's aim is first to test a basic hypothesis (his choice of basic confidence region 
reflecting this aim) and, in the event of rejection of the basic hypothesis, to follow up 
by investigation of other "wider" hypotheses. In what follows it will be useful to use 
both 0 and r to denote possible values of the parameters. We suppose, for convenience 
of theoretical discussion only, that the basic hypothesis has been expressed in the form 
w(a) = {T: h('r) = a}, 
with typical follow-up hypothesis 
w1(b)= {'r: h1(T) = b}, 
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where h'= [hh], h, h1  and h2 being possibly Vector functions and a and b vector 
constants of appropriate dimensions. Note that if a is an extension of the vector b 
then co(a) Ew1(b). We denote the likelihood-ratio test statistic for testing w(a) within the model w0 by A(x; a), i.e. 
A(x; a) = sup L(x, 
T)lrewia) 
sup L(x, 'r). 
1wo c  
Similarly we define A1(x; b) as the likelihood-ratio test statistic for testing w1(b) within wo. The following lemma gives a basic relation between A1  and A. Lemma. 
infA{x; h(0)} = A1(x; b). 
Oewi(b) 
Proof. 
inf A{x; h(0)} = sup L(x, 
T)/Oeaq(b) 
sup 	sup L(x, T) Ooj(b) lEoi{h(0)} 
= sup L(x, 'r)/-
req(b) 
sup L(x, 'r), 
since 
[r: TEw{h(0)), where 0 Ea(b)] 
['r: h(r) = h(0), where h1(0) = b] 
= ['r: h1(T) = b] 
We now make an assumption about the class of likelihood-ratio tests involved, 
namely that the critical region of size c for testing ca(a) within coo  is 
A(w(a)) = {x: A(x; a)> cA)}, 
where the critical value cA) is the same for each a. A similar assumption is supposed 
to hold for likelihood-ratio tests of o1(b). If, moreover, the test for each w(a) is of 
exact size a for each 0 e w(a) then we have, for each a, 
	
P[Afw(a)}10J=ix 	 (1) 
for every 0 e*v(a), where P(. JO) is the probability measure associated with 0. As 
confidence region based on x and designed initially for the testing of hypotheses of 
type co(a) we take 
C(x) = [0: A{x; h(0)} < c(A)i. 	 (2) 
We note that 
P{x: C(x)30J0} =P[x: A{x; h(0)}c(A)f 01 
= 1 —P(A[w{h(0)}]J 0) 
for every 0 e co0  since 0 E u{h(0)} for every 0 E w0. Thus the confidence region has exact size 1 -. If the tests are not of exact size so that (1) has to be replaced by 
sup P[A(cv(a)}J 0J = 	 (3) e,(2) 
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then 
P{x: 	3 01 0} 1— cx 
for every 0 e con, and so the confidence region defined by (2) has conservative size 1 - cx. In either case we have the following basic theorem. 
Theorem. The confidence-region test of w1(b) based on C(x) uses as critical region 
A{w1(b)} = {x: A1(x; b)> c(A)I. 
Proof. The confidence-region test of cu(b) based on C(x) rejects w(b) if and only if 
w1(b)flC(x)= 0, 
i.e. if and only if 
A{x; h(0)}> ç(A) 
for all 0 E w j(b), i.e. if and only if 
inf A{x; h(0)}>ç(A). 
e€(b) 
The result of the theorem then follows by application of the Lemma. 
The feature of this test is that it uses the customary likelihood-ratio test Statistic A1  for testing a1(b) within w0  but compares it against the critical value ç(A) of the 
Statistic A instead of the critical value c(A1) appropriate to a test of size cx. Such a 
simultaneous test procedure, which has also been arrived at from different con-
siderations by Gabriel (1964), gives support to advocates of fixed-odds likelihood-
ratio testing. Confidence-region tests of all hypotheses of the form w(a) have size cx 
but those of wider hypotheses such as cal(b) have their effective size 6 smaller than cx and simply determined by 
c(A1) = c(A). 	 (4) 
The discussion of the properties of confidence-region procedures in Aitchison (1964, p. 468) thus generalizes. 
3. APPLICATIONS OF THE GENERAL THEORY 
Standard test statistics are usually simple monotonic functions of likelihood-ratio 
test statistics rather than these statistics themselves. In order to apply the general 
theory we have therefore to consider the consequences of using U(A) and U1(A) instead of A and A; for the sake of definiteness we suppose that U and U1 are mono-tonic increasing functions. Let c(.) denote, as before, the upper cx point of the stated 
statistic. It is then easy to see that, instead of comparing U1  against c(U) as a direct test of size cx would require, the confidence-region test of w1(b) compares U1 against U1[U'{c(U)}J. Thus its equivalent size 8 is more readily determined by 
c,(U3) = U1[U 1{c(U)}J 	 (5) 
than by (4). For example, in some applications we have U and V of the form 
U(A) = k(AL. 1), 
U1(A1)=k1(A-1); 	 (6) 
for such a case the inverse function U' is easily determined and (5) reduces to 
	
cfi(Ul) = (k1Jk) c(U). 	 (7) 
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The tests which arise in the confidence-region procedures considered by Aitchison 
(1964)—for linear hypotheses in univariate models and for parametric hypotheses in 
asymptotic situations—are all simple monotonic functions of likelihood-ratio test 
statistics, which satisfy the assumption of Section 2. Thus, these confidence-region 
procedures fall within the framework of this more general theory and the confidence 
regions C(x) defined by (13) and (24) of the previous paper are in fact of the form (2) 
defined here and are of exact size 1 -a. The advantage of the general result of 
confidence-region testing—that the customary test statistic is used but against a fixed 
critical value determined by the initial test—is the ease with which procedures are 
derived from it, for nothing more than a knowledge of the standard test statistic is 
required; there is no need to become involved in detailed investigation in special 
cases and it is not even necessary to find the basic C(x) explicitly. This is of par-
ticular help in multivariate situations. For example, suppose that x1, ..., x are 
independent p-dimensional observations on independent  
distributions, where 0 is a p x q matrix parameter, E is a p x p covariance matrix 
(nuisance) parameter and the z, ..., z1 are known constants. If w(a) = {0: OH = a), 
w1(b) = (0: 6111 = b), where H, of order q x r, can be partitioned as (111, 
H.) with H1  
of order q x r1, then the confidence-region test of a 1(b) would use the usual likelihood-
ratio test but instead of comparing against the upper a point of Up r r q  it compares 
against the upper a point of Up,rf _q ; see Anderson (1953, Sections 8.3 and 8.4) for 
such tests and the definition of the U-distribution. 
To provide a simple illustration of the use of such a procedure we consider the 
problem of assessing the effect of an air filter on the size distribution of particles in an 
atmosphere. In a common form of sampling, air is drawn through a sampler and 
particles in different size ranges are deposited at p (say) different stages in the sampler, 
the larger particles being at the earlier stages. An observation thus consists of a 
p-dimensional vector of quantities (or, to conform more closely to the usual model 
adopted, logarithms of quantities) of particles deposited at the various stages. The 
effect of introducing a filter is that the quantities of larger particles entering the 
atmosphere may be reduced. One way of measuring the effectiveness of the filter is 
thus to determine up to which stage (if any) there is a significant reduction in the 
quantities deposited. We suppose that altogether a set of m observations 
with, and a set of n observations y = (y1, ..., y) without, the filter are available. (In 
actual practice the experiment is more complicated than that described here because 
of the desirability of measuring the effect at different locations within the atmosphere. 
For illustrative purposes we have, however, ignored such complications.) The m + n 
observations are independent, x1, ...,x.. being on a p-dimensional normal distribution 
N(,%, Z) and y1, ...,y on N(, Z). 
Since interest is in the number of stages affected we require to examine differences 
between a and (3 through the system of nested hypotheses w1 	
... ' 	= 
where 
Wj = {(a, : a, - Pi = 
a and Pi  being the subvectors of a and pconsisting of their final i components; 
note that a, = a, f3 = (3. In terms of the general multivariate model introduced 
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earlier in this Section, we have 
M = rn+n, 0 = [cc, 3J, q 2, z1 ... Zm U 0]', Zm+i •.. Zm+n [0 1]', with 
of order 2 xp and Hi, the "H1" corresponding to C01, Consisting of i columns of H; also a = 0, b = 0. 
The confidence-region procedure is now easily described. Let 
= x1, n 
(m+n-2)S = 
and denote by , Yi 
the subvectors of and Y consisting of their final I components, and by Si  the ix  
submatrjx of S Consisting of the components common to its final 
irows and icolumns. From standard multivarjate theory (see, for example, Anderson, 1958, Section 5.3.3) the test of null hypothesis w at Significance level a uses critical region based on the inequality 
m+n-_ i__lmn(1?z+n2) (x, y) 	 - - 	- - 
= (x1 y1)
, 
 S1(x1 yj> C(Fim+n_i . 
The relation of the test statistic U, on the left side of this inequality to the corre-
sponding likelihood-ratio test statistic A1 is 
U(A1
) 
which is of form (6). The confidence-region procedure takes as its first target the smallest hypothesis w, which is thus the ca of the general theory. For cop  we thus get the usual Critical region of size a, rejecting cop (and thus deciding that at least the first stage is affected) if 
U(x, y)> C(Fpm+pj).  
If we reject cvi, 
we proceed to examine Successively the inequalities 
U1(x, y)> Ca(Fpm+pj) (i = p l,p 2, ..., 1), 
rejecting w1  if the corresponding inequality is satisfied. Let oi be the last hypothesis to be rejected; note that the confidence-region procedure then guarantees the accep- tance of all of w11, 
..., o. The conclusion is then that the first p—j+ 1 stages, and only those stages, are affected. 
A computational point worth noting is that the Si
1 can be generated in the 
process of inverting S provided one of the bordering techniques of matrix inversion is used. 
It is 
of interest to consider the equivalent significance level fli  of the confidence.. region test of cvi. From (7) this is determined by 
(m+n—j— l)p 
('n+ 	c(Fp,m+n_p_i) 	 (8) 
so that 
gI = I{k(m+n—j— 1), w, 
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-where ] denotes an incomplete beta ratio (Pearson, 1934) and 
X = (m-I-n--p— I)I{m+n—p— I +pca(Fp.m+np_ j)}; 
see Aitchison (1964, equation (6)) for a slightly more special form of (8). Table 1 
gives an example of such equivalent significance levels for the case of 6 stages and for 
two confidence region sizes, 090 and 075. 
TABLE  
Equivalent significance levels, 9j, for confidence region tests of 
wfor the case p = 6 andfor a = 0- 10 and 025 
I 	cx=01O a =O25 
6 	010 025 
5 0052 015 
4 	0024 0082 
3 00091 0037 
2 	0•0027 0013 
I 000049 00028 
The table illustrates once more the added caution employed by confidence-region 
testing when the hypothesis under test widens, as compared with fixed-level testing. 
In the present practical situation we may be disinclined to overstate too readily the 
efficiency of the filter, and to meet this disinclination the confidence-region procedure 
seems well suited. Although equivalent significance levels are a poor substitute for 
a well-developed loss function they may at least prove a satisfactory guide for some 
statisticians and comparison of them for various x may provide a useful basis for the actual choice of ot in a practical application. 
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5 CONSTRUCTION OF F-OPTIMAL DESIGNS 
A well-known result in the design of randomised controlled 
trials to compare a control against s different treatments is that 
in order to minimise the variance of a control versus treatment 
contrast we must assign Vs as many experimental units to the control 
as to each treatment. Motivated by a consultative problem in which 
interest is in a much more complex set of contrasts Aitchison 
(4:1961) sets out to investigate the nature of generalisations 
of the familiar result to a general set of contrasts. The main 
features of the approach are briefly as follows. 
A definition of F-optimal designs which maximise the infimum 
of the power of the appropriate F-test over a region defined 
by the specified contrasts. 
A proof that an F-optimal design has a minmax property in 
relation to the set of variances of the contrast estimators. 
A demonstration that a direct approach to this maxinf or 
ininniax problem is usually difficult. 
The conversion of the problem, through game theory, to the 
computationally simpler problem of maximising a concave 
function of the form 
s-'-1 	s 
( E a..x.) 	(xeS5) 
j=l 	i=l 1 
3 1 
over the s-dimensional simplex S5 where a. 13 
(i = 1, . . . ,s; j = 1, . . . ,s+1) are given non-negative constants. 
S. 	The provision of a computational scheme for this maximisation 
problem and some examples of its application. 
Apart from work on optimal design in polynomial regression 
most approaches to experimental design in 1961 were content with 
establishing or denying optimum properties of well-established 
designs. An interesting aspect of the above approach, therefore, 
is its provision of a computational construction for optimal designs. 
AITCHISON, J. (1961) 
The construction of optimal designs for the one-way 
classification analysis of variance 
Reprinted from J. R. Statist. Soc. B23, 352-67 
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SUMMARY 	- 
A consideration of the purpose of some one-way classification experiments, 
leads us to introduce a criterion of F-optimality of design, a compromise 
measure which concentrates on the detection of certain specified effects while 
allowing at least the inspection of a wider class of effects. To give added 
validity to this notion we first establish its equivalence to a mm-max 
weighted variance design criterion. The actual construction of F-optimal 
designs is our main purpose. The direct mm-max approach is difficult, and 
so our next main result directs attention to the equivalent problem of 
finding optimal strategies for a certain two-person zero-sum non-matrix 
game. Finally, we provide a computational scheme for the solution of this 
game and illustrate the technique by examples. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IN a one-way classification experiment involving t treatments and using a fixed total 
number n of observations, a design problem arises whenit is possible to assign in 
different ways the numbers n (j = 1, 2, ..., t) of observations to be taken on the 
treatments. We suppose that any t-way partition (n1n2 ... n) of the integer n is a 
possible design, allocating n1  observations to the jth treatment; and that the corre-
sponding fixed-effects analysis-of-variance model concerns n independent random 
variables Z,k, where Z2k  is N(01, (72) (j = 1, 2, ..., t; k = 1, 2,.... ni), with a2 unknown. 
The modifications to the theory for the case of 0,2 known are trivial and we prefer to 
treat the more realistic case. Any choice of design, by way of some criterion of 
optimality, must take account of the purpose of the experiment. Examination of the 
following examples provides the motivation for the introduction of the criterion of 
F-optimality in section 2. It is then the purpose of the paper to show how F-optimal 
designs may be constructed. 
Example 1. This is the familiar case of comparing a control (which we take as 
treatment I) with s = t— 1 treatments. We are interested only in contrasts in the 
e1 (j = 1,2, ..., t), and primarily in the special contrasts 0— O (j = 2,..., t), i.e. 
the s simple control versus treatment contrasts. Our attitude to the experiment may 
be that we wish to test the null hypothesis that all contrasts are zero, just in case some 
unspecified contrast is of importance, while ensuring that the design we choose 
enables us as efficiently as possible to detect any significant control versus treatment 
contrasts. If we regard each of the set of specified contrasts as of equal importance. 
we may decide to choose the design which gives the F-test of zero contrasts the best 
chance of detecting when one or other of the inequalities 161 — Oj  I > A U = 2, ..., z) 
is satisfied. We shall see that such a procedure is equivalent to the usual method of 
choosing the design which minimizes the variance of a control versus treatment 
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contrast estimator, and assigns .Js as many observations to the control as to each 
treatment. 
Example 2. This is one of the many possible generalizations of Example 1. Suppose 
that we have tj standard, but untested, treatments or controls (numbered F, 2, ..., t1) already in use and that t2 = I - t1  new treatments are proposed. We again take the 
precaution of being interested in all contrasts, but particularly in control versus control 
Contrasts 05  0,.. (j,j' = 1, 2, ..., t1; j0 j') and in control versus treatment contrasts 
0— 01, (1 = 1, 2, ..., t; k = t1  + 1, t1 + 2, ..., t). We may then consider using the 
F-test of zero contrasts and choose our design to make as sure as possible that we 
detect whether one or other of the i t(t + r2  - 1) inequalities 
I0j-0j'IA1  (ji'1,2,...,t1;jj'), 
holds. 	
I 0J_ 0kIA2 U'= 1, 2,...,tj;k_— t1+1,...,t) 
Example 3. In six locations equal quantities of a perishable commodity are stored. 
A preservative is suggested and an experiment is proposed to measure the deterioration 
at each location of a number of treated and of untreated specimens. We consider the 
12 location-treatment combinations as our 12 treatments, treatment  (j = 1,2,..., 6) 
being the use of preservative in location j, and treatment j± 6 (j = 1, 2,..., 6) being the use of no preservative in location j. We.may then be interested only in whether 
the preservative is effective, i.e. only in the set of treatment (given location) contrasts 
0j+6 _ O (j = 1,2, ..., 6) and intend to use an over-all test of these; while, for some 
such reasons as differential costs in large-scale treatment in different locations, special 
importance attached to certain locations by management, etc., we wish to choose 
our design so that we readily detect when one or other of the inequalities 
M(07 — 0)+(0— 02)+(0— 03)}—{(01o __ 04)±(0il ._ 05)}A1, 
- 0) + (011  - 9)} —(012 — 06) >1 A21 
holds. 	
012 — 06 
Such considerations of design are compromises between allowing for the 
unexpected, and so leaving open the possibility of following up the F-test with a 
data-snooping technique such as the Scheffé (1953) S-method, and making as sure 
as possible that certain specific inequalities in the parameters are detected. That such 
an approach is a reasonable one is supported by the analysis of section 2, where our 
main result shows its equivalence to the choice of a design by a mm—max weighted 
variance principle. 
Although much attention has been given to the problem of optimal design in linear 
experiments during the past decade, see the excellent survey by Elfving (1959), work 
has been concentrated on establishing or denying optimum properties of well-
established designs, or on supplying sufficient conditions for designs to possess these 
optimum properties. Few computational methods for the actual construction of 
optimal designs were considered until very recently. An important breakthrough has 
been made for polynomial regression, where Guest (1958), Hoel (1958), Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1959) and Williams (1958) have constructed optimal designs under 
various criteria of optimality. Apart from this the outstanding contribution to 
computational techniques is the work of Kiefer and Wolfowjtz (1959), who exploit 
a method based on Chebyshev approximation for the case of minimum variance 
estimation of a single parameter, and, by drawing analogies with the theory of a certain 
fl, 
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type of game, point one direction of forward progress for more general problems 
Our own problem leads, via a different route, to a Solution which is most readily con-
structed by appealing to another type of game. 
2. THE DESIGN PROBLEM 
Although in this paper we use the results of this section only for the special case 
of a one-way classification analysis of variance, it is an advantage, and adds no extra 
difficulty, to establish them in the wider setting of the general linear fixed-effects 
model for which they are valid. In particular, this allows us to indicate the special 
place of the one-way classification on the ladder of computational difficulty. 
 A linear fixed-effects model with parameter vector 0 = 
[0 	... 0 we use design d with associated real design 	 1  O j' is given. If matrix fixed integer, we make a vector.obseation Md of order n x t, where n is a on the n-di 	vector-valued random variable Z, which is N(Md 0, o2 I), i.e. we make n real observations on each of the independent components of Z. We assume that we are interested only in 
r 
we confine attention to the class D 
linearly independent combinations 
= f 	- 	= GO of the parameters 0, and so 4, 
of designs (with associated design matrices of order nxt) for which i is estimable Let (,d) denote the power at 	of the F-test, using design dc- D,,,   of H0( = 0) versus 	
are 0); the se of the test and 02  unimportant in what follows and so we omit them from our notation in order to simplify it. Let i' be any region in R, r-dimensional real space. Definition of F(ç, 1F) optimal designs. A design d* E D4, is said to be F(tIi, 1) Optimal if 
inf 	i, d*) = max inf 	5, d), 41 E"F 
i.e. 
if it maximizes the infimum in the region T of the power of the F-test of the null hypothesis that 14i = 0. 
We are concerned here only with a very special form of 
T. The examples of 
Nsection 1 show that our main interest is often in special combinations of the , say (1 	1,2, ..., s) 
and whether or not one or other of the inequalities h (i 	1,2, ..., s) is 
satisfied. Thus throughout this paper we shall always take 	= u where F, {i4sRr h 4i 	}. The relations 
{4 (2.1) j :Ib'qJJ 	}=r{i• h'ti} Uj: 
show that we lose no generality by considering only the one-sided type of linear 
inequality above. The main result, Theorem 1, of this section is to establish the equivalence of the F(çi, 
F) principle and a type of ruin—max weighted variance 
Principle of design choice. For this we require the following lemma. Lemma 1. If? is a positive definite r  r matrix then 
min 	= ê,2/(h P 1 h). *El  
Proof The function i'Piji is strictly convex in i4i in R?. Hence 
min 	min  
= 	/(h' p—i h1), 
by a simple application of the Lagrange-multiplier technique. 
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Corollary. We have that 
mm 	?Pii = mm 	P 1 h1 . 
4eT 
Theorem 1. Let H = [h1  h2 ... li8]1 and iId denote the least-squares estimator of 4' for 
design d  D,. The following three statements are then equivalent. 
d*  is F(4',W) optimal. 
d*  is F(H4,, V) optimal. 
max var (h Pd-)I = min max var 4,d)/. 
deD4, i 
Proof. We establish first the equivalence of (i) and (iii). The quantity (4,,  d) depends 
on 4i and donly in the form 4"V(qid) 4,, where V(.) denotes "variance—covariance 
matrix of"; and is indeed a strictly monotonic increasing function of 4,'V1(4Jd) 4'. 
Hence d*  is F(4i,W) optimal if and only if 
min 4,'V'(1d,) 41 = max min 4"V 1(i) 4,, 
i.e. by the corollary to Lemma 1, if and only if 
mm 	/fh V(rd) hi) = max mm 	/{h 	'd) h.}, 
i 
i.e. if and only if 
max h V(i,d*) h.JA = min max h V(liJd) h,/. 
deD4, i 
The equivalence of (i) and (iii) follows on noting that 
var (h '4'd) = h V(uJd)  h. 
If in the equivalence just established we replace (4', T) by (4, (b), where 4 = H4' 
and 
= U{ ER8 : 
we obtain the equivalence of (ii) and (iii) immediately on noting that d*  is F(HI4J, 'F) 
	
optimal if and only if d*  is F(b, (I))  optimal, and that 	= HJd. This completes 
the proof. 
Kiefer (1958) uses implicitly the notion of F-optimality and establishes its 
equivalence, with a W different from ours, to another type of optimality involving the 
characteristic roots of V(41d),  but rejects the notion on the grounds that it assumes 
the use of the F-test, whereas a pure max—min power principle would not insist on 
this. Our own view is that there are many situations, as indicated in section 1, where 
there is a two-fold purpose of the experiment: to keep an eye on all 4', which requires 
the use of an F-test, while focusing special attention on 14. For those who remain 
suspicious of such a compromise procedure as F-optimality the results of Theorem I 
may clothe the idea in respectability. It is comforting to know, from the equivalence 
of (i) and (ii), that it makes no difference, as far as the choice of design is concerned, 
whether we initially carry out an F-test of the null hypothesis that 4' = 0 or restrict 
ourselves to the null hypothesis that Hi4i = 0, involving only the special parametric 
functions. Statement (iii) means that d*  is chosen to minimize the maximum weighted 
lie 
356 	
A1TCHISON - The Construction of On,;.,,.i 
[No. 2, 
(the weighting factor being I/) variance of 
th
Designs 
e least-squares estimators of the s special parametric functions. If we had adopted an estimation or confidence-interval approach for these s 
special parametric functions, then an appropriate design criterion 
might just have been this mm—max weighted variance one above, the weighting 
indicating that we regard the special parametric functions as not of equal importance. 
Such a procedure ensures that we minimize the maximum expected length of the usual 
confidence intervals, taking into account their Possibly differing importance 
The simplification in the computation of d* 
that we obtain in the one-way classification analysis of variance arises from the fact that 
var(1'I d) is then a homo- geneous linear function of (I/111, In  2, ..., I/n1) with non-negative coefficients thus led to the problem of determining a design n 
	 We are = (nn .. n') such that 
max I 
i 
J-1 a11/n 	mm max 
n€N 
where N is the set of all f-way partitions of the integer n, and 	0 (i = 1, 2, ..., j 1, 2, ..., z). Clearly we have that, for each 1, a 5  >0 for somj. Moreover, we can assume that, for eachj, a>O for some 1; for otherwise if = 0 for all z we would obviouly take no observations on thejth treatment and so the problem would reduce to one involving at most t— 
i treatments It is also worth noting here that when an inequality of the form Jh'qjJ_>A is 
involved the breakdown by (2.1) leads to the Consideration of only one expression of the form 
2a/n,, since 
var(hL4,d) = var(_h' d) 
Instead of considering a design n, we may consider equivalently y = (
Y1 Y2 ... 
where y = n1/n 
denotes the proportion of observations assigned to thejth treatme Yd 
nt, 
and 	
= 1. For the sake of mathematical simplicity we then adopt the following 
Customary, though not fully justified,device of approximating to the problem involv-ing discrete y, by Converting it to 
Continuously, Stipulating only that one of continuous variation. We allow y to vary  
yeT (YR':O U=1,2 t) 
the simplex in R'. An optimal design  y* then satisfies 
max Z (a/y;) nun max (a/y). (• 	 (2.2) YET £ J 
If y* turns out to be a vector with integral elements, as can be the case, then the 
original discrete problem is solved. Otherwise we hope to arrive, by rounding the to nearer multiples of 1/n, or setting y = I/n if y < I/n, at a solution sufficiently close to the discrete optimum. If n is large we could justify this procedure by usin
g  the fact that there is then a y of the discretevariation problem veryclose to any given member of T. For moderate n the procedure is more one of intuition and 
Practical expediency; we can console ourselves, hOwever, as do Kiefer and Wolfo
witz  
(1959) 
when faced with a similar difficulty, that there is practical sense in providing a Solution y* (independent of n) of (2.2), valid for all large n and probably for moderate n in many situations rather than in facing a major computational problem for each moderate n or abandoning the problem altogether. 
From now on we Consider the problem of finding a y satisfying (2.2) as 
the design problem. It is convenient to have some jargon for the quantity defined by 
119 
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(2.2), which we term the mm—max 
 of the design problem. From the mm—max of the 
design problem we may easily determine the max—mm power in the definition of 
F-optimality. Bounds may be immediately placed on the min—max of the design problem by noting that 
/ 	\2 
* 	 max(Eat.J 	
(2.3) / leT1 	
I 
In the next section we make a direct approach to the mm—max problem so that 
we may later highlight the efficiency of the game-theoretic approach 
3. A DiREcT APPROACH 
The direct approach we adopt here is the following. Let - 
TkfrET : Ea/Y max E aj f) (k—J,2,.5) 
Then 	
min max a/y1 = mm 
YeTk i 5 	IETL I 
and we find for each k a y E Tk  which gives this flhifljniuni. This is not altogether easy since usually the IniImum  in the unrestricted region T does not occur in TA: 
So, 
although the convexity ofa/y. in y then allows us to restrict attention to the 
boundary of , the detection of y often requires some elaborate enumeration of parts of this boundary. Since T= U T, we can then take y* as a ytL Corresponding to the least of 
mrn.akJ/yJ  
YCTk j 
We illustrate this method by the following example. 
Example 4. Let 1 = 6 and Suppose 
 that, although we are interested in all Contrasts, 
	
our main Concern is to detect whether one or other of the inequalities 
	 , 
I0-OI, 102-031,>A, 1 03-04   j, I°-°4, 	holds. IO1O2 I Here A [a,4 is given by 




00. 11 001 
0010 101 - 
0 0 1 0 0 1] 
In 
any example we exploit any symmetries that we recognize, and here it is clear that we can restrict attention to the subset T' of  for which y1 = y2, y4 =
Y5y
6, so that the problem is reduced to that of determining 
nun max(2/y1, l/y1+ 1/y3, 1/y3+]/y4) YET' 
Let Ti {y e T' : y1  < y3, 2/y1 l Outside T1, we mu 	
/y3 + l/y. Since the minimum over T' of 2/y1 Occurs st seek for the minimum over T1 of 2/y1  on the boundary of T1. 
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Now this minimum on the boundiry of T1 where y1 = y3  can be shown to be 12, occurring where y1  y3 = = ; also the minimum on the boundary of T1  where = I/y3+ l/y4  can be shown to be 8+2 /3, Occurring where 
	
(6+83)(j1,y3,y4) = (2J3,3+.j3,l+43) 	 (3.1) 
Hence 	 min 2— = 8+2/3 
with y' 	
TI  Yl determined by (3.1). 
After similarly tedious calculation we can show that 
11 	1\ 	 .. Gmin l\+—j = 12, and mmn_+_j =8+2 V3,T \Yj Y31 	 T1 3 Y41 	- 
the latter again occurring at (3.1). Hence'the optimal design is given by (3.1) with 
mm -max (8 + 2 J3)/2 
4. THE GAME ASSOCIATED WITH THE DESIGN PROBLEM 
4.1. General Remarks 
We now show that the design problem (2.2) is greatly simplified when we recognize 
its equivalence to that of finding an optimal strategy in a certain finite, but non-matrix, 
game. We first list together for easy reference some points of notation and defini-
tions of various sets and functions which enter our argument. We also precede our 
mathematical results with an explanation of their motivation and their practical 
consequences; the reader who has then no appetite for the mathematical proofs that 
follow may proceed immediately to the computational routine of Section 5. 
Notation. We use the vector notation v> 0 to mean that each component i'1 0 and at least one v >0, and v>> 0 to mean that each component v >0. The symbols and 	denote summation over i = 1, 2, ...,s and jr= 1,2,...,: respectively. To save 
tiresome repetition we use max and mm, without specifying the sets involved, to 
denote maximum over S and minimum over T, respectively, where S and T are the two sinplexes defined by (4.1) and (4.2) below; otherwise the sets will be specified. 
The matrix A. The s x t matrix A = [a11] of non-negative elements is such that for each 1, a, >0 for some i, and for eachj, a 3 >0 for somej. 
Sets. We require the two simplexes in R8 and R' defined by 
S=cxeR8 :x>O, Ex1=l}, 	 (4.1) 
T= {y ER': y> 0, E Yj 	 (4.2) 
Functions. The interrelations between three real-valued functions K, L, M and a 
vector-valued function Y play a central role in the theory. The following are the 
defining relations: 
K(x, y) = a x1/y1  (x ES, yeT), 	 (4.3) 
with the interpretation that a,xjy, = 0 when either a11 0 or x1  = 0, even if y5 = 0. Note that K(x, y) can assume the value Co (for example, when y, = 0 and a11 >0, x1 > 0). 
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Useful elementary reformulations of this definition are 
K(x,y)=xa1(Y) (xES,yET), 	 (4.4) 
where a(y) = E1a131y1  and with the interpretation x1a3(y) = 0 when x1 = 0, even if 
a4(y) = cc; and 
	
K(x,y) = 2-1--2a11x1 (xeS, yET), 	 (4.5) 
jYji 
with the convention that 
( 	
a11 x /1 = 0 if 	a11 x1  








a15 x1 /L(x) (x G S), 	 (4.8) 
and hence 	 Y(x) = [Y1(x) Y2(X) ... )'(x)]' (xeS). 	
(4.9) 
4.2. Motivation and Summary of Results 
In the design problem (2.2) we are already faced with a problem in game theory. 
For y is a mm—max strategy for Player II in the game (S0, T,a(y)), where 
Player I has a space S0 of s pure strategies, for convenience denoted by the 
s vertices of S. namely e1  = [10... 0]', ...,e8 = [00... 1]'; 
Player II has mixed strategy space T; 
the payoff (the amount paid by II to I) is a1(y) when I chooses e1 and II 
chooses y. 
The inherent difficulty of the problem is now more evident. It lies in the awkwardness 
of handling the discrete space S0  and in the related fact that, in general, 
max min a1(y) < min max a1(y) 
so that the game is not determined. For instance, in Example 3, 
max min 4y) = 4/2 
by (2.3) and 	 minmaxa;(y) = (8+2V3)/ 
as found in section 3. Hence for (S0. T, a(y)) there are no optimal (as distinct from 
max—min and mm—max) strategies for the two players and so there is no advantage 
to be gained by studying the game from the viewpoint of Player I at this stage. 
1 
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Our first task is thus to follow through the consequences of removing this discrete 
feature by the device of replacing S0 by the corresponding mixed strategy space S. 
with strategies 
x = 	xc(xO, E ; = i), 
i 	/ 
and hence the payoff a1(y) by K(x, y). The effect of this is happily that Player II's 
mm—max behaviour is unaltered (Theorem 2). Any direct attack on this problem 
will, of course, lead us back to the approach of section 3; our one hope of a simplifica-
tion is that now we may discover Player II's mm—max strategy by studying Player I's 
max—min problem. 
We must therefore now pose the following three questions: 
Is the new game (S, T, K) determined; is min max K(x, y) = max mm K(x, y)? 
If so, can optimal x-strategies be readily found? 
If so, can an optimal y-strategy be easily constructed from an optimal 
x-strategy; and is this strategy unique? 
The three parts of Theorem 3 answer these questions in the affirmative. Part (i) 
depends essentially on the convexity of the functions a(y), which in turn provide 
the convex—concave property of K(x, y), as stated in Lemma 3a. The answer to (ii) 
provides the basis of the computational scheme of section 5. The set of x-optimal 
strategies is found to be those x ES at which L(x) attains its maximum over S. 
Parts (ii) and (iii) depend on the inter-relations of the functions K, Y and Al (and 
hence L) and this is the motivation for establishing Lemma 3b before Theorem 3. 
The outcome of (iii) is that the unique y-strategy y is given by y' = Y(x*), where x K 
is any optimal x-strategy. Although uniqueness is not an essential feature it is useful 
to know that the design problem is completely solved when we find any one xi'. 
The advantage of the game technique is that the computational problem is 
reduced to that of maximizing the concave function L(x) over the convex set S, for 
which a straightforward technique can be devised. As opposed to the direct approach 
we are here dealing with the single simple function L(x) instead of the much more 
complicated function, the maximum over i of a(y). The fact that often s < t or that 
there are symmetries in the problem may make the game approach even more favour-
able. To sum up, it is our ability to answer questions (i), (ii) and at least the first part of 
(iii) in the affirmative that has enabled us to simplify the computational problem. This 
is largely due to the exploitation of the convexity and special form of the a(y), which 
enable us to obtain the specific forms of Y(x) and M(x) in Lemma 3b; the use of the 
technique of this paper for other design problems would depend on some similar 
form of exploitation. 
4.3. Mathematical Results 
Theorem 2. If y E T saisfies one of the relations 
max a1(,y*) = mm max 
max K(x, y*) = min max K(x, y), 
then (i) it satisfies the other, (ii) y'>O. 
13 
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Proof (1) This is established if we can show that 
max K(x, y) max aj(y) 
for every yET, for then, in particular, 
maxK(x,y*) maxa(y*) 
and also 	 mm max K(x, y) min max a(y). 
Suppose that for any given YET, 
maxa1(y) = 
then for every x ES, K(x, y) K, ak(y) since 
ak(y) —K(x, y) ak(y) x1 E x1 a(j) 
$ 	I 
Also K(x, y) = ak(y) when xk l,x1 = 0 (i 0 k). Hence the result. (ii) Our result here follows at once if we can show 
that 	 that y = 0 for Somej implies 
max a2(y*) v minmaxa1(y). 
Now if y 	0 then ay*) = cc for some 1, since a> 0 for some i. Hence 
But, by (2.3), 
nun max a(y) tmax Ea <cc. 
Lemma 3a. (i) On S, K(x, y) is concave in x for each given YET. 
(ii) On 2', K(x, y) is convex in y for each given x S. 
Proof (i) By definition (4.4), K(x, y) is clearly linear in x for given yeT, that is 
AK(x1,y)+(l —)t )K(x,y), and trivially 
(0<A< I). 
(ii) The convexity of K(x, y) in y for given X ES follows at once from the definition (4.5) and the inequality 
__<~(1i\) (0<<J). Ay + (I - it) y2, YIJ 	Y25 
Lemma 3b. For every X ES there Corresponds a unique y 
= Y(x) eT such that 
K{x, Y(x)} = mm K(x, y) = M(x). 
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Proof. For given x €S, K(x, y) is convex in y€T. Clearly from definition (4.5), in 
order to minimize K(x, y) we must put y5 = 0 if 
ajj x j = 0. 




i 	 ) I 
subject to 	 : Yj  
JEJ(x) 
by a direct application of the Lagrange-multiplier technique, we find that there is one 
local (hence the absolute) minimum, occurring where 
X) 
{jeJ(x)}. 
Thus, since (x) = 0 if jJ(x), the minimum of K(x, y) over T occurs at the unique 
point y = Y(x), and we find by substitution that K(x, Y(x)) = M(x). 
Theorem 3. For the game (S, 7', K) 
min max K(x, y) = max mm K(x, y); 
the set of optimal x-strategies is {x* ES: L(x*) = maxL(x)}; 
there is a unique optimal y-strategy yf  given by yf = Y(x*)0, where x" is 
any optimal x-strategy. 
Proof. (i) To establish this result we can appeal to an unpublished proof due to 
M. Schiffman of a general mm—max theorem; we refer here to the version given in 
the second proof of Theorem 1.5.1 of Karlin (1959, pp. 28-30). The first part of that 
proof yields the following result for a real-valued function K(x, y), defined for 
xeS,yET. If 
S. Tare closed, bounded, convex sets; 
K(x, y) is convex in y for each x, and concave in x for each y; 
K(x, y) is continuous and the convexity and concavity of K(x, y) are strict, 
then min max K(x, y) = max mm K(x, y). 
Our particular 5, T, K satisfy (a) and (b), but not (c). In the general case, however, 
property (c) is used only to establish that, for each XE 5, there corresponds a unique 
Y(x) €7' such that K(x, Y(x)) = mm K(x, y), and that Y(x) and M(x) = mm K(x, y) 
are continuous. Lemma 3b thus replaces this part of the general proof, for our Y(x) 
and M(X) are clearly continuous. Thus our knowledge of the special form of K 
allows us to dispense with condition (c), and the result follows. 
1 D. 5 
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x is an optimal x-strategy if and only if mm K(x*, y) = max mm K(x, y), i.e. by Lemma 3b, if and only if M(x*) = max M(x) or L(x*) = maxL(x). 
Let x be any fixed optimal x-strategy. If y" T is any optimal y-strategy then K(x*,y*)K(X*,y) for every yET and so K(x*, y*) = min K(x*,y). By 
Lemma 3b the only solution for y is Y(x*), and the uniqueness property is proved. 
(Note that we have incidentally established the interesting property of L and Y that L(x1) = L(x2) = maxL(x) implies Y(x) = Y(x2).) 
The. optimal solution y* satisfies max K(x, y*) = rain max K(x, y), and so, by Theorem 2, y* > O 
Combining Theorems 2 and 3, we then have the following corollary, which forms 
the basis of the computational procedure of the next section. 
Corollary. The unique solution y" of the mm—max design problem is given by y* = Y(x*), where x is any solution of L(x*) = maxL(x), and the min—max is 
min max K(x,y) = K(x*, y*) = M(x*). 
S. COMPUTATIONAL SCHENM  
Our remaining task is to devise a method of calculating an x e  such that 
L(x*) = maxL(x). Since the optimal y-strategy y = Y(x*)O we know that 
A'x*>> 0, and so, when convenient, we can confine the x we consider to the open 
convex set (x ES: A'x' 0}c S. 
Our simple search method for locating an x' uses the equivalence of the two 
properties stated in Theorem 4. The proof of this theorem is of little direct interest 
to us and so is omitted. It depends on either an appeal to standard results in concave 
programming (see, for example, Karlin (1959), pp. 199-204) or a straightforward 
application of the concavity of L(x) and the property 	 = L(x), where 
the superscript notation denotes partial differentiation with respect to xj. 
Theorem 4. The following two statements are equivalent. 
X' ES and L(x*) = maxL(x); 
x ES and A* can be found to satisfy 
L0)x*)_A*0 (i= l,2,...,$), 	 (5.1) 
L(x*) -A* = 0. 	 (5.2) 
Moreover, if in (ii) L 1' (x*) A* <0, then x* = 0. 
We now present the complete computational scheme and then discuss its validity. 
Computational Scheme. Denote by Lkl (x) the expression obtained from L(x) by setting x=x=... =0. 
Step 1. By actually solving, determine whether the equations 
L' (x) - A = 0 (i = 1,2, ..., s), 	 (5.3) 
Exj 	 (5.4) 
'5 
1 
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have a solution (x0, ) with x0>0. If so, then take x = x0 ; otherwise proceed to 
Step 2. 
Step 2. Carry out the following investigation for each k. 
Determine, by actually solving, whether the equations 
Lx—A=0 (14k), 	 (5.5) 
(5.6) 
Xk = 0 
	
(5.7) 
have a solution (Xk, ) with Xk>O. 
For those k for which Xk exists, calculate the corresponding Lk(x) = 2A  and 
proceed to Step 3.  
Step 3. Carry out the following investigation for each (k,l) for which xk and xz do 
not exist. 
Determine, by actually solving, whether the equations 
L(l ) (x)—A=0 (i+k,l), 	
(5.8) 
;=l, 	 (5.9) 
1kJ 
Xk=XO 	 (5.10) 
have a solution (Xkl, k) with Xkl>O. 
For those (k, 1) for which Xki exists, calculate the corresponding Lkj(x) = 
Then proceed to the next obvious step of investigating the L (x) for which there 
are no Xk, x1 , xrn, X,, Xkrn, or Xim. 
Continue this finite process until it terminates. Scan the calculated set of 
Lk(xk)'s, L(xkj)'s, etc., and choose as x' an Xk, Xkl, 
..., which corresponds to the 
maximum of this set. 
Note: If Xk = x1 = ... = 0 implies that a component of A'x is zero then by the remark 
at the beginning of this section, the corresponding Lk(x) need not be investigated. 
Validity of the computational scheme. This routine, which is usually easy to apply 
since it depends only on solving elementary sets of equations, can be justified as 
follows. 
If, in Step 1, x0 >0 exists then xS by (5.4). Also, trivially from (5.3), 
L() (x0)—A<0 (i=l,2,...,$) and we have 
Hence x = x0  has property (ii) of Theorem 4, and so has also property W. 
If no x0  exists it follows from Theorem 4 that L(k) 
(x*)_ A* <0 for some k, and 
thus that 4 = 0 for some k. Hence we may confine attention in Step 2 to the situation 
on each of the boundaries Sk = {x ES: Xk = 01. On Sk we can replace L(x) by Lk(x). 
Theorem 4 then applies to Lk(x) with S replaced by Sk  and (i = 1, 2, ..., s) by 
(1 4 k). 
Thus, in Step 2, by reasoning similar to that applied in Step 1, the Xk>O we obtain 
are such that 
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For any k for which Xk >0 does not exist 
maxLk(x) 
2€ S 
must occur on one of the subsets Ski = {x ESk x1 = 0}, and clearly we need consider only those 1 for which x1 >0 also does not exist. The x11  we obtain are such that 
L(x,) = maxL(x). 
lESki 
So, by continuing the process and choosing x as we do, we arrive at our optimal 
X-strategy. 
We can see heuristically that 4 = 0 only when the corresponding effect is 
unimportant compared with the other effects. In many practical situations thçre will 
be few unimportant specified effects and so we may expect the process to terminate 
very quickly. 
6. APPLICATIONS OF THE GAME APPROACH' 
The technique in its various aspects is adequately demonstrated by its application 
to the following simple examples. 
Example 1. (See section 1.) By symmetry'we must clearly have 
and so 	- 	 th2 A'x* = [sl 
giving 	y 	J(s)f{s+ J(s)}, y = 	= .. =Y1* l/{s+ J(s)}, 
the well-known optimal design with mm—max (I+ J(s)}2/2. 
Example 4. (See section 3.) Here 
L.Lcx) = 
is symmetric in x2, x3 and in x4,x5,x6  and so it is clear that 4 = 4,4 = 4 = x. In our computations then we can impose the extra condition 
- X2=x3; X4X5=X6.  
Thus, in Step I, equation (5.4) becomes xj+2x2 +3x4  = 1, and in Step 2 we need consider only L1(x), L2(x), L4(x), 
Step 1. Equations (5.3) and (5.4) reduce to 
(Xi +xé 
Mxi+x+(2x2+3x4)-k - =0, 
=0, 
x1 +2x2 +3x4 	=1, 
and have unique solution (x1, x2, x4) = (, - , ) . 0; hence we proceed to Step 2. 
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Step 2. Here by the Note there is no need to consider L4(x). 






which have unique solution (x1, x2, x4) = (0, J, 1)> 0 and we have 
L1(x1) = 2) = {1+V5}/& 
For k = 2 equations (5.5)—(5.7) yield 	 -_ 
xr1  
(1 + J3) x 	- 	= 0, 
x1+3x4 	=1, 
- 	 x2 =0, 
with unique solution (x1, x2, x4) = (6,0,2 + J3)/(3(4 + .J3)} >0 and we have 
L2(x) = 2k2  = (8+243)VL. 
Here for each possible k (= 1,2) we havp found an Xk>O and so we need proceed 
no further. Since (8 + 2 J3)4 > 1 + j5 we take x' = x2, and this gives, by the use of 
x" = Y(x*), the optimal design given by (3.1). 
Example 5. As an illustration of the use of Step 2 we outline the application of the 
routine to the matrix 




- 	 0101 
Step 1. Equations (5.3) and (5.4) have no finite solution. 
Step 2. By the Note, L4(x) need not be considered. Only for k = 2 do we find an 
xk>O. We have x2 = [0,0,,-fl with L(x2) = 242. 
Step 3. By the Note and the existence of x2 we need consider only L(x). We easily 
find x13 = [0, 1, 0, fl' with L-13(x13) = 1+ 45. 
Since 1+45>242 we take x = x13 and so the optimal design is 
= [2,45,2, 1 ]'/{5 + 4(5)}. 
We could in this case have foreseen that xr = 4 = 0 by observing that the first and 
third effects are unimportant since a1(y) < a2(y), a3(y) < a(y) for every y E T. 
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6 PARAMETRIC TOLERANCE REGIONS 
6.1 Background 
In the 1960's the Hospital Engineering Research Unit, later 
the Building Services Research Unit, of the University of Glasgow, 
was involved in problems of the design of an adequate supply of 
engineering services, such as gas, electricity, water, piped 
oxygen, to meet demand in new hospitals. Data were available on 
patterns of demand in situations where there was deliberate over-
supply. Some of the problems seemed to call for the standard 
technique of guaranteed-cover statistical tolerance regions. The 
rationale underlying these was carefully explained many times and in 
many different ways and sets of tables provided to allow easy 
estimation of design values. 
In terms of the general setting of parametric statistical 
problems in §1 the experiment f refers to the future demand 
situation and the experiment e to the observed demand pattern data. 
A guaranteed-coverage tolerance region R(x) C  is then sought 
which satisfies the probabilistic statement 
P [x : P {R(x)I0}  > c0] ? g for all 0 c 0, e 	£ 
where suffices e and f are used to make clear the nature of the 
probability measures involved. Thus the guarantee g is used in the 
usual frequentist confidence coefficient sense, referring to 
repetitions of e, and c is the coverage or proportion of future 
'demands' which are to be met at this confidence level. The 
difficulty of interpretation of this approach, particularly in 
131 
relation to g, has been argued at length in Aitchison (7:1964). 
The principal confusion is that the probabilistic interpretation 
of g, which is strictly in terms of repetitions of the informative 
experiment e, is often transferred by users, such as the hospital 
engineers, to the proportion of successes that would be obtained in 
the use of a specific design: 'If we use R to set designs for 100 
hospitals then, roughly speaking, bOg of these hospitals will 
function satisfactorily as regards coverage.' 
6.2 A first step towards a solution 
Faced with persistent misinterpretations such as this, the 
consulting statistician must eventually face the self-criticising 
question: Have I really formulated this problem in an appropriate 
way? In a rethinking of such problems Aitchison (7:1964) makes the 
following points. 
Such design problems are essentially decision problems and so 
there may be considerable advantages, not least in sensible 
communication between client and statistician, in formulating 
them in proper decision theoretic terms. 
Since the action space is the space of sets in Y the utility 
function takes the form U(R,O), where R CY. In more 
practically oriented terms it is, however, easier to adopt a 
utility structure of the form V(R,y), denoting the advantage 
of the design region R when the actual outcome in the future 
experiment f is y. This confrontation between R and y is 
probably the easiest for the designer to appreciate and V can 





3. 	The realisation that decision theory is much more easily and 
sensibly pursued from a Bayesian viewpoint suggests the 
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It is regrettable, though perhaps inevitable in the light of 
the prevailing climate in 1964 of confrontation between 'Bayesians' 
and 'frequentists', that this decision theory approach was not 
immediately pursued. But fashion dictated that Bayesians should 
show that they could produce goods similar to frequentists but 
with, of course, a better brand label. Thus Aitchison (7:1964) 
did not immediately develop the decision theory approach but diverted 
to what he called restricted tolerance region problems with utility 
function 
1 if P(RIO) > c 
U(R,O) = { 
0 if P(RIO) < C. 
Since W(R,x) is maximised trivially and uselessly by R=Y the 
problemwas regarded as finding R, for a specified g, to satisfy 
133 
W(R,x) = g<1, the maximum attained when R=Y. Leaving aside the 
argument as to whether the Bayesian presentation is more appropriate 
than the frequentist this restricted Bayesian tolerance region still 
suffers from the (c,g) problem, the difficulty of interpreting in 
real terms statements involving probabilities about probabilities. 
The difficulty is exposed by the posing of the basic question: is 
it better to be 95 per cent certain that 99 per cent of future 
demands will be met or 99 per cent certain that 95 per cent of 
future demands will be met? 
Thus although the technical problems of defining Bayesian 
tolerance regions and of deriving them for standard situations had 
been resolved it could be argued that these regions provided no 
better a resolution of the real problems than classical statistical 
tolerance regions. But in this study a more practical and sensible 
approach had been touched on, through the use of statistical decision 
theory. It is towards the problems raised by this approach that 
we turn our attention in the next section. 
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Bayesian Tolerance Regions 
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SUNMARY  
In the theory of statistical tolerance regions, as usually presented in 
frequentist terms, there are inherent difficulties of formulation, development 
and interpretation. The present paper re-examines the basic problem from a 
Bayesian point of view and suggests that such an approach provides a set of 
widely applicable, mathematically tractable tools, often more tailored to 
the requirements of users than the corresponding frequentist tools. For the 
one-dimensional case, Bayesian intervals are quoted for a number of standard 
distributions and prior densities, and the customary feature of a Bayesian 
analysis—that special prior densities give rise to standard frequentist results 
—is briefly demonstrated. A problem which seems to be of greater practical 
significance, namely the selection of an optimum tolerance region from a set 
of possible tolerance regions, is also investigated and the overwhelming 
advantages of the Bayesian approach are indicated. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IN this paper the term Bayesian refers to any use or user of prior densities on a 
parameter space, with the associated application of Bayes's theorem, in the analysis 
of a statistical problem. The term frequentist applies to any analysis or analyst of the, 
"objectivist" school, where the use of prior densities is denied and where there is a 
tendency to interpret probability solely in terms of relative frequencies in large-scale 
replication. Typical contributions by frequentists on the problems considered here 
are Wald and Wolfowitz (1946), Bowker (1947), Walls (1951) and Fraser (1953). 
Bayesian revivalists seem so far to have neglected a promising missionary field in 
the heart of frequentist territory—the field of statistical tolerance regions. Savage 
(1954, Section 17.3) briefly dismisses the whole concept of tolerance interval as a 
slippery one, unamenable to behaviouralistic interpretation. Although Raiffa and 
Schlaifer (1961, Example 6.1.2) introduce their Bayesian treatment of estimation by 
a simple illustration, which falls into the general class of tolerance-region problems 
as defined in Section 3 of this paper, their situation does not belong to the special 
subclass of these problems which is usually understood to constitute the subject 
matter of tolerance-region theory. Welch and Peers (1963) obtain mainly asymptotic 
results on conditions under which frequentist and essentially Bayesian upper (or 
lower) confidence limits for a real parameter 0 are identical. Their approach, however, 
is staunchly frequentist and they repeatedly assert that their weights are not to be 
regarded as prior probability densities. Since an upper tolerance limit is merely an 
1.36 
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upper confidence limit for a qpantile of some fixed order it would be possible, at 
least for cases where quantiles of fixed order are monotonic functions of 0, to derive 
from their results asymptotic forms of prior density functions which yield frequentist-
type limits. While these forms might provide, for such cases, a means of measuring 
the agreement or disagreement between frequentist and Bayesian analyses they 
appear to be of limited practical value in the situations treated here. 
It is the purpose of this paper to initiate a mildly evangelical campaign among 
workers in the field of tolerance regions by demonstrating that the Bayesian approach 
has much to offer in theoretical and practical terms. Since conversion to a new way 
of thinking often arises out of self-criticism, one of our early tasks is to undertake a 
critical re-examination of the probabilistic statement which forms the basis of the 
frequentist structure of tolerance-region theory. This statement is a complicated one, 
involving many mathematical difficulties and with a frequentist interpretation often 
misunderstood—in the author's experience—by users of tolerance regions. Bayesian 
formulations of the problem are mathematically simpler and appear to be much 
closer to the spirit in which tolerance regions are used in many practical situations. 
In standard situations the Bayesian, by persuading himself that his prior densities 
have a special form, may act as if he were a frequentist, though his probabilistic'  
interpretation will differ from the frequentist. We shall note this aspect in our study 
of standard univariate distributions where one-dimensional intervals are required. 
When the problem is one of selecting a region from a set of possible tolerance regions 
on certain optimality criteria—and this, it is suggested, is the type of problem of 
practical importance—we shall see that Bayesian theory stands up to the task well, 
whereas it seems difficult even to formulate the problem sensibly in frequentist form. 
In defining thE experimental setting of the tolerance-region problem we must be 
careful about notation, since this is crucial to the development and interpretation of 
the various probabilistic statements we encounter; The - notation adopted here is 
substantially that of Lindley (1961). We suppose that the uncertainty features of a 
random experiment if, with outcome space £2' and event space .Q, are described by a 
probability measure on ., say P(. 10) belonging to a parametric family 
(P(. 10); Oe®}, 
where 0 is the parameter space. We suppose that each measure P(. 0) admits a 
density function p(. I 8) on X. We do not know which particular parameter value 8 
is the true one. There is available a set x = (x1, . ., x,J of outcomes of n (indepen-
dent) replicates of e; we denote the corresponding density on Xn by p(x (Th) 8) and 
the associated product probability measure by P(. 10). These are the immediate 
definitions needed by the frequentist. The Bayesian requires the further concept of 
a prior probability density 7T(0) on 0; this prior density represents either his prior 
beliefs, if these are ascertainable or a convenient, sensible form of weighting over the 
possible parameters. The consequence of observing x is to alter, by way of Bayes's 
theorem, this prior density into a posterior density 7r(0I xt) over 0; the correponding 
probability measure (over the Borel a-field defined on 0) we denote by H(. Ix). 
The Bayesian then decides his course of action solely on this posterior distribution 
and on the consequences of his possible decisions. 
We begin our discussion with an examination in Section 2 of the "simple" version 
of the tolerance-region problem as usually presented by frequentist writers. The 
problem is to choose some region R E, for which it can be reasonably claimed that 
a proportion c of outcomes of future replicates of é' will fall in R. If 8 were known 
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the tolerance-region user would select a region R eg with the property that 
F(R 0) = c. When R has this property we say that R has cover c at 00. The selection 
of a suitable R would then usually pose a relatively simple mathematical problem. 
It is uncertainty about 0 which forces some compromise solution on the user. His 
experimental data x remove some of this uncertainty about 0. The user thus seeks 
a region R(x 1) E, which he hopes will provide cover at least c; that is, he hopes 
that he can say with some "confidence" that P{R(x )) f 0)> c. He would then be 
reasonably sure that at least a proportion c of future outcomes of e fall within 
R(x"). It is in the probabilistic formulation and interpretation of the term 
"reasonably sure" that the frequentist and Bayesian begin to differ. 
2. THE FREQUENTIST ANALYSIS - 
The basic statement on which the frequentist builds his theory involves the family 
of probability measures {P(. 0): 0 E O} associated with the n-replicate outcome 
space Tn. Let R be a measurable function or statistic, with domain l?t' and range 
and providing, for each 	a subset R(x(12))  of . For given 0, cover c and 
statistic R, denote by G(0, c, R) the set of all XW  which yield, through R, regions of 
cover at least c at 0, so that 
G(0,c,R) = [XL) : P{R(x())I 0}c]. 	 (1) 
The frequentist says that we have a satisfactory tolerance statistic R if each proba-
bility measure of this set is some pre-assigned value q near unity; that is, if 
P{G(0,c,R)J 01 = q 	 (2) 
for every CE®. 
The popular frequentist view of probability—as the counterpart, in a mathe-
matical model of an experiment, of stable relative frequency in a large number of 
replicates of the experiment—allows the following interpretation. If we repeat the 
n-replicate experiment a large number of times, each time obtaining some observation 
x 	and each time constructing, through R, a tolerance region R(x), then a pro- 
portion q of these regions will be satisfactory in providing cover at least c; for this 
interpretation see, for example, Fraser (1957, p. 116) and Weissberg and Beatty 
(1960). While this statement is comforting to a statistician making repeated use of R 
to provide his customers with tolerance regions, its meaning for the individual 
customer is not at all easy to specify. The author has recently experienced the 
difficulty of trying to sell the frequentist approach to engineers whose work is crucially 
concerned with problems of tolerance regions. While there was no difficulty in their 
understanding of the cover c, the confidence coefficient or quality q was a much more 
elusive concept. This is not surprising, for in many applications there is no reality 
in the idea of repeated replication of the n-replicate experiment. The frequentist 
might then argue that the probabilistic statement, while not of direct application to 
the engineer's needs, is intended to give him comfort through the hope that his 
particular experiment is one of the lucky ones belonging to this proportion q in a 
population of hypothetical experiments. This seems to be little removed from 
admitting two different interpretations for probability—the forced acceptance of a 
kind of degree-of-belief interpretation for p(n)  while retaining the relative frequency 
interpretation for F. It is this confusion of interpretations, none of which quite fits 
the real problem, which causes misunderstandings with users. 
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This confusion can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose that it is required 
to specify what fixed daily amount of a perishable commodity it is necessary to supply 
in order to be "reasonably sure" that the probability of supply meeting demand on 
any one day is c. We may then decide, on the basis of x, daily observations 
(supposed independent) of demand over a month say, to quote a value r(x), where 
R(x°) = {—co, r(x)} is a tolerance interval of cover c and quality q. If, for each of 
100 months' observations, we construct a supply system with design values based on 
the function r(.), then the frequentist interpretation is that, roughly speaking, for a 
proportion q of these systems will the supply be satisfactory in that the probability 
of supply meeting demand on any day is at least c. Unfortunately, what is sometimes 
thought to be the interpretation by the user is that, if he observes one month's 
demands, quotes a supply value from this and then constructs 100 actual systems 
based on this one supply value, a proportion q of these systems will function satis-
factorily as regards cover. This interpretation is clearly wrong; either all are satis-
factory or all are not. The user is, however, so confused by the complexity of the 
probabilistic statement and the insistence on frequentist interpretations that he falls 
easily into these misunderstandings. 
This is, however, not the only difficulty surrounding the statement (2). The 
probability P(' ){G(0, c, R) 101 depends essentially on B in the general formulation, and 
the true value 00  of the parameter is unknown. Yet the frequentist determines by his 
probabilistic statement that this probability is to be q, independent of 8. Two escape 
routes, other than the pursuit of distribution-free regions which reflects a complete 
change of attitude, are open to avoid this entanglement with 0. He can alter his 
statement (2) so that the left-hand side does not depend on 0, though his problem of 
determining a whole function will remain. He can achieve this by requiring R to satisfy 
inf F(){G(0, C, R) I 0} = q, 	 (3). 
6E8 
as in Fraser (1957, Definition 5.1). This essentially minithax procedure can place 
undue emphasis on particular values of 0 with possibly awkward effects (Lehmann, 
1959, p.  13). Alternatively he could introduce a weighting factor 7r(0) associated with 
each 0 and choose R so that 
f
dO r(8)P(G(O, c, R) ( O} = q, 	 . 	(4) 
thus producing "Bayes solutions". In either case it will be observed that he is agreeing 
to place more emphasis on some values of 0 than others and so is moving towards a 
Bayesian outlook. It is not surprising, therefore, that he tends to avoid this escape 
route and concentrate on the second. 
The second approach is to attempt to choose the function R in such a way that 
P('{G(O, c, R) I 0} is indeed independent of 8. The frequentist thus directs his attention 
to the search for such a pivotal statistic. For example, in the well-known case where 
p(x 8) is a N(,, a2) density, he uses R(x) = (2+k1s,2+k2s), where 2 and s have 
their usual meanings and k1 and k2  are constants, and so achieves a disengagement 
from 0 = (jL, a). While we would not seek to deny the reasonableness of this choice—
based presumably on the fact that (2,$) is minimally sufficient for (, (7) and on an 
attempt to reflect, in the linear expressions 2±k1s and 5+k2s, the linearity of per-
centiles in p. and a—no case seems to be made out by the frequentist that there is just 
one such pivotal function of the minimal statistic or, alternatively, that the one chosen 
13 
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is in some sense the best of such pivotal functions. Moreover, in cases where no 
minimal sufficient statistic exists, it is difficult to see on what principle, other than 
that of expediency, the frequentist could choose his pivotal statistic. 
We shall see later, in Section 5, that the frequentist's difficulties in the three 
aspects of formulation, interpretation and mathematical development grow when he 
is faced with a situation, where there are certainly many possible R which satisfy his 
requirements and he has to incorporate some additional optimality criterion in his 
choice of R. 
We can express the frequentist approach in terms which allow an easier comparison 
with the Bayesian formulations. For we can assign a utility U(R, 0) to the choice of 
a tOlrance region R when the parameter value is U in the following way: 
	
U(R, = (1 if P(R l) C, 	- 
0 if P(RJ O)<c. 
(5) 
This is simply an expression of the nega'tive of a loss function in frequentist decision 
theory. The frequentit then wishes to choose his tolerance-region statistic R(.) in 
such a way that the expectation, with respect to the P(1)(. I 0) measure, of this utility 
is q. This is so since U{R(.), O} is merely the indicator function of the set G(9, c, R) 
and so 
f
dx 	U{R(x'), 6}p(x(1) I 0) = P(' ){G(0, c, R)}. 
3. THE BAYESIAN FORMULATIONS 
A number of statisticians—in particular, Lindley (1961), Raiffa and Schlaifer 
(1961) and Savage (1962)—have vigorously advocated a rethinking of statistical 
theory and practice in Bayesian terms. I have no wish hereto enter into the general 
controversy over the relative merits of frequentist and Bayesian statistical analyses. 
My intention is rather to point out that the Bayesian approach must be regarded as a 
serious alternative to, or at least a useful complement of, the frequentist one in 
tolerance-region problems. 
The Bayesian bases his action on two components—first, his posterior measure 
fl(. Ix) and secondly, his utility function U, a real-valued function defined on 
x 0 with typical value U(R, 0), the utility of choosing tolerance region R when the 
parameter value is 0. His action is to choose R so as to maximize his expected 
utility, the expectation beiiig taken with respect to the H(. I x(1)) measure;. that is, 
he maximizes 
W(R,x' )) = I dO U(R, O)ir(8 Ix" )) 	 (6) 
Jo 
with respect to R. 
Stated in these general terms, a tolerance-region problem can be described as a 
decision problem in which the decision space is the whole or part of the event space ., 
the decision function or tolerance-region statistic being a measurable function with 
domain Tn and range . Underlying the selection of a tolerance region R c-2 there 
is usually the suggestion that R will contain a high proportion of the outcomes of 
future replicates of or most of the "important" outcomes of future replicates. The 
choice of region should thus depend on our assessment of the advantage or disadvan-
tage associated with R in relation to each possible outcome x. This dependence can 
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in fact be given full expression in our choice of utility function U. For Suppose that, 
Corresponding to each x, it is possible to assign quite a specific advantage or 
value V(R,x) attaching to R. Then we would wish to choose R so as to maximize the expectation of V(R, .) with respect to the marginal distribution of x, assessed in the 





dOp(xJ O)1T(OIx(n)) (xE.%). 	 (7) J 
Thus we require to maximize 
f
V(R, X) 	= f dO ir(OIx(n))fixv(R,x)p(xJ 0) 	(8) 
with respect to R, and so we arrive at the maximization of (6), taking 
U(R, £1) 
= f dx V(R, x)p(x! 9) 	 (9) 
as the utility derived from the value function V. The utility specification therefore 
leads to as wide a class of problems as the value specification. 
The problem treated by Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) in their Example 6.1.2 has a V specification. If the daily demand of a perishable commodity falls outside the 
Chosen tolerance interval (—cc, r) the supplier loses the potential sale of x--r units, say at a loss a(x—r); if demand falls inside the interval then r—x units are lost through deterioration at a loss b(r—x), say. Thus they take 
1-a(x7r) (x~r), V(R, x) 	
- b(r - x) (x <I-). 	
(10) 
While a detailed specification of V and U may be possible in many problems there are cases where V(R, x) depends only on whether x falls inside or outside R and not on the actual value of x. For example, the main elements of concern to an engineer, 
who chooses the design of an electrical supply system so that only those demands x which lie in R are met, may be the capital cost of R and the possibility of the system 
failing through demand exceeding supply, with the consequent costly repair to the 
system and his prestige as designer; see, for instance, the example of Section 5. Another problem of demand-and-supply type is the choice of the height of the lower 
deck of a double-decker bus. The supply value is the height r provided and a typical demand is the height x of a standing passenger. All passengers with x < r are accom-
modated comfortably and it is difficult to apportion different degrees of discomfort 
for passengers with x r. Again, if a decision is to be taken, not by a single Bayesian 
but by a group of Bayesians each with his own utility and prior density functions, it 
may be necessary for the group, as a compromise measure, to adopt a V specification of the type just discussed, namely 
IB(R) (x O R), V(R, X) 
= 1C(R) (xeR). 	 (11) 
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This leads, by (9), to the equivalent U specification 
U(R, 0) = A(R)F(RJ 0)+B(R), 	 (12) 
where A(R) = C(R)—B(R). 
The important characteristic of the utility function defined by (12) is that it 
depends on 0 only through the cover F(R j 0) provided by R at 0. Any utility function 
displaying this characteristic will be said to lead to a restricted tolerance region 
problem. It should be observed that while (12) gives the most general form of 
restricted U arising from a V specification there are other forms of restricted U, for 
example, that given by (5). The restricted form of the problem is the one traditionally 
associated with the branch of statistics known as tolerance-region theory. 
The mathematical problem associated with either the general or restricted formu-
lation above is, relative to the frequentist approach, the simple-task of maximizing a 
function. The technique of maximization will depend largely on the form of U or V 
and, since the choice of this in any particular application requires specialized know-
ledge, we shall not pursue this essentially computational aspect further. Later, in 
Section 5, we shall study some interesting aspects of the restricted problem and its 
frequentist counterpart. In the remainder of this Section we return to a comparison 
with the frequentist treatment of Section 2. 
The restricted Bayesian approach is not practicable with the utility given by (5) 
since clearly the maximum utility of 1 occurs when R = T. If we therefore com-
promise by deciding to accept an expected utility of q near I, so that we choose R to 
satisfy 
W(R,x ))=q, 	 (13) 
then we obtain the Bayesian formulation closest to the frequentist. A useful alter-
native view of this formulation is provided in the following way. For given cover c 
and region R, denote by H(c, R) the subset of ® consisting. of parameter values at 
which R gives cover at least c; that is, 
- 	H(c, R) {O : P(RJ 0) c}. 	 (14) 
Then, since U(R,.) is the indicator function of the set H(c,R), relation (13) states 
that R is to be chosen so that 
Q(R) = fl{H(c, R)Ix")} = q. 	 (15) 
Our Bayesian rationale may then be expressed as follows. If we knew the true 
parameter value £1 we would have no difficulty in deciding on an appropriate R with 
cover c at 0. Since we do not know 00 we must make our choice taking account of 
our opinion or knowledge at the time of choice. After we have experimented and 
observed x this is provided by the measure H(. lx)  associated with 0. By 
choosing R so that H(c, R) has H(. I 	measure q we are thus, as Bayesians, saying 
that we are strongly of the opinion that the unknown parameter value is such that R 
provides at it cover at least c; the strength of the opinion is measured by the quality 
q = Q(R). This seems a reasonable resolution of the problem and is, we believe, the 
kind of reasoning which takes place in the minds of many users of tolerance regions. 
We shall see in Section 4 that the formulation based on (15), with a choice of prior 
density which in a sense describes a display of ignorance about the parameter, leads 
to exactly the intervals quoted by the frequentist school. 
14 
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The customary advantage of the Bayesian approach can now be seen. It sub- 
	
stitutes for the choice of a whole function R defined on 	in the face of entanglement 
with the parameter 9, the choice of a region R for the particular x observed, free 
from any complication with unknown parameter values. The price that has to be 
paid for this great increase in mathematical tractability is the admission into the 
argument of prior densities. Now such an admission may be anathema to the fre-
quentist, but in tolerance-region problems it is how I believe many decision-makers 
act. An engineer, faced with the design of a supply system as in Section 2, will, if he 
cannot experiment, behave as a rather pessimistic Bayesian and arrive at his design 
value by some weighing up of the likely values of 0. Indeed, this is the kind of 
information which is sometimes laid down for him in his guide books. In recent 
conversation with some engineers the view was put that it was widely recognized that 
the prior weights deducible from these books were often ridiculously pessimistic and 
based on the flimsiest of evidence, but that engineers acted by the book because this 
was their safeguard in law. Perhaps one method of breaking away from this situation 
is for the progressive engineer to use this quoted information as a prior density 
function, to carry out any possible experiments of observing demand and to base his 
design on a Bayesian tolerance region. In the unlikely event of his being called to 
account for his choice of design it would be up to the Bayesian to appear as expert 
witness for the defence. It is indeed difficult to see how else it would be sensible to 
combine, the guide-book information and the experimental evidence other than 
through a Bayesian analysis. 
4. BAYESIAN TOLERANCE INTERVALS 
4.1. A General Result 
We now investigate the case where X is all or part of the real line. Our main 
purpose is to derive, for some standard distributions with associated reasonably rich 
families of prior densities, Bayesian tolerance intervals as defined by (15); and further, 
to show their relationship to the corresponding frequentist intervals. An excellent 
account of criteria for the choice of suitable "conjugate" prior densities, together with 
the main properties of these families in relation to the experimental density, is given 
by Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961, Chapter 3) and there is no need to reproduce their 
advocacy here. We catalogue our results by way of the experimental density. 
Before we consider these special densities, however, we can derive a simple result 
for determining an upper tolerance limit r = r(x) for the case where 0 is a real 




dxp(xl 0) = c 	 (16) 
and let 8(x') be the c probability point of the 7r(0l x") 
distribution. We then have 
that 
r1{0: 81 	0 1 X(n)) _,(X(n)) < 	q, 
so that, if d(0) decreases as 0 increases, 
11 [0 : d{ 1.(x)} d(0) I x] = q. 
Thus 
r(x') = dc{i_q(x)} 	 (17) 
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gives an upper tolerance limit of cover c and quality q. The corresponding limit 
when d(0) increases as 0 increases is 
	
dc( q(X)}. 	 (18) 
4.2. Upper Tolerance Limits for the Gamma Distribution 
Here 
so that 	
p(xI 0) = Okxk_le_ex/r(k) (x>O), 	 (19) 
d(0) = 2x2(2k; c)/O, 	 (20) 
where x2(2k; c) is the c probability point of a X2(2k) distribution. For this case d(0) 
decreases as 0 increases and so the limit (17) applies. We use here a gamma prior 
density 	 - 
= b 9a_1  e°/F(a) (0>0), 	 (21) 
which results in a gamma posterior density 
V(01 	= (b + z)a+nk 9a+nk_1 e+z)e/r(a + nk) (9>0), 
where z = x1  +.. -  + x. Hence 
Si_q(X') = 2 2(2a + 2nk; 1 —q)/(b +z) 
and so an upper tolerance limit is 
= dc{ i_q(x)} = (b + z) x2(2k;  c)/y(2a + 2nk; 1 - q). 	(22) 
Lower tolerance limits may be similarly obtained. The corresponding frequentist 
limit, based on th ufficiency of .z for 0, can be shown to be 
zj(2k, c)/(2nk; I - q) 	 (23) 
Note that this corresponds to the case a = b = 0 of the Bayesian result. This has the 
appearance of being very reasonable, for E(0) = alb and var(0) = a/b2 and, letting 
a-+0,b-+0 so that a/b->., we have a limiting density with finite mean and infinite 
variance, which signifies considerable ignorance about 0. For the dangers of such 
interpretations of vagueness about parameters, however, see Raiffa and Schlaifer 
(1961, Section 3.3.4). 
4.3. Upper Tolerance Limits for the Normal Distribution 
For this case O=(t,a), 0 ={0: a> 0) and p(x1) is the N(ji,cr2) density. We 
define 2 and sin the usual way by n2 = Exi and (n— 1)s2 = E(x-2)2. The conjugate 
prior density is of normal-gamma type with 
n(jz, a) cc (1/a) exp { - kb(J.L - a)2/a2} (1/cr)L1  exp ( - wv/a); 	(24) 
we then say that 	a) is a NT(a, b, v, w) density. It follows very simply that 
(i' at x'°) is a Nr(A, B, V, W) density, where 




V={wv+ba'-i-(n—l)s2+n22 —BA2}/W. 	 (27) 
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Since d(0) = z + v a, where ", is the c probability point of the N(O, 1) distribution, we require by (15) to choose r so that 
	
Il{(,a):,L+vcarIxCn}q 	 (28) 
If we introduce new parameters (, ) by 
= B(a—A)/a, 	= V/a-, 	 (29) 
then the inequality in (22) becomes 
(+vB})/q<B&(r_A)/V 	
(30) 
ow the posterior distribution of (, ) is such that e and 71 are independent with e distributed as N(0, 1) and 71 as ( 2(W)/ W}, and so (e+VB*)/7) has a non-central fm-distribution with W degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter 	If :(W, vB; q) denotes the q probability point of such a non-central f-distribution then it follows from (30) that 
B(r—A)/V= t(W,vBI; q) 
and so 
T_rA+VB4t(W,vB&;q). 	 (31) 
When b = w = 0 we have by (25), (26) and (27) that 
t—+sn_*t(n_1,vn;q), 	
(32) 
which is the familiar frequentist limit. The improper prior density associated with 
b = w 0 is of Jeffreys type and is usually interpreted as a display of ignorance about 
the parameters p and a; see Jeffreys (1961, Section 3.4.1). 
4.4. Upper Tolerance Limits for Poisson and Binomial Distributions 
For discrete distributions over non-negative integers we define d(C) as the smallest integer satisfying the inequality 
d(6) 
p(xfC)c, 	 (33) z—O 
and the Bayesian upper tolerance limit r(x') is defined by 
d(0)<rIx(n)} = q. 	 (34) 
For the Poisson experimental density 
p(xJ 0) = e 0 C-T/x! (x = 0, 1, 2, ••) 	 (35) 
with gamma prior density (21) we obtain a gamma posterior density with 
= 2x2(2a+2z; q)/(b+n). 	 (36) 
Since d(0), which is easily obtainable from Poisson tables, increases with C, the limit r(x' )) is readily obtained by (18). Again, as in Section 4.2, the case a = b = 0 pro-duces a frequentist tolerance limit. 
A similar type of analysis can be applied to the binomial experimental density 
with a beta prior density. For difficulties in the interpretation of the case which leads 
to frequentist results see Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961, pp. 63-65). 
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4.5. Finite Tolerance Intervals for the Normal Distribution 
Finally in this Section we consider the problem of obtaining a Bayesian tolerance 
interval (r1, r2) for the normal experimental density with prior density (24). By (15) 
we have to choose a pair (r1, r2) to satisfy the probabilistic relation 
11[(p,  ci) : 0{(r2-  ji)/a} - ( I){(r - p.)/a} ? cj x'] = q, 	 (37) 
where 1' denotes the distribution function of a N(O, 1) distribution, and the trans-
formation (29) provides the equivalent inequality 
I{B 	e+(r2 —A) V 1 ,}—cD{B 	+(r1 —A) V'} 
If k1  = (r1—A) V-1, k2  = (r2 —A) V' satisfy. the new probabilistic statement then 
r1=A+.k1V, r2 =A+k2 V; 	 (38) 
It can be shown that the length of the interval (k2 —k1) V is minimized when 
k3 = - k1 = k say, so that (A - k V. A + k V) would be a satisfactory tolerance interval. 
Because of the distributional properties of (, ) the value of k is exactly that given in 
frequentist tables; see, for example, Owen (1962, Section 5.4), where B 	corre- 
sponds to the estimator of 1L based on B observations andq the independent estimator 
of a with W degrees of freedom. Again the case a = b = 0 yields the usual frequentist 
interval (2—ks, 2 + ks) based on the outcome x of n replicates. 
5. OPTIMDM TOLERANCE REGIONS 
On the assumption that the frequentist has chosen his pivotal statistic or the 
Bayesian his prior density, the tolerance-interval problem, based on (2) or (15) and 
developed in Section 4, usually leads to a unique sensible solution. This is not so, 
however, when . is higher-dimensional. There may then be many statistics R 
satisfying (2) and many regions satisfying (15) so that -formulations based on the 
frequentist utility (5) are incomplete. A problem of this typeis the so-called "diversity 
problem" of engineers, illustrated by the following simple example. 
Example. An electrical supply system of the type illustrated in Fig. I is to be 
designed. "Operations" of the system are independent and the loads "demanded" at 
r ohms 




Fxo. 1. Electrical supply system. 
terminals A and B—of x and y amps, say—are independently and identically dis-
tributed, the variation from operation to operation being described by a measure 
P(. 0) associated with the (x,y)-plane. The system succeeds at an operation if the 
drops in voltage between C and A and between C and B are both less than v volts. 
A design consists of choosing the sizes of the cables AD, BD and CD, the sizes being 
172 	 AITCHISON - Bayesian Tolerance Regions 	 [No. 2, 
most conveniently expressed in terms of the associated resistances, say r, r and s ohms. 
Then clearly the cover at 8 provided by the design (r, s) is given by P(R 0), where 
R = {(x,y): rx+s(x+y)<v,ry+s(x+y)<v}. 
If there is available information on the potential demands on the system—possibly 
the observed demands on an already existing system which has been so overdesigned 
that failure is virtually impossible—then we might attempt to regard the choice of 
design (r, s) as the choice of a tolerance region R to satisfy (15), or, in the frequentist 
case, a tolerance-region statistic R to satisfy (2). But here there are clearly many 
Statistics and many regions satisfying (2) and (15), respectively, and it is obvious that, 
to make the problem sensible practically, we must take account of the cost K(R) 
associated with the construction and/or operation of the design (r, s). Regarded as a 
restricted problem, the utility must take account of both F(R 0) and K(R). 
Even in the one-dimensional case it is difficult to feel satisfied with the frequentist 
formulation characterized by (2) or its Bayesian counterpart, for the utility U(R, 0) 
in a restricted problem will usually take account of two competitive factors. The more 
extensive the set R the greater is the cover provided by it at 0 and so the greater will 
be the utility. On the other hand, there must usually be disadvantages attached to 
increasing R, such as increased cost or length of interval; if not, why, in any practical 
problem, do we not quote T as a region which certainly provides cover 1? In the 
remainder of this Section we term this disadvantage factor a cost K(R) and find it 
convenient to speak in terms of the operations of systems such as the supply system 
of the above example. 
If a cost K(R)—such as running cost, possibly with some allowance for capital. 
cost or depreciatioii --- !can be assigned to each operation of the system, then it may be 
appropriate to consider the following restricted V specification. 
(A1 —K(R) (xR), 
V(R,x) k —K(R) (xeR). 	 (39) 
Here A, is the (negative) monetary value associated with failure of an operation and 
the monetary value associated with success of an operation. The corresponding 
U specification is, by (12), 
U(R, 0) = AP(RIo)—K(R), 
where A = A—A1. The bayesian formulation in terms of the maximization of 
W(R, x )), as given by (6), is then straightforward. For instance, simple calculations 
show that, for the experimental and prior densities of Section 4.2, the region R = (0, r) 
must be chosen so as to maximize 
a + nk) - K(R), 	 (40) 
where I denotes the incomplete beta-function (Pearson, 1934). This presents no 
computational difficulties. The frequentist, on the other hand, is faced with - U(R, 8) 
as his loss function in the general decision problem and hence with the formidable 
task of finding a function R which maximizes 
I dx(')p(x( 0)[AP(R(x(n))I 0)—K{R(x')}] 	 (41) 2.  
147 
1964] 	 AITCHISON - Bayesian Tolerance Regions 	 173 
for every 8. It is quite possible that no such function exists and he would be forced 
to adopt one of the other escape routes from the entanglement with B indicated in 
Section 2. It seems to be a fair generalization that the more sophisticated the 
specification of the utility or loss function the more the Bayesian enjoys the situation, 
whereas the more the frequentist encounters difficulties. 
When the cost associated with the system is essentially the capital cost K(R) of 
constructing the design or region R and there is pressure to provide cover c, then a 
more suitable form of utility function may be given by 
IA1-K(R) if P(RIO)<c, 	 (42) U(R, 0) 
= k — K(R) if P(Rj 8)c. 
We then have, by (6), that 
W(R,x) = All{H(c, R)Ix}—K(R) = AQ(R)—K(R), 	(43) 
where A = A2 — A1  and an additive constant has been omitted. The difficulty with such 
a formulation is that it may be practically impossible to assess A. In these circum-
stances, if the pressure to provide cover c is strong, it is interesting to study the 
following resolution. From the set of regions satisfying the guarantee of cover given 
by (15) choose one which minimizes the cost. 
The frequentist, trying to formulate his corresponding problem, has first the 
formidable task of discovering the set 9 of all statistics satisfying (2). Even if he can 
find .l?, how does he then proceed to choose the statistic which gives minimum cost? 
There is unlikely to be a statistic R* E. which provides uniformly minimum-cost 
regions in the sense that 
K{R*(x()) = min K{R(x)}, 	 (44) 
BER 
for all x' 	He may then decide to take as a suitable toleiance-region statistic 
that R which satisfies (44) for the particular x he observes, but this suffers from the 
defect, unpopular with frequentists, that the statistic used depends on the particular 
x 	which turns up rather than on some properties of measures over the outcome 
space. Clearly there are great difficulties involved even in the formulation of the 
frequentist problem. 
The Bayesian, freed from the necessity of determining whole functions in the 
presence of unknown 0, is able to formulate the problem much more simply. We 
can, in fact, pose two different problems and exploit a useful duality property of 
them. 
Fixed-quality q problem. We wish the selected region R to satisfy (15) so that the 
quality Q(R) of the region is fixed at q. If 6"(q) denotes the set of all such regions, 
that is, if 
.9(q)={R:Q(R)=q} 
we then wish to minimize K(R) over 
Fixed-cost kproblem. We suppose that the cost of the selected region is to be fixed 
at k so that we are interested only in regions in the set 
.fT(k) = {R : K(R) = k}. 
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We then wish to choose a region R*(k) which maximizes Q(R) over this set; that is, 
Q{R*(k)} = max Q(R) = L(k), 	 (45) 
ReY(k) 
say. In what follows we make the assumption, reasonable in many applications, that 
the maximum quality L(k) is a Continuous and strictly increasing function of k. 
Solutions R*(k) of fixed-cost problems lead easily to the solution of the fixed-
quality q problem. If, in fact, we determine k* such that L(k*) = q then R*(k*) is an 
optimum tolerance region of fixed quality q; the minimum cost is k*.  For, suppose 
that R1  with cost k1  <k*  and not R*(k*) is optimum. Then we have 
q.= Q(RI) max Q(R)=L(k)<L(k4)=q, 
RY(k1) 
a contradiction, so that R*(k*) is in fact an optimum fixed-quality q region. 
Solutions of fixed-quality problems could,. by similar reasoning, provide a solution 
of the fixed-cost problem. Since the set 3(k) is usually easily defined and in no way 
depends on U the fixed-cost problem is likely to be a straightforward maximization 
problem. From its solutions for different k the function L(k) can be explored to 
obtain k*  and hence R*(k*). 
It is not our purpose here to explore further the computational aspects of this 
problem, which, for complicated systems, are considerable. Our objective has been 
the limited one of showing that the Bayesian approach, in contrast to the frequentist 
one, to the search for optimum tolerance regions leads to well-formulated problems. 
6. SoME GENERAL REMARKS 
It is my hope that this paper and that by Mr Thatcher which follows are pro-
vocative enough to lead to a discussion which will sweep tolerance-region theory out 
of the doldrums in which it seems to be at present becalmed.. While I have no doubt 
that frequentists and Bayesians will try to create such a stormas to drive the craft into 
port, their own or their opponents'—I am not sure which—I hope that the direction 
of motion may be influenced by the views of users of tolerance regions. A very useful 
contribution to the discussion could be the opinion of users as to which type of 
problem—the general or the restricted type—they have met, what utility or loss 
functions they regard as useful and how applicable they, as users, judge frequentist 
and Bayesian analyses. 
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The preceding paper was read at a Research Methods 
Meeting of the Royal Statistical Society on 5 February 
1964. At the same meeting a paper on a related subject 
was presented by A.R. Thatcher. The discussion and 
replies which customarily follow such read papers 
therefore refer to both these papers. 
DISCUSSION ON THE PAPERS BY MR AITCHISON AND MR THATCHER 
Mr C. B. WINsmN: We have just heard two very interesting papers. I feel some 
diffidence in opening the discussion on them for at least two good reasons. One is that 
Mr Aitchison throws out an invitation to the users of the statistical techniques he has just 
discussed. In this particular discussion, though I cannot really claim to be a user of 
tolerance intervals, I shall have to present myself perhaps as a theorist for them, but I 
very much hope that real users will join in as he suggests. Mr Aitchison gives thanks 
to users who have been sceptical and forced him to reconsider his notions. What a very 
healthy state of affairs this is. We are all realizing that the diversity of problems to which 
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statistical methods are applied have many subtle logical differences, and that these 
differences should not only be understood by the statistician but should be reflected in his 
treatment of the problem and in his interpretation of the results. Unfortunately we have 
been rather type-cast in the past as statisticians because our modes of reasoning have been 
rather limited and have been inflicted on the users rather than arising from their demands. 
So we must give special thanks to sceptical users, such as the Glasgow Hospital engineers 
that Mr Aitchison mentions, and also to responsive statisticians, such as Mr Aitchison, 
who respond to the points that these users put and try to ensure that the statisticians' logic 
fits the situation. 
My other reason for being short is that I am sure, with a high probability, though one 
that I would not like to give a number to, that yourself, Mr Chairman, and other Bayesians 
are just aching to join in this discussion. 
Mr Aitchison's paper, to which I want to address my remarks in the most part, is a 
very lucid one and, like very many lucid ones, it arouses some questions, and indeed 
misgivings, about the problems that he is discussing, and their formulation. Both papers, 
I think more Mr Aitchison's, acknowledge these tolerance interval problems basically as 
decision problems. If one considers, for example, production ofa particular item, intervals 
are simply an aid on the way to a decision, perhaps help on the way to a decision for 
a large number of different people with different uses. If one gives the prediction of 
how productivity is going to be next year, or something of that sort, then one is usually 
giving the prediction to help people who are guiding the economy, i.e. help people who 
are going to have to make decisions. So I accept the fact that these problems basically are 
decision problems, ones with particular sorts of risk functions, as Mr Aitchison points out 
in his paper, that have basically two values, though there can be differences. 
What sort of special cases can there be for the use of this sort of decision problem? 
Let me try to give two sorts. The first one might be something like this. A manufacturer 
is to mass produce a device. He takes a sample of conditions under which the device will 
have to function, and then fixes his tolerances as the result of this sample, and goes into full 
production. He cannot then change his production after he has- started. Some of his 
devices meet extra conditions outside the tolerance interval and they fail. The proportion 
that fail may be a plausible measure in this particular case, and this is the point I want 
to emphasize, of the cost of setting up the process in the way that he did. And the 
proportion that do not fail correspondingly is a measure of the success. The light-hearted 
example that Mr Aitchison gives of people in a bus is really a case just like this. But there 
are really quite serious examples which are similar, the sort of ergonomic ones where in fact 
people do not know all the statistics of the users. In the case of the bus, of course, the 
bus designer would only have to look up statistics for the whole population—we hope he 
would not just take a sample. But there are many cases where this sort of thihg.would 
happen. Now in this sort of example the idea of a cover which Mr Aitchison has 
introduced occurs not as a probability but basically as a utility, as a payoff function. 
The payoff may in some cases be uncertain because the initial sample on which the tolerance 
interval is based is finite. In such a case one has great misgivings about the whole notion of 
the quality that has been introduced. Why should one fix so severely on a single value c 
for the payoff function? Why concentrate on getting a probability, in the Bayesian 
formulation, of getting the payoff above c? What one should be interested in is looking 
at the whole payoff or cover function, as it depends on C and, of course, on the fixed 
sample that one took at the beginning. The fixed sample has been taken, so basically 
one will simply have a cover function as a function of 0. And then what one should do is 
to consider this payoff function in the light of the likelihood function (or the posterior 
probability function, if one were a very convinced Bayesian), obtained from the initial 
sample that one had got. Now it may be objected that this sort of notion is not a true 
tolerance interval problem. But I think it does have all the characteristics of the Sort of 
problem that Mr Aitchison is thinking of. Another type of problem that perhaps comes 
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more closely to the spirit in which these things have been introduced is one of a sort, 
again the sort that Mr Aitchison has defined, where one might have a reservoir and have 
to define the size on the basis of a fixed sample of rainfalls. Or one might have a storage 
system and basically only have a limited sample in which this storage system is used. 
Again this reservoir will only have a life of so many years imputed to it, so one would be 
interested in the finite sample that the reservoir will face after it has been built. In this 
particular case cover is not a payoff function, it is a probability, but I think the same 
sort of point comes up. Basically one would be interested in plotting the cover as a 
function of 8 after one has taken one's first sample. I would want the cover to be high 
where the likelihood or the posterior probability, crossing fingers as before, was high, 
and only low where all the evidence pointed to an infinitesimal chance of the parameter 
being the true one. Incidentally, Mr Aitchison raises the notion of a statistician having 
to give evidence in a law case, and if I were giving evidence, or advising in this situation, 
I would be very sceptical of the notion of producing a Bayesian prior probability distri-
bution. What I would expect to do would be.for the statistician to produce his cover 
function, and if the cover function was low in a particular range of values of 9, say, I 
would expect him not merely to say that he had a high prior probability of values excluding 
this particular portion where the cover was low, but to sho' evidence that he had 
really thoroughly investigated these values of 9 to make sure that that sort of value of the 
parameter had not actually occurred. Quite often, in the real world, as against the very 
formalized world of these tolerance intervals, there is lots of ancillary evidence or extra 
experiments that one can go to to see what sort of value of 9 there might be. And it may 
be perfectly possible to follow up these particular values of 0 and see that they could not 
really happen at all. That is not, of course, to say that the more mechanical sort of 
Bayesian reasoning is not useful for deriving a procedure, of course it is. The very best way, 
as we know from many examples, for getting a particular procedure is to try out a prior 
probability distribution, get a procedure. What I am saying is that having got this 
procedure one should plot the whole cover function in a problem of this sort. 
I was worried, too, in this light, at a remark that Mr Thatcher makes on page 188 of 
his paper. There he states that he gives an idea of a mixed strategy. He says, just above 
7.2, "Similarly, under the Bayesian approach, there may be occasions when the prior 
knowledge is somewhat imprecise, so that one hesitates between one prior distribution 
and another." Again it will be possible to mix the Bayesian solutions by a random experi-
ment. I think in that particular case what one would be more likely to do is to put the 
plausible prior distributions, ones that you might think apply in extreme cases, and so on, 
produce solutions for them, and then plot the cover functions, to see whether in fact they 
had this sort of dip in unfortunate places, and so on. I do not think in the least that one 
would simply carry on straightaway and get a unique solution in this sort of thing without 
checking on the cover funtion or the risk function first. 
The essential thing is basically to keep a distinction between those parts of the problem 
that can be found by calculation, and this would be the cover function, and the subjective 
elements where they are brought in, to demonstrate entirely, especially if one has to argue 
with a variety of different users, or even legal minds, just how these things are to be kept 
distinct. 
I found both these papers very interesting ones, as I said, and I have much pleasure in 
moving the vote of thanks. 
Mr D. F; KERRIDGE: I rather imagine that I was asked to second the vote of thanks 
because it was feared that the speakers might not be controversial enough, and I will do 
my best to raise still further any temperatures that have not already reached boiling point. 
But first I must praise Mr Aitchisons paper on two points which I think are very important. 
First, that it looks as if it is meant to be read. So many papers look as if they are meant to 
be flied. Secondly, that he recognizes explicitly that what we do, or rather what we as 
theorists recommend that others do, must be determined by the needs of the user. You 
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may remember that Dr Good at one of these meetings (Good, 1960) suggested that 
operations research is needed to determine what users actually do with the answers we 
give them. We theorists have in the past paid very little attention to this. The question 
then arises: what do users really want? Now it may very well be that users do not want 
a tolerance interval. In fact, given the right situation, nobody would want it. If you have 
got understandably defined costs, and you have decisions to make, I do not think anybody 
would dream of treating it in any other way than as a decision problem. This means, as we 
know, that we must use Bayesian strategies, so I do not think that Mr Aitchison is really 
saying anything which is very controversial here, from whichever point of view you like 
to look at it. Nobody has yet suggested that decision theory is wrong for the kind of 
problem in which you are making decisions. I am therefore in complete accord with the 
practical recommendations of the paper. However, reading between the lines to find 
something controversial, I find the suggestion that what we are trying to do is to tell the 
engineer what he ought to believe. Now I have no great experience with engineers, but 
1 do not think an engineer wants to be told what he ought to believe. He wants to be told 
what he can do that will fairly certainly be right. It is true, of course, that very often 
Bayesian methods do lead us to make decisions which are right, but there seems to be 
some suggestion that there is some other reason for using them. I claim that the only 
respectable reason for using Bayesian methods is because you are a frequentist. Now I 
know that Bayes's theorem fell into disfavour for a short time among frequentists, although 
von Mises himself, the most vigorous advocate of the frequency theory, consistently 
maintained that the use of Bayes's theorem was the only sensible way to make an inference. 
I think that this view is one which is likely to return. If we look at the justifications which 
are given of the use of Bayesian inference from the non-frequentist point of view, the 
usual explanation given is that these are the rules that you must adopt In order to be 
consistent. Now I do not know that anybody wants to be consistent. After all, we can be 
consistently wrong, just as easily as consistently right. I admit the appeal of consistency, 
but the appeal is only to but aesthetic instinct for tidiness, which is not necessarily a safe 
guide in practical affairs. The engineer, I should imagine, is not concerned with being 
consistent, he just wants to be right. This brings me back to my main thesis that the 
right reasons for using Bayes's theorem are frequency reasons. The difficulty is perhaps 
that the frequency properties of Bayesian solutions are not really well understood yet, 
though we are getting to understand them more. We have here in these two papers practical 
examples in which Bayesian and confidence solutions agree to within any reasonable 
practical degree. Take Mr Thatcher's paper: the difference between the Bayesian and 
confidence interval solutions is of the order of one observation, which is neither here nor 
there in any practical situation. We may like, as theorists, to have exact solutions, but 
it does not really bother the practical man very much. Nothing fundamental can depend 
on one observation. And, in fact, the randomized strategy Mr Thatcher suggests in the 
final part of the paper indicates even more strongly that the difference between the 
confidence interval and the Bayesian solution is very small, because he finds that by taking 
a mixture of the two we can get randomized confidence intervals which have slightly 
greater efficiency than the ordinary confidence solution. The difference between the two 
solutions in the first place was only one observation either way: by taking a half-and-half 
mixture of the two things you have got an even smaller difference. Obviously, if you 
took some prior distribution which was half-way between the two you would get 
inferences which in the long run would give you sensible frequency answers. There are 
already a few results known on the frequency properties of Bayesian inferences. I myself 
proved a little while ago (Kerridge, 1963) that given a finite number of hypotheses you 
cannot often end up with the wrong result if you apply Bayes's Postulate. And I understand 
that Professor Savage has a result which shows that in large samples you must have agree-
ment between confidence intervals and the results of applying Bayes's theorem and 
constructing intervals from the posterior distribution. Clearly, there is a great deal of 
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further investigation needed, but this seems a very hopeful line of development. What we 
really need are rules for finding inoffensive prior distributions which will make the 
convergence between the two kinds of solution even more rapid, such as those given by 
Dr Welch and Dr Peers in their recent paper in Series B (Welch and Peers, 1963). To a 
first approximation it is fairly easy to see what to do. For instance, if you take the case 
where you have discrete hypotheses you find that the posterior probability of each 
hypothesis is roughly normally distributed in large samples, by a simple application 
of the central limit theorem. If you arrange that the prior probability distribution is 
such that the means of these distributions are equal then you are going to get the 
convergence between the two methods pretty rapid. And this seems the only really 
satisfactory way to choose prior distributions, that is, to choose them so that they give 
sensible answers. In fact, I think that this has already been applied to some extent. If you 
look at the ways in which Jeffreys chooses prior distribution (Jeffreys, 1961, p.  192) he 
does seem to bear very much in mind that they should lead to reasonable posterior 
distributions. Or at least he produces a rule by, say, invariance theory which gives him a 
prior distribution and then rejects it because he does not like the answers it gives. Far 
from being illogical in doing this, I think this is precisely the right thing to do. And this, 
I hope, is what we shall see happening in the future. 
I must thank both the speakers very much. I wish they could have said something 
more controversial. I have much pleasure in seconding the vote of thanks. 
The vote of thanks was carried unanimously. 
Professor E. S. PEARSON: I am glad that Mr Thatcher has brought out again for 
inspection this historic problem of the two binomial samples, because each generation of 
statisticians responds to the outlook of its time by giving a rather different twist to the 
possible solutions. There is some progress, a greater understanding of the relationship 
between the alternatives, but to me at any rate it seems doubtful whether there can ever be 
a uniquely acceptable answer. 
I am not going to be drawn into the heat of controversy by Mr Aitchison's challenging 
remarks, but should perhaps go this far in a confession of faith. For myself—and I want 
to emphasize that this is a purely personal attribution—I feel a certain dishonesty in 
inserting into the foundation of my mathematical inference structure a function, say f(p), 
which will often have no real meaning for me. In reaching conclusions on the basis of 
statistical data there are many factors to be taken into account which do not seem to be 
expressible in terms of numbers, and prior knowledge may often for me have to be one of 
these. But to quote a recent remark of M. G. Kendall's, "a man's attitude towards 
inference. . . is determined by his emotional make-up, not by reason or by mathematics"; 
perhaps I might add also, by the conditioning of his life experience. 
In this connection, then, may I be allowed to make a few remarks from the historical 
angle as to where Mr Thatcher's problem stood in 1922 when Dr Irwin, our President, 
and I happened to be learning our statistical theory together at University College. First, 
following a good tradition, I will remark in passing that his equation (16) was given in 
a paper of mine published in Biometrika in 1925, except that in my particular approach 
the prior distribution of p was taken as symmetrical with b = c in his equation (15). 
I am not suggesting that you should read my paper which, by modern standards, was not 
perhaps a very good one, being far too discursive. I could make much better use of the 
data now! But it is relevant, I think, to refer to it here as one outcome of discussions which 
were taking place at a point in time over 40 years ago when ideas on inference were 
beginning to be thrown into the melting pot. 
What was the position then? The early British school of applied statisticians had not 
seemed to feel the need to think very deeply about the basis of inference; on the whole 
their outlook was certainly a frequentist one, but at times they felt compelled to appeal 
to Bayes's theorem. Thus, my father in 1920 wrote a paper called "The fundamental 
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• problem of practical statistics", which starts from Bayes's theorem. He thought he had 
found a solution to the dilemma but in this I am sure he was wrong. Starting in terms of 
Bayes's illustration of the balls on a billiard table, he pointed out that if the probability 
distribution governing the position of the later balls was the same as that for the first, 
marker ball, the posterior distribution for Mr Thatcher's a2 assumed Laplace's form 
whether the prior distribution f(p) was uniform or not. This assumption of a common 
distribution might be true for dropping balls onto a table, but in general, of course, is 
not likely to hold. 
My own investigation must, I fancy, have been stimulated by K. P.'s reference to some 
remarks of Edgeworth made as long ago as 1884. Writing in the journal Mind, Edgeworth 
had asserted: 
I submit, the assumption that any probability-constant about which we know 
nothing in particular is as likely to have one value as another is grounded upon the 
rough but solid experience that such constants do as a matter of-fact, as often have one 
value as another (p. 230). 
And again: 
We take our stand upon the fact that probability-constants occurring in nature 
present every variety of fractional value; and that natural constants in general are 
found to show no preference for one number rather than another. Acting on which 
supposition, while in particular cases we shall err, in the long run we shall find our 
account (p.  231). 
You will see that Edgeworth is appealing not to an equal distribution of ignorance nor 
to a subjective measure of probability associated with a particular set of circumstances 
but to a loosely defined, general statistical experience. It was to examine this claim that 
I collected a very large number of twin binomial samples, n1, n2, from many different 
kinds of population. I then examined how far the frequency a2 in the second sample 
fell within the Bayes's posterior limits, 
takingf(p) as constant, 
giving it U- or V-shaped forms corresponding roughly to the actual distribution 
of (a1  + a2)f(n1 + n2) found in my particular large-scale statistical experience. 
In this way it may be said that I started my statistical career ag a Bayesian frequentist! 
I am interested to hear that this is what Mr Kerridge thinks that one should be! 
But while its consequences could be explored in this simple classical problem, a 
Bayesian frequentist attack of this kind did not then seem to be a very profitable line of 
study. And at this juncture came Fisher's 1922 Royal Society paper with its condemnation 
of the use of inverse probability. It was hardly surprising that most of the statisticians 
of my generation—and of course there were not many of us—who had certainly not felt 
happy with Bayes, moved away (as Fisher himself admitted he had done) from the Bayesian 
tradition which had still had some influence on our elders. 
Asa result, an interesting 6onsequence followed. With the use of posterior distributions 
ruled out of court, there was a strong incentive to find some method for providing interval 
estimates for unknown parameters in the case of small samples, a field in which Fisher's 
work had provided so many distributions. To meet this need, the fiducial and confidence 
interval theories were evolved independently but almost simultaneously in the late 
1920's. 
Now, of course, in the 1960's, these problems are looked at with revived interest in the 
light of the subjective theory of probability. We understand more and these discussions 
are a sign that we are alive and healthy. But there is always a question in my mind. Is 
any advocate of the Bayesian approach yet prepared to take responsibility for writing a 
new Statistical Methods for Research Workers for the plain working statistician? 
Mr T. W. MAyER: The engineer's task in the design of physical systems is twofold: 
he must assess the demand which will be made on the system and he must provide a 
system which is physically capable of meeting this demand. 
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In undertaking the first of these tasks, an activity for which he is academically ill-
prepared, he may encounter a loading distribution in which the maximum demand is so 
large as to be indeterminable, and thus be obliged, albeit with a clear conscience, to accept 
the inevitable inadequacy of his design, or he may encounter a loading distribution in which 
the maximum demand may conceivably be met, and thus be presented with a dilemma 
based on the understanding that total satisfaction is within his power, if not his pocket. 
In either event, from the outset, an understanding of the real world interpretation of 
"cover" and "quality" is necessary. Although the engineer may understand the relative 
frequency interpretation of "P" he is unable, even after consultation with the user, to 
arrive at a sensible measure of cover, let alone quality, in ignorance of the consequences 
of design failure. 
Moreover, his decision regarding the level of the design cannot sensibly be made, 
whether the outcome space is uni- or multi-dimensional, in conscious or unconscious 
repudiation of his obligation to the possibly dissatisfied users of other unsatisfactory 
systems which function serially or coincidentally with the system under investigation. 
The opportunity afforded by a Bayesian approach—of admitting a measure of the 
consequences of design failure and a measure of the utility of the operation—is an 
attractive one. In many cases, however, the physical ramifications of failure may not be 
readily determinable while in other cases, although all the physical aspects are understood, 
their effect on the user may defy simple quantitative assessment. 
Although the engineer has been in the past largely unaware of the wealth of statistical 
help on which he could draw to assist him in the definition of loading distributions, he 
has never been unmindful of the abnormal occurrences, due either to the malfunctioning of 
a piece of equipment or to the stupidity on the part of the user, which would bring about 
design failure. The development of automatic control devices, pursued with the object of 
obviating the dangers which might accompany such abuses, has, fortunately, if inad-
vertently, brougbt about a simplification in the specification of the value function "V", 
This can best be illustrated by an example. 
A fusible link is incorporated in an electrical circuit supplying a number of socket 
outlets; any demand in excess of that for which the circuit is designed effects a break in 
the circuit by fusing the link and the system becomes inoperative. The fact that the 
resulting inconvenience, in terms of the trouble to repair the fuse and the lack of facilities 
during the repair period, is the same whatever the magnitude of the excess demand, 
indicates that this situation is of the restricted type. A more sophisticated form of control, 
such as might be found in an elevator, wherein an automatic reset is actuated when the 
excess load is removed constitutes a "V" specification in which the elements of cost due 
to inconvenienceare replaced to a large extent by the capital cost of the control mechanism 
in the evaluation of A. 
Although most engineering problems fall into the restricted category there are some 
which do not. If we consider the supply of hot water to a hospital ward unit we encounter 
a most intractable situation. Failure of the design obviously results in some inconvenience 
to the staff and possible danger to the patient. The degree of this inconvenience and danger 
is dependent on the form in which the failure manifests itself: it may be reduced flow of 
hot water, it may be slight reduction in temperature over a protracted period or it may be 
drastic reduction in temperature over a short period. This lack of understanding of the 
physical possibilities together with the acutely difficult task of evaluating inconvenience 
and danger presents such a complex problem that the engineer may be glad to revert to the 
vagueness of Frequentist interpretation. 
In any event, when the storm of discussion has finally abated, the engineer will be 
quite happy if he discovers the craft safely moored in either one of the two ports rather 
than at the bottom of the sea. 
Dr J. A. HARTIGAN: I would like to make one or two purely technical comments. 
First, it seems reasonable to distinguish completely between the observation space 
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and the.prediction space e', which are connected by having probability distributions indexed 
by 0. For example, in a regression problem, .' would represent observations for certain 
values of the fixed variables, and ?/ would represent a new observation on a new set of 
values of the fixed variables. 
The tolerance region R in Y (having observed x) is of particularly simple form if 
Mr Aitchison's (39) is such that the cost K(R) is a positive measure, with density k(y), 
say. Then the Bayesian procedure with prior density ir(0) gives 
R = 
The asymptotic behaviour of regions of this form is accessible if k(y) is a prior density 




We can assess the "size" of the regions by Bayesian size, b(x) = it(R I x) or confidence 
size (or cover) C(0) = F(RX 10). It then appears that the regions R are asymptotically 
of fixed confidence size if and only if 
1(0) oc I.(0) oly 
here I(0) is Fisher's information, and the "asymptotically" means that T and ?I  become 
infinite replicates of some base spaces TO andYo. The asymptotic behaviour of the tolerance 
regions R is independent of the prior density it, so that regions of fixed confidence size 
would seem to be inadmissible asymptotically unless the loss function K is generated by 
an 1(0) satisfying the above condition. 
It is still reasonable to assess the size of the regions R by C(0), 9 unknown, as 
Mr Winsten has suggested; the Bayesian size b(x) could be useful as an estimate of the 
confidence size. In fact b(x) - C(0) as t becomes an infinite replicate, and it may be 
reasonable to select the prior distribution, it to make b(x) a "good" estimate of C(0) for 
finite K. 
Dr B. L. WELCH: Theoretical distinctions are probably best brought out by the kind 
of discussion of specific problems which has been provided by the authors tonight. I 
should like, nevertheless, to make some points in the general theory of the singleparameter. 
0, which I believe to be relevant. It is well known that in large-sample Bayesian theory 
the choice of the prior distribution is not, within broad limits, a critical issue. Nor, if 
the appropriate confidence theory, based on the maximum-likelihood estimator, 9, is 
developed, do the numerical values of confidence points differ from those of Bayesian 
probability points. It is the present-day emphasis on small sample theory—possibly an 
over-emphasis—which opens up the breach between different approaches. It is of interest 
to note, therefore, that with a particular choice of prior distribution we can still secure 
concordance between Bayesian and confidence points at the further level of approximation 
where we take into account the first corrective terms in asymptotic theory, i.e. those terms 
whose influence is of order n in probability. 
At this level the computation of confidence points in terms of 0 alone requires a 
knowledge of the third cumulant of 0. Alternatively, as has been described by Bartlett 
(1953), we may calculate confidence points on the basis of the distributional properties of 
8L/90. Again the third cumulant is required. Although the results based on the distribution 
of 0 and those based on the distri6ution of aLlaO are not identical they have the same 
probabilistic properties to order n. 
In Bayesian theory, on the other hand, it has been shown in a recent paper by H. W. 
Peers and myself (Welch and Peers, 1963) that there is one specific prior density function, 
w(0), which has special properties in relation to confidence theory. The weight function 
is w(0) = ,j{ic(0)} where ,<2(0) = var eLlaO, i.e. the weight function is equal to the standard 
deviation of OL/00, or, near enough, is inversely proportional to the standard deviation 
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of O. it was shown that Bayesian probability points calculated with this weight function 
can also be interpreted as confidence points. It can be proved furthermore that these 
confidence points, whilst not identical with those based purely on the distribution of O, or on the distribution of aL/EO, have the same probabilistic properties to order n. 
In those situations where the variance of OEIH does not depend on 0 to the order of n-1  with which we are concerned (0) is constant and we have a uniform weighting. In 
general by an appropriate transformation 	g(0) we can pass over to a parameter 
for which the variance of aL/Eqc will be constant. The weighting will then be uniform on 
that scale. Furthermore, it is clear that this transformation is the familiar variance 
equalizing - transformation which is commonly applied to the maximum-likelihood 
0 estimator . This, perhaps, is not unexpected. 
For instance, in the case of binomial samples the variance stabilizing transformation 
is y = sin_1/(x/n). Correspondingly we can write 77  = sin' 'p. Taking to be uniformly 
distributed is the same as taking a weight function oi(p)ccp-i(l -p). One notes that in 
Mr Thatcher's paper he finds suggestions pointing to weight functions p or (1 -p)-' 
according to which of two problems he is considering. We may note that these two 
alternatives straddle the valuep(l -p) 4  suggested by general asymptotic theory. Perhaps 
too much should not be made of this since the latter theory assumes continuity for a 
variable which is strictly discrete. The step of the binomial variable expressed in terms of 
the binomial standard deviation is of order n and so discontinuity effects are, as Mr 
Thatcher has observed, not negligible in the present context. This may possibly be the 
whole explanation. 
In general it may seem illogical to use frequency arguments to suggest prior distribution 
functions for insertion in Bayesian analyses. But historically this has often been done 
before—for instance in the case of the Student distribution. The sole object of these 
remarks is to point out that asymptotic theory taken beyond the usual large sample 
results can make sugestions of this nature. Whether Bayesians care to adopt them is 
another matter. 
Professor G. A. BARNARD: It is not the custom at our Society to over-emphasize 
points of agreement and I will come straight to my disagreement, therefore, especially with 
Mr Aitchison. After so many speakers have drawn attention to the falsity of the anti-
thesis between the Bayesian and the frequentist point of view it is perhaps not necessary 
for me to comment further. I cannot resist adding that one would hardly expect, after 
reading Mr Aitchison's paper, to find that one of the first men to advocate the application 
of Bayes's theorem, in circumstances like those contemplated here, was in fact Richard 
von Mises, who was in a sense the founder of the modern frequentist theory of probability. 
I know this false antithesis between "Bayesian" and "frequentist" methods does not 
originate with Mr Aitchison, but I think it would be very sad if it were given wider 
currency. 
Another misapprehension that might arise also, and indeed apparently has arisen, is 
that the notion of introducing utilities into statistical decision problems is a specifically 
Bayesian notion. In fact it can be traced back to Gauss, but in more recent times it is 
primarily the work of Wald who was certainly never in any sense a subjective Bayesian. 
The fact is, of course, that all the arguments which Mr Aitchison puts can be put into 
frequency terms, and, indeed, if I may refer to my own paper on "Sampling inspection and 
statistical decisions" (Barnard, 1954), especially pp. 163-165, I indicated there that in 
some respects the Bayesian argument can be better couched in terms of frequencies than 
in terms of probabilities. 
In view of all that has been said and the hour, I must confine myself to making one 
further point. Consideration of the theory of tolerance intervals is valuable in connection 
with the Bayesian controversy, because there is another separation in the theory of tolerance 
intervals, that is, into the parametric and the non-parametric approach. It is well known 
that if we take the distribution to be Continuous only, on being presented with the first 
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sample of n1  observations, we can find limits associated with a small probability a such 
that unless an event of probability a occurs a specific proportion of a subsequent 
sample of n2  will fall within given limits. This is without assumption about the form of the 
population. These limits will be expressed in terms of the percentiles of the sample. If we 
now assume that the population in question is (for example) normal, then we can find 
limits having similar properties, this time in terms of k and s. Whether we use the first 
set of limits or the second, that is, whether we use non-parametric or parametric limits, will 
depend on the actual state of our knowledge. If the assumption that the distribution is 
as nearly normal as no matter has empirical support of some kind, then we may use the 
parametric limits, but if we do not have such information then we shall be wise to use the 
non-parametric limits. It seems to me to be similar with regard to the non-Bayesian 
versus the Bayesian limits. We may in fact know the case in hand to be one of a series 
for which we can at least approximately guess the frequency function. If so, then we 
should use the Bayesian limits. But if not, then I think we should be deceiving our clients 
if we present them with Bayesian limits. If a professional body of statisticians were to 
sponsor the use of Bayesian tolerance limits in situations where nothing was known of 
the relative frequencies of the class of cases to which a given one was to be referred, it 
would be as if a body of professional civil engineers sanctioned a practice whereby if 
nothing was known of the subsoil upon which a building was to be erected the designer 
should assume it to be clay. What the civil engineers should do in such a case of course 
would be to make no such assumptions but instead to take steps to discover what the 
subsoil was. In the same way, if we are faced with a situation calling for Bayesian tolerance 
limits then it is our duty as statisticians to acquire the empirical knowledge necessary to 
support whatever assumptions we require to make about the prior distribution. Unfortu-
nately, the treatment commonly given, and in this particular paper we have an instance of 
it, does not proceed in this way but instead proceeds by reference to what Raiffa and 
Schlaifer call conjugate prior distributions, or what I have called distributions closed 
under sampling. These distributions have mathematical elegance, but the fact that they 
have this gives us, to my mind, no reason whatever for supposing that nature will be so 
kind as to ensure that the frequencies met with in practice will follow such convenient 
forms. Just as Wald's minimax procedure implied the supposition that nature was un-
reasonably malevolent, I think the assumption of a convenient prior distribution assumes 
nature to be unreasonably benevolent. 
I was interested to hear tonight that Professor Pearson made some empirical investi- 
gations to discover what nature's habits in these matters really were. It is very urgent that 
this kind of work should be pursued more vigorously. Mr Ford, at Imperial College, 
worked on this, too, and more recently Professor Hald in Denmark has done more work 
in connection with sampling inspection. There is a very unfortunate tendency amongst 
the fashionable Bayesian approach nowadays to ignore the importance of these empirical 
investigations. 
May I conclude with one question for Mr Thatcher. He has not commented on the 
treatment of a related problem given by Fisher in terms of likelihood in his book Statistical 
Methods and Scientific Inference and I would be very grateful to hear his comments on 
that particular treatment. 
Dr D. J. BARTHOLOMEW: I hope it is a sign of the times that papers have begun to 
appear which compare Bayesian and frequentist approaches to inference in the context of 
particular problems. The two theories can be mutually illuminating as I hope to show 
with particular reference to Mr Thatcher's paper. Before discussing my main point in 
detail it may help to clarify it by some general remarks. 
Mr Aitchison's paper clearly demonstrates the mathematical advantages of Bayesian 
methods. Once the problem has been formulated the solution is a matter of mathematical 
routine. This is rightly contrasted with the ill-defined problem of choosing a pivotal 
function for frequentist methods. However, as Aitchison remarks; the price to be paid 
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for this simplification is the introduction of a prior distribution. To many statisticians 
this seems to require the abandonment of objectivity in favour of a theory built on the 
doubtful foundation of individual introspection. As Thatcher points out, the problem 
is particularly acute if our prior knowledge is vague or non-existent. However, it would 
be possible to retain the obvious advantages of the Bayesian approach without sacrificing 
objectivity if some formal way of representing ignorance could be found. It is well known 
that Jeffreys has suggested an invariance principle to achieve this end. (It is interesting 
to observe that his choice of prior distribution is the same as the weight function arrived at 
by Welch.) However, it is perhaps surprising that no one, to my knowledge, has suggested 
judging the suitability of a prior distribution solely by the frequency properties of the 
tests or estimates to which it leads. I hope to elaborate this principle elsewhere, but it has 
one consequence which is relevant to the discussion of Thatcher's problem. It implies 
that the choice of prior distribution and the choice of experiment are intimately linked. 
This means that the choice of a particular experiment expresses implicitly a certain prior 
belief about the unknown parameter. This is made explicit by finding what prior distri-
bution gives results having the required frequentist properties. If there is no such 
distribution it seems plausible to conclude that the experiment proposed is not Suitable. 
Conversely the principle requires that the Bayesian should select an experiment which, 
when combined with his prior distribution, leads to results which have the usual frequentist 
properties. The result of applying these general ideas to Thatcher's problem seems 
particularly interesting. 
Consider it first from the frequentist point of view. It is important to recognize that 
Thatcher gives two distinct methods. One, giving upper limits, we shall call the U-method 
and the other, giving lower limits, we shall call the L-method. The U-method makes 
statements of the kind Pr {a2 > u(a1)} < a where a need not, of course, be small. Similarly 
for the L-method we have Pr f a2 <1(a1)} 	. It is important to recognize that the two 
methods are different because it is not true in general that u1_(a1) = 1(a1) for all a,. In 
fact it is easy to see from a diagram that u1_(a1) > 4(a1) for some values of 01. Thatcher's 
two-sided prediction interval, with confidence coefficient at least (I —2c1), is {u(a), 1(a1)}. 
It would be more natural to use either u(a1), u1_(a1)} or {11_(a1), 4(a)). The difficulty 
with both of these intervals is that they do not guarantee the required confidence 
coefficient although, as is clear from a diagram, it is possible to find a lower bound to 
the confidence. To do this we have to calculate the maximum probability outside the 
limits on any diagonal. An inspection of special cases suggests that this will seldom, if 
ever, be less than (1 - 2). The U- and L-methods thus give confidence intervals. 
The intervals obtained by the U- and L-methods will never be longer than Thatcher's 
and are often shorter. Whichever method we use (U or L) the confidence coefficient is 
the same. The only difference between them is that the L-method gives shorter intervals 
if a,< in, and longer intervals if a1 > n1. In order to make a rational choice between 
the two methods we must have some prior information. All that is needed is some indi-
cation of whether p, and hence a1/n1, is more likely to be nearer 1 than 0 or vice versa. 
If this information is not available it can be argued that, in choosing U or L, we are 
acting as if we had it. If we are ignorant the simplest way to obtain the necessary infor-
mation is to make a single observation before the experiment begins. If this were a 
success we would choose the U-method and if it were a failure the L-method. 
Next consider the problem from the Bayesian point of view. Thatcher has shown that 
the U-method agrees with the Bayesian method if the prior density is proportional to 
1/(1 —p) and that the L-method agrees if the prior density is proportional to 1/p. From 
the Bayesian point of view therefore the U-method would be appropriate if we had enough 
prior knowledge to believe that p was more likely to be near I than 0. The L-method 
would be used if we thought that p was more likely to be near 0 than I. This is precisely 
the conclusion that we reached using frequentist arguments. We are now in a position 
to suggest a suitable prior distribution to represent complete ignorance about p. The 
minimum amount of information required to choose between the U- and L-methods is 
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that provided by one observation. We thus require a prior density which is converted 
into 1/(1 —p) if the observation is a success and into I/p if it is a failure. The only density 
satisfying this requirement is I/p(l —p). 
We have thus reached the following conclusion. The Bayesian and frequentist 
prediction limits agree under the following circumstances. The Bayesian must use the 
prior density l/p(l —p)  to represent complete ignorance. The frequentist must make one 
preliminary observation to decide whether to use the U- or L-limits. 
This example illustrates the general point made earlier. The Bayesian formulation 
suggests that Thatcher's prediction interval can be improved upon since it cannot be 
derived from any prior distribution. It also makes explicit the fact that the U- and 
L-méthods presuppose a very vague knowledge about p. This, in turn, indicates a way of 
modifying the experiment if we are completely ignorant. The frequentist approach, on 
the other hand, provides objective grounds for believing that the prior density proportional 
to I/p(I —p) is a suitable representation of complete ignorance about p. 
These conclusions have a bearing on Mr Aitchison's problem. Although the frequency 
statements about tolerance intervals may be tortuous they do provide some grounds for 
judging whether the prior distribution used is reasonable. It is thus reassuring to find that, 
in the simple examples considered, there is an equivalence between Bayes's and frequency 
methods. 
Dr IRWIN: I should have thought that the suggestion that has been made of using 
the prior distribution dp/p(l —p) would rather please the Bayesian because it would mean 
that log (p/(l —p)} would have a uniform distribution. 
Mr H. E. BISHOP: Might there not be some advantage in not simply taking one pre-
liminary observation to give a clue to the prior distribution? It might be better to take a 
number greater than one chosen to have some optimal property. 
Dr BARTHOLOMEW: I have not investigated this point but my impression is that one 
observation would be the optimum number. This would leave the maximum number of 
observations for actually making the prediction. 
Mr A. STUART: Like Professor Pearson and Professor Barnard, I lack strong belief 
in my mind as a mirror to nature, and so I am not given to persuading myself that merely 
convenient prior distributions really are the ones I should be using. Bayesians have 
sometimes justified such self-persuasions by pointing out that they are no worse than 
those involved in the common distributional assumptions made in parametric problems. 
This, it seems to me, is a stronger argument for abandoning the prevalent evil than for 
adding another to it, but Mr Aitchison dismisses the distribution-free approach in a 
sentence. 
Bayesian statisticians depend upon a modern form of the pathetic fallacy—they 
expect the world to reflect the vibrations of their minds. I hope they will not model 
themselves too closely upon the hero of a satire who, when asked for a rule of invention, 
said: "Why, Sir, when I have anything to invent, I never trouble my head about it, as 
other men do." There is no escape from satire in the modern world, but this one, The 
Rehearsal, was published in 1672 by the second Duke of Buckingham. Perhaps with some 
pre-vision, he named his hero "Bayes". 
Professor D. V. LINDLEY: Nearly all discussions of probability treat it as a function 
of a single argument. That is, with an event A of a suitable type (what is suitable depends 
on the school of probability) is associated a number called the probability of A and 
denoted by p(A). This is false: probability is a function of two arguments; the event A 
being considered as above, and the conditions, B say, under which the consideration is 
taking place. That is, all probabilities are conditional and should be written p(A I B). 
B is essential in the determination of the numerical value of the probability. Recognition 
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of this fact resolves many paradoxes. Thus if A is .a hypothesis, it is often said that its 
probability, if it has one, is either I or 0 depending on whether it is true or false. This 
is only correct if B contains the knowledge of its truth or falsity: if B contains substantially 
less knowledge values other than 0 or I are perfectly sensible and permissible. 
In a study of tolerance regions (and to use Mr Thatcher's notation) the practical 
circumstance is that one will have observed a1 successes in n1 trials and be desirous of 
making a probability statement about a2, the number of successes in a future n2 trials. 
In other words, the practical requirements demand consideration of p(a; n2 a1 ; n1) in 
an obvious notation. Of what practical value then is the frequentist probability statement 
about p(a2> u(a1)) when the real situation involves a knowledge of a1 ? For this practical 
reason the frequentist approach to tolerance regions seems to me to be incorrect. Only 
a Bayesian can discuss the relevant conditional probability p(a2 ; n2  J a1 ; n1). 
A second point is that I have yet to meet a situation for which the problem of 
restricted tolerance regions is appropriate. Let us take, for example, the electrical supply 
system illustration of Mr Aitchison's. This can be formulated as a decision problem. The 
possible decisions are the pairs (r, s) of resistances and we can consider the utility of any 
pair given 0, the state of nature. The utility will involve the cost of the pair and also the 
more difficult considerations of the consequences of a drop in voltage below u. It may be 
objected that the latter are involved, but they are relevant to the problem and any avoidance 
of them by restriction to a value of q is an artificial device to avoid some hard thinking 
about the consequences. One is surely likely to obtain a better result by a deep considera-
tion of the utility than by a mathematical restriction based on a practically confusing 
value q. 	 - 
The following written contributions were received after the meeting: 
Dr I. J. GOOD: I have read Mr Thatcher's paper and am happy to comment on it 
since I have for decades been interested in circumstances in which statisticians implicitly 
make use of initial distributions. For example, the fiducial argument occasionally implies 
an initial distribution (Lindley, 1958). But it can be used inconsistently. [If the probability 
densities for two experiments are f(x, a) and f(x, b) where 
f(x, a) = 02(x+a)e_10/(9+a) (a>0, 0>0,x->O ' >0,x0, a*-b), 
the final fiducial probability density for 0 depends on the order in which the two experi-
ments are reported!] "Pistimetrjc inference" for multinomial distributions (Roy, 1960) 
is clearly equivalent to the use of an initial density of the special divergent Dirichiet form 
and then the final expectation of pi is its maximum-likelihood value. For the binomial 
case one gets Haldane's distributionp-'(l -p)' (Jeffreys, 1961, p. 123). Theestimatiori of a 
multinomial probability by Johnson (1932, pp. 421-423) as (n+k)/Z,(a+tk) (where n, is 
the ith frequency; 1 = 1, 2, .., t) can be shown to be equivalent to the use of an initial density 
of the symmetrical Dirichlet form. Johnson's most controversial assumption was that the 
probability that the next category to be observed is the ith one depends on n j and on the 
total sample size, Ini, but not otherwise on n, for j* i. This assumption might be a 
reasonable approximation for small samples, but it is false, for example, in the multi-
nomial sampling of species (Good, 1953; Good and Toulmin, 1956). In the binomial 
case, t = 2, Johnson's assumption is indisputable, but the beta distribution is not thereby 
established since his proof breaks down in this case, a fact that seems not yet to have been 
noticed. 
A modern Bayesian who puts emphasis on the judgements of probability inequalities 
will regard as reasonable a high order of infinity of initial probability distributions, but 
will usually be prepared to limit his attention provisionally to a class with only a finite 
number of parameters. He might adopt Hardy's use of the beta distribution in 1889 (see 
Perks, 1947). This was perhaps the first use of Carnap's (1952) "continuum of inductive 
methods". The obvious generalization to the multinomial case is the class of Dirichiet 
distributions. A modern Bayesian might sometimes judge the use of only a finite number 
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of initial distributions, such as Mr Thatcher's p and (I -p)', to be adequate. But if the 
problem is one with logical symmetry between "successes" and "failures", then all 
reasonable initial distributions are symmetrical about p = 1/2. So I cannot readily accept 
the confidential predictions, but my reason would not be the speaker's since I am prepared 
to use more than one initial distribution at the same time. [Note that the average of 
p-' and (1 —p)-1  is Haldane's p(l —p)'. Perhaps this would lead to results approximately 
agreeing with the confidential predictions.] 
In the multinomial case, the initial distribution proportional to Hp' leads to the 
value (k+ l)/(tk+ 1) for the initial type II expectation of the "repeat-rate" Ep. You 
could select k by equating this initial expectation to your direct initial guess of the 
population parameter, or you could use upper and lower guesses and so upper and lower 
values for k. Or you might prefer to assume a type III distribution for k. Whatever 
method you used, you would not simply take k = 0, since the initial type II expected 
repeat-rate would then be 1. The pistimetrician, Roy, therefore implicitly uses an 
unreasonable initial distribution. 
As a natural generalization, the Bayesian could select one of an rn-parameter class of 
initial distributions by guessing initial values of m population parameters. 
Theorem 1 is a special case of the following fact: If a parameter is repeatedly and 
independently selected from a superpopulation in accordance with some type II physical 
probability distribution (Good, 1957, p. 862), then a Bayesian who repeatedly uses any 
other assumption for the distribution will make probability estimates that will almost 
certainly not agree with the long-run frequencies. So a Bayesian must learn from experience 
and use his judgement rather than always adopting fixed rules. This is why some of us 
use subjective probability rather than credibility; but credibility is an ideal. 
Mr Thatcher states that if p = I the Bayesian's predictions will be wrong every time, 
if he uses a continuous initial density. But they will not if he attaches non-zero proba-
bilities to null hypotheses. If every trial in a large binomial sample is a success, the 
Bayesian would predict that probably p = 1. The speaker's apparent strictures concerning 
Bayesians apply only to out-moded varieties. 
The confidence man, in the same circumstances, would merely put the upper bound of 
p at 1, in other words he would say absolutely nothing about the upper bound. Confidential 
methods need improving with the aid of a little utility philosophy. When the true value 
of a parameter is p, there is a utility loss 'F(S lo') in stating that the parameter lies in a set S. 
as compared with correctly stating the precise value of p. This loss decreases when the 
interval or set is made smaller, provided that p remains inside the interval: hence short 
confidence intervals are preferred to long ones. The function 1Y always lurks in the back-
ground, formless and unformalized. 
Dr G. M. JENKINS: Mr Thatcher's result that the confidence limits for his problem 
correspond to certain Bayesian limits, although mathematically interesting, does -not seem 
to me to be very relevant. Furthermore, the prior distributions which he obtains look 
rather curious. 
I do not see that much is to be gained by judging Bayesian and likelihood methods by 
means of criteria which are relevant to decision theory. If one takes the view that inference 
is concerned with trying to extract as much information as possible from,what might well 
be the one and only experiment one is able to perform, then the probability of being 
"correct" (whatever this may mean) in a hypothetically infinite sequence of experiments 
is irrelevant. 
On the other hand, the Bayesian approach skates on thin ice if no objective prior 
distribution is available, since the answer is different for each prior distribution. In a 
recent paper (Barnard, Jenkins and Winsten, 1962, to be referred to as BJW) it was stated 
that the application of Bayes's theorem in any objective sense is equivalent to using the 
likelihood function from one experiment as the prior distribution for the next. For a 
series of experiments, this is equivalent to saying that the likelihoods are multiplied. As 
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emphasized in (BJW), an important problem in this area is the correct choice of a metric 
or scale on which to plot the likelihood function. One solution to this problem may be 
obtained by noting that if the log-likelihood function .f(0) = log L(0) is parabolic, i.e. 
2(0) = _(0_O)2/202, 	 (I) 
where 0 is the maximum-likelihood estimator, then the second derivative - (d22'/d02) is 
constant and equal to 1/c72. In the sampling theory approach it is the expected value 
of this which measures the information in 0. For a normal or parabolic likelihood this 
is constant and hence there is equal information for all values of 0. This suggests that 
a good choice of scale is to find a transformationf(0) such that the likelihood is parabolic 
in!.  From a Bayesian point of view it is this scale which seems the natural one in which to 
assume that the prior distribution is uniformly distributed. 
It will not be possible in general to find a transformation f(0) which makes the likelihood 
function exactly parabolic in f so that a less restrictive aim would be to make the second 
derivative independent of f in the neighbourhood of f = f(0), the maximum-likelihood 
estimator off. Since 
6 - 	/dO\ 2 (d 23\ 	. 	 2 df2) - 	df)d02)' () 
it follows that the left-hand side is constant if 
f~(_d2 <0\ 
(3) 
If we take f to be uniformly distributed, then the prior distribution for 0 is 
-. 	 (0) dO = J(2') dO, 	 (4) 
where again the second derivative is evaluated as a function of 0.in the neighbourhood of . 
For a binomial distribution 
(d2\ 	—n 	 5 () 





It is to be noted that the transformation (3) is mathematically equivalent to the variance-
stabilizing transformation in sampling theory, but the logic underlying it is quite different. 
Other interesting prior distributions which emerge from this approach are given in the 
following table. 
Parameter Scale Prior distribution 
Normal variance 	. 	 . f = log a da/a 
Exponential distribution . f = log jz djt/1j 
Correlation coefficient 	. f = tanh' p dp/(l —p2) 
First-order autoregressive . I = sin dcxI4(1 
- 
It is not suggested that a local transformation such as (3) will always be a good 
normalizing transformation but it does lead to intuitively sensible prior distributions. 
Professor H. E. Daniels has pointed out to me that for a binomial distribution, the logit 
transformation 
f= log (ji_) 	 (8) 
would result in a likelihood function more nearly normal than the are sin transformation. 
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This would correspond to a prior distribution of dp/p(l —p). Analogous considerations 
arise in sampling theory where it is well known that a variance-stabilizing transformation 
is not necessarily the best normalizing transformation. 
If one were pressed to give an answer to Mr Thatcher's problem, namely, based on a 
binomial sample with a1 successes out of n, what are the "95 per cent limits" for the 
number of successes in a further sample of n,, one could approximate the likelihood in 
the first sample by taking sin -' /p to have a normal form with mean sin-' 	and variance 
I/n,. If all we know is that a further sample of n, is to be taken then this will have the 
effect of reducing the variance to I /(n, + n2), but our best estimate of the mean is still 
sin-11 J. Hence "95 per cent limits" for sin-1  .,/p will be given approximately by 
sin 	± I 96/,/(n, + n,). 	 (9) 
If several parameters are to be estimated then frequently the log-likelihood function 
factorizes as follows: 
-T(0) = 2,(0)+ £°2(02)+ ... + 9(0). 	 (10) 
Examples of this factorization have been given in (BJW). 
Since 
and 	 (11) 
it follows that the scales for the a parameters may be chosen independently and the 
transformed likelihood behaves approximately like n independent normal likelihoods. 
When the cross derivatives (11) are not zero, then the choice of scales requires the 
solution of certain partial differential equations. I have not yet been able to find a solution 
for a problem of this kind. 
Mr AITCifiSON replied briefly at the meeting and subsequently in writing as follows: 
I wish to express my thanks to Mr Winsten, Mr Kerridge and other speakers for their 
kind remarks about my paper and to all who contributed to a helpful discussion. 
Before I consider the more controversial aspects of the discussion I wish to comment 
on two technical points. Dr Hartigan's simplification when the cost function K in the 
value function (39) is a positive measure is extremely elegant. Since cost will often only 
be meaningful for intervals of the form (—cc, r) or (0, r), or their higher-dimensional 
counterparts, and since cost will increase with r the positive-measure assumption is 
realistic and his development, together with its accompanying concept of Bayesian size, 
could be of decided practical value. In my paper I concentrated too closely on cases 
where the informative experiment consists of replicates of the basic or prediction experi-
ment to notice the advantages, indicated by Dr Hartigan, of completely divorcing the 
observation and prediction spaces. I adopt this approach now to make my second technical 
point—not commented on in the discussion—namely, the connection between the two 
papers. In this more general setting the frequentist and Bayesian problems, whose 
equivalence or lack of it are Mr Thatcher's concern and whose probabilistic formulations 
are his relations (3) and (13), are easily shown to be restricted tolerance region problems. 
If x denotes the observation on the informative binomial experiment, then (3) and (13) 
seek a region R. which is a set of integers {0, 1, ..., u(x)}. If y denotes a typical outcome 
of the binomial experiment for which prediction is required then we can arrive at the 
two probabilistic statements by using the restricted value function 
V(RZ Y)- 
	(yeR1), 
- 0 (yR), 
and setting the corresponding expected utility equal to 1— cc, expectation for the frequentist 
being with respect to the binomial density p(x I 6) and for the Bayesian with respect to the 
posterior density r(O 1x), where my 0 corresponds to Mr Thatcher's p. 
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Mr Winsten's suggestion that, for any proposed region R, the graph of the cover or payoff function P(R I) should be investigated to highlight the awkward values of 6 for 
that R is a good one, easily missed in the struggle to reach a decision. But it is necessary 
to decide eventually on some R and I am not at all clear how Mr Winsten proposes to 
decide. It is unhappily a common feature of such decision problems that no single 
reasonable R is outstandingly successful for all 0 or even all probable 6. In his apparently 
informal use of his "ancillary evidence" about 6 1 suspect that he may be eventually 
indistinguishable from a Bayesian. 
It is a common frequentist tactic to make the disarming claim that there is no anti-
thesis between frequentism and Bayesianism and that the frequentist is prepared to 
admit Bayesian methods, even to say that they are the appropriate tool, in their proper 
place. Both Mr Kerridge and Professor Barnard use this tactic in their own individual 
ways. Of course frequentist von Mises advocated the use of Bayes's theorem and of 
course frequentists developed decision theory. My concern was the present state of 
tolerance region theory, the inability of uset's to comprehend the frequentist formulation, 
and the lack of evidence of any serious attempt among statisticians (Professor Barnard and 
Mr Kerridge excepted) to practise what they preach and actually ask their clients if they 
have any prior information about 0. I was disappointed, though not surprised, to find 
no frequentist rise to the defence of his formulation by way of the principle, so repugnant 
to the Bayesian, of imbedding a decision problem in a hypothetical long run of such 
problems with its use of irrelevant probabilities such as 	1 8), a point well stressed 
by Professor Lindley. A re-reading of my paper has made me realize that I was still 
too frequentist in outlook when I wrote it. While trying to provide alternatives to the 
frequentist probabilistic setting I did not free myself sufficiently from other aspects of 
that theory such as the concept of quality q, which I would now happily abandon in 
favour of more formal Bayesian decision theory. Abandonment of q does not, however, 
imply that I agree with Professor Lindley that the restricted problem as I defined it is not 
a real problem. Mr Mayer, in his very helpful contribution as a user, gives examples 
which I hope provide the necessary existence theorem. 
I do not now attach much importance to attempts to establ
-
ish equivalence of Bayesian 
and frequentists results, as considered in Section 4 of my paper, and as studied by Mr 
Thatcher in his paper, and Mr Kerridge and Dr Welch in the discussion. To a Bayesian 
there seems to be no especial merit in showing that one's own formulation can lead—
under certain circumstances—to results equivalent to those of another formulation which 
one regards as absurd. To judge a Bayesian solution solely by its frequency properties, 
as suggested by Mr Kerridge and Dr Bartholomew, seems to me equally open to question 
(a point also made by Dr Jenkins) though I had better not prejudge Dr Bartholomew's 
promised results. Mr Kerridge has, however, propounded his assessment of Bayesianism 
in forthright frequentist terms but his concept of "the right answer" completely eludes me. 
How, if we are faced with a new type of decision problem are we to decide, at the relevant 
time of making the decision, whether we are making the right-decision? Who is to be the 
arbitei of right or wrong? I would be as reluctant to accept Mr Kerridge's arbitration as 
he would be to accept mine. Again, since I cannot find the lines between which he was 
reading, I see no need to answer his charge that I am trying to tell engineers what they 
ought to believe. His experience of engineers is obviously slight if he imagines I have 
such ambitions. 
Many speakers point to a lack of objectivity in the use of prior densities and in 
particular Professor Barnard and Mr Stuart conjure up a picture of the Bayesian as an 
ivory-towered philosophizing fool. It seems to me that the fallacy of all such arguments 
is the naive view that decision-making is, or can be made to be, an objective occupation. 
On the contrary, it requires judgement all along the line. The choice of a loss or utility 
function is clearly a matter for informed assessment, for who can categorically say that 
conditions and consequently losses will not have altered by the day of reckoning. The 
choice of a parametric or a distribution-free model is another matter of nice judgement. 
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(My "dismissal" of distribution-free regions, which offends Mr Stuart, was on the grounds 
that they are open to the same anti-frequentist attack as parametric regions and, of course, 
provide no direct comparisons with the Bayesian formulation.) Professor Pearson rightly 
points out that one's system of inference is a purely personal attribution. To him the use 
of prior densities often seems dishonest. To me the principle of imbedding decision 
problems calls for as much introspection as the search for prior information about 0, 
especially as I believe, with Mr Winsten, that such information exists for those who seek it. 
Professor Barnard is probably correct when he complains that Bayesian writing, including 
my own, tends to be couched in terms which give the impression of an unwillingness to 
acquire empirical knowledge about 0, and I hope we heed his warning in future. There 
do remain, however, situations where the only way to acquire information about 0 is by 
performing the informative experiment indexed by 0. For these I do not see that I deceive 
my client if I ask for his views about 0, show him, and allow him to adjust, his prior density 
function—the use of conjugate prior densities is a matter of convenience and not 
essential to the Bayesian; work on the mathematical expression of ignorance, such as 
that of Dr Jenkins, is very relevant here. How often does the frequentist deceive his 
client by not telling him that, for the purposes of solution, his particular decision problem 
has been imbedded in a sequence of such decision problems. The strength of the Bayesian 
approach to any problem lies in directing attention to those aspects of the decision problem 
which are relevant and in displaying clearly how, and on what assumptions, the decision 
is being taken. It might even be argued that by highlighting the subjective elements in 
decision-making the Bayesian makes the process more objective. 
Mr THATCHER replied briefly at the meeting and subsequently in writing as follows: 
I should first like to thank Professor Pearson for his fascinating contribution, and 
Dr Good for his masterly conspectus of the neo-Bayesian position. 
So much of the discussion seemed to be in tacit agreement with a "Bayesian-frequentist" 
approach that, like Mr Kerridge, I find it unexpectedly difficult to discover points of 
controversy. Fundamental attitudes have had a thorough airing. As a change, I should 
Eke to consider certain mathematical points raised by Drs Bartholomew, Jenkins and 
Welch, before returning to a final question of principle. 
The results in Sections 2 and 7 of my paper were deliberately confined to one-sided 
confidence limits and their associated two-sided central limits (i.e. such that the frequency 
of wrong predictions does not exceed a at either limit). Dr Bartholomew introduces the 
much more tricky subject of non-central limits (i.e. such that the frequency of wrong 
predictions does not exceed 2a at the upper and lower limits taken together, but may 
exceed a at one or the other). The distinction is important. Dr Bartholomew describes my 
derivation of central limits as a mixture of two different methods, and suggests that a 
"rational choice" between them, based on a preliminary observation, should be used to 
obtain non-central limits. I am not quite clear why a preliminary observation followed 
by a sample of size n1  should be very different from a sample of size 
n1 + 1; but, be that as 
it may, there are other ways of finding non-central limits. For example, several methods 
are quoted by Blyth and Hutchinson (1960) for the case when n2/n1  is infinite. 
Dr Bartholomew's arguments lead him to the conclusion that, in the problem of two 
binomial samples, a Bayesian who uses the prior distribution p'(l —p)' dp will make 
predictions acceptable to a frequentist. But with this prior distribution, whenever the 
first sample consists entirely of successes (a1 = n1), the Bayesian probability distribution 
for a2  is entirely concentrated at a2 = n2. 
Consequently the Bayesian, whether he uses 
central or non-central limits, will be bound to predict that the next sample will contain 
no failures at all. So even if the predictions are right whenever a1<n1, they will still be 
wrong whenever a1 = n1, a2<n2 ; and by the method of Section 5.2, 
case B, we can find 
an example in which the frequency of these wrong predictions will exceed 2a. This proves 
that Dr Bartholomew's conclusion is false. 
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The same disadvantage applies to the prior distribution jr4(l -p)-1 dp. Drs Jenkins 
and Welch show that it has desirable asymptotic properties; but, nevertheless, predictions 
based on it do not satisfy the frequency criterion. More generally, Theorem 1 shows that 
it is impossible for a Bayesian to find a prior distribution which will satisfy a frequentist. 
My aim in seeking one was, of course, the same as Dr Bartholomew's; but Theorem 
I shows that one prior distribution is not enough. It is therefore interesting to learn that 
so eminent a Bayesian as Dr Good is prepared to use more than one prior distribution at 
the same time; though he objects to the particular pair p dp and (1 —p)  dp, on the 
grounds that they do not treat successes and failures symmetrically. However, this objection 
is overcome by the "strategy" in Section 7.7 of the paper. 1 was sorry that none of the 
Bayesian contributors made comments on this point. Subjective choices from an infinity 
of prior distributions may be all very well when there is some ground for making the choice; 
but when there is no prior information whatever, can one really improve ona randomized 
strategy? 
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7 PREDICTIVE DENSITY FUNCTIONS 





must play a central role in predictive problems. In relation to e 
and f this predictive density function sums up our present view, 
based on e and p(0), of the relative probabilities of the outcomes 
of f. Since any analysis concerning f must be undertaken at the 
present it is the relevant inference tool for predictive purposes. 
The idea was not new, the 'rule of succession' of Laplace, 
concerned with the probability of success at the (n+l)th binomial 
trial given n successes in the preceding n trials, being an early 
particular example. Jeffreys (1961, p.143), Geisser (1964) and 
Guttman and Tiao (1964) had examined situations involving 
predictive density functions associated with normal distributions, 
with Guttman and Tiao also considering two-parameter negative 
- 	exponential distributions. All of these used conventional vague 
prior distributions. The aim of Aitchison and Scuithorpe (9:1965) 
was to emphasise the key role that such predictive density functions 
play in predictive problems, and a first step was the derivation 
of predictive distributions for the standard univariate models - 
binomial, Poisson, gamma, normal, normal linear regression - on 
the basis of proper conjugate prior distributions. 
In addition to clarifying the structure of predictive problems 
Aitchison and Scuithorpe (9:1965) are concerned with the provision 
of a viable means of resolving some engineering design problems. 
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For this purpose they provide a catalogue of expected utilities 
for various simple utility functions so that a user, by expressing 
his more complex utility function in terms of these simpler 
functions, has an immediate evaluation of expected utility for 
decision purposes. 
The framework for statistical prediction contained in 
Aitchison and Scuithorpe (9:1965) allows them to bring within one 
general framework previous work on Bayesian andfrequentist tolerance 
regions, to classify these. regions in terms of simple specifications 
of the utility U or value V function and to identify situations 
in which such tolerance regions may be appropriate. Aitchison 
(10:1966) later shows that a linear-utility tolerance interval, 




A(r_y) 	(y >r), 
is identical to an expected-cover tolerance interval with cover 
A/(1+X). This result thus provides users of expected cover 
tolerance intervals with a decision-theoretic interpretation for 
their choice. 
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Some problems of statistical prediction 
By J. AITCH1SON AND DIANE SOULTHORPE 
University of Liverpool 
SUMMARY 
A general framework is introduced for the study of inference and decision predictions 
about the outcome of a future experiment from the data of an independent informative 
experiment. This allows a simple classification of prediction problems, and shows the place 
of standard inference predictions within the framework. A Bayesian approach to decision 
prediction is then presented and techniques appropriate to a variety of realistic utility 
functions are developed. Finally, some prediction problems associated with classes of 
experiments are considered. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Statistical prediction is the use of the data from an informative experiment F to make 
some statement about the outcome of a future experiment F. The prediction statements 
commonly treated in the literature are of inference type, in which the purpose is to give 
some indication of the likely outcome of F, or to suggest some subset of possible outcomes 
in which the actual outcome of F is likely to fall. There are also, however, prediction 
p'roblems of a decision type, for which the decision space consists of subsets of the outcome 
space of F, and where the prediction is related in a much more precise way to some specific 
purpose. Our own interest in the subject has arisen from decision problems in the supply of 
hospital engineering services (e.g. oxygen, gas, conditioned air, suction, etc.). In a simple 
version the supply system may be supposed to function at a series of independent operations, 
at each of which a constant quantity r (e.g. number of outlets) of the commodity is available 
for supply. At each operation of the system some variable quantity y is demanded; this 
may be below or above r. If y > r the system has failed fully to meet demand and if y <r 
the system has oversupplied. The extent to which fixing the supply at r is satisfactory 
depends on the relative demerits of failing to meet demand and of oversupplying, and on the 
variation in y. Here we can suppose F to be the observation of a free demand, unrestricted 
by the limited supply. The informative experiment F may consist of demands x1, ...I x on 
an existing similar system which has been overdesigned, so that F consists of n replicates 
of F. If the existing system is not overdesigned but supplies r1, say, at each operation then 
F may be regarded as n replicates of F, with observations truncated or censored at r1; this 
case can be treated only by asymptotic methods and we shall not consider it here. 
Our purpose in this paper is first to suggest a clear and flexible framework within which 
such inference and decision prediction can be discussed, to indicate briefly how existing 
inference procedures fall within this framework, and then to develop the model towards 
specific decision prediction procedures. We do this for the case in which F and F are inde-
pendent experiments; thus we do not consider the situation where the outcome of F is a 
part realization of a stochastic process and F is the continuation of the process. 
The four ingredients of this type of prediction problem are as follows. 
(i) The future experiment. There is a future experiment F for which a prediction of some 
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sort is required. We suppose that F has outcome space Y (with typical outcome y  Y) and 
event space 9, and that the possible probabilistic descriptions off form the class of density 
functions 	
{PF(IO): OcO}, 
where the parameter space 0 is some part of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. We 
denote by PF(  0) the probability measure on &I corresponding to the density function 
PF( 0) on Y. The true value of tife parameter 0 is not precisely known. 
The 'informati)e experiment. An informative experiment E has been performed. This 
experiment we suppose to have outcome space X (with typical outcome x) and event space 
., and to be described by one of the class of density functions 
{PE(' 0): O€®}; 
corresponding probability measures on X are denoted by PE(  0). The choice here of 0 as 
indexing parameter is quite deliberate for we suppose that the true describing densities of 
E and F have the same true parameter value as index. It is through this connexion between 
E and F that E provides information about F. (The full description of E will often contain 
nuisance parameters, but no confusion should arise if we omit specific mention of them in 
the indexing of the class of density functions for E.) Although E and fare connected by Owe 
shall assume that, for given 0, they are statistically independent. We then denote the 
probability measure associated with the compound experiment (F, F) by PEA. ); it will, 
of course, be the product probability measure associated with PE( 0) and F( 0). 
The inference or decision space. The characteristic of all prediction problems is that 
the stated inference or decision is a subset (possibly a point) in the outcome space Y of F. 
We can therefore conveniently take as inference or decision space the event space Q.Y of F. 
If we observe x€X in the performance of F we take some region R = 8(x) €/ as our predic-
tion region. The function 6: x -> 6(x) is the inference or decision function. A special feature 
of such prediction problems is that there is a natural probability measure F(  0) associated 
with the decision space; this feature is important in subsequent analysis. 
To distinguish between the function 8 and its value 6(x) for a particular outcome x of F 
we shall use the terms predictor and prediction, respectively. 
Evaluation of a predictor. To choose between alternative prediction procedures it is 
necessary to have some means of evaluating a procedure. Many such evaluations are 
possible and the one chosen should always accord with real assessments. The most direct 
assessment (and one which appeals to the practical man) of the merits of a choice 1? for 
a prediction region is to consider its effectiveness in relation to each possible outcome y of F. 
For any chosen R and observed y it should be possible to assign some realistic utility or, 
since we are going to have two aspects of utility, a y-utility or value V(R, si). 
We now explore the possible methods of analysis from Bayesian and frequentist view-
points to see how so-called standard techniques fit into the general framework and for what 
type of prediction they are formulated, and to set the scene for further development of the 
problem. 
Two cases may be distinguished at this stage. 
Case 1. A prediction is required for only one performance off. 
Case 2. It is envisaged that a series of replicates of F is to be conducted and that the 
prediction region R is to be used for each replicate. An example of such a situation is the 
demand and supply one already meitioned, where a replicate corresponds to an operation 
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of the system and the constancy of it to the fact that supply is to be the same at each 
operation. In such a situation we shall assume, except in § 6- 1, that utilities are additive 
over replicates; this should hold true in many practical situations. 
Faced with case 1 a Bayesian would proceed to obtain ir(yx), the posterior distribution 
of y given x, probably through intermediate attention to the nuisance parameter 0; from a 
prior density 7T(0) on 0 the posterior density 7r(0x) is obtained in the usual way and this is 
converted into nyIx) through the relation 
7T(y 	= f e
pF (ylO)7T(Olx)dO. 	 (1) 
(Integration should be replaced by summation when discrete spaces are involved.) The 




H(R,x) = 	V(R,y)7T(yx)cl/. 	 (2)
We shall see in succeeding sections exactly how the Bayesian makes use of the H function. 
Since, from (1) and (2), 
IJ(R, x) 
= 
fe {5 V(i?, y)p(yO) dy) iT(OIx) dO 	 (3) 
we see, by defining a 0-utility U(R, 0) for it—or briefly a utility since we have decided to 
use the term value for 'y-utility—as 
U(R' 0) 
= fy V(R,y)p.(yIO)dij, 	
(4) 
that the problem may be regarded from another viewpoint, namely as a Bayesian analysis 
in terms of the utility function U and the posterior density rr(O Ix).  Indeed in some inference 
problems, such as tolerance region predictions, the utility function is the starting point and 
expression is given to the Bayesian method by the use of 
H(R,x) 
= 
fe U(R,0)17(OIx)dO. 	 (5) 
Relation (4) shows the interconnexion of the utility and value functions. It is clear that in 
practice each value function leads to a utility function, but it is possible to consider utility 
functions which do not arise from value functions. The two approaches—through value and 
utility functions—are mathematically speaking only different techniques of evaluating the 
double integral (3). If the 0-integration is performed first we use (1) and (2); if the y-integra-
tion is carried out first we use (4) and (5). Which we use can therefore be a matter of choice; 
it may be that one method is more simple mathematically than the other. 
Case 2 leads to the same H(R, x) and here the more natural road is through (4) and (5). 
For, if the region B is going to be used repeatedly in a sequence of independent performances 
of F and the value is V(R, y) when y is observed, then since utilities are assumed additive 
over independent future experiments, U(R, 0) corresponds to the average value per replicate, 
and so provides a measure of the effectiveness of the prediction region. Note that the 
additive property of utilities is necessary only in case 2 to provide this appropriate frequentist 
interpretation of U(R, 0). 
Although the value function V is an appealing one to the practical man it has some con-
siderable conceptual difficulties for the frequentist. For instance, in case 1 it is natural for 
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him, in accord with frequentist decision theory, to introduce his predictor & and to take the 
expectation of V{&( ), y} with respect to the informative density pE(xJ 0). The resulting 
expectation depends on (0,y), the unknown state of nature; the presence of both 0 and y 
makes the usual awkward feature of frequentist theory, namely the difficulty of finding 
pivotal statistics, even more embarrassing. The dependence of y on 0 through PF(YI  0) is 
waiting to be used but there is no obvious frequentist way to introduce it. For case 2, the 
argument which takes the value function to the utility function (see equation (4)) by way 
of a sequence of performances of F, allows the frequentist to proceed in his usual way by 
basing his considerations on 
G(,0) = 
fX 
Uf 8(X), 01PE(Xj 0)dx. 	 (6) 
We shall see in § 4, however, that this can lead to an inconsistency in interpretation, and 
there is little doubt that the frequentist is on the safest logical ground—though farther 
removed from practical considerations—when he confines himself to utility functions. 
The introduction of the value function does, however, have some advantages for us in 
that it allows a convenient means of cataloguing problems so that frequentist and Bayesian 
counterparts are clearly displayed. 
Fig. 1 displays the steps leading to the U and II functions which form the basis of 
frequentist and Bayesian prediction analysis. Where a density appears beside an arrowed 






analysis 	 analysis 





Fig. 1. Derivation of the basic criteria of Bayesian and frequentist prediction analysis. 
2. CLASSIFICATION OF PREDICTION PROBLEMS 
We have already divided problems into two categories by the Bayesian and frequentist 
approaches. While this is often for many statisticians a division on philosophical, and 
almost emotional, grounds we shall attempt not to enter Into controversy here but merely 
state techniques and suggest under what conditions we think they are certainly applicable. 
For easy future reference we therefore first set out these Bayesian and frequentist conditions. 
We can then concentrate attention on the other four categories of classification. 
Conditions for Bayesian analysis. All the Bayesian analyses of this paper are applicable 
when one or other of the following conditions obtains. 
B 1. There is available, previous to F, some information On 0 which can be described in 
terms of a prior density 7T(0) on 0. 
176 
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B2. There is no such prior information available but it is possible to describe 'ignorance' 
or 'vague previous information' in terms of a (possibly improper) density m(0) on 0; see, for 
example, Lindley (1965, pp.  13-18). 
B 3. No generally acceptable 7T(0) is available, but it is agreed that a useful method of 
drawing an inference or reaching a decision is to show the variation in 1? caused by choice 
of different 1T(0). 
Conditions for Ire quentist analysis. We shall refer to the following frequeiitist conditions 
when we judge that an analysis is applicable under one or other of them. 
A series of B's is envisaged, each followed by a single F for which a prediction is 
required. A series of ease 1 predictions is thus required. 
Again a series of B's is envisaged. Following each B, however, a prediction is 
required for a whole series of F's. Thus we have in this case a series of case 2 predictions. 
Conditions F 1 and F 2 usually allow a direct correspondence between long-run effects, 
e.g. relative frequencies and average utilities, and concepts of the mathematical model, 
e.g. probabilities and expected utilities. When there is no reality in the series of similar 
prediction problems envisaged in F 1 and F 2 then recourse has to be made to some principle 
of imbedding the problem in a series of dissimilar inference or decision problems; see, for 
example, a recent advocacy of such a principle, by Neyman (1964, pp.  927-32). We shall 
find it convenient to label this as a third frequentist condition. 
Acceptance of the principle of imbedding. 
(1) The relationship of B and F 
Two main cases may be distinguished; these both arise frequently in practice. 
B is n replicates of F; 
F is a future experiment carried out at some value z of an independent variable, so 
that the future experiment is better described by 1. B is then a regression experiment, i.e. 
it consists of independent experiments ., ..., 1,,. We repeat that so long as B and F are 
indexed by the same parameter, prediction is possible; thus the case where B is n replicates 
of F, truncated at t, i.e. where 
PE(x10) = pp(xlIO) ... pF(xflIO)/[1 - F( - cc, t)IO}]', 
can be readily treated by asymptotic methods. We shall, however, concentrate on the 
important cases (a) and (b) here. 
(2) The form of density 
We shall consider in this paper the standard distributions—binomial, Poisson, gamma 
and normal. It is possible to include cases (a) and (b) above within one framework and this 
we shall do here. The four specifications are as follows. 
D 1. Binomial. B is Bi(k, 0), i.e. it consists of k binomial trials, each with probability 0 of 
success; Fis Bi(l, 0). Note that, by sufficiency arguments, this covers both cases (a) and (b). 
For (a), the total number x of successes in the n replicates is a sufficient statistic for 8 and is 
a Bi(n/c, 0) random variable. Hence take k = ni. For case (b), is Bi(z, 8) and x is the total 
number of successes in F, . . ., F,,; then x is sufficient for 0 and is a Bi(z1 +... + z,, 0) random 
variable. Such a regression situation may arise if the trials consist of processing a number of 
objects, the number of objects having arisen frm some chance mechanism, e.g. a Poisson 
process. Note also that case (a) may be of interest in its own right; see, for example, Thatcher 
(1964). 
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Poisson. E is Po(kO), i.e. E records a Poisson count with mean parameter kO and 
F is P0(18). Remarks similar to those for the binomial case apply here. 
Gamma. E is Ga(k, 0), with k known, i.e. 
PE(xJO) = 
and F is Ga(l, 0). Similar remarks apply here also. For example, when E is n replicates of 
F the sum x of the outcomes of ,the n replicates is sufficient for 0 and is Ga(nk, 0). Hence 
take k = ni to obtain the above specification. 
D4. Normal. F is N(p, 0.2)  and F produces a joint sufficient estimate (m, s2)  for 0 = (1 1, 0-2). 
We shall suppose that m, 82 are independently distributed, and that m is N(p, h 2) and 
vs2/0 2 is x2(), where Ii and P are known constants. Case (a) is clearly included in this. So 
also is the regression situation, where F. is described by a N(a + fiz, 0-2) density. For, if and 
have their usual meanings and 
,= 	(x—) (z —)/(z—)2, 	2 = 
then, for given (z - )2, { + fl(z - ), s} are jointly sufficient fora = a + /Jz and 2;  also 
+fl(z - ) is distributed as N[jt, {1/n + (z - )2/(z - )2}o-2], independently of (n _2)s2/2 
which is x2( —2). We consider the case of real z here for simplicity; there is no difficulty in 
extending the results to the case of vector z. 
(3) The utility specification 
In some problems, especially of the frequentist tolerance region type, the specification of 
utility is directly in terms of the utility function U, and there is no corresponding V, whereas 
in most practical situations it seems natural to specify in terms of a value function V. Thus 
it is first necessary to distinguish whether a U or V specification is involved. Then, of course 
the specific form of U or V involves a classification. We shall see later how a useful library 
of such specifications can be built up. 
(4) Inference or decision prediction 
The distinction we adopt here between a decision and an inference problem is that the 
former uses value and utility functions which lead to a genuine problem of finding a pre-
dictor 6 which maximizes 0(6, 0) for all 0 in the frequentist context or a prediction R which' 
maximizes H(R, x) in the Bayesian context; whereas, inference problems, because of their 
less specific purpose, are based on very simple value and utility functions, and for these 
maximization of G(., 0) or H(-, x) leads to the trivial and useless statement that the appro-
priate prediction region is Y regardless of what x is observed. Inference predictors and 
predictions are therefore sought which yield some specified value, say q, below the maximum 
attained by Y. A frequentist inference prediction problem thus requires the finding of a 
predictor 6 such that 	
0(6 0) = q 	 (7) 
for all 0. The Bayesian counterpart is that of finding a prediction R (it is not necessary to 
find the predictor) such that 
H(R,x) = q. 	 (8) 
For discrete distributions such as D 1 and P 2 the equality sign has to be replaced by . 
Later, in § 5, we shall consider another class of problem where a prediction is required for 
a whole class of future experiments and not just a single F. 
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3. PRELIMINARY DISTRIBUTION RESULTS 
For Bayesian analyses it is extremely convenient to separate the construction of iT(y x) 
and the specification of V(1?, y). Here we collect in a convenient form for further reference 
the appropriate results for the four standard density specifications D 1-4. Although a 
posterior distribution on Y is the object of this inference side of the analysis it is more 
natural to commence the argument through a prior density n(0) on 0. This yields, through 
the information x from E, a posterior density n(Ojx) on 0, given x. Since the transition from 
(0) to n(O!x) is now well catalogued (see, for example, Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1961) we shall 
suppose, to avoid over-elaborate notation, that in all our cases the stage 7r(OJx) has been 
reached and that n(OIx) has one of the following forms in the standard problems. The 
parameters of these distributions will, of course, depend on x. 
Dl. Binomial 	(Ojx) = Oa_1(1_O)b_1/B(a,b) (00 < 1). 	 (9) 
D 2, D 3. Poisson and gamma 
rr(OIx) = baOa_le_bO/F(a) (0>0). 	 (10) 
D4. Normal. Here 0 = (,a, o) but to make the integration problems that arise more 
directly manageable it is convenient to introduce r = i/o and thus to take 0 = (4u, r). We 
then suppose that n(Olx) is of normal—gamma type 
	
ir(Ojx) oc rexpf— b7-2 1a_a)2}r"_1 exp (— wv7-2). 	 (11) 
It is worth observing here that this does in fact cover the regression experiment case (b). 
The fact that, for fixed z, the parameters x and ft appear only in the form a = a +,6z, and 
that a prior multivariate normal—gamma density (see Raiffa & gchlaifer, 1961, chapter 3 
for definition and suitability) on (a, fl) and r induces a posterior normal—gamma density, 
which in turn 'condenses' into a posterior normal—gamma density, say 1r(/,rIx) fort and r, 
allows the treatment within the framework of D 4. 
From these it is a matter of routine summation or integration as in (1) to obtain the 
following densities for ny x). 
Dl. Binomial 	 n(ylx)= 




1 	\a D 2. Poisson 	 11(ylx) 




D3. Gamma 	 1T(Y!X)= 	
b 




B(, w) {w + b(y — a)2/v( 1 + b)}1(+1) 
4. STANDARD INFERENCE PREDICTIONS 
The standard results on prediction in text-books and journals are invariably of inference 
type and fall into two categories, one involving a simple V specification and the other a 
simple U specification. These may be termed expected cover predictions and tolerance region 
predictions, respectively. It is the simplicity of the V and U functions which allows (7) 
and (8) to be transformed into probabilistic statements which are the usual starting points 
of such analysis. 
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Expected cover predictions 
These predictions use 
11 (y€R),1 
V*(R,y) = 	 (16) 
O (yR),J 
which, through (4) gives U(R, 0) = PF(RIO), the cover of R at 0. Relation (7) can be written 
in the form 
PEF 	 (17) 
for all 0. A frequentist difficulty of a slightly subtler form than those discussed in Aitchison 
(1964) is now apparent. For in the usual frequency interpretation of probability (17) is 
meaningful in terms of repetitions of E and F, an inference being made after each E, and its 
success or failure being assessed against the F following that E, so that F 1 is the appropriate 
condition. We saw, however, in § 1 that for the frequentist who wished to argue from a V 
specification it was necessary to think in terms of case 2 where E served for a series of future 
F's, for which F 2 is the appropriate frequentist condition. It would therefore seem that the 
frequentist cannot happily consider a V-specification except, of course, by some appeal to 
F 3. Nevertheless, this does leave open the possibility of starting the argument at the 
corresponding U or asserting that (17) is the basic inferential statement, within the terms of 
Fl orF3. 
Such frequentist expected cover regions have been considered usually in terms of relation-
ship (17) by various writers; see for example, Thatcher (1964) who treats the binomial case, 
Proschan (1953) and Fraser & Guttman (1956), who deal with the normal case. The interval 
associated with the normal regression case is commonly quoted in text-books as a prediction 
interval; see, for example, Bowker & Liebcrmann (1959). The technical problem of extending 
this type of normal regression inference prediction to the case where the future experiment 
is to be performed at a finite known set of z values is resolved by Lieberman (1961). 
One technical point worth making here is that ô(x) satisfying (17) is in no sense a 
frequentist confidence region for y; the statement (17) involves the joint distribution of (x, y) 
and so y is not being considered as a 'parameter'. 
Bayesian analysis requires the choice of an R such that 
fR iT(ylx)dy q 	 (18) 
and so R is essentially a Bayesian confidence region. Thatcher (1964) deals with the binomial 
case and Lindley (1965, pp.  212-13) uses this as the basis for his prediction interval for the 
case of normal linear regression. 
Since we have had difficulty in tracing any treatment of the Poisson and gamma cases 
we have thought it convenient to present in Table 1 the Bayesian and frequentist intervals 
for the four cases. We have not included derivations of the frequentist results which for 
D 1—D 3 can be Obtained along the lines of Thatcher (1964) and involve routine but tedious 
summation and integration. The Bayesian results are readily obtained in terms of tabulated 
functions from (18) and the formulae (12)—(15). 
Tolerance region predictions 
The specification here is 
{1 if .F(RJ0) c,} 	
(19) U*(R,0)= 
o if PV (RIO) <C, 
1 
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where c is a specified desired cover, and leads either to Bayesian or frequentist tolerance 
regions. Since these have been discussed at length by Aitchison (1964) we confine comment 
here to observing that the formulation suffers from the serious practical difficulty of 
deciding on a balance between c and q. In the form of words commonly used in such problems, 
is it better to be 99 % certain (q = 0.99) that a predictor will provide 95 % cover or to be 
95 % certain of 99 % cover? 
Although Aitchison (1964) does not discuss tolerance regions in the regression situation 
there is no technical difficulty in carrying out this extension through the device discussed in 
density specification P4. Wallis (1951) has already considered the frequentist aspect of this 
extension. 




Density 	included) 	 Bayesian Frequentist 
Dl 	[0,8(x)] 	8(x)= -in {y:P(a+b+l-1,y,a+b-1,a-1) < 1—q}—a a_— x+1,b=k—x 
[8(x), l] 8(x)= max {y:P(a+b+l-1,y,a+b-1,a-1)q}—a+1 a=x,b=k—x+1 
D 2 	[0,6(x)] 	8(x) = -in {y: Ib/(b+e(a,7) 	q}— 1 a = x+ 1, b = k 
[8(x), co) 6(x) = max {y:Ib/(h+fl(a,y) < 1—q} a = x,b = k 
D3 	[0,6(x)] 	8(x) = b(1—B(a,1; l—q)}/B(a,l; 1—q) a = k,b = x 
18(x), cc) 8(x) = b{1 - B(a, 1; q)}/B(a, 1; q) a = Ic, b = x 
1)4 	[0,8(x)] 	8(x) = a+{v(1+b)/b}tt(w; q) a = m 
[6(x), cc) 8(x) = a—(v(1+b)/b}tt(w; q) b = 1/h 
[8(x). 82(x)]{'1 } = 
a 	{v(1 + b)/b} 	{w; 	(q + 1)} 
The notation min (y: A} is used to denote the least y satisfying property A. 
The function P is the hypergeomotric distribution function as tabulated by Lieberman & Owen (1961). 
The function I is the incomplete beta function as tabulated by Pearson (1934). 
B(a, 1; q) is the q-fractile of the incomplete beta distribution, and satisfies IB(O,1;  .) (a, 1) 	q. 	It is 
thus obtainable from Pearson (1934). 
t(w; q) is the qfraetile of the t(w) distribution. 
5. BAYESIAN DECISION PREDICTIONS 
As we have already observed, the specifications V* and  U* of the preceding section are 
too naïve for decision problems. While such simple specifications are not directly useful it is, 
however, possible to build on them to obtain procedures for decision predictions on the basis 
of value specifications. Our interest will centre on specifications which are of the form 
fy(i)y(y_1)...(yj+1) (yr),1 
T(r,y) 
= lo 	 (y>.r)j 
for density specifications D 1 and D 2; 
V5(r,y) 	!I' - J 	
(yr), 
- ko (y>r),f 
 
 
for D3; and 
T(r,y) = f(y—a)i (yr), 
lo 	(y>r),J (22) 
for P 4. From these it is possible to construct more realistic value functions, for example, 
in the demand and supply problem outlined in § 1 the prediction region R is of the form 
(- 	, r] or [0, r]; if there is a cost C(r) of operating R, which should usually include an 
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allowance for depreciation, and if the penalties for supply exceeding, or falling short of 
demand are proportional to the quantity in excess, or unsupplied, then a sensible value 
specification V(R, y) or V(r, y) is 
(fl(r 
a(y - r) - 0(r) (y 
V(r, y) = 
	
	 (23) 
- y) - 0(r) (y > r).j 
Then V may be easily expressed in terms of the simpler J specifications as 
V(r, y) = aT(r, y) - xrV0(r, y) +fir{1 - J(r, y)} - flV1(, y) - V1(r, y)} - 0(r) 	(24) 
for  1—D3, and as 
V(r, y) = V1(r, y) - (r - a) J(r, y) + fl(r - a) {1 - T'(r, y)} - fifj'ç(cc, y) - V1(r, y)} - 0(r) (25) 
for D4. 
Again, when a finite interval R = (r1, r2) is required and when losses are quadratic in 
distance of y from the interval, and increase quadratically with distance inside the interval 
(the deeper y is contained in the interval the more we may have used too large a prediction 
interval) we may have a V-specification 
1_(y_ni)2 	 (yr1), 
V(R,y) = - (y—r) (r2 —y) (r1<y<r2), 	 (26) 
t —(y—r2)2 	 (yr2). J 
This is again easily expressed in terms of T functions; for example; for problem D 3, 
V(R, y) = - 2T7(r1) + (3r1 + r2) V1(r1) - r1(r1  + 2-2) V0(r1) 
+ 2T(r2) - (r1 + 3r2) V1(r2) + r2(r1  + r2) V0(r2) 
+2r2 V1(cc)-4—V2(co) 	 (27) 
in an obvious abbreviated notation. 
More complicated polynomial value specifications can obviously also be expressed in 
terms of these simpler J'5. 
Moreover, integrating with respect to n(lx) to obtain H(r, x) or briefly H(r) as in (2) is a 
linear operation and so the V's in the above formulae may be replaced by the corresponding 
H's. It is therefore useful and sensible to have a catalogue of R(r) corresponding to the 
simple T' value functions for the four standard density specifications. These are given in 
Table 2; see footnote to Table 1 for definitions of the B, I and P notation. 
We note in passing that, when a 'point' prediction, i.e. a single predicted outcome r of F, 
is required, the value specifications V(r, y) = - - rl and V(r, y) = - (y - r)2 lead to the 
use of the median and the mean of the 7r(ylx) density. 
One general comment is worth making here. The H(r) are easily seen to be the 5th order 
incomplete moments, over (— ao, r) or (0, 'r) instead of the complete space Y, associated with 
the r(yjx) distribution; these are factorial moments for D 1 and D 2, moments about the 
origin for D 3 and moments about a for D 4. Such incomplete moments occur in allied 
decision problems, for example, those of Raiffa & Schlaifer (1961, chapter 6). The Raiffa & 
Schlaifer problem is concerned with situations where the state or parameter space coincides 
with the decision space (as in estimation problems) or can be made by transformation to 
coincide with it. In our type of problem the decision space is Y or ?f and the state space is 
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Y > e, 0 being a nuisance parameter in the sense that the value specification does not depend 
on it. While there is thus a certain similarity between the two types of problem the depen-
dence of the present situation on 0 is too strong to reduce it to the Raiffa & Schlaifer 
problem. This dependence on 0 arises from the fact that the necessary relationship between 
the informative experiment F and the future experiment F can only satisfactorily be 
described in terms of their common indexing parameter 0. In order to apply the Raiffa & 
Schlaifer theory to our problems we would have to be able to express the prior uncertainty 
about the outcome of F directly as a density 7T(y) on Y and to allow the information x to 
alter this directly to ii(yjx) without any reference to 0. To do this we would really have to 
think of the family of densities describing F as being of the form p(xjy), i.e. indexed by 
E Y, and this is seldom a natural view. The necessary introduction of 0 leads to a more 
involved type of decision analysis but the resulting distribution theory is no more 
complicated. 	 - 
Table 2. 11(r) for the densities D 1—D 4 
Density H,(r) 





__  7f (—a-) 
D3 




1 (vw(1 +b) 5 B{(j+ 1),(w±} 	1)+Ig{(j+ 1), 4(w—j)}] (r>a), 2 	b 	B(, w) 
1(vw( +b))' B(Ci+ 1 ) (w —J)} [(-1)' —4(j+ b 
	
	 l),(w-5)}I (r —< a) B(f, w)  
where (r—a)2 U 
= {vw(14b)/b}+(r_a)2 
Table 2 provides a convenient means of constructing H(R, x) for a particular problem. 
The method of subsequently maximizing H(., x) must depend largely on its form and on the 
computing facilities available. Therefore instead of entering a general, and necessarily 
vague, discussion on the relative merits of differentiation, iterative and search techniques, 
we provide an illustrative example which demonstrates a technique that we have found 
useful in hospital engineering supply problems. We there consider the value specification 
(23). From (24) we have, for D 3 and omitting the x in the notation for brevity, 
H(r) = ( + fi) H1(r) - (z +fi) rH(r) + ,#r —,8H1(co) - C(r). 	 (28) 
Setting H'(r) = 0 and using the fact that H(r) = rIii-(rjx) we have as condition for a maximum 
(+fi)I4(r)+C'(r)—fi = 0 	 (29) 
and standard computational techniques may be applied to obtain a solution. 
The specification of a
, fi and C(r) is necessary for a completely satisfactory decision 
analysis. When the cost C(r) of operating the system is small (for example, when the cost is 
mainly capital outlay and the system is to operate over a long period) or if the engineer 
judges the cost to be of secondary importance conpared with the failure—success assessment, 
then we may set C(r) = 0 and obtain the following simple analysis. It is now easier to work 
in terms of the relative cost ratio A = fl/a, which characterizes the relative costs of failure 
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A(r — y) (y>r).J 
For the engineer who hesitates to specify A it is possible to display the dependence on A of 
the de8ign value rA which maximizes H) by plotting the graph (A, rj. From (29) the 
relation between rA  and A is 	(1 +A)HO(rA)—A = 0 	 (31) 
and the graph is very easily plofted by varying rA and obtaining the corresponding A, 
given by 	
A = I10(rA)/{1—H0(rA)}. 	 (32) 
The corresponding expected utility is given by 




and the graph {A,ll(r A)} can be plotted at the same time. To illustrate this point Fig. 2 
shows the two graphs for case D 3 when F is Ga( 1,0) and the outcome of E leads to a = 25, 
b = 50. The feature of this graph, that it shows immediately the increase in A which is 
catered for by a specified increase in the supply quantity r and the corresponding change 
in expected utility, seems to be particularly appealing to some engineers. This is especially 
so when the possible values of r increase by discrete steps, for example, in case of deter-
mining cable and pipe sizes; then it is almost more meaningful to quote the range of A values 
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Fig. 2. Graphs of r1, the design value corresponding to a relative cost ratio ?, and HfrA), the 
-- 	maximum expected utility obtained by use of rA. 
6. PREDICTIONS FOR CLASSES OF EXPERIMENTS 
There are a number of prediction problems in which it is convenient to consider a whole 
class 	of pssible future experiments , indexed by z € Z, i.e. 
= {F: z€Z}. 
A typical situation is where the informative experiment E is a regression experiment 
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(1, ..., 1i), and it is not known precisely for how many, or which, future experiments 
predictions will be required. It is assumed, however, at least in the subsequent three 
subsections that the appropriate z is known at the time of making any required prediction. 
Since it is now essential to show the dependence of the experiment ] on z we use pF(yjz, 0) 
for the density associated with F, and F(• z, 0) for the associated probability measure. 
Several analyses of this situation are possible; the one chosen should, of course, reflect the 
realities of the situation as closely as possible. 
(1) Simultaneous tolerance regions 
Licbermann & Miller (1963) have suggested one resolution of the problem through a con- 
cept of simultaneous tolerance regions by containing all the possible predictions within one 
probabilistic statement. The approach is a frequentist one and since a predictor 
is required for each possible z, what is required in order to define a whole prediction precedure 
is a whole class of predictors 	
= 
The Lieberrnann & Miller procedure, which is for the normal regression situation, is based 
on a modification of the simple tolerance region probabilistic statement (see, for example, 
Aitchison, 1964) to 
PEEx: PF{6'Z(x)Iz,0} c for all zcZjO] = q for all 0€O. 	 (34) 
(Actually, there is a further modification in their work to allow the possibility of c varying 
over some class, but the simpler version (34) is sufficient illustration here. The statement is 
clearly designed for a situation where it is envisaged that repeated 'use will be made of the 
one outcome of the informative experiment to provide answers to all sorts of prediction 
questions about different experiments in the class . The sense of added responsibility 
arising from this extended use of the information instils a feeling of extreme caution in the 
statistician and he seeks to play safe by constraining his entire procedure within the 
probability value' q. It is also clear (see the argument in the next subsection) that the 
containment within the probabilistic statement (34) is motivated by the feeling that the 
(unspecified) utilities are not additive over inference or decisions. If such is the case then 
(34) can be regarded as a useful technique for those who are faced with a series of similar 
prediction problems (as in F 2) based on repetitions of E, in which case q has a relative 
frequency interpretation. Otherwise, an appeal to F 3 is necessary to make the process 
acceptable. It should be pointed out here that the difficulty of counterbalancing q and c 
in this much more involved situation seems to require tremendous insight. 
(2) Frequentist predictions when utilities are additive over predictions 
We assume that when a number of predictions are to be made on the same information the 
utilities are additive over predictions. The following argument can then be applied in the 
frequentist analysis. There is some (z), albeit completely unknown, which describes the 
relative frequency with which 1 actually arises. Since U{(x), z, 0} measures the utility of 
in predicting for F. when E yields x, it is reasonable, because of the additive utility 
property, to assess the overall merits of A in relation to F by the average utility per forecast, 
viz. 
I(i, x, 0) = 
fZ 
dz &(z) U{8(x), z, 01. 
Using this I as a utility function in a straightforward frequentist inference or decision 
I. 
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analysis we are led to seek a procedure A which maximizes or sets equal to q the average 
1(A,0) = fX dXPB(XIO) 
 fZ dz 6)(z)  U{8(x ,z,0} 	 (35) 
for all 0€ 0. Reordering this double integration, a step which will in general be possible, 





dz&(z) dxpE(xlO) U{(x),z,O) 
= fZ dz (z) 0(8Z , z, 0) 	 (36) 
and so, to obtain a A which, for instance, maximizes I(A, 0), all that is necessary is to find 
for each fixed z, a predictor 8  which maximizes G(8, z, 0). In other words, we are faced with 
the case of a specified future experiment as in § 2. No principle of simultaneity in this 
situation seems necessary even on this frequentist view of the problem. Lack of knowledge 
of &(z) has been placed in much the same category as not knowing the true parameter value 
in more straightforward frequentist analyses. 
(3) Bayesian predictions for classes of experiments 
When the Bayesian knows the outcome x from E and the 1 for which he has to predict 
then his information about y is contained in the density 
(yjx,z) 
= fe 
PAYIZ, 0) 7T(6'lx) dO. 	 (37) 
He will then base his prediction region R on 
H(RZ, x, z) = 
fy 
V(-k- y) (yIX, z) dy, 	 (38) 
either maximizing with respect to B in decision prediction or setting H(RZ, x, z) = q for 
inference prediction. It is thus clear that there is no difference here from the ordinary 
regression problem with fixed 1, and so we need make no further comments on the problem. 
(4) Predictions when z is not known at the time of prediction 
We consider only the case where utilities are additive over predictions. When the 
particular 1 is not known it is required to provide a single region R (not depending on z) 
to be used for any Fz which may arise. For example, in a demand and supply problem the 
demand y for a commodity at an operation may depend on a variable temperature z and 
the supply system has to be determined in advance; e.g. it may involve laying of pipes or 
cables. We suppose that we have information about the demands at various temperature 
levels in the past, that is the outcomes y1, ..., y, from experiments 1, . . ., F. Clearly we 
require to have information about the likely temperatures that may arise before we can 
effectively predict B. The approach we adopt is essentially Bayesian, and proceeds as 
follows. If the information about z contained in &(z) is independent of the Bayesian infor-
mation about 0, and so about y, contained in nO!x), or n(yjx, z)—we shall presently explore 
more deeply how this independence may arise—then for decision predictions the Bayesian 
will attempt to maximize 
	
fZ
J(R,x) = (z)H(B,x,z)dz. 	 (39) 
It may reasonably be asked how we can assume that the information available on z and 0 
after the informative experiment can be regarded as independent—with density (z) 7i(0 x) 
—when, in the regression situation indicated earlier, the information about the relative 
186  
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frequencies of future z's is also to be found in x = (z1, yi; ...; z, y.,). The density associated 
with the joint occurrence of z and y  can be expressed as 
p(zjr)pE(ylz, 0), 
wherep(zft) is the marginal density of z and depends on a parameter r. Since this separation 
is often the natural way of regarding the informative experiment it may well be that the 
prior information about r and 0 is independent in the sense that the joint prior density is 
7T1(r) 7T2(0). If this is the case then a trivial application of Bayes's theorem to obtain the 
posterior density of r and 0 shows that the factorization is retained; the posterior density 
isof the form 	
7r1(rIx)7r2(0Ix). 
It is the variation in future z which is relevant to our determination of B and so we must 
convert this to posterior information about z and 0 with density 
f d,T P(Z J T ) 7T1(TJX) 7T2(01X) = &(zlx) 2(0 Ix); 
again the factorization persists and the assumption originally made about independence 
is thus valid in these circumstances. 
If, of course, the experimenter has himself selected the z values of the informative experi-
ment E then the Bayesian assessment of &(z) must be made on information outside E and so 
again the assumption of independence seems reasonable. 
The integral (or sum in the case of discrete Z) J(R, x) is not expressible in simple terms, 
but with the facility for constructing H(R, x, z) described in § 5, the problem of maximizing 
J(-, x) is within the scope of most automatic computers. 
We wish to thank the referees for their very constructive comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper. We also wish to express our thanks to members of the Hospital Engineering 
Research Unit of the University of Glasgow for presenting us with problems which stimu-
lated this research. 
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Suni(Y 
Expected-cover tolerance intervals are commonly used as a means of 
statistical prediction. In their construction the effectiveness of such intervals 
in relation to a future observation y is assessed only in terms of "success" 
if y falls in the interval and of "failure" otherwise; no account is taken in 
the assessment of how far inside or outside the interval y happens to fall. 
The present paper considers the construction of intervals which do take 
account of this factor in a linear way. From a Bayesian viewpoint it is found 
that expected-cover and linear-utility intervals can be regarded as equivalent 
through a simple relation between the expected cover and the relative cost 
ratio. For the frequentist approach it is first shown that linear-utility 
intervals can be simply constructed for the normal and gamma distributions. 
Comparison of these with expected-cover intervals shows that, while there is 
not complete identity, there is an equivalence in a "large-sample" sense. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
TOLERANCE intervals are a means of statistical prediction. From a set x of observations 
—the outcome of some informative experiment E—a tolerance interval 6(x)—a 
subset of the outcome space of some future experiment F—is constructed. The choice 
of the predictor 6 or the prediction 6(x) is in some probabilistic sense aimed at con-
taining the outcome  of For a sequence of such outcomes of repetitions of F, and the 
precise sense in which 6(x) is related to F determines the type of tolerance interval. 
In this paper we study, from both a frequentist and a Bayesian approach, two such 
types—expected-cover and linear-utility intervals—and their interrelations. 
Suppose that F is described by a density PF(Y I 9) (y c- fl, where the true value of 
the indexing parameter 8 is not known; we denote by P,( I 0) the corresponding 
probability measure. Suppose further that an independent (for given 0) informative 
experiment E is described by a density PE(XI  0) (X C_ X), the common parameter 9 
ensuring the possibility of prediction; again, E(  9) is the corresponding probability 
measure. We denote the product probability measure which describes E and F by 
Ep( 	0). A frequentist expected-cover tolerance interval 6(x) depends on the choice 
of a predictor 8 satisfying the probabilistic statement 
PEF((x,y): ye 6(x)J 0} = q for all 0, 	 (1) 
where q is the "confidence coefficient"; see, for example, Proschan (1953), Fraser and 
Guttman (1956), Bowker and Lieberman (1959, pp. 253-257), Thatcher (1964). This 
probabilistic statement is equivalent to the relation 
fPF{S(X) 8}p(x 8) dx = q for all 0. 	 (2) 
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Since PF{6(x)I O} is the cover provided by 6(x) when the true parameter value is 0, 
the statement (2) shows the origin of the name "expected-cover". 
For a Bayesian expected-cover interval we require to find a prediction R = 8(x) 
satisfying 
[I(Rjx)=q, 	 (3) 
where fl( Ix) is the probability measure corresponding to the posterior density 
3'Ix) of y for given x; see Aitchison and Sculthorpe (1965) for a discussion of the 
appropriateness of this density. 
Aitchison (1964, particularly in the discussion) and Aitchison and Sculthorpe 
(1965) have set such problems within the framework of a general inference and 
decision approach to prediction. If V(R,y) denotes the value (or y-utility) of an 
interval or region R when y is the observed outcome of F, and if 
U(R, 0) 5v(R Y )PF (yI 0)dy, 	 (4) 




U~ S(x), O)p.E(x 1 0) 	 (5) 
for all 0. The corresponding Bayesian decision prediction approach requires the 
determining of an R which maximizes 
H(R, x) 
= fy 
V(R, y) 1T(y I x) dy. 	 (6) 
For an expected-cover analysis we take 
1 (yeR), 
V(R,y)= 
l.o (y R), 
(7) 
from which, by (4), U(R, 0) = PF(RI 0), so that G(6, 0) is the left-hand side of (2), and 
so of (I). Similarly, H(R, x) becomes the left-hand side of (3). That we do not 
attempt to maximize here is a consequence of the fact that 6(x) = Ygives the maximum 
of I for G and for H, and this leads to the trivial prediction that ye Y. Instead of 
maximizing we transform the problem from one of decision type to essentially that 
of inference by seeking a 6 such that 
G(8,0)=q for all q, 	 (8) 
or an R such that 
H(R,x)=q, 	 (9) 
where q < 1 is a preassigned number. 
The V-function which is the basis of expected-cover analysis is so simple that it 
leads to inference rather than a true decision problem requiring maximization. This 
simplicity arises from the fact that the expected-cover V-assessment treats as equally 
serious any y outside R and as equally successful any y inside R. While the V-
specification may in practice be a crude assessment of the worth of an interval or 
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predictor, the question immediately arises: is there some more sophisticated assess-
ment which takes account of the extent by which y falls outside or inside R and leads 
to equally simple constructions? One such assessment for an interval of type 
= (- cc, r) is the linear y-utility 
V(r, 	
y—r (yr), 	
(10) y) =  
IA(r — y) (y>.r). 
Here the loss involved if y falls outside the interval is considered as proportional 
to the distance y—rof  from the interval. Moreover, ify falls inside the interval we 
have used a larger interval (larger by an amount r—y) than was necessary and the loss 
specified by V is proportional to this amount. The choice of the factors of propor-
tionality as A and 1 loses no generality, and allows the two types of loss to be treated 
as of unequal seriousness. Note that the relative cost ratio A is not necessarily greater 
than 1. Aitchison and Sculthorpe (1965) have discussed the suitability of such linear 
value functions to the design of certain supply systems, where not only must there be a 
penalty for undersupply but also a penalty for overdesign. An alternative view of such 
problems is, of course, that they are aimed at estimating the "parameter" y. It is from 
the estimation aspect that Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961, Chapter 6) use the same linear 
utility. Their view of the problem is, however, essentially different in that they feel 
able to describe the situation in terms only of the "parameter" y without reference to 
the natural indexing parameter 0. 
An interesting and immediate consequence of relations (18) and (32) of Aitchison 
and Sculthorpe (1965), not made explicit by them, is that Bayesian expected-cover 
and linear-utility intervals, of the form (—cc, r) or (0, r), are exactly the same provided 
q=A/(l+A). 	 (11) 
The provision of this alternative view of expected-cover intervals may make them 
more attractive to some users in that they feel that it is easier to assess the relative cost 
factor A than the more nebulous "confidence coefficient" q. 
We now explore how far it is possible to develop the frequentist linear-utility 
approach; since in general there is no guarantee even of the existence of a function 
satisfying (8) we first investigate the often amenable normal case. 
2. FREQUENTIST LINEAR-UTILITY NORMAL TOLERANCE INTERVALS 
In the normal case we take PF(Y!  0) to be a N(ji, 
0r2) density with mean jL and 
standard deviation a—so that 0 = (1a, a2). We suppose that the informative experi-
ment Eprovides us with independent estimating statistics m and s for jt and a—so that 
x = (m, s)—and that m is N(j, ha2) and vs2/a2 is 2(v), that is, x2 with v degrees of 
freedom. This description includes the case where E is n replicates of F, and also the 
case where E is a normal regression experiment, carried out say at levels z1, .. ., z, of a 
predetermined variable, F being a future experiment to be carried out at z; see, for 
example, Wallis (1951), Owen (1963), Aitchison and Sculthorpe (1965). In such 
circumstances it is well known that a tolerance interval of expected cover q is 
(—cc, m + k0 s), with 
k0 r=J(1+h)t(v;q), 	 (12) 
where t(v; q) denotes the q-fractile of the t distribution with v degrees of freedom. 
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It will pay us to retain the general notation of Section 1 while investigating the 
U-function corresponding to (10). From (4) we have 
CO 
U(r, 0) = 	(y_r)Pr(YI 0) dy+AJ (r_y)PF(YI 0)dy. 
Later in our analysis we shall require 
U(r,0) (13) - 	- 
where we now use PF(rI  0) as an abbreviation for PF((—co, r) 161. 
Just as in expected-cover analysis it seems sensible to consider limits of the form 
r = 8(rn, s) = in + ks, based on (m, s) which are joint sufficient statistics for 	a), so 
we consider here limits of this type, and attempt to find a k, if any, which maximizes 
G(k, 0) for all 0; note that we write G(k, 0) for G(8, 0) since k completely specifies S. 
The joint density of (en, s) is 
1 
	(
(n17-) .t 	v' 	s1vs2"
2ap(m,$) =a.j(2h) 
exp - 
2ha2   21 F( LI) 
 (?e7P 
and (5) gives 
,. 	
a.00 
G(k,0)= I U(m+ks,0)p(m,$)dtnds. 	 (14) fJ— Jo 
It is fairly easy to estabjish that a maximizing value of k necessarily occurs where the 
derivative of G(k, 0) with respect to k is zero. From (13) the derivative equation is 
obtained as 
f-00. f00 _('+p(m+ksIo)}sp(m,$)dmds0. 	 (15) 
Now 
PF(m+ksI=( a +k ),  
where 1 is the distribution function of the standardized normal distribution. If we 
introduce the change of varib1es 
SVV  
M= 	•= aJ(v±1)' 	
(16) 
we reduce the left-hand side of (15), after the cancellation of a factor, to 
f7 fow [A— (1± A) {M4Jh + kSV(v + l)/Jv}]f(M)  g(S) dMdS, 	(17) 
where fiM) and g(S) are N(0, 1) and ( 2(v+ 1)/(v+ 1)}k densities respectively. In 
considering (17) we can therefore treat M and S as independent with the specified 
densities and if we introduce another N(0, 1) variable W, say, independent of (M, S), 
we see that the derivative equation yields 
Pr{WMVh+kSV(v+1)I,Jv} = A/(1+A). 	 (18) 
19Z 
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It then follows immediately, since (W— MJh)/S/(l +h) is distributed as t with v+ 1 
degrees of freedom, that 
k=J{(1+h)v/(v+l)}t(v+1; A/(1+A)). 	 (19) 
Thus the upper normal linear-utility tolerance limit is rn+ks, where k is given by (19). 
There is here no relation between q and A (independent of v) which leads to 
equality of expressions (12) and (19); the complete equivalence of expected-cover and 
linear-utility intervals, which was a feature of the Bayesian approach, is thus absent. 
When, however, the estimate s of a is based on a large sample, so that v is appreciable',  
wesee from (12) and (19) that the two intervals are for all practical purposes the same 
if q and A are related as in (11). Since the direct interpretation of q is not without 
difficulty (see Aitchison and Scuithorpe, 1965, P. 477) the new interpretation arising 
from the correspondence (11) provides a useful alternative view of expected-cover 
intervals. An interval with expected-cover q is for appreciable v the same as a linear-
utility interval with A-factor equal to q/(l —q). For example, a statistician who uses a 
95 per cent expected-cover interval is behaving in approximately the same way as a 
statistician who regards the proportional loss caused by outcomes above the limit to 
be 19 times more serious than that caused by outcomes inside the interval. 
3. EXTENSIONS AND DIscussioN 
While we have developed the theory for intervals of type (—co,r) it is clear that a 
similar development is possible for intervals of type (r, co), and that the comments on 
correspondence between expected-cover and linear-utility intervals remain unchanged. 
For example, if Xagain denotes the ratio of the proportional cost of falling outside 
to that of falling inside the interval, the frequentist expected-cover and linear-utility 
intervals are (rn—k0 s,cc) and (m—ks,cc), where k0 and k are given as before by (12) 
and (19). 
It may also be remarked that the Bayesian correspondence and the frequentist 
approximate correspondence can be extended to the case of finite prediction intervals 
of the form (r1, r.2). For example, in the normal case, the symmetric linear y-utility 
specification 
A(y—r1) if y<r1, 
V(r, r2, y) 
r1 —y 	if r j<y(r1+rp), 
= 
y—r2 if 4(r1+r2)<yzr2, 
A(r2 —y) if yr2, 
leads to such a correspondence. It must be admitted, however, that we are not aware 
of any prediction problem for which such a specification is realistic. 
By a development similar to that of Section 2 it can be shown that for the case of 
gamma distributions, with 
p_ 	.-I 8) = O" x1 e_2/r(k), 
P(YI C) = 
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where BCk+  1,!; 1/(1 + A)} is the 1/(1 + A) fractile of the beta distribution with density 
tk(1 —t)'-1/B(k+ 1, 1). Apart from the replacement of k by k+ 1, this interval is the 
same as the frequentist interval of expected-cover q = A/(1 + A); see Aitchison and 
Sculthorpe (1965, Table 1). When k is large (which will be so, for example, when E 
is a large number of replicates of F) the difference between the two types of frequentist 
interval is small, and again the two ways of interpreting such prediction intervals 
complement each other. 
The fact that relation (11) identifies Bayesian, but not frequentist, expected-cover 
and linear-utility intervals means that any attempt to derive normal frequentist intervals 
from their Bayesian counterparts with special priors will involve the use of different 
priors for the two types of interval. It is in fact easily shown from relation (19) and 
Aitchison and Scuithorpe (1965, Table 1) that the improper prior density lr(JL, a) cc 1/a 
applied to the Bayesian expected-cover (or linear-utility) interval produces the fre-
quentist expected-cover interval, whereas to produce the frequentist linear-utility 
interval requires the use of the improper prior i(J2, a) cc 1/a2. Such a result is of some 
interest because it warns against the too ready acceptance of ir(p., a) cc 1/a as the 
"ignorance" prior which will reproduce frequentist results. A similar feature arises also 
in the gamma case. It may be that this "discrepancy" between priors (which in the 
normal case is of the order of a degree of freedom) can be resolved by allowing 
sequential experimentation in the manner of the recent interesting investigation by 
Bartholomew (1965), but this is certainly beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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14 
8 SOME PROBLEMS OF DECISION MAKING 
If problems of prediction can be formulated in decision-
making terms then the confrontation of a specified value function 
V(R,y) with an experimentally based p(yjx) involves straightforward 
maximisation, leading at best to an explicit solution and at worst 
to computation towards a numerical result. In engineering 
situations there is usually some hope of specifying V(R,y) in a 
realistic way, and even when such a specification leaves some 
element of vagueness it may be possible to show the range of 
solutions produced by this vagueness, and so present a basis for 
evaluation of designs. For an example of this sensitivity type of 
analysis see Aitchison and Scuithorpe (9:1965). 
There are, however, areas of possible application where the 
specification of utility structures is much more difficult, for 
example, in clinical medicine. In clinical practice decisions are 
made in the face of uncertainty, often great uncertainty, and so, 
however much clinicians may back away from the idea, there must be 
- 	implicit utility judgments being made about the quality, or even 
the value, of individual lives. Moreover, if decision making is 
coherent and rational (we do not need to spell out the precise 
meaning of these terms in this commentary) then actions are chosen 
as if there is a well-defined utility structure and a probability 
distribution with actions chosen by maximising expected utility. 
If clinicians are unable or unwilling to specify their utility 
structures an interesting question that then emerges is the extent 
to which it is possible to reconstruct or estimate the implicit 
utility function from a series of recorded actions. 
'95 
A suitable area for such an investigation appeared to be in 
the area of treatment allocation and a feasibility study is described 
by Aitchison (11:1970). On the basis of information z on a patient 
(the initial state) the clinician assigns treatment t (one chosen 
from several available) and the patient's 'final state' is in terms 
of features y. The predictive aspect of the problem is seen as 
determining a reasonable assessment of the prognostic distribution 
p(ylt,z), depicting the probability that a patient in initial state 
z and given treatment t will display final state y. The feasibility 
analysis undertaken assumes that the set of prognostic distributions 
is known or has been constructed. The decision problem is then seen 
as the specification of a utility structure V(z,t,y) with, for a 
given patient with initial state z, a choice of t which maximises 
U(z,t) = ly V(z,t,y)p(ylt,z)dy. 
The models for inconsistent decision making are then studied 
reflecting the quality of data which the clinician may provide when 
faced with deciding on treatments for a sequence of n patients with 
initial states z1,.. •Zn• Even with simple one-dimensional z and 
y, with U(z,t) taken to be linear in z for each t and with the 
prognostic distribution p(yt,z) of normal linear form in z for 
each t, there are many awkward problems concerning identifiability 
of parameters. For the poorest quality of data, namely where the 
clinician can provide no information on any aspect of utilities 
but only on the chosen treatments t1•••tn for the n patients, 
the unidentifiability is so extreme that only the breakpoints on the 
z scale where treatment changes can be estimated. 
It would be too much of a digression from our main theme to 
0 
detail all the various aspects of this investigation. One 
interesting technical aspect in relation to many of the estimation 
problems here is that they fall within the area of probit analysis 
and its generalisations. One such generalisation is reported in 
Aitchison and Bennett (12:1970). 
AITCHISON, J. (1970) 
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Statistical Problems of Treatment Allocation 
By J. AITCHISON 
University of Glasgow 
[Read before the ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY on Wednesday, January 14th, 1970, 
the President, Professor SIR Roy ALLEN, in the Chair] 
SUMMARY 
The problem of allocating one of a number of possible treatments to an 
individual, on the basis of information about his initial state must take 
account of the associated prognosis distributions for his future state and 
also the utility structure. A decision-theoretic model for such treatment 
allocation is presented and within its framework are considered questions of 
optimality, suboptimality of various kinds, and also the feasibility of 
recovering the implicit utility structure used by a decision-maker from ob-
servation of his pattern of treatment allocation. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE aims of this paper are modest. The first is to bring to the notice of fellow 
statisticians a source of interesting and important problems which have had less than 
their fair share of attention. I am encouraged to believe that such a display is necessary 
by the reaction of the chairman of a recent university seminar bearing tonight's title. 
1-le admitted great surprise at the content of the talk, having expected, or perhaps been 
conditioned to expect, some new investigation of the design problem of how to 
allocate treatments to experimental units to obtain an efficient comparative trial, and 
not the problem of day-to-day judgments of how to allocate treatments to non-
experimental units. The second intention is to demonstrate to workers in other 
disciplines, and in particular medicine, that their difficult problems of decision-making 
under uncertainty are under active investigation by statisticians. There are indeed 
encouraging signs among workers in medicine (see, for example, Card, 1967, 1970; 
Ledley and Lusted, 1962; Lusted, 1968) of a desire to re-appraise their whole approach 
to decision-making in more numerate and scientific terms. 
By attempting this dual purpose I am well aware that I have probably fallen 
between two stools. My one fear is that, as a consequence, discussants may spend all 
their time trying to place me safely back on one, while my one hope is that I may be 
told how to sit comfortably on both, in short that tonight may provide a forum for the 
discussion of what may usefully be attempted in this field. May I also apologize in 
advance for the absence of a detailed application to a real problem. The explanation 
is simple; I have as yet no suitable real data. Indeed one of the reasons for undertaking 
this work is the belief that any request for funds to sponsor a real investigation should 
be preceded by the exploration of the possibilities. My choice therefore seemed to lie 
between holding back the ideas of the paper for n ( 3) years until such time as data 
are collected and analysed, or presenting this kind of feasibility study. The hope that 
others may recognize their problems in tonight's formulation and already have suitable 
data has made me bold enough to make the first choice. 
19, 
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1. FORMULATION 
There are many practical problems which have the following general form. An 
individual unit is initially in a state x, where x (possibly a vector) belongs to a set X of 
possible initial states. A set T of alternative treatments is available for application to 
the individual unit. The application of a chosen treatment brings the individual unit 
to a final state y, a member of a set Y of final states, but not all units in initial state 
x and given treatment t will reach the same final state Y. For given x and t the vari-
ability in y is described by some prognosis density function p(y I x, 1) on Y. The net 
benefit of applying treatment t to a unit in initial state x depends on the superiority, 
in some sense, of  over x, and on the cost, in some sense, of applying the treatment to 
x; in other words, some utility function U(x, t,y) is explicitly, or more commonly 
implicitly, at the basis of any rational procedure for allocating treatments to units. 
A treatment allocator, or more briefly an allocator, is then simply a function i- on X 
- 	to T; for each x e Xan allocator i- provides a treatment or treatment allocation r(x) eT. 
A few practical situations will show the general nature of the problem and high-
light differences in the availability of information on p(yi  x, t) and in the difficulty of 
specifying U(x, t, y). 
Example 1. Improving process quality. An attempt is to be made to rationalize 
the method of allocating treatments (one of which may be "do not treat") to loads of 
raw material of differing initial quality x to obtain a final quality y. Past experience 
may be so extensive and the allocation of treatment to initial quality x so haphazard 
that a full picture of the p(yj x, t) density functions is available from records. More-
over we may know the cost k of treatment t for each t, and also the way in which 
selling price g(x) depends on the quality x at which a load is marketed. Thus the 
utility function is completely specified as 
U(x,t,y) =g(y)—g(x)—k.  
This is a situation where there is perfect information with completely specified. 
prognosis and utility functions. 
Example 2. Initial state an indicator offinal quality. There is nothing in the formu-
lation which demands that x and  should be of the same nature, that X and Y should 
be the same set. For example, x may be some indicator (present height, degree of pest 
infestation, the extent of weeds) of potential yield of a growing crop; the treatments 
the different combinations of fertilizer, insecticide and weeding practice; and y the 
eventual yield. Here U(x, t, y) may again be specified, a reasonable form being 
U(x,r,y)=g(y)—k, 	 (1.2) 
where g(y) is the market price of a crop of yield y and k1 is the cost of treatment t. 
To obtain information about p(yj x, t) in this case it is probably necessary to conduct a 
controlled experiment or field trial, in which crops at different indicator levels 
x1, ..., x are assigned treatments t1, ..., t in some specified random way and the 
resulting yields y1, ..., y, are determined. The informative experiment thus provides 
data in the form of n triplets (x1, t1, y1), ..., (x,, 
One problem of which I have direct experience and which lies somewhere between 
Examples I and 2 is that of optimum selection of electricity tariffs for hospitals; see 
the report by Thomson (1968), who does not go fully into the decision-theoretic 
approach now briefly described. Electricity Boards offer a choice of at least three 
tariffs, the bill at the end of a basic period depending on total consumption x, the 
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"treatment" or tariff t chosen, and peak instantaneous demand y during the period. 
Careful study of the tariff conditions soon shows that the amount of the bill or "loss" 
L(x, t, y) can be expressed, for each t, as a function which is piecewise linear within 
simple subsets of the (x,y) plane. A prospective customer such as a hospital may 
have a shrewd idea of what range of x's it will operate at, but have little idea of what 
the more nebulous quantity y will be. Studies by Thomson of data on (x,y) from a 
number of hospitals extending over a period of years suggest that p(,y I x, t) takes 
simple linear normal regression forms. He in fact makes the added assumption that I 
does not affect y. While this is probably reasonable for the complex behaviour of a 
hospital, for other users there may be a "treatment effect", the choice of a t which 
punishes large y inducing a conscious attempt by the user to keep y low. The con-
frontation of L(x, t, y) with p(yl  x, t) by the method of the next section then produces 
the optimum tariff appropriate to any particular indicator x. 
Example 3. Allocation of a medical lreaA,ncnt. A patient consults a physician 
because there are some unpleasant features in his present state or symptom vector x. 
Here x will consist of information such as high temperature, backache, dizziness, and 
may be added to by the physician when he records, for example, pulse rate, blood 
pressure, result of a blood test. The physician may well reach his decision about which 
treatment to assign to the patient in two stages. First as an aid to his thinking he 
diagnoses the ailment. He says that the cause df the abnormalities in the symptom 
vector is the presence of some disease, or at least one of a restricted class of diseases. 
('The statistical problem here is that of classification, and will not be our immediate 
concern although it will arise in Section 6.7 in an unusual setting. Classification has 
of course been a recent subject of discussion at our Society; see, for example, Hills 
(1966), Marshall and 01km (1968).) Having completed the diagnosis stage and so 
delimited his problem, he then begins to think of what treatment—medication by one 
of a number of available drugs, or surgery—he should assign to the patient in order to 
bring the present symptom vector x to some final symptom vector y which he hopes 
will be more pleasant than x for the patient. In his assignment of treatment he must 
take account of the variability of prognosis even with a given treatment, the desira-
bility of moving from unpleasant x to more pleasant y, and the differing "costs" of 
treatments, not only in money terms such as occupation of hospital bed, commitment 
of nursing staff, drug bill, but as importantly in terms of discomfort of treatment to the 
patient. 	 - 
The source of the information on which the physician bases his prognosis, dis-
tributions p(y jx, r) is a combination of his training, his reading and his experience. 
It is a remarkable phenomenon that this distribution is usually stored in the physician's 
head and is seldom set down in any concrete form. Again the utility structure is 
seldom, if ever, thought of in any explicit way. And yet treatments are allocated, 
decisions are made. Can any constructive analysis be undertaken in such situations 
to relieve the physician of some of the burden of storing information and to direct his 
attention more directly to the precise nature of the value judgments he is implicitly 
making? 
The only references I have been able to find to a decision-theoretic approach to 
treatment allocation in medicine are Raiffa (1968), who in his introductory "thumb-
nail sketches" presents and discusses in general terms on pp.  250-255 the decision 
problem of treatment of a sore throat caused by streptococci or a virus; and Lusted 
(1968, pp. 150-159), whose main analysis is in programming terms; see also Aitchison 
(1970b). Most writers seem preoccupied with diagnosis. 
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In discussions with medical and dental colleagues the following areas have been 
suggested as possibly suitable for investigation. 
The operation of a coronary care unit. Here the symptom vector, in addition to 
"medical" data, would contain information on age and family responsibility; treat- 
ments may be simplified to confinement to the intensive care unit or to the general 
ward; the final state may he some measure of mobility at three or six months' time. 
Treatment of thyrotoxicosis. Statistical studies of diagnosis in thyroid clinics 
are among the most successful and detailed yet undertaken; see, for example, Boyle 
et al. (1966) and Taylor (1970). Experience, goodwill, and continuing studies by 
Dr Taylor indicate that the considerable controversy over the relative merits of 
treatments for thyrotoxicosis—surgery, orally administered radioactive iodine, and 
drugs—would be an interesting choice for study. 
Root treatment in dentistry. In endodontics the "hollow tube" controversy 
(Kennedy and Simpson, 1969) is concerned with the best choice of treatment for root 
infection of a tooth-.---extraction, the conventional "endodontic triad" (criticized by 
Seltzer and Bender, 1965) of thorough débridement,.sterilization and complete 
obturation of the root canal, a variety of other treatments which delay permanent 
filling until there is radiographical evidence of healing, and surgery. An attempt to 
investigate the factors in x with somewhat limited data is to be found in Storms 
(1969), and discussion of the elements of y in Bender et al. (1966) and Seltzer at al. 
(1967). In such studies the "cost" of treatments certainly has to take into account the 
staying power of the patient over what may turn out to be a necessarily long period of 
treatment. 
Example 4. Sampling inspection. Some familiar problems of sampling inspection 
may be readily expressed within the framework of treatment allocation. In our 
example here the initial state x is unknown and an informative experiment provides 
data on which to base some plausibility distribution p(xI z) for x. 
A batch of N items from a batch process contains unknown' numbers x of 
defective and N—x of effective items. From past experience we may know the 
plausibilities p(x) attaching to the various x. The different treatments may consist of 
inspecting different numbers of items and rectifying any defectives in the inspected set 
before placing the batch on the market. One method of proceeding is to carry out a 
preliminary inspection of a random sample of size n from the batch. Suppose that z 
are found to be defective and n - z effective. Since 
= 
(x) (N—x)1(j 	' 	(1.3) 
is known, we can convert the prior information p(x) into posterior information 
p(xlz) by a simple application of Bayes's theorem. The information z is now to be 
used to decide how many additional items t should be inspected before placing the 
batch on the market. The cost of inspecting each item is k; all detected defective items 
are rectified at cost q per item; the replacement loss of a defective item is r; the selling 
profit of an effective item is s. 
Here y is the eventual number of defectives in the batch and it is clearly necessary 
to write the prognosis distribution as p(y I x, z, t) to display its dependence on z as well 
as on x and t. In this case we can completely specify 
p(ylx,z,t)- VZ—Y/ 
Z /N—x—n+z\ 
X+Z +Y)I(N; ). 	(1.4) 
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Also a suitable utility function can be constructed: 
U(x,z,t,y) = Ns—ry—q(x—y)—c(z±z), 	 (1.5) 
since we sell N items, have to replace y, have rectified x—y and have inspected 
altogether z + t. 
To resolve the allocation problem we have to confront the utility U(x, z, 1, y) with 
the combined plausibility and prognosis assessment p(xz)p(yx,z,t). 
Example 5. An economic situation. An extremely difficult form of the problem is 
that facing the Chancellor of the Exchequer on budget day. Here x is the present 
economic state of the country, the treatments are the possible budgets he may present, 
and y is the economic state of the country at some specified future date or dates. The 
problem is difficult for two main reasons; an inherent unwillingness even among 
political economists of the same affiliation to express with any clarity their U(x, t, y) 
and the almost total absence of experience on which to base a sound prognosis 
distribution p(yjx, t). 
From these five examples we see that the problem presents itself in varying degrees 
of completeness, from the case of a known utility structure and prognosis distribution 
in Example 1; through the case of a known utility structure with a prognosis dis-
tribution to be inferred from the results of a controlled experiment in Example 2; the 
Jack of formal expression of a utility function and the replacement of a specific 
prognosis analysis by the use of informal experience in Example 3; the lack of precise 
knowledge of the present state in Example 4; to the precarious problem of Example 5 
where vague aims and vague prognostications abound in a situation where it is 
impossible to experiment. 
It is the purpose of this paper to investigate and illustrate what can be effectively 
achieved in situations of different degrees of clarity about aims and of information 
about the effects of treatments. In Section 2 the optimum theory under perfect 
information on p(yI x, t) and U(x, t,y) is first set out as a yardstick, and in Section 3 
a normal linear utility model, used to illustrate concepts and results, is briefly des-
cribed; Measures of suboptimality associated with a number of suboptimal allocators 
of interest are obtained in Section 4. The use of an informative experiment to provide 
information on p(yI x, t) is described in Section 5, only briefly since our main interest 
in this paper is in situations where the main cause of difficulty is the reluctance to 
specify the utility function. In many of these vaguely specified practical situations 
treatments are actually allocated by some decision-maker. 
A question of considerable interest will be that of attempting to describe such 
actual treatment allocation in terms of statistical decision theory and the particular 
problem of discovering or recovering the utility function the decision-maker is sub-
consciously using. For this it is necessary to introduce a model of an inconsistent 
decision-maker. The extent to which his utility function is recoverable will depend on 
the ease with which we can make some suitable assumption about its parametric 
structure, and the amount of information about his "optimum" decisions that the 
decision-maker can give us. Different situations are dealt with in Section 6, and 
recovery estimation methods investigated and illustrated. One of the wilder hopes of 
such an investigation is that the confrontation of the decision-maker with his utility 
structure may eventually bring to him an awareness of the possibility of formalizing 
his decision processes and perhaps relieve him of the wearing necessity of much of the 
more routine decision-making he has repeatedly to face. 
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On the whole the discussion is confined to the case of two treatments, although 
many of the results extend to the case of more than two treatments. The extension, 
however, is not a routine matter and involves in particular some interesting problems 
of identifiability and estimability of parameters. Irithe fear that these may obscure the 
structure of the problem I have not considered them in this paper. 
2. THE CASE OF PERFECT INFORMATION 
The case where the initial state x, the prognosis density functions p(ylx, t) and the 
utility function U(x, t,y) are all known to the decision-maker is straightforward. Our 
interest in this case of perfect information is not only for its own sake, but also as a 
.basis for subsequent considerations. A standard principle on which to obtain an 
optirnuin allocator 'r'1' is then to ensure that it allocates treatments so as to maximize 
the expected utility 
U(X, t) = fy U( X, t, Y) Ay I X, 0 dy, . 	 (2.1) 
where the expectation operation is with respect to the prognosis distribution for given 
(x, t). (Throughout theoretical considerations, we shall assume that y is a continuous 
random variable since our illustrative example takes this form; the case of discrete 
random variables, or random vectors, possibly of mixed type, requires only the 
replacement of the simple integration operation by the appropriate accumulation 
operation.) An optimum allocator can thus be constructed by choosing, for each 
xeX, a treatment T*(X)  satisfying 
U{x, i*(x)} = max { U(x, t): t E T}. 	 (2.2) 
It may happen that .j*(x) is constant, say t, for all xeX, that is, the same treat-
ment z  is optimum for every initial state. Such a treatment t is termed a uniformly 
optimum allocation. 
Note that in the case of perfect information no informative experiment on which 
to base prognosis assessments is necessary. Another point worth noticing at this stage 
is the special feature that the action or decision t influences the unknown "state of 
nature" y. It is in fact a problem in predictive decision-making in the sense of Aitchison 
and Sculthorpe (1964). 
3. NORMAL LINEAR UTILITY MODEL 
Since it is likely -to play an important role in subsequent theoretical development 
and first attempts at practical application, and also for its usefulness in illustrating 
the theory and concepts, we specify, and establish the notation of, a normal linear 
utility model. For this model in its n-dimensional multivariate form we have 
p(yx, t): a N(c+Bt x,E) density function, 	 (3.1) 
U(x,t,y) = 'x+-q'y—Kt, 	 (3.2) 
where cx,, 6, are vectors and B,  I matrices of appropriate dimensions. Then 
U(x,t) = ('+q'B)x+-z)' — Kg. 	 (3.3) 
.Z047.. 
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In its simple univariate form we have 
pCvlx, 1): a N(cx+ f3x, a-2) density function, 	 (3.4) 
U(x, 1, y) = ex + 	 (3.5) 
where all the symbols are scalars. 
Two useful integrals I(a, b, c, d) and J(a, b, c, d) associated with the normal model. 
are set out in the Appendix. 
4. THE MEASUREMENT OF SUBOPTIMALITY 
4.1. Definition 
If, from application to application of an allocator i-, the initial state x is variable, 
with density function p(x) on X, then we obtain an overall measure of the effectiveness 
of i- in the expected utility per allocation by -r, namely 
	
U(T) = f U{X, (X)}P(x) dx. 	 (4.1) 
The extent of suboptimality of a non-optimum procedure T can then be readily 
measured as the loss of expected utility per allocation when compared with an 
optimum allocator i*: 
S(T, T*)= U(T*)_U(T). 	 (4.2) 
The importance of suboptimality in this paper arises mainly in circumstances 
where we envisage the decision-maker unable or unwilling to enunciate his problem 
explicitly and as a result indulging in inconsistencies of some kind. Suboptimality 
provides a measure of the consequences of these inconsistencies. 
4.2. Suboptimality from Use of Wrong Utility Function 
For the case of two treatments with T= (1,2} we have the following optimum 
allocator: 
1 if U(x,1)—U(x,2)>O, 
(4.3) 
2 	if U(x, 1)— U(x, 2) <0. 
Then 




ff I U(x, 2)p(x) dx +U(x, 1)— U(x, 2)}p(x) dx. 	(4.4) 
.IX 	 U(z,1)-U(z,2)O 
Suppose that U(x, r) is linear in x, say 
U(x,t)=a+bx, 	 (4.5) 
then 
U(x, 1)— U(x, 2) = a+b'x, 
where a = a1 - a2, b = b1 - b2. The use of a suboptimal procedure may arise from a 
wrong assignment of the parameters of the utility structure and so lead to an allocator: 
1 if c+d'x)O, 
(4.6) 
2 if c+d'x<O. 
o5 
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Then 
U(r) = I U(x, 2)p(x) dx + J 








= 1(a, b, a, b) — I(a, b, c, d), 	 (4.7) 
from Integral I of the Appendix, if x is N(, 
4.3. Suboptimality of a Randomized Allocator 
We shall find in later sections that in order to describe the inconsistent behaviour 
of actual decision-makers we have to allow randomied allocators. For the case where 
T consists of two treatments such an allocator can be expressed in the form 
1 	with probability IT(x) 
(4.8) 
2 with probability I - 17(x). 
Then U(T) is easily evaluated as 
U(i) = 
5 
U(x, l)ir(x)p(x) dx+J U(x, 2){1 —lr(x)}p(x) dx 
= f .,,U(x, 1)p(x) dx+5 {U(x, I)— U(x, 2)) 1r(x)p(x) dx. 
Hence 
S(r, i*) = 
J
{U(x, 1)— U(x, 2)}p(x) dx— ({u(x, 1)— U(x, 2)}ir(x)p(x)dx. (4.9) 
U(x,1)— U(x,2)>O 	.) X 
For one of the normal linear utility models for inconsistent behaviour studied later 
we shall find that v(x) takes the form (I(c + d'x). For this normal linear case then we 
have immediately from Integrals 1 and 2 of the Appendix that the suboptimality of 
the randomized allocator is 
I(a, b, c, d) — J(a, b, c, d). 	 (4.10) 
4.4. Suboptimality of a Constant Allocator 
Since a constant allocator, say i- with T(x) = 2 for every x  X, can be. expressed as 
a randomized allocator with 17(x) = 0 for every x  X, the above result allows us to 
assess the suboptimality of misassuming that treatment 2 is a uniformly optimum 
allocation. For such a constant allocator the suboptimality reduces to 
S(2, T*)  =U(x, 1)— U(x, 2)}p(x) dx. 	 (4.11) 
fiU(x,1)—U(x,2)>O 
Such a measure is relevant, for example, when it is mistakenly assumed in the investi-
gation of a controlled clinical trial with two treatments that the only conclusions 
possible are that both treatments are equally effective or that one treatment is better 
than the other for all initial states. 
.O6 
214 	AITCHISON - Statistical Problems of Treatment Allocation 	[Part 2, 
4.5. Suboptimality from Use of Subvector of Initial Stale Vector 
The motivation for considering this problem is that it arises whenever a decision 
is required as to whether to allocate a treatment on the basis of a subvector x1 of x 
or whether first to gain additional information by observing the remainder x2 at some 
cost and then to allocate on the basis of the complete vector (x1, x2). Analysis of this 
situation is a first step towards a full sequential treatment of the problem. In addition 
to the prognosis distribution p(y I x1, x2, z) and the utility specification U(x1, x2, t, y) 
we assume that the conditional density function p(x21 x1) is known also. Clearly the 
variability of x2 for given x1 is very relevant to the decision whether or not to allocate 
on the basis of x1 alone. 
A convenient way of expressing the advantages or disadvantages of taking the 
additional information is to quote a breakelLen cost, that is the maximum amount that 
it would be worth paying for the additional information. This is equivalent to the 
concept of the expected value of information of Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961, p.  87). 
Let us consider first allocators based on x1  alone, that is functions from K1 to T. 
The unknowns in the utility U(x1,x0, t, y) are (x2, y) and so the allocation of treatment 
at this stage (that is, on information x1 only) is to be assessed in terms of the expected 




= fX jX V 
U(x11  x2, t, y) AYx1, x21  t) p(x2 x) dy dx 
xi x2, t)p(x2!  x dx2. 12 
The optimum allocator 'r thus assigns allocation 1-'(x1) so as to maximize this. The 
maximum expected utility from an immediate allocation on the data x1  is therefore 
maxT JU(xl x21  t)p(x2 I x) dx2. 
To compare this with what we might gain with the taking of additional information 
x2 we will assume that the cost of observing x2 is zero and that U(x1, x2, t, y) assesses 
the advantages and disadvantages of other factors. If we were to observe x2 then we 
must consider allocators: (x1, x2) - r(x1, x,4). The optimum allocator i-'' will then 
provide expected utility 
maxr U(x11  X21  t). 
At the point of assessing the advantages of r'' over the previous T we, of course, 
know only x1, and so we must take the expectation with respect to p(x2 x). The 
maximum expected utility obtainable from making use of this cost-free additional 
information is 
maxT  U(x1 ,x21  t) p(x2 I x) dx2. 
j.12 
Hence the breakeven cost, which is simply a measure of the suboptimality of using 
information x1  alone as compared with using cost-free further information, is 
S(r', r*) = 
f 
 maXT U(x1, x2, t) &21 x1) dx2 - maxT fU(x,, x2, t) p(x2 I x1) dx2. (4.12) 
X3 	 I 	 X2 
I, 
O7 
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Example. For the two-treatment normal linear utility model we set 
U(xj,x2,t,y) = 
p(yJx1,x2,t)= YI-g+,x1+Ix2,Y2), 
The parameters i and ) will naturally depend on x1 but we have dropped the nota- 
tional dependence for the sake of simplicity. Then 
U(x11 x21 1)= 
Now 
(1 if U(Xi,X2,1)—U(x1,x2,2)>O, 
T(X, X 
= 12 if U(x11 x2, 1)— U(x1, 2, 2) <0, 
and an application of Integral I of Section 3 gives 
$ maxT U(x11 x21 t)p(x2 x)dx2 = U(x1, , 2) + w[{vx} + v(x1) (v(x}], (4.13) .x 2 
where 
= {'(F1— F2)c2(r1— r2y}, 	 (4.15) 
	
v(x1) = w' {U(x1, , 1)— U(x1, p, 2)). 	 (4.16) 
Hence the breakeven cost is 
~WWLVW)+V(-Y1)q1 fU(X1)}]
j 1 	if 	) 0,b(x 




max1 b(x1) = (2i7-) w, 	 (4.18) 
the maximum occurring when v(x) = 0. Thus if 1J is defined by the relation (see 
De Groot, 1968): 
(4.19) 
we reach the following conclusion. 
It is worth observing x2 if the cost involved is less than 
wW{u(x)} when i(x) >0, 
w['?{v(x1)} + v(x1)} when v(x1)<O. 	 (4.20) 
If the cost involved exceeds (2-)4 w then it is never worth observing x2. 
Note that the quantity w is a natural one to enter these cost considerations since 
we would clearly be prepared to pay more for the additional information the "bigger" 
71 is, the greater the "difference" between I' and F2, and the more "variability" () there is in x2 for given x1. 
'_._ --_-•_ '--p - 	 . 	 - 	 . --.----.---..-. 	-- 
O8. 
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5. ESTIMATION OF THE PROGNOSIS DISTRIBUTION 
For the case where xis known and U(x,t,y) well formulated, but p(yjx,t) not 
fully known we suppose that the class of prognosis models is indexed by a possibly 
vector parameter of an index set 0, p(y  I x, i) being the prognosis density function 
corresponding to the index U E 0. For instance in the normal linear case, if there is no 
great past experience with the treatments, the al, B1 and E act as indices. A satisfactory 
informative experiment by which to gain knowledge of U will then be a controlled 
trial where individual units with initial states, say x1, ..., x, providing a good cover of 
X, are used. The assignment of treatments t1, ..., t,, which may include the treatment 
"do not treat", to the units in this trial should cover T and. be made in a known 
random way according to the well-established principles of experimental design, the 
use of blocking or other devices depending on the special circumstances of the situa-
tion. The final states y1, ...,y are recorded, so that the data then take the form 
(x15 11,y1), 	 From a Bayesian viewpoint these data, denoted briefly by 
z, will convert a prior plausibility function p(0) into a posterior plausibility function 
I z), which will then provide a prognosis density 
p(ylx,tlz) = 
fe 
po(yk,t)p(Ok)dO. 	. 	 (5.1) 
An alternative approach from a frequentist point of view is to obtain an estimate, 
(z) say, of U by some standard estimation principle, such as maximum likelihood, and 
set 
X, t  I  z) = Pë(:)(Y I x, t). 	 (5.2) 
It is well known that if the informative experiment is sufficiently large or a suitable 
indifference form is used forp(0) these two prognosis assessments (5.1) and (5.2) will 
hardly differ. It is certainly not our purpose here to dwell on the relative merits of the 
two approaches. 
Once the prognosis distribution (5.1) or (5.2) has been obtained the treatment 
allocation problem is again straightforward, the definitions and analysis taking 
exactly the same form as for the case of perfect information (Sections 2 and 4) with 
(v Lx, tjz) replacing p(y Ix, t). 
Example. For the univariate form of the normal linear model with two treatments 
we suppose 
0 = (cx11 Ph' a21921 a) 
to be unknown; data of the form 
(x1, t1, y1), ..., (x, t,, y) 
then correspona to two separate regression scatter diagrams with common error 
variance. Let S1, A, S2, R2 be the usual least-squares estimates of 1, fl, , 92, and s 
the usual "pooled" estimate of a2. Then a standard Bayesian inference based on a 
vague prior 	fi 	$, o) cc 1/a leads to a normal-gamma type of posterior dis- 
tribution for 0, and it can then be shown that p(yx, tIr)is of generalized Student form 
with mean vector (+ $1x, 2,+62 x). Subsequent analysis of the treatment allocation 
problem, then follows from the previous considerations of the normal linear model 
with 	replacing 	The frequentist form for p(yjx,tz), given by (5.2), is 
N(d + x, s2) and use of this in place of the previous p(y I x, t) again leads to the same 
subsequent analysis as the Bayesian approach. 
e 
.2O 
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This brief and somewhat superficial account of the construction of the prognosis 
distribution is not an attempt to write the problem off as either trivial or unimportant. 
Indeed the contrary is the case. The non-triviality of many of the statistical problems 
is soon realized in some applications, where the final states are (possibly multi-
dimensional) categories, for example, death, survival with recurring headache and 
dizziness, survival with recurring headache but no dizziness, and so on. In such 
circumstances some interesting multidimensional generalizations of quantal analysis 
can arise; see Aitchison and Bennett (1970). There is also a growing awareness of the 
importance of obtaining reliable prognosis distributions in a number of fields, par-
ticularly in medicine; see, for example, Peel et al. (1962), Hughes et al. (1963), 
Ginsberg and Offensend (1968), Norris et al. (1969), and the report of a proposed 
prognosis study of the treatment of breast cancer in The Scotsman of November 21st, 
1969. Our reason for not treating this aspect in greater depth in this paper is that we 
want to concentrate attention on certain problems in the specification of the utility 
structure. In what follows therefore we shall suppose that the prognosis distribution 
p(y I x, t), whether constructed along the lines of this section or not, is available. 
6. MODELS FOR INCONSISTENT TREATMENT ALLOCATION UTILITY ESTIMATION 
6.1. The Problem 
So far we have been concerned with situations where the utility function U(x, t,y) 
is completely specified, and where the problem is to determine the optimum allocator. 
Now we turn to the converse problem, where allocations, presumably optimum in the 
view of the decision-maker, are being made and yet the decision-maker is unwilling or 
unable to state explicitly his utility function, though he may be prepared to make some 
utility assessments about the particular situations he meets. Can we then infer or 
estimate the utility function that the decision-maker is implicitly using? The motiva-
tion here is to show the decision-maker that it may be possible to formalize his 
allocation procedure. There are, two possible effects of this. The exposure of his 
utility function may invite him to ask the question: Is this the kind of utility function 
I want to use, should I not perhaps modify my utility funOtion? Alternatively he may 
be encouraged to use the estimated utility function to automate the decision-making 
process and so free himself from much of the arduous routine allocation that comes 
his way. 
The method of recovery of the utility function will depend on what information 
is supplied by the decision-maker. We shall consider a number of different qualities 
of information in decreasing order of quality and the different models which generate 
these data. We would expect a decision-maker who works with a vague utility 
function not to be consistent in all his allocations, and our models will have to 
entertain this possibility. We shall thus be constructing models for inconsistent 
decision-making. One of the topics of interest will then be to measure the extent of 
this inconsistency, which again we shall interpret in terms of suboptimality. The 
general type of model considered here we term an expectation model. Another type, 
a prediction model, is briefly discussed in Section 6.8. 
In order to recover the utility function we shall have to impose some structure on 
the situation. For the reasons indicated in Section 5 we assume that we know the 
prognosis density function p(y [ x, t). We shall also assume that U(x, t, y) is of a certain 
parametric form, say U(x, t,y, 0, where is the indexing parameter. For example, 
with the uthvariate normal linear utility model discussed in Section 3 we may regard 
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= (, 77' IC1 , K2) as the indexing parameter, or if the costs of treatments are known, 
C = (6,71). We write 
U(x, t, ) = J U(x,t,y, )p(yx,t)dy 	 (6.1) 
for the expected utility. Then for the two-treatment case we have 
U(x,t,C)= 
'7i—Ki+(e+'7p2)x for 1=1, 	
(6.2) 
2 —ic2+(+7))x for t=2, 
~A, + p, x for t = 1, 
(6.3) 
A2+i2x for t=2, 
where the two alternative sets (E,'7, K1, K2) and (A2, A,tj,,t) of parameters are in one-
to-one correspondence by 
o —i o 	c 
A2 	= 	0 cxz 	0 	- 1 	
, 	 (6.4) 
1 9 0 0 K1 
P2 	1 9 0 0 	K2 
e 	 0 	0 —92 91 	Al 
- 1 	0 	0 1 —1 
65 
K1 	91 92 P2Pl 	
. 	( . 
K2 	 ° P1P2 a2 2 P2 
The problem is then whether it is possible to estimate (A1, A2, K1, K2) or equivalently 
(, 77, K1, K2). 
I can give no general guidance as to choice of parametric form. As in all applied 
mathematics, simplicity and tractability will largely outweigh other considerations in 
the early stages of development. For the linear form, here chosen for simplicity, with 
and 7) of opposite signs, U(x, t,y) gives some measure of the "difference" between 
x and y, discounted by cost. 
6.2. Classification of Expectation Models 
When faced with an individual in initial state x the decision-maker may visualize 
the consequences of applying treatment t through his knowledge (whether formal or 
informal) of the prognosis distribution and from this assess, possibly subconsciously, 
the expected utility U(x, t, 0
. We can then picture him as running mentally through 
all the possible treatments and obtaining estimates of all the U(x, t, ), estimates 
subject to errors el because of the inherent informality of the process. Thus he 
arrives at a set of estimated utilities 
u=U(x,r,C)+e (teT). 	 (6.6) 
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Since we have subsumed in our formulation of the treatment allocation problem that 
treatments are defined in such a way that two treatments cannot be applied to the 
same individual we may reasonably assume that our decision-maker produces errors 
e that are independent. We assume moreover that each e  is N(O, 82).  The assumption 
of hornoscedastic variance here would be reasonable, for example, if the decision-
maker has much the same experience with all the treatments. We have made 'the 
simplest possible assumptions; these are not in any way essential to the arguments 
that follow though naturally they simplify the mathematical development. 
We can then visualize three main possibilities about the kind of information 
suppliable by the decision-maker. 
The decision-maker may be able to provide for each of the presented initial 
states x1, .... x his expected utility estimates u, ..., u11; 1121, ..., 	...; t1 b ..., U nk, for 
each of the k treatments. We shall term the model which generates data of this form 
the full utility expectation model. 
In many situations it will be asking too much of the decision-makdr to provide 
estimated utilities for all the treatments for each of the initial states presented to him. 
He may be more willing to provide such utilities only for the treatments that he would 
actually apply for the given initial state, that is, for the treatment that he regards as 
the appropriate optimum. Thus, if he is presented with a set x1,...,x of initial states 
which provide a good cover of X the data will take the form 
(x1, t, ufl, ..., (xx, t, zm), 
where t denotes the treatment he regards as optimum for the initial state x1 and u' 
is the utility he associates with this allocation. The model here is termed the optimum 
utility expectation model. 
He may feel completely unable to provide any information on the expected 
utilities but only name the optimum treatments t', ..., t that he associates with the 
initial states x1, ..., x. The corresponding model is the optimum treatment expectation 
model. 
6.3. Data for Illustrative Example 
To illustrate the degree of success of the recovery operation by estimation pro-
cedures associated with the three expectation models we have simulated a decision-
maker who allocates treatments from T= {l,2} with a univariate normal linear 
utility form. Indexing in terms of (At , A2, u1, t 2) gives the simpler estimation pro-
cedures. The following are the values chosen for simulation purposes: 
A1 =7, A2 =3, 1,1 =04, p2 -08, 8 =04. 
The errors were easily generated by taking N(0, 1) random deviates and multiplying 
each by 04. The utility and treatment data associated with 25 initial states are pre-
sented in Table 1. 
In this simple example the decision-maker would of course have to be very naive 
not to recognize his inconsistency in the overlap of l's and 2's in the column of t''. 
I hope the reader will admit this naivety in such an illustrative example. In less 
orderly sets X in higher dimensions recognition of inconsistencies requires great 
sophistication. Inconsistencies occur in diagnosis and no doubt also in treatment 
allocation. 
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TABLE I 
Simulated data from the three expectation tnodels 
	
Fall utility 	Optimum utility 
Initial state 	model model 	Optimum treatment 
model 
a2 	t7 	u 
3-1 8-17 5-32 	1 	8-17 1 
4-6 901 7-26 1 901 1 
5-2 9-16 738 	1 	916 1 
64 892 8-49 1 8-92 .- 1 
6-7 10-37 8-97 	. 1 	10-37 1 
7-7 996 9-31 	1 	9-96 1 
87 10-31 1017 1 10-31 1 
9-0 1029 10-55 	2 	10-55 2 
91 1090 1007 1 10-90 1 
95 1067 10-96 	2 	10-96 2 
9-5 1104 10-45 	1 	11-04 1 
106 11-17 11-42 2 1142 2 
10-9 12-39 11-45 	1 	1239 1 
11-3 11-08 12-60 2 12-60 2 
11-9 12-41 12-70 	2 	12-70 2 
11-9 11-73 12-18 	2 	12-18 2 
13-9 1178 1455 2 1455 2 
152 13-26 14-80 	2 	1480 2 
17-7 1462 1737 2 17-37 2 
19-2 15-00 18-47 	2 	18-47 2 
19-6 15-09 19-22 	2 	19-22 2 
209 15-12 1877 2 18-77 2 
22-3 16-09 2147 	2 	21-47 2 
234 1669 2151 2 21-51 2 
25-0 16-74 22-95 	2 	22-95 2 
6.4. Full Utility Expectation Model 
With such full data the estimation problem is one of standard regression analysis, 
the two sets 
(xi, u1 ) 	(i = I, ..., 
(x1, u2) (i= 1,...,n), 
being the scatter data for two regression lines u = A1+1 1x, u = A+x. Standard 
least-squares estimation then gives as estimates of A, ?, tLl, j, 
= 7-01. 12 = 	m1 = 0-405, 	in2 = 0-785; 
and for the error standard deviation 8 the usual root mean-square error (pooling the 
residual sums of squares of the two regression analyses) 
d= 0404. 
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6.5. Optimum Utility Expectation Model 
The data are here displayed in Fig. 1, and, in terms of regression analysis, we can 
imagine their generation as follows. At each of a number of values of the explanatory 
variable x, two regression experiments 1 and 2, corresponding to the two treatments 
and with true regression functions Ai+ttix and k2 +ix, are performed. What is 
recorded, however, is not both responses, but only the greater, together with the 








0 	 5 	10 	15 	20 	25 	Initial 
sate X 
FIG. 1. The data of the optimum utility expectation model of Table 1. 
Treatment 1, 0;  treatment 2, 0. 
appearance of a straightforward two regression-line scatter diagram, we are therefore 
aware that corresponding to each o there is a ghost 0 below and to each 0 there is a 
ghost o below. While it is tempting to fit least-squares regression lines to the two sets 
of data this is an entirely incorrect estimation procedure. The nature of the generation 
of the data—a form of random censoring in that the smaller of the two response 
outcomes is suppressed—must be taken into account, and will often have the effect 
of altering appreciably the estimated regression functions. 
The estimation can be easily carried out by an iterative maximum-likelihood 
procedure expressible in terms of repeated adjustments to least-squares estimates. 
The probability that experiment t'' gives an outcome u'' and that this is greater than 
the outcome of the independent experiment t is 
1 /u*_A._p..x\ 
(u*_A—'2tx\ 6 	 6 	)' 	
(6.7) 
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where we use unstarred Ito denote the non-optimum experiment or treatment. If we 
denote by Ji summation over the set of n, observations for which treatment i gives 










The likelihood derivative equations can, after some tedious algebra, be converted 
into a simple iterative scheme for the computation of the maximum likelihood esti- 
mates l, m, l, m2, d of A,, 	S. This iterative procedure seems simpler than the 
standard one based on the Newton method and the information matrix. Let the 
vth iterates be denoted by the l, 	/V),  ,14v), d'', and the estimates obtained from 
the data regarded as simple scatter diagrams for two regression lines by !, th1, 12, 	d. 
The function w is defined by 
ç'(z) 
W(Z) = -. z) 	
(6.9) 
tl)( 
The iterative scheme is then: 
l-1 - 	x u* _l( 




d (p-i)  ) 1 (6.10) 






u - 4v-1)  
) 1 '2 	j IM2 = F1 —d' 
r a2  
I 
d' 
(v) Im2i [ 2 x 2 x2J 
L (u*— 1
1 m 	x)j' 
d -' 
= j(u*)2 _l1() j u*_mEi XU* 
'2 d(v 1 	(* - 
1(w-1) - m 	
I 
'')  
d -1  
+E2(u*)2 _4 ) 2 u*_rn) xu* 





The final equation also has an analogy with ordinary least-squares estimation. 
The two terms involving the w function on the right-hand side may be interpreted as 
adjustments to the other six terms, which constitute the pooled residual sums of 
squares associated with the fitting of ordinary regression lines to the two scatter 
diagrams. 
Table 2 shows the results of iterating to the maximum-likelihood estimates from 
initial estimates set equal to the least-squares estimates 11,ru1, d. A similar 
iteration from the true values of the parameters also took five cycles to reach the 
.215 
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same accuracy. Note that there is an appreciable difference between the maximum-
likelihood estimate of j and the unadjusted least-squares estimate. The slope of the 
line on which the latter is based is lowered by the admission of the ghost data. 
TABLE 2 
Iteration to the maximum likelihood estimates 
v 	1" 	m" 	4k') 	n4P) 	d(v) 
0 	656 0-482 338 0-782 0402 
I 7•21 0-361 310 0-796 0-408 
2 	6-70 0453 3-20 0-791 0402 
3 702 0-396 3-18 0793 0-405 
4 	687 0-422 3-18 0-792 0404 
5 - 6-88 0-421 3-18 0-792 0404 
6.6. Optimum Treatment Expectation Model 
In this model the decision-maker records only the number of the treatment which 
he regards as optimum. Thus he will allocate an individual in initial state x to treat-
ment I if and only if the utility estimate u1 is greater than the utility estimate u0. 
Since u1 and u2 are in our underlying model independent N(A1+ 1 x, 82)  and 
N(X+jx, 82)  random variables this means that the probability of recording treat- 
ment lis 	 - 
Pr {u1  > u2} = (1) (Al 




A = 	2, B = P1tL2 	 (6.14) 
Thus the decision-maker sets 
1- 	with probability (I(A + Bx), 
7(x) = (6:15) 
2 with probability 1 - 't(A +Bx), 
and so is operating a randomized allocator as defined in Section 4.3. 
This is precisely the basic binomial trial model of probit analysis (Finney, 1947) 
with the choice of treatment 1 as "response" and of treatment 2 as "non-response" to 
"stimulus strength" x. We have thus a familiar estimation problem with, however, 
one difference. The drastic reduction in the available information has resulted in the 
unidentifiability of the basic parameters, for there are clearly many sets of 
(A1,,A2,19,8) which give the same (A, B) and hence the same model. Indeed only 
the forms A and B and functions of them are identifiable. We shall see, however, that 
the estimation of A and B is sufficient for one important purpose. 
The corresponding model for more than two treatments (Aitchison and Bennett, 
1970) is more complex and the problem of identifiability is non-trivial and of estima-
tion non-standard. 
-2/6 
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The true values of A and B in our simulated example are 
A =7-07,  B =-0707. 
The standard iterative estimation procedure of probit analysis applied to the data give 
maximum-likelihood estimates 
4=711, .=-0726. 
6.7. Discussion of the Three Models 
Because of the unidentifiability, and hence the inestimability, of the basic para-
meters of the model of Section 6.6, we cannot compare the standard errors of the 
estimators to obtain measures of our ability to recover the utility function from the 
diminishing quality of the information associated with the three models. There is, 
however, a function of the parameters of particular interest. A decision-maker who 
could state his utility structure explicitly would choose treatment 1 if and only if 




provides a critical point. For all x below it one treatment (in our example, 1) is 
optimum; for all x above it the other treatment (2) is optimum. This critical point, 
being associated with the identifiable function —B/A, is estimable from the data of the 
probit model. Indeed in the standard terminology of probit analysis the critical point 
is the ED 50. 
Table 3 gives the estimated critical points obtained through the three models 
together with their estimated standard errors obtained by standard maximum-
likelihood approximation methods. The increasing magnitude of the standard errors 
measures the decreasing effectiveness of the data. 
TABLE 3 
Estimated critical points and their estimated standard errors 
Estimated 	Estimated 
Expectation model 	critical point standard error 
Full utility (Section 6.4) 	 974 	 033 
Optimum utility (Section 6.5) 	 997 0-43 
Optimum treatment (Section 6.6) 	9-79 	 0•60 
Even with probit-type data there is clearly some hope of effective estimation, at 
least of this important critical point. The problem in this case has a deceptively 
familiar form. For consider the graphical representation of such data for a two-
dimensional initial state (x1, x2). In Fig. 2 each point represents the initial state of an 
individual presented to the decision-maker and shows the chosen treatment. For the 
normal linear utility model the critical point is now replaced by a critical line but again 
the appropriate es.timation procedure is a form of probit analysis. The diagram, how-
ever, has the appearance of data for the standard classification problem, the classes 
being treatments, and it would be tempting to apply discriminant analysis, an entirely 
different procedure, to the two clusters to determine an appropriate dividing line. If, 
p2/7 
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in a medical context, there were a one-to-one correspondence between disease and 
treatment, it might be difficult for the physician to disentangle the classification 
(diagnosis) and treatment allocation problems. It would be interesting in such a 
situation to compare the two techniques of discriminant analysis and utility estimation 
to see what practical differences might arise and possibly to relate misclassification 
probabilities with utility structures. Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper. 
FIG. 2. Initial states (x1, x2) and treatments allocated by an inconsistent decision-maker. 
Treatment 1, 0; treatment 2, 0. 
Although we have discussed three different models these relate to differences in 
what the decision-maker is able to reveal and not in his supposed process of decision-
making. The measure of inconsistency of this process or its suboptimality is thus the 
same for all three models. Suppose that the natural distribution of initial states is 
normal with mean 11 and standard deviation 5. The suboptimality of our simulated 
decision-maker is then, by (4.10), 
101—.\21jt1-1i21 
=842{I(A,B,A,B)—J(A,B,A,B)} with &=I1,=25 
= 0030. 	 (6.16) 
The estimated suboptimality obtained by the substitution of estimates, say from the 
optimum utility data, for parameters is 0032. The average utility per allocation with 




for such a stream of initial states is, by (4.4); 
+11+8.J2I(A,B,A,B) = 1289, 
a standard for comparison. 
.27 
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Whether or not a suboptimality of this magnitude is of practical significance 
must, of course, depend on the circumstances of the real problem. The suboptimality 
depends, as we would expect, on 8, the error standard deviation, and in our example 
the magnitude of 8 is moderate. Notice also that (6.16) cannot be written solely in 
terms of A and B, and hence the suboptimality, regarded as a parametric function, is 
unidentifiable and in consequence inestimable in the optimum treatment expectation 
model. One interpretation of this is in terms of Fig. 2. If there is considerable overlap 
of the treatment "clusters" we cannot say to what extent this arises from great 
inconsistency (large ) or from the inherent difficulty of decision-making with close 
mean utility functions A,.+i1 x and )2+ 2 x. 
It is interesting to quote here the suboptimality of a decision-maker who claims 
that his utility structure is the same as that of our simulated decision-maker but who 
insists in allocating only one of the treatments, say 2, for all initial states. This is the 
constant allocator of Section 4.4 with suboptimality 
J2I(A,B,A, B) = 1-09, 
compared with the 0-030 of the simulated decision-maker. 
6.8. Prediction Models 
The preceding sections have discussed models for a decision-maker who estimates 
the expected utilities associated with the separate application of the two treatments. 
It is also possible to construct models in which the decision-maker is visualized as 
predicting the final states and hence the actual utilities associated with these applica-
tions. For given x and -t the prognosis distribution p(yx, t) induces a distribution for 
the statistic U(x, t, y, 0. For example, with the univariate normal linear utility model 
this distribution is normal with mean U(x, t, 0 or +/1gX and standard deviation 
I ,jja. With such a prediction model allocation to treatment will then be made on the 
basis of the larger of the utilities predicted. The only difference between prediction and 
expectation models is therefore that where we previously had 8 we now have 
From the point of view of estimation, the utility structure that we recover will be 
identical for the two types of model. If we estimate on the assumption that estimated 
expected utilities are being quoted or used we obtain exactly the same maximum- 
likelihood estimates of (, A,, 	/2) or (, 77, c, K2) as we would obtain using the 
corresponding prediction model. The maximum-likelihood estimates , d and s of 
71, & and a would satisfy the relationship d = 	s. Thus while the two types of model 
differ in concept there are no practical differences between them. 
Another source of inconsistency could be the existence of errors in, or uncertainty 
about, the initial state vector x. While I have not studied this in any detail I suspect that 
it will again lead back to something very like the expectation modeir of earlier sections. 
7. DiscussioN 
It must be re-emphasized that this paper is essentially a feasibility study. The 
main investigation is of the circumstances of treatment allocation under which the 
utility structure of a decision-maker may be satisfactorily estimated from his behaviour 
pattern. The work was motivated by proposals that such behavioural studies of certain 
areas of medical practice might be undertaken. In medicine growing attention to the 
construction of quantitatively based prognosis distribution raises the question of 
whether the natural hesitancy of medical decision-makers to make explicit their 
utility structures can be compensated. 
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Our illustrative example concerned a one-dimensional initial state and a not-too-
inconsistent decision-maker. For higher-dimensional initial states and more inherent 
inconsistency the amount of data required for satisfactory estimation will naturally 
increase. Fortunately the greatest need for knowledge of the utility structure is 
likely to occur in those situations where allocations have to be made repeatedly and 
where, therefore, more data should be available. Again we have investigated in 
depth only two-treatment normal linear models. As indicated earlier, the case of more 
than two treatments raises substantial, though not insuperable, new problems, and 
the extension to categorical initial and final states is also of interest. 
To automate optimum treatment allocation as defined in this paper the estimation 
of critical points or critical lines is all that is necessary. The hope that at least this 
estimation will be of practical value is encouraged by the analogy we drew with the 
problem of classification, and its increasing success in applications to medical 
diagnosis. 
I am grateful to Professor W. 1. Card and Dr T. R. Taylor, of the University of 
Glasgow Department of Medicine in Relation to Mathematics and Computing, for 
discussion of the medical problems which motivated this paper. 
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APPENDIX 
The following integrals make repeated appearances in computations of sub-
optimality associated with normal linear models. 
Integral 1 
Let the n-dimensional random vector x have an N(t,!j, 1) density function denoted 
by(x js,). Then 
I(a,b,c,d)




(Al) (d'.Qd)l (d'2d)'  
where 	and 	without displayed parameters denote the standardized univariate 
normal N(O, 1) density and distribution functions. Moreover, 
maxCd I(a, b, c, d) = I(a, b, a, b). 
This result is readily established by standard techniques, first by a transformation 
to the N(O,I) case, then by the introduction of a suitable orthogonal transformation 
and finally by standard differential calculus maximization techniques. 
A second useful integral which succumbs to the same technique is the following. 
Integral 2 





c+d ) b'Qd f c+d' 1 (a+b') 
(1 +dW)1j+(l +d'cd) 	(1 +d'd)fJ 	
(A2) 
DIscussIoN ON PROFESSOR ArrcHlsoN's PAPER 
Dr M. Hiu.s (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine): Professor Aitchison's 
paper raises a number of questions, most of which are concerned with the potential 
usefulness of his approach in the field of medicine. Before considering any of them I 
should like to make the general point that there is a considerable danger of distortion 
when parts of the logic of medicine are formalized in order to make explicit their 
probabilistic basis. For example, Professor Aitchison, in describing diagnosis as a process 
whereby abnormalities in a symptom vector are said to be due to the presence of some 
disease, is distorting the process of diagnosis. Although the paper is about treatment 
allocation rather than diagnosis, the two are so closely connected that it is very difficult 
to discuss the one and ignore the other. 
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It seems to be generally accepted that the closest one can get to a definition of disease 
is a consensus of opinion about which of a huge number of possible vectors, x, referring 
to a person's physical and mental state, shall be described as diseased. This set of vectors 
is then classified in various ways, the most important being by (a) aetiology, (b) functional 
pathology and morbid anatomy and (c) clinical description. Diagnosis is the process of 
classifying a particular vector x in one or more of those schemes, and the most common 
decision which needs to be made in this process is whether or not to make a further 
investigation of a patient in order to improve the classification. The reason for trying to 
improve the classification is to narrow the range of possible treatments and to increase 
the probabilities of favourable outcome to treatment. The diagnostic process may well 
stop at a relatively crude level if a single treatment is indicated or if the prognosis of a 
number of treatments is approximately the same. Now this is all relevant to the paper this 
evening because we are asked to consider a situation in which there are a number of possible 
treatments, a range of x vectors, and a decision has to be taken about which treatment 
goes to which x. It is natural to ask when such a situation might arise and one possibility 
is when the diagnostic procedure has reached the end of the line without narrowing the 
choice of treatments to one. Another is where the diagnosis stops at a fairly crude level 
due to ignorance (as in psychiatry). In most situations falling into these two categories 
the prognosis distribution is not likely to be very informative, although the utilities may 
vary considerably, and I am led to the conclusion that it is this combination which really 
interests Professor Aitchison. Taking his example 3(iii), the controversy implies that 
I x, t) is not very informative, but the utility of a treatment which saves a tooth might 
be considerable to an actor yet low for a hermit. It is very reasonable to assume that in 
the absence of much information from p(y I x,  0 the utilities must play a part (albeit 
unconscious) in the treatment allocations. 
This brings us to the.real point of the paper, which is the estimation of utilities. 
It is suggested that this might serve two purposes, which I shall refer to as confronta-
tion and replacement. if all that is known about a doctor is his. treatment allocation, 
t1 or t2, for a range of x vectors, then the technique of discriminant analysis (or 
probit analysis or logistic regression) expresses P(t* 	x) as some simple function 
of a linear form in x. Such an empirical relationship might be used to show that the 
allocation behaviour was strongly influenced by social class and ages and not much else, 
and this might be a surprising "confrontation" for the doctor. If the fit of the model was 
very good it could be used for future allocation, perhaps even replacing the doctor, 
although this would obviously require extensive data over the range of possible x's. 
I should like to separate the application from the methodology here because the con- 
frontation seems to me to be most interesting and potentially valuable whereas the use 
of parametric utilities does not seem to add to the standard statistical methods for this 
problem. The other models, in which the doctor is able to state utilities, I find difficult to 
visualize. The initial step of stating utilities at all seems to me to be so large that 
the question of whether or not one smooths them by regression on x pales into 
insignificance. 
In conclusion I would suggest that Professor Aitchison is dealing with a much more 
restricted situation than he would have us believe from his very general formulation, but 
that in this situation there is considerable interest in the further analysis of allocation 
behaviour. An analogy may be drawn with voting behaviour which has, incidentally, been 
intensively analysed without bringing in utility functions. That I am unable to follow 
Professor Aitchison the whole way with his utility models is probably due to a personal 
view that such models tend to impose a rigidity which is not compatible with the changing 
state of medical knowledge and availability of new treatments. The news that statisticians 
are actively engaged in considering these problems may, I think, be received with mixed 
feelings by the medical profession, but this evening our own feelings can only be those of 
pleasure in the interesting possibilities which Professor Aitchison has revealed to us, and I 
am happy to propose a vote of thanks. 
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Professor D. R. Cox (Imperial College, London): The present status of statistical 
decision theory is rather puzzling. If utility can be identified with money and all the 
probability distributions are effectively based on data, the position is clear. Important 
examples, for instance in control theory, acceptance sampling and in stock control cer-
tally exist, but these are a small proportion of practical decision problems. An elegant 
and apparently all-embracing general theory is available involving subjective probability 
and subjective assessments of utility. Yet 1, for one, am unconvinced that this necessarily 
captures the essence of decision problems. (For instance, does Example 5 of the paper 
do more than reword the Chancellor of the Exchequer's problem?) Professor Aitchison's 
paper is doubly welcome for the interesting new technical material and for the balanced 
discussion of what are clearly a group of challenging and important practical problems. 
I want to make two detailed comments and then to return to the general question of 
formulation. 	- 
There is a connection with familiar problems in experimental design. If the treatments 
are indexed by one or more continuous variables, an allocator is a choice of optimum 
conditions on the basis of data. Yates (1952) and subsequently Anderson and Dillon 
(1968) have investigated the economic and decision-theoretic aspects of this, but further 
investigation from the viewpoint of Professor Aitchison's work might be fruitful. 
Next, in the interesting estimation problem connected with Fig. 1 the use of a logistic 
density rather than a normal would have simplified the likelihood and combined with the 
approximation e/(l + ez)rr  1 + kx (I x < 1/k) might have led to fairly simple estimates 
from which to begin an iteration; this would be especially worth considering in situations 
more complicated than that of (6.8). A further statistical problem associated with 
this sort of data concerns an appropriate definition of residuals for testing goodness of 
fit. 
Returning now to the general issues, I think that Professor Aitchison's explicit intro-
duction of a prognosis distribution is an important clarifying idea. In his Section 5 
Professor Aitchison is, in more familiar terminology, suggesting the estimation of treat-
ment differences and of their interactions with important classificatory variables; the 
emphasis on interactions is important. Professor Aitchison has, however, put main 
emphasis on the utility function. There are, in essence, two extreme forms of decision 
problem. One is typified by the view of life in which one is constantly faced with clear-cut 
conflicts between selfish and altruistic considerations, i.e. the choice of utility is at stake. 
On the other hand, the uncertainty may be entirely in assessing the consequences of any 
decision taken, i.e. the choice of prognosis distribution may be central. Where in between 
these extremes do the practical problems considered by Professor Aitchison lie? Even 
if the difficulties lie primarily in the choice of utility, should not much more emphasis be 
placed on establishing the components of utility? What are the main components; how 
do they depend on the final state y; what relative importance is attached to these com-
ponents first by patients and then by doctors; is a rough completely "economic" weighting 
feasible, etc.? 
Quite generally, I feel that much of statistical decision theory can be criticized for its 
concentration on a premature synthesis of utility and subjective probability into single 
numbers, when the emphasis should be on the analysis of these concepts into components 
and the detailed study of these. Synthesis there must be when the final decision is to be 
made, but the gaining of understanding and the improvement of decision-making seem 
to require much more than an immediate sweeping together of these difficult concepts 
into single numbers. 
I want to attach low utility to the manufacture of sources of disagreement that do not 
really exist and there is nothing in Professor Aitchison's paper, or indeed in the literature 
on decision theory, to suggest that it would not be a good idea to make the above kind 
of analysis. The point is that this does not get much emphasis. 
Professor Aitchison has given a lucid and interesting paper on an important topic and 
I have much pleasure in seconding the vote of thanks. 
2..Z3 
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The vote of thanks was put to the meeting and carried unanimously. 
Dr J. A. ANDERSON (Department of Biomathematics, Oxford University): I would like 
to say how much I have enjoyed Professor Aitchison's paper, particularly since I found it 
very thought-provoking on several counts. He is to be congratulated on a clear and 
thorough presentation of the structure of the treatment allocation problem. However, 
1 would like to question one or two points lie made. His chief objective is to estimate 
satisfactorily the utility structure in treatment allocation. Presumably, his method would 
be judged to be successful if it predicted accurately decisions actually made by a doctor. 
This is clearly a very interesting field of research but it suffers from some drawbacks. 
Firstly, if the doctor's and the system's decisions disagree, it could be due to inadequacies 
in either but how will we know which? Secondly, it seems a little restricting to try to 
reproduce one doctor's decisions. Why not allow the system and the doctor to improve, 
if possible? This would suppose that there exist objective criteria for judging the success 
of a treatment. In medicine, where decisions are being made repeatedly, I think this is 
quite possible. 
I was amused to see quality control and management of the economy included as 
examples of medical situations suitable for treatment allocation. Irrespective of how 
reassuring we find the parallel between doctors choosing treatments and politicians 
choosing economic strategies, it seems that Professor Aitchison regards them as equivalent 
for decision-making purposes. I think there are two differences; firstly, medical decisions 
are made repeatedly whereas I believe that economic strategies are varied infrequently, 
and secondly, the pay-off from an economic decision is measured almost entirely in 
financial terms, while in medicine at least three distinct elements can be distinguished: 
the patient's survival, 
the quality of the patient's remaining life, 
the financial cost. 
Although there are strong theoretical reasons why a decision-making system should 
depend on a single utility function, as in the present paper, there are practical reasons in 
the medical context for overriding this requirement. 
I think most doctors would find a utility function, in arbitrary units, rather artificial, 
so I suggest that an acceptable treatment allocation system might be to present the risks 
(factors I and 2) and the financial cost associated with each treatment, leaving the doctor 
to make the final decision. A doctor's decision is based on considerations like my factors, 
so why not give him objective assessments of them? This might be the first stage, the 
second stage being to use the factors in a statistical system. This could be as suggested - 
here, or based on a linear combination of my factors (Fishburn, 1964) or even based 
on putting bounds on the various risks as suggested by myself (Anderson, 1969). 
There are several reasons why I think rules based on the factors (1)—(3) are to be 
preferred. Firstly, they are quite objective quantities, so the associated risks can be 
estimated without any further assumptions. In fact, this exercise would be very similar 
to estimating Professor Aitchison's prognosis distributions. Although I have no hope of 
sample sizes large enough to ignore sampling errors, at least something can be said about 
them. I like the device of assuming that guesses of utilities have a given error distribution, 
particularly since it gives such satisfying results with the normal linear model. However, 
I cannot help wondering about the size of the sampling error in the resulting utility 
estimates, bearing in mind that in real-life the unknown prognosis distribution also has 
to be estimated. 
It may be that the procedure of the doctor deciding between statistically assessed risks 
might be more advantageous in the long-term, since it is more flexible. For example, a 
physician choosing between surgery and radio-therapy might be influenced by the avail-
ability of a particular surgeon and make adjustments to the appropriate risks. In another 
context, perhaps kidney disease, a deciding factor might be the patient's willingness or 
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ability to find a large sum of money. In this case it might be appropriate for the patient 
to be told the risks and for him to make the decision. 
In these circumstances, I suggest that the objective and subjective stages in decision 
making should be kept separate. 
Another point to remember is that several doctors might be concerned in the treatment 
of a patient, making one set of personal utilities unworkable. 
Professor W. CARD (University of Glasgow): I am grateful for the opportunity of 
commenting on this very interesting paper. I am a doctor and not a statistician so I 
obviously cannot comment on the technical mathematics but only on those parts which 
particularly affect clinical medicine. 
In his formulation Professor Aitchison speaks of a final state y and a utility function 
of x, t and y. This rather suggests that, in terms of medicine, he has in mind some acute 
condition which can be said to have a final state. But we are frequently concerned with 
treating a patient where the outcome cannot ever be regarded as final but has a duration 
measured in years, e.g. freedom from recurrence of a cancer. It seems to me therefore 
that the utility state has to be considered as having a duration overa period of time, and 
that this in itself has some further probability distribution. Doctors get over this by putting 
the patient into a particular class. Medicine perhaps is unusual in that the subjective 
awareness of the state y is only part of the total utility state of the subject. 
Professor Aitchison classifies three types of utility expectation models, but it is not 
easy to believe that any doctor at the moment would be prepared to estimate utilities 
numerically as demanded by his first and second models. There is no doubt that the 
doctor could name what he believed to be his optimum treatment as in Model 3. But I 
think a doctor could go further and could express his preferences over a series of utility 
states and give some estimate of his degrees of preference (Card and Good, 1970). Though 
we find it difficult to think in terms of numerical estimates of utilities today we may learn 
to do so in the future and here one might suggest an analogy with the percentage disability, 
decided by a Medical Board under the Industrial Injuries Act. In effect this is a numerical 
estimate of a utility. I also think it is important to point out that we should get a good deal 
of help if the methods Professor Aitchison proposes only allowed us to calculate big 
differences in expected utility as this would give us more time to spend on the subtle 
decisions. 
Professor Aitchison has made the simplifying assumption that his two treatments, 
z and 12, are mutually exclusive. But often in medical practice this is not so. if we have 
an alternative medical and surgical treatment as for example in duodenal ulcer, we may 
advise medical treatment first in the knowledge that surgical treatment can always be 
carried out at a later date. Also if we have two medical treatments it is not uncommon 
for them to be carried out sequentially especially when a treatment may itself provide a 
valuable piece of diagnostic evidence, the so-called therapeutic test of the diagnosis. 
Finally, may I say how gratifying it is that statisticians like Professor Aitchison are 
prepared to interest themselves in some of our medical problems which involve decisions. 
Mr M. J. R. HEALY (Medical Research Council): I would like to add my congratu-
lations to Professor Aitchison for his lucid and interesting paper. The neglect of the 
problem of treatment allocation is certainly remarkable; it is becoming increasingly 
irksome in the field of clinical trials, where the statistician's instinct to relegate treatment x 
subject interaction in its entirety to error (however reasonable this may be in agricultural 
field trials) runs counter to the clinical fact that different categories of patients respond 
differently to almost any particular treatment. 
Where I would differ to some extent from Professor Aitchison is in the relative 
emphasis which he gives to the three components of the problem—the initial state, the 
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prognosis distribution and the utilities. It is of interest that a practitioner's implicit 
system of utilities can to some extent he deduced from the practice—it is arguable that a 
rational man ought to USC some system of utilities, and it could be useful to demonstrate 
inconsistencies. However, I am not sure in what sense a utility function can be said to be 
wrong; on being made aware of my implicit utilities I may wish to change them, but I feel 
that irreducible differences of opinion are likely to persist as between, for example, 
different doctors or between doctor and patient. 
By contrast, the prognosis distribution is in essence objective and subject to investiga-
tion, as Professor Aitchison points out. Actually obtaining information may, however, 
be exceedingly difficult in areas such as medicine in which the possibilities of experiment 
are limited—the outlook for getting the prognosis distribution from non-experimental 
observations is not bright, as has been clearly shown in agricultural fertilizer work where 
the role of the prognosis distribution (or at least its expectation, given t) is played by the 
response curve. Equations (5.1) and (5.2) in the paper are a little misleading without some 
indication that the left-hand sides are estimates subject to more or less uncertainty. 
Dr Yates's Nature article, to which Professor Cox referred, was essentially concerned with 
the costs involved in estimating the prognosis distribution, and it is of interest that he 
pointed out the value of studying its dependence on the initial conditions so as to avoid 
the type of suboptimality described in Section 4.5. 
The third part of any particular allocation problem is the initial state. This differs 
from the prognosis distribution in that it must be determined afresh for each new case 
and consequently the costs associated with its determination-cannot be avoided in the 
overall utility reckoning. Fertilizer work again provides an example—much argument 
has been expended on the accuracy to which soil analyses should be determined, but this 
is largely misplaced in the absence of knowledge of the full prognosis distribution which 
would render the utilities (here fairly simply arrived at) calculable. In the medical context, 
the cost (to both the patient and the community) of elaborate investigations can be large, 
and decisions about them may be as important as treatment decisions. 
Dr H. THOMAS (London Graduate School of Business Studies): I would like to add 
my thanks to Professor Aitchison for his paper. I do not want to discuss any aspect of the 
medical problem because I know nothing about it. I have two general points—one is about 
the practical applications of the type of formulation that Professor Aitchison has put 
forward, and the other concerns one possible practical application in the business studies 
context. 
My first point ties in with what Professor Cox was saying. This centres round the 
confusion existing in statistical decision theory and was summed up by Professor 
Ehrenberg at the Sheffield R.S.S. conference last year. It was pointed out there that since 
there appear to be few useful routine applications of Bayesian procedures in the literature, 
there seems to be some doubt about whether Bayesian procedures are applicable at all to 
practical problems. I do not object to Professor Aitchison's formulation at all because I 
think it presents the decision-theory framework in a different way, and in an interesting way, 
but it adds to the rather sterile debate on a theoretical level about statistical decision theory 
and does not furnish us with any larger applications of Bayesian procedures in practice. 
My second point is on its possible application to the type of investment decision 
problem which Professor Plackett was considering in a paper he read to this Society 
recently. I have been doing some work on this particular problem, trying to estimate 
such things as the prognosis distribution and the utility function given that you have some 
initial state of an investment project (e.g. initial estimated rate of return) which is x and 
have some treatment factor t (men, money, machines) and you want to arrive at some final 
state, a final rate of return or something of this nature desirable to a business firm. . In this 
.2.26 
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context, we meet again the problem of how to obtain information on the prognosis dis-
tribution; many business men will tell you that every investment decision is different from 
every other, so one has no historical data base and, therefore, no objective evidence to 
enable one to assess a prognosis distribution. 
The other problem that occurs in the application of Professor Aitchison's structure to 
an investment decision problem is the relevant utility structure for the problem: it seems 
to me that if one's objective, as Professor Aitchison has pointed out, is to attempt in some 
way to automate the decision-making process, why should we he trying to recover the 
information from how the individual decision maker makes the decision in a given context? 
The effort should be placed on obtaining a corporate global utility function. I apologize 
for raising this application in a basically medical discussion, but 1 feel it is an important 
issue: it would be nice if we could have some routine practical applications of Bayesian 
methods in the Journal as well as the debate on statistical decision theory. One application 
1 should commend to attention in the business field is the thesis of Gittins on optimal 
resource allocation written in 1968. 1 believe Professor Davies is doing work in the 
chemical industry on this problem. 
I thank the author for the paper. The structure is very useful for people working in 
the practical area. 
Dr T. R. TAYLOR (University of Glasgow): I would like to contribute to this discussion 
as a physician who is actively interested in the application of decision theory to clinical 
problems and who is collaborating with Professor Aitchison in this field in Glasgow. 
As I see it, the aims of those working in this field should be threefold: 
To develop a detailed model of the diagnostic process including treatment allocation. 
To pursue the analysis of decisions made by physicians in the course of their day-
to-day work so that some of the simpler ones may be automated and insight gained 
into the more complex ones. 
Attempt to extend our analysis of the decisions taken by physicians to allow them 
to learn more about their own decision-making behaviour: this is referred to by 
Professor Aitchison as "confrontation". 
We will depend, for the success of these aims, on convincing our fellow physicians of 
the practical as well as theoretical value of decision theory. We must therefore choose an 
operational decision unit which is clinically meaningful as well as being tractable from the 
design point of view to the statistician. For these reasons we have chosen not an individual 
decision-maker but a single out-patient clinic. 
We have been in fact actively studying the thyroid out-patient clinic in Glasgow Royal 
Infirmary and have had excellent collaboration from Dr John A. Thomson and his-staff 
and the active encouragement of Professor E. McGirr. In this clinic we have the essential 
ingredients for a tractable decision system, namely a stream of patients passing through 
the clinic, a group of decision makers and the ancillary nursing, laboratory and other 
staff and facilities which are to be deployed in the course of decision making and treatment. 
Our approach has been to impose on this unit a structure which will be operationally 
meaningful to doctors and will fulfil the design criteria necessary for our studies. I myself 
am a full-time active member of the team in this clinic and I regard this as an essential part 
of the educational progress without which our decision makers would not be able to 
collaborate however well disposed they might be. The structure which we have imposed 
on this decision unit is as follows: 
(1) We have produced a set of definitions of all the symptoms, signs, laboratory tests 
and diseases in the thyroid clinic. These have been amended and have been finally 
approved by all the physicians involved in the thyroid group at the Royal Infirmary, 
and our aim is in the near future to attempt to have all the thyroid physicians in 
Scotland agree on a similar set of definitions.  
t. 
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A prospective survey of all the patients seen in this thyroid clinic is in progress 
from which we will be able to derive our prior probabilities, likelihoods and the 
prognosis density function referred to by Professor Aitchison. 
A work-study analysis and costing analysis is now in progress to provide us with 
a financial estimate of the cost of each item of evidence and each treatment used 
by the decision makers in the clinic. Other "costs" such as the discomfort of the 
patient and the inconvenience of the investigations are also being investigated by 
myself by interviewing patients. 
As a final comment may I clarify our intentions and answer the criticisms of two of 
the previous speakers about the final utility structure which we hope to infer from our 
studies. This utility structure has been referred to as a single item by Professor Aitchison 
in his theoretical analysis. We are well aware that this is intuitively not the way in which 
the physician-decision maker thinks about costs. We have analysed costs into (i) financial 
costs, (ii) the discomfort to the patient of his initial state and (iii) a similar analysis of the 
inconvenience, financial or otherwise, of the initial state, the investigations and the treat-
ments and final state. This analysis is at the present moment only theoretical, but we are 
in the process of pursuing it in some clinical cases in the prospective survey at the present 
moment. 
The value of confronting of the decision-maker with his utility structure is one which 
will undoubtedly be of value, possibly more so than any other aspect of this work. In a 
study now nearing completion, we have compared the six physicians in the thyroid clinic 
in tackling twenty varied cases of non-toxic goitre and the reactions of these physicians to 
the results of this analysis have been most instructive. Indeed the individual physicians 
are enthusiastic about this study in improving their performance as diagnosticians and 
clinical decision-makers. 
Professor D. J. NEWELL (University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne): The beginning of this 
paper is very valuable, because nearly all clinical trials in the past have been designed on 
the assumption that the population of responses to treatment will 'be homogeneous, that 
is that there will be no interaction between the "x-variables" and the response to treatment. 
Of the few trials which have considered the possibility of non-homogeneous response, 
the first that I can recall was by Newton and Tanner (1956). Here the response was 
preference for one drug or another. Using a double-cross-over design, they devised a 
statistical analysis (further discussed by Armitage and Healy, 1957) which first finds the 
most frequently preferred treatment, and then determines whether there is a minority 
group which consistently prefers the other treatment. It is then open to the investigator 
to discover whether this group has identifiable characteristics for future treatment 
allocation. 
One of the advantages for Professor Aitchison of trials where the assumption of uniform 
response has been made is that they sometimes yield data of the sort he is looking for. 
A trivial example is this: we have recently looked at a particular treatment for the post-
infarction period in coronary thrombosis (Newell et al., 1970). Overall (on the assumption 
of homogeneity) it has no effect on mortality, but when we start looking at the interactions 
it becomes interesting. Selecting from the x-variables just age and sex, we find that the 
drug saves the lives of young men, but is apparently lethal to old women. Where I have 
doubts, in common with previous discussants, is in the allocation of utilities. Using purely 
accounting utilities, one might say that this is uniformly a good treatment, since it saves 
the lives of young males who could contribute to national income, and it eliminates some 
old people whose contribution, in a strictly financial sense, is negative. These are not the 
sort of utilities that doctors would put on these outcomes. But it is very difficult to quantify 
utilities in a case of this nature. Similarly, since some doctors have in the past used this 
treatment for patients of any age and either sex, they would be alarmed if the utilities 
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implied by their actions were imputed to them. So although the concepts in this paper are 
admirable, one can foresee great difficulty in the assignment of utilities. 
Mr J. G. SKELLAM (Nature Conservancy): Even if a utility function is well defined, 
there are two aspects of utility—short-term and long-term utility. It may sometimes pay 
not to aim repeatedly at short-term utility, but to make sub-optimum decisions particularly 
in the early stages in order to gain knowledge which may throw light, for example, on the 
prognosis distribution. Extra information and research are invaluable in achieving greater 
utility afterwards. 
The author replied at the meeting and later added to his reply in writing, as follows: 
Our Society is probably unique in its approach to treatment allocation. It takes its 
patient (the reader of a paper), encourages him to disclose his initial state, subjects him 
almost simultaneously to a number of different treatments, and then awaits the publication 
of the Journal to see him declare his final state. I would like to thank all the discussants 
for their considerate treatment, which stopped short of the radical surgery I have been 
conditioned to expect, and for their helpful references to related work. I hasten to assure 
them that my final state after digesting their prescriptions remains one of uncured 
optimism. 
Before I briefly take up the two basic questions raised in the discussion may I remove a 
number of the obscurities in my paper which seem to have led to misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation. First, my purpose in presenting the five illustrative examples was simply 
to show the relative usefulness of the decision-theory approach in situations of different 
difficulty. I would thus agree with Professor Cox that in the Chancellor's problem 
(Example 5) the difficulty is such that formulating it as a decision problem merely 
reiterates the difficulty; this was the purpose of my choice. But I would certainly not 
agree with his suggestion that statistical decision theory fails to capture the essence of 
decision problems. I have seen its practical merits in the tariff selection problem, and 
already in the thyroid clinic currently being studied we can see the insight which the 
clinicians are obtaining into their problems. If the theory does nothing else it certainly 
highlights what information is missing, and amazingly this is one of the features often 
unrecognized by workers close to a practical situation. J.do not understand Dr Anderson's 
comment about my inclusion of quality control and management of the economy as 
examples of medical situations suitable for treatment allocation. I did not give them as 
such examples. The paper is, in particular, about the problems of medical treatment 
allocation, but the issues are broader, as Dr Thomas in his example from research and 
development indicates. 
Although I tried hard in the paper to steer the discussion away from controversy over 
the merits or demerits of a Bayesian approach Dr Thomas has raised it by expressing 
doubts about the applicability of Bayesian procedure to practical problems. For the 
medical applications, which are now my main concern, I would make just one comment. 
In the studies into decision-making in the thyroid clinic in the Royal Infirmary at Glasgow 
referred to by Dr Taylor in the discussion we have had no difficulty in persuading 
clinicians to be Bayesians. They were already Bayesians before the study began, though 
they might not have called themselves by that name. There is no difficulty in getting them 
to update their priors after each piece of information becomes available. Moreover, the 
idea of prognosis, though not its quantification, is in daily use in medical circles. I 
cannot promise Dr Thomas a large application of Bayesian procedures in medical practice 
at the moment, but I am convinced that with patience and in the enlightened atmosphere 
of Professor McGirr's Department in the Royal Infirmary of Glasgow some worthwhile 
saving of doctors time and effort is attainable. 
My purpose in asking whether one can recover the implicit utility structure actually 
used is not, as Dr Anderson interprets it, because I think this is the end of the exercise. 
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It is 
indeed only the beginning, an attempt to demonstrate that there is something which 
is implicitly used. A conviction of its existence would perhaps encourage the more direct 
construction of utility functions. We have seen in Professor Card's discussion that while 
he cannot envisage any doctor at the moment assessing utilities numerically (although 
clearly his Medical Board is in fact doing this already) he sees some future hope. On this 
point, one must ask how far short his degrees of preference are from cardinal utility. 
Clearly they lie somewhere between ordinal and cardinal, but 1 suspect that for decision-
making under uncertainty he will find that they fall short of adequacy for clear-cut 
decision-making Rationality implies the existence of cardinal utility and what he is 
suggesting falls short of this. It may be a step towards it however. 
I am confused by Professor Card's discussion of "final states". At one point he seems 
to be saying that my formulation cannot deal with situations where the assessment of 
treatment takes place over time. The term funl is used to distinguish it from initial and 
the y could denote a realization of a multivariate stochastic process. (I do not claim 
that the mathematics is easy.) At another point he seems to be claiming that doctors have a 
way of overcoming this time-involvement by classifying the patients. If doctors are 
happy with such a classification 
 system then it simplifies my task because it means that Y 
consists simply of the classes specified by the doctor, and I have a nice finite set to handle. 
The doctor's mind in fact has grasped the difficulty of the realistic mathematical formulation 
and has already done the mathematical simplification in converting to classes. 
Professor Card's point about mutual exclusion is also duel think to a misunderstanding. It is 
a familiar device of decision theory that in defining the action set—here the class of 
treatments—one sets out one's possible actions so that they are mutually exclusive. With 
Professor Card's two medical treatments, in1 and m2  for example, we might consider four 
or even more new "treatments" to reach this mutual exclusion: 
4 : rn1 only, 	 t3 : ni2 only, 
4 : m1 followed by fl12, t4 : rn2 followed by m1. 
Of course the more natural way of analysing such a problem would be a formulation as a 
of mutual exc (nil,,n2} 	 l 
sequential medical decision problem, revertingto the class f 	 usive 
actions.. Courses of action can really only be satisfactorily compared if we take steps to 
make the formulation with this mutually exclusive criterion. 
I apologize to Mr Healy for the use of the word "wrong" in connexion with utility 
functions. "Different" would have been a better and unemotive word. All I was aiming 
to obtain in 
Section 4.2 was some measure which would allow me to say to a decision-
maker who, when faced with an estimated utility a + b'x, said he thought it would be better to use c+d'x: "This is what this difference amounts to in terms of expected utilities". 
Mr Skellam's remark is, I think, interpretable as saying that problems are often sequential. 
There must indeed be few medical decision problems which are not sequential. What I 
have been attempting is to obtain an oversimplification which may be tried out in a simple 
situation. It is the way of all applied mathematics that one builds up from oversimplifi-
cation towards reality. 
	
The two major points that have been raised are (i) the 	 allocation 
Controversy and (ii) the "all your eggs in one utility basket" or "you cannot put a price 
on life' syndrome". 
(i) It has been interesting to note that the diagnosis—treatment division of medicine 
has been 
questioned, not by the two doctors taking part, but by statisticians, in particular by Dr Hills. He seems to concentrate on the semantic problems associated with diagnosis. 
I agree that I used my language loosely when I said that the cause of abnormalities was 
the presence of disease. I also agree that the only sensible definition is in terms of the 
classification of vectors. It follows then that the vector itself or some subset of it or some 
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extension of it is clearly relevant to the assignment of treatment. Does the term "diagnosis" 
mean the extension of this vector to the position where classification is synonymous with 
treatment? Certainly in the practice of medicine today there appear to be many situations 
where the doctor would suppose that he had completed the diagnositc process and yet 
there are still a number of available treatments. Of course the search for indicators 
should continue, and presumably the indicators will further divide the existing 
disease categories. But it is interesting to note that those engaged in statistical problems 
of diagnosis seem seldom directly to concern themselves with the continuation of the 
problem in prognosis and treatment. Have they always been dealing with situations 
where there is a single clear-cut treatment once diagnosis is completed? 
(ii) I am taken to task because I attempt to show to what extent an implicit utility 
function can be estimated. The mention of a utility function seems anathema to some 
discussants. Rather than put all your eggs in one basket, study all the components of 
utility (Professor Cox, Dr Anderson). I think that Dr Taylor has already shown in his 
description of our work in the thyroid clinic that we are aware of the various components 
of utility, and I need not enlarge on the details. The intriguing point is how does the 
decision-maker mould together these various aspects in reaching a final decision. What 
are the scaling factors used? Now it is possible to sit back and say that this kind of scaling 
or balancing is best left to the subconscious—the "we must not put a price on life" 
attitude. What 1 was attempting to illustrate was how insight into the implicit scaling 
might he obtained from behavioural studies with various qualities of information. I 
emphasize again the feasibility aspect of this study. I set as my object the exploration of 
various qualities of data. The study I think shows clearly what must be demanded to gain 
what insight. My illustrative example was the simplest I could find to explain how the 
counter-claims of advantage and cost were scaled in the decision-making process. 
It was gratifying to find agreement about the aim of clinical trials and I hope that our 
discussion tonight may lead to deeper investigations of these. 
We are still in the early days of statistical decision theory. It is clear that the ideas of 
Raiffa, Schlaiffer and their colleagues have had at least a catalytic effect on business and 
economic decision-making. The utility specification problems there are sizeable and the 
position is often less promising in their inability to "experiment". In the medical world 
the p(y I x, t) is a recognizable object and it is clear that much more systematic quantifi-
cation of it is possible. There are arts, for example the basic reference lottery ticket 
approach, of attempting to elicit numerical utilities, which direct the attention of quite 
unpromising decision-makers to the right kind of reasoning. 
Finally, many of the discussants refer to the great difficulty of the problems. They are 
also important. We in this country are surely in a unique position with our N.H.S. 
which is certainly capable of .yielding with co-operation and careful forethought, data 
.of immense value for the transformation of unfortunate x's by optimum f's into hap-
pier y's. 
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Polychotomous quantal response by maximum indicant 
By J. AITCHISON AND J. A. BENNETP 
University of Glasgow 
Probit analysis call be reformulated in a model where the subject's response or non-
response is determined by which one of two random variables, indicants, is the greater. 
The extension of this formulation to more than two categories of response leads to a new 
generalization of probit analysis, which raises interesting identifiability and estimation 
problems. 	 - 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In its simplest form probit analysis (Finney, 1947) is concerned with a basic experiment 
in which an experimental unit is subjected to a stimulus of known strength and the category 
of outcome, response or nonresponse, recorded. For a stimulus of strength x the prob-
ability that a subject responds is assumed to be 
cI)(A + Bx), 
where is the standardized normal distribution function, and A and B are unknown para-
meters. The purpose of an informative experiment which subjects n units to a stimulus, the 
itli unit receiving strength;, is simply the estimation of the parameters A and B, or sonic 
function of them, for example -A/B, the so-called LD 50. The mechanism traditionally 
visualized in this confrontation between stimulus and subject is that each subject has some 
specific natural tolerance to the stimulus and will respond if and only if the strength of the 
stimulus applied exceeds this value. On the assumption that tolerance is N4u, 0-2),  i.e. 
normally distributed with mean It and variance 2,  over the experimental units, the prob-
ability that a unit, chosen at random, responds to a stimulus strength x is 
= 	(A +Bx), 
with A= — 1u/cr and B=lfo. 
There is, however, another way in which this model can be generated and which allows a 
generalization to more than two categories of response. The generation is particularly appro-
priate to situations where the category of outcome determined by the experimental unit 
may be regarded as the result of some reasoning, or possibly subconscious, process of assess-
ing the effects of the choices of the various response categories. An indication of the nature 
of this kind of model is given by Aitchison (1970) in a situation where the stimulus x is the 
initial state of some unit and where the two categories are two possible treatments which 
may be applied to the unit. Here we shall set this initial motivation in terms of a simple 
economic example. 
Suppose that we are studying the demand for some commodity and that the possible 
responses to the stimulus of an income x are purchasing, response 1, and not purchasing, 
response 2. We can here imagine the experimeiltal unit, a person, visualizing two separate 
experiments. The first of these experiments assesses the amount of enjoyment, y1  say, that 
.Q33 
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will arise from the purchase of the commodity taking account of the consequential dis-
comfort of being short of money. The second experiment looks forward, under the conditions 
of not having purchased the commodity and assesses the amount of enjoyment, y2 say, 
arising from retention of income but lack of the commodity. Suppose that, for a person with 
income x, the independent random variables yl and Y2  are N( 1  +,81 X,   0.2) and N( 2 + fl 2x, 0.2).  
A purchase will be made if and only if ,,1 > Y• Putting the argument in a form which leads 
to straightforward generalization, ve have, for the probability of a response, purchasing, 
0. 
	
pr(j1 > Y) = 
	
{(y1—a2—fi2x)/0.}q{(y1-1—fi1x)/0.}dy1 
= 	- 2 + (/3k - fi2) x}/(oV2)] 
= (A+Bx).  
Thus, we arrive at exactly the probit model with 
A = (i—z2)!(0V2), B = (fil — fl2)/(0.V 2). 
If we term Yi  and Y2  the indicants of responses 1 and 2, then the choice of the quantal res-
ponse is by maximum indicant. One point worth noting at this stage is that the mean in-
dicant lines , = 1+/?1x and y = a2+fi2x intersect where x = -(al  -a2)/(fi1-fi2) = —A/B, 
that is at the LD 50 strength. 
In § 2 we give the generalization of this maximum indicant model to the case of more than 
two categories of response. This formulation leads to an interesting problem, not normally 
present in probit analysis, concerning identifiability of parameters. This is already apparent 
in a simple form in our reformulation of the binary response probit model, for clearly 
(' a2113,43,07) is not identifiable although the parametric functions ( - )/o and (13.,-   
are identifiable. In the more general case the problem is more subtle and its resolution forms 
the subject of § 3. The process of estimation is discussed in § 4. Our interest in this model 
arose from the development of techniques for estimating utility functions from decision 
behaviour, particularly in the allocation of treatments in simple medical situations. Un-
fortunately the collection of data on such behaviour' is a long-term project and so in §5 
to illustrate the estimation procedure, we have had to rcort to artificially constructed data. 
We hope that this will at least demonstrate the feasibility of the approach and perhaps 
reveal a model of some interest to workers in fields other than medicine. 
2. THE GENERAL MODEL 
Suppose that there are c categories of response, denoted 1, ..., c. An experimental unit 
assigned stimulus x performs c independent experiments. The outcome y of the ith experi-
ment is the indicant of response categoIy i and is assumed to be distributed as 
N(ai 	0.2) (i = 1 ..., c). The subject then chooses that category of response which corres- 
ponds to the maximum indicant. We assume that there are no ties since the probability of 
ties is negligible. 
It is of course arguable whether the assumption of independence is a realistic one. Since 
one subject is visualizing the imaginary experiments it would be more reasonable to suppose 
that the y, are jointly distributed with nonzero correlations. Our reason for studying the 
case of independence here is mainly the applied mathematical attitude that when there are 
tensions between simplicity and realism, and between tractability and intractability, a 
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simple tractable model may at least be useful in detecting where departures from realism 
occur whereas a• realistic intractable model can serve little purpose. The independent model 
has sufficient components to explain the inconsistent behaviour of decision makers envis-
aged by Aitchison (1970) without leading to impossible mathematics. The introduction of 
correlations would so complicate the inherent identifiability difficulties as to make impossible 
the considerable estimation difficulties. 
The probability that category i is chosen is, therefore, 








A= (c—c,)/o, B = ( fifi) lo- 	(i = 1,...,c-1). 	 (2.2) 
This model differs radically from other generalizations of probit analysis to more than two 
categories, in that the categories of response are not necessarily ordered. The model of the 
Aitchison & Silvey (1957) generalization visualizes c ordered categories, a series of instars or 
stages in the development of an insect. Independent, nonnegative, random variables 
represent the times spent by an insect in successive instars. The response cate-
gory of an insect subjected to stimulus strength x, time from hatching, is then determined as 
1 if y>x, 
i 	if Yi +...+16_i  < x, 	 > x (i = 2,...,c-1), 
C if l/i+...+l/c_i. 
The models of Ashford (1959) and Gurland, Lee & Dahm (1900) essentially use the concept 
of a natural tolerance y, distributed as N( + fix, o2).  This natural tolerance falls into one of 
the c ordered intervals (— cc, 	('' ye), •.., (_ cc), thus determining the category of 
response. All of these previous generalizations lead to category probabilities p(x) which can 
be expressed in terms of differences of standardized normal distribution functions. None of 
them is relevant to the applications envisaged for the present model and, therefore, we have 
to face up to whatever difficulties arise from the integral expression (2.1). 
3. IDENTmABTLITY 
In this section we shall concern ourselves with the question of identifiability; a general 
result will be proved specifying which functions of the parameters are actually identifiable. 
It transpires that we are always able to estimate the polychotomous counterparts of the 
LD 50 strength. 
First the role played by the stimulus strength in the identifiability problem must be made 
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apparent. The experiment of subjecting an individual to a stimulus of strength x is 
a binomial trial with success probability 
p1(x) = 'J?(A+Bx). 
In a single binomial trial the success, or response, probability completely identifies the model, 
but for any specified value 0 of this success probability there will correspond many (A, B), for 
example any A and B satisfying A +Bx = _1(0) 
Hence, for the model of a single binomial trial, A and B are not identifiable. For a model, 
however, consisting of two independent binomial trials at different stimulus strengths x1  
and x21  the parameters A and B are identifiable since the equations 
01  = p1(x1) = (11(A +Bx1), 
02  = p1(x2) = (A +Bx2), 
have clearly a unique solution for A and B in terms of 01  and  82.  A formal proof, by the im-





- g5(A+Bx2) x2q(A+Bx2) 
= (x2 — XI)  çb(A+Bx1)çli(A+Bx2) 
+ 0 	(x1  + x2)1 	 (3.1) 
and, by the implicit function theorem, the uniqueness of the solution, and hence the identi-
fiability of A and B, is established. Thus, in our formulation, (al-2)/°  and (fl1 —fi2)/0' 
are identifiable and form a maximum identifiable set. 
The general result is contained in the following theorem. 
THEOREM. For the model consisting of two multinornial trials, the first with category prob-
abilities p1(x1), ...,p(x1) and the second with category probabilities p1(x2), ...,p0(x2), where 
X1 + x2, and p(x) is given by (2.1), the parameters A1, ..., A_1, B1, ..., B_1  are identifiable. 
Proof. Identifiability will be established if we can show that 
JC 
= 9p1(x1), . ..,p 1(x1),p1(x2), . ..,p_1(x2)} 	0 
A_1, B1, ..., B_1) 
for distinct x1, x2. Two simple relations are required: 
(i) 	 ap1/aB=xppjaA (i= 1,...,c-1;j= 1,2); 	 (3.2) 




Thus, from (3.2), 
J - 
M1 x1M1 	 (3.4 
CM x2M2' 
Z3 to 
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where 
I_fi = [ p1(x1)/A_1 1 






M2  (x2_xi)Mj = (x2_x1)c_lMj !M21.  
The determinants I All ] and JM2 j both take the form 
d1- E 7111,. 	m12 	... 	rn1, 1  
k+i 
M21 	d2 - 	n,, ... 	m2 c—i 
k+2 . 	 ( 37) 
m_1,1 	m_1, 2 	... d 1 - 	m_1, k 
k+c-1 
where, for i + k, 
Mik = 
=  -f o (v) {v + (At-Ak ) + (B- Bk)x}  )(v +A1 +Bx) -00 
x fl {v+(A-A1)+(B-B1)x}dv. (38) 
ji, k, c 
Note that we have used (33) in setting 
k (i= 1,...,c-1). 	 (39) 
h+i 
The nonvanishing property of the Jacobian J will follow if we can establish that any 
determinant of the above form (3.7) is nonzero. The result contained in the Appendix asserts 
the positivity of such determinants, and so the identifiability property is proved. 
While the basic parameters a,, ..., 	, 61, .. ., fl o.  of the general model of § 2 are unidenti-
fiable, the Theorem and the fact that functions of identifiable parameters are identifiable 
ensure the identifiability of all standardized differences of 's and of fl's, such as 
(;— c)/o. 
Critical values of the stimulus strength occur where two indicant means, for example 
;+flx and a+flx,  are equal. A typical critical strength is thus 
(310) 
From the above identifiability considerations we see that all are identifiable. The inter-
pretation of E,, in terms of category probabilities is that 
p( 1,) =p(). 	 (3.11) 
Thus the LD 50 concept of probit analysis is replaced by a set of 1  c(c — 1) critical strengths. 
The relevance of these in the practical problem of utility estimation mentioned in § 1 is 
that they are crucial in determining the optimum behaviour of a reasoning subject. 
4. ESTIMATION  
While identifiability of parameters is a necessary condition for their estimability it is 
not a sufficient condition in that there may be no absolute maximum of the likelihood func-
tion at finite values of the parameters. For example, in a simple probit analysis, observation 
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of the reactions of two individuals, the first submitted to strength x1 and the second to 
strength x2 x1, does not allow estimation of A and B. While considerable insight into the 
general concept of estim ability might be gained from a thorough investigation of this parti-
cular case we feel that it is less important from a practical point of view. Data which lead to 
inestimability are generally easily discovered through a breakdown of the computational 
procedure of estimation. This section therefore deals only with the techniques involved in 
obtaining estimates of the parameters A and B (i = 1, ..., c-- 1). 
The procedure for c = 2 is well known, as this is exactly a probit situation. For the method 
of estimation see, for example, Finney (1947). An extension of the probit method is required 
before we can handle values of c in excess of 2. In fact, we have set out the procedure com-
pletely only for c = 3. For higher values of c, the procedure is similar, but requires either an 
algorithm for the evaluation of multivariate normal integrals (Plackett, 1954; Steck, 1958) 
to replace the bivariate algorithm used here or, more promisingly, application of recent 
techniques using llermite—Gauss quadrature (Sowden & Ashford, 1969) directly to the 
generalized form of (4.1). 
The case c = 3. One suitable technique is the usual maximum likelihood adaptation of 
Newton's method of solution for a system of equations. Studies of its application to a 
number of artificial situations of the type of § 5 suggest that ill-conditioning arises only when 
the data are sparse in relation to the inherent variability a-. This, the price of trying to do 
too much with too little data, must inevitably attend other methods of estimating. In the 
application of the technique to the study of large scale decision-making envisaged by 
Aitchison (1970), the repetitive nature of the decision problems will provide an adequate 
supply of data. 
An obvious obstacle to the maximum likelihood approach is the evaluation of integrals 
like 
f co 0(v)(v+a)(I(v+b)dv. 	 (41) 
A polynomial approximation for I, suitable for use on a computer, is available, giving high 
speed and accuracy to seven places of decimals; see Ibbetson (1963). 
Since it is easy to express (4-1) as the integral over a rectangle of a standardized bivariate 
normal density function, we have, in this case, preferred this approach to a quadrature 
technique. The required bivariate integral can be approximated very quickly on a computer 
to, at worst, three places of decimals (Cadwell, 1951; Owen, 1956). Writing 0(. 11t, 0-2) for 
the density function of a 1u, a-2) distribution, we have 




= ç5(a10, 2) (l){(2b—a)/J6}, 	 (4.2) 
by the convolution theorem. Hence 
1=f" 	(xj0, 2) {(2b—x)!V6}dx+C(b), 
p2.32 
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where G(b) is a function of b alone; letting a = - , we see that 0(b) 0. Thus 
f
a 	
If .0 q(xjO,2) ç3(y)dyjdx, -ca 	
2b—x)/y'G 
 
which, after the substitution 






- -2(1—p2) 	2PXY+ Y2))dXdY = B(a/2, b/2; ), (4.3) 
for p =., in the notation of Owen (1956). Thus 
p1(x) = B[(A1+B1x)/2, {A j _A2+(131 _B2)x}/V2;4], 	 (4.4) 
P2(X) = B[(A2+B2x)/..J2, {42 — A1+ (132 —B1 ) x}/J2; i.]. 	 (4.5) 
If we now write n for the total number of individuals subjected to strength x, and ri and s, 
for the numbers among the n in response categories 1 and 2, respectively, then the likeli- 
hood is effectively 	g 
H {p1(x }r1{p2(;)}sz  fi  -PI(Xi) —p2(x)}7 i=1 
g being the number of distinct x's. The log likelihood function, with subscripts removed 
for simplicity, is 
L = 	{rlogp1 +8109p4+ (n-- r — s) log (1 —p1-- p2)}. 	 (4.6) 
If we write 
E1 = 0(A1+B1xJ0, 2) [A1 - 2A2+ (B1 — 2132) x}/J6], 	1 
E2 = ç(A2+B2 xO, 2) (J)[A2 — 2A1  + ( B2 — 2B1 ) x}/J6], (47) 
E3 	/.4A1 — A2 + (B1 —B2) xJo, 21 (t[{A1 +A2 + (B1  + B2) x}/J6],J 
C1 = ( El +E3)/p1+F1/(1_p1_p2), -2 = 	3/P2+E1/(1 —pi  _p2), 	
(4.8) C3 = — E3/p1+F2/(1 _P1 _P2)' C4 = ( E2+E3)/p2+E2/(1 —p1--p2),f --  
then the likelihood equations, after simplification with the use of (4.2), can be expressed as 
= aLlaA,. = En[C1{(r/n) —p1} + C2{(s/n) —p2}J, 
= aL/aB1  = Enx[C1{(r/n) —p1} + C2{(s/n) —p2}], 
= 8L/aA2 = n[C3(r/n)—p1}+C4{(s/n)p9111 	 (4.9) 
= aL/aR2  = Enx[C3{(r/n) —p1} + C4{(s/n) —p2}]. 
If, further, we write 
= C1(E1+E3)—C,E3, w2 = —C1E3 +C2(E2 +E3), w3 —C3 E3 +C4(E2+E3 )1  (410) 
then the information matrix is 
nw1 Enxw1  Enw2 ZnXlV2 
0 
= flXW ).flXW1  Xnxw2  flXW2 	 (4.11) 
Enw2 nxw2 nw3 Enxw3  
nxw2 Znx2w2  nxw3 Enx2w3  
'7 	 81M57 
.Z3 
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The iterative method of solution is given by 










where A1is  the ith iterate of A1, and similarly for B1, A2 and B2. The initial approximations 
A101 B10, A20 and B20 can conveniently be set at zero. 
The use of the inverse of (4.11) as the variance matrix involves the usual invocation of 
asymptotic properties of maximum likelihood estimators, and the supposition that we have 
sufficient data to justify this asymptotic assumption. A main aim is not so much a study of 
the accuracy of the estimates obtained as the ability of the fitted model to simulate the 
envisaged subject. We have, therefore, not felt compelled at this stage to make simulation 
studies to discover the adequacy of asymptotic theory for particular n. 
5. TEST DATA 
The data for testing purposes was constructed as follows, for the case c = 3. 
We chose the values 	10-4,,81  0.01, a= 9.0,82= 004, a3= 4.0, ft3 = OlOando- = 
One hundred values of the stimulus strength x were drawn from the uniform distribution on 
the selected interval (0, 120), using tables of random numbers. For each x, tables of random' 
normal deviates permitted the construction of a randomizedy, from the N(; +,8,X,  0.2)  distri-
bution(i = 1,2,3): the greatest of these y  (i = 1,2,3) determined the category corresponding 
to the value of x used. Figure  shows the lines y = + /x (i = 1, 2, 3) in the range considered. 
With the initial approximations A10 = B10 = A20 = B20 = 0, the KDF 9 computer at 
Glasgow University, operating under the Egdon system, took less than forty-five seconds 
to produce answers, which are shown in Table 1 together with the chosen values of the 
parameters. 
Table 1. Calculated and chosen values of the parameters 
Parameters Calculated values Chosen values 
A1  7907 6400 
B1  —0.108 —0090 
A 2  6423 5•000 
B2  —0078 —0060 
612 48889 46667 
613 73297 71111 
23 82855 83333 
The variance-covariance, matrix of the estimators is 
2598 —0•032 2431 —0028 
—0032 0.000 —0029 0.000 
2•431 —0029 2•435 —0•028 
0023 0.000 —0028 0.000 
.4o 
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Fig. 1. The three mean indicant lines used to generate the test data. 
APPENDIX 
We now prove the positivity of the determinant A. (m 2), defined by 
m1,, 	rn12 	... 	m1, 
k+1 
M21 	d2 - m 	... 	m2R 
k+2 - 
flifu 	rn 2 	... d,— Lm flk 
k+n 
where di > 0(i =1.....n) and m 1 < 0(i rtrj). 
The method used is induction on n. Specifically, we take as our induction assumption: An > 0 
(m - 2, ..., N). We then prove that 	0. 
By adding all other columns to the first, we see that 
M12 	... m1+1 
d2 	d2 - m57 .... 	. m2 .N.-i-i 
A 	- k42 
dR+l 	m+12 	... 	d+1— 	E rn 
that is, 
k+N+1 
d jDu+(_l)miiDji+(_1)2m j3Djs+...+(_l)Nml.N+1DIN+l, (Al) 
where D1, is the minor of the (i, j)th element in 	N+1•  Now 
N+1 	.. 




m32 	d— Z m3 	... m3N+i 
D j k=2 
k*3 








m31 + m32 	d3- m37 
k=1 
k+3 
mN+ii+mN+ii mN+13 ... 
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where d = di - m 1 (i = 2, ... N +1). This is an Nth order determinant and, by the induction assump- 
tion 
D11 > 0. 	 (A2) 
By subtracting all other columns from the first in the Nth order determinant D12 we have 
N+1 
42 — 	m2J, 	m23 	... 
k=2 
k#2 
which, by the induction assumption, is positive. 
It is not difficult to see that, by (1— 2) interchanges of adjacent rows in D11 (i = 3, ..., N + 1), D1, 
may be expressed in a form analogous to the above expression for D12. Hence 
(—l)D1. > 0 (i = 2, ...,N+l). 	 (A3) 
Thus, finally, by (Al), (A2) and (A3) it follows that AN+j > 0. 
This completes the induction step, and it remains only to prove the result for n = 2. We have 
I d1 - m12 	m12 I 
1i2 = I 	 I, 
= d1d2 - d1m21 - d2m12  
>0. 
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9 STATISTICAL PREDICTION ANALYSIS 
Following the recognition of the central role of predictive 
density functions in all prediction problems, and particularly at 
the stage of development in 1965 it was natural to seek formulations 
of some standard problems in terms of the new approach. In the three 
publications associated with his Ph.D. thesis therefore Dunsmore 
(1966, 1968, 1969) explored the reformulation of the problems of 
classification, calibration, regulation and optimisation as decision 
problems, albeit with simple and perhaps oversimplified utility 
functions, involving predictive aspects. These, together with a 
realisation that in an increasing number of these consultative 
problems predictive methods could give conclusions radically 
different from other popular and strongly advocated methods, led 
to the conviction that some major work explaining, developing and 
popularising predictive methods should be undertaken. This 
conviction resulted in the publication of Aitchison and Dunsmore 
(13:1975), and it is to the developments reported there that we 
now turn. Further strong motivation for the book is to be found 
expressed in its preface. 
The aim of the book was to develop the ideas and the methodology 
in such a way that they were seen as an extremely tractable tool 
by the user. The developments over previous work already quoted 
are as follows. 
1. 	An extension of the treatment of predictive density functions, 
with, in particular, a full account of the multinormal 
situation, leading to d-dimensional Student, Siegel and Student-
Siegel distributions for future mean, covariance matrix, and 
joint (mean, covariance matrix) distributions. 
A full and usable explanation of predictive regression analysis. 
A full study of decisive precision problems relating design 
values associated with all-or-nothing, linear-loss and 
quadratic-loss utility structures to the mode, percentiles 
and mean of the predictive distribution. 
A more thorough study of the predictive density function as 
a means of conveying information about prediction. In 
particular, most plausible Bayesian prediction intervals, 
regions of previous experience and atypicality indices are new 
concepts developed. 
A new expository device is introduced for the description of 
tolerance regions, namely the coverage distributions, the 
distributions of Pf{R(X) e} induced by the distributions 
P(XIO)• This concept allows the simple definition of c-mean e 
coverage and (c,g) guaranteed coverage tolerance regions in 
terms of the mean and percentiles of these distributions. 
Mean-coverage and guaranteed coverage intervals for the two-
parameter negative-exponential distribution are provided for 
the first time. 
Sampling inspection is presented as a predictive decision 
problem, with a utility function of the form U(a,y), where 
y is the relevant characteristic of a typical item of output 
and a a possible action, such as scrap the untested items. 
For particular specifications of U(a,y) mean coverage and 
guaranteed coverage predictors are seen to be appropriate, 
and so circumstances under which there is support for such 
predictors are identified. 
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The nature of a calibration or assay problem is spelt out 
carefully in terms of model assumptions concerning standards 
and specimens and the relation of specimens to standards. 
Unlike the decision theory specification of Dunsmore (1968) 
this approach leads to the notion of the calibrative 
distribution, expressing for each specimen with given response 
the relative probabilities of the possible calibrative 
values. The method is compared favourably with a number of 
other approaches to the problem. 
A similar spelling out of the modelling assumptions is 
used in a study of the relevance of predictive distri- 
butions to the problem of medical diagnosis. In this 
approach diagnosis is regarded as an essentially inference 
problem, with aim the supply of realistic probabilities for 
the possible disease types rather than a decision problem 
involving allocation to  particular type. The reason for 
this is the almost invariable absence of anything approaching 
a realistic utility function. The favourite object of study, 
the overall misclassification rate, is included in this 
condemnation as being possibly misleading, and in some actual 
cases ridiculous as a measure of quality of diagnosis. Thus 
the approach adopted provides the clinician at the end of the 
diagnostic phase of patient management with as realistic odds 
as possible leaving entirely to him, in the absence of a pro-
perly quantified utility structure, the informal process of 
deciding on treatment in the light of the diagnostic assessments 
provided. The assumptions lead to the use of predictive 
distributions in deriving the crucial tool, the diagnostic 
4S 
distribution. For the multivariate normal cases this leads 
to the predictive method suggested by Geisser (1964). 
What no one seemed to have realised up to this point in 
development is how radically different this predictive 
statistical diagnosis can be from the popular (for example, 
BMD and other computer packages) estimative statistical 
diagnosis methods. By estimative diagnosis we mean the simple 
plugging in of estimates in the model as if they were the true 
values, in sharp contrast to the weighting process according 
to reliability inherent in the predictive method. Aitchison 
and Dunsmore (1975) provide a real example, from a Glasgow 
hospital, where the odds assigned by the two methods are so 
at variance as to suggest completely different treatments. 
This difference will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section. 
A further feature introduced here is the provision of atypi-
cality indices, on a scale 0 (absolutely typical) to 1 (com-
pletely atypical), with respect to each of the disease types 
as a system of monitoring whether a new case may have 
wandered into the wrong clinical network. If all the 
atypicality indices are close to 1 then such a suspicion is 
aroused. Again radical differences between estimative and 
predictive assessments of atypicality indices emerge. 
AITCI-IISON, J. and DUNSMORE, I.R. (1975) 
Statistical Prediction Analysis 
Cambridge Univeristy Press 
A copy of this book is reproduced in volume 2 
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10 ESTIMATIVE AND PREDICTIVE MODEL FITTING 
'When two statistical methods applied to the same important 
practical problem provide answers of such enormous difference 
that they can commonly lead to radically different practical 
consequences - even to the difference between curing and harming a 
patient - it is high time to subject them to a critical comparison. 
Such is the current situation with two methods of statistical 
discrimination distinguished by the terms estimative and predictive.' 
So ran the introductory remarks, based on experience of real medical 
diagnostic applications, of Aitchison, Habbema and Kay (17:1977). 
We now examine the relative merits of these methods as claimants 
to realism. 
Statisticians often refer to the process of 'fitting the model' 
p(y0) for the experiment f, say, from the information x arising 
from an experiment e, described by density function p(xIe) on X. 
The intention of the process often seems to be the assessment of 
the whole density function p(yjo), and certainly in some applications 
such as calibration and diagnosis this is an appropriate aim. A 
popular way of fitting the model is first to estimate U by 0(x), 
for example a maximum likelihood estimate, and then to regard 
as the fitted density function. This process of replacing parameter 
by estimate has been termed the estimative method of model-fitting 
(Aitchison and Dunsmore, 13:1975). It is often supposed to be a 
satisfactory procedure (Boneva, Kendall and Stefanov, 1971) when 
there appears to be no specific purpose to the exercise such as 
hypothesis testing. Aitchison and Dunsmore (13:1975, p.228) point 
out that the procedure really must be suspect since it is a case 
of putting all one's eggs in one basket, namely 0(x), without 
taking any account of the unreliability of 0 as an estimator. 
The predictive method of model-fitting uses as an assessment 
of p(y0) a predictive density function: 
p(yIx) = fe p(y0)p(01x)d0. 
In the construction of p(yx) we are not picking out one particular 
value of 0, such as 0(x) in the estimative method, but weighting the 
possible p(yIO) by p(Olx), this weight being an assessment of the 
probability of 0 on the basis of x and the prior p(0). Even if p(0) 
is not too well specified we might prefer p(yx) to pyj0=(x)}, 
since any reasonable weighting should be more sensible than ignoring 
unreliability of estimates altogether. Thus on purely intuitive 
grounds we should expect the predictive method to make better 
sense than the estimative method. 
When p(y0) is of N(p,a2) form and e is n replicates of f, 
with the usual estimates x and s of p and ci, we have as estimative, 
fitted model a N(x,$) form and as predictive fitted model, on the 
basis of the standard vague prior, St{n_1,x,(l+n 1)s2} in the 
notation of Aitchison and Dunsmore (13: 1975) . If we were dealing 
with a problem of estimation or hypothesis-testing we would instruct 
our students to use the St distribution rather than the N 
distribution. Why then should the situation be different if the 
purpose is different from straightforward estimation or hypothesis-
testing? 
Aitchison (14:1975) provides further theoretical support for 
the use of predictive fitting in preference to estimative fitting. 
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Since, at least in some applications, the objective is to obtain 
a good assessment of the true p(yje) by a fitted density function, 
say q(yx), we should perhaps judge success by some measure of 
closeness of the shotq(yx) to the target p(yO). One such measure, 




p(y6) log q(yx) 
If r(yx) is a rival to q(ylx) then q(yx) is 'closer' to p than 
r(ylx) if 
M(p:q,r) = D(p;r) - D(p;q) 
= I p(yjo) log q(ylx) dy 
jy 	 r(yx) 
is positive. This measure depends on x and so we are forced to 
assess the relative merits of q and r as methods of fitting p(yIO) 
by considering their relative performance in repeated applications 
against a background of replication of e, that is in terms of the 
criterion 
f 
p(xO)dx 1 p(ye) log q(ylx) dy 
x 	 y 	
r(ylx)  
Aitchison (14:1975) shows that if p(yIe) is multivariate normal 
Nd(p,E), if r(yx) is taken to be the estimative fit Nd(x,$) and 
q(yx) to be the predictive form Std{n_l,x,(l+n 1)S} then the above 
criterion is positive. Thus on this criterion the estimative fit 
is inferior to the predictive fit based on the vaguest prior' 
distribution (Aitchison and Dunsmore, 13:1975, Table 2.3). See 
also Murray (1977) for an optimum property of this choice of prior. 
We reemphasise that this inferiority of the estimative fit to the 
predictive fit is being assessed on a criterion which makes no 
assumption of knowledge of a prior distribution. 
A similar advantage of predictive over estimative fit is 
established for gamma modelling. 
Apart from these theoretical considerations there is another 
effective way, namely simulation, of examining the greater claim to 
realism in multivariate normal modelling of the predictive method. 
This is a main objective of Aitchison, Habbema and Kay (17:1977) 
within the context of statistical diagnosis. 
It is relatively easy to simulate d-dimensional normal vectors 
from any distribution. Suppose then that we simulate n1 vectors 
from a known Nd(lJ1,1) distribution, n2 vectors from a known 
Nd(p2,E2) distribution. We can then, using these as a diagnostic 
training set, construct both an estimative and a predictive 
diagnostic system, based say on a prevalence ratio of ¶1/ 112. 
Suppose that the odds assigned by the estimative and predictive 
diagnostic methods (Aitchison and Dunsmore, 13:1975, Chapter 11) 
for a new case with feature vector y are q1 (y)/q2(y) and r.1(Y)1T2(Y)-
Since we know the simulative distributions we have an absolute 
standard, namely 
p1 (y) 	¶i 
p2GY 	TT 2 
against which to judge the quality of the estimative and the 
predictive values. 
Aitchison, Habbema and Kay (17:1977) carry out a number of 
such simulations and find overwhelming.support in favour of the 
predictive method in these comparisons. Since the predictive 
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distributions are just as easy to compute as the estimative distri-
butions there seems little excuse for not applying the predictive 
method. 
It is interesting to comment here that the predictive method, 
which has a Bayesian origin although it can equally be regarded as 
a simple weighting device, seems to have sparked off a response 
by frequentist supporters. For example, Moran and Murphy (1979) 
adapt the estimative approach to diagnosis so that it more nearly 
conforms to the predictive approach.- It is difficult to resist 
making a cynical comment here on fashions in statistical theory. 
There was a time when it was fashionable for Bayesians to devise 
Bayesian methods which conformed with long-used frequentist methods 
(Lindley, 1965). Now it seems that some frequentists, appreciating 
the effectiveness of some Bayesian methods, are determined to show 
that the Bayesian results can equally be established through 
frequentist arguments.. 
Having thus established the relevance of predictive density 
functions in straightforward parametric statistical modelling we 
can now turn to specific applications. First, in §11 we use 
predictive diagnosis as a norm against which to judge subjective 
diagnostic judgments; and secondly, in §12 we consider the use 
of predictive parametric modelling in more complex diagnostic 
situations. 
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SUMMARY 
Fitting a parametric model or estimating a parametric density function plays an impor-
tant role in a number of statistical applications. Two widely-used methods, one replacing 
the unknown parameter by an efficient estimate and so termed estimative and the other 
using a mixture of the possible density funptions and commonly termed predictive, are 
compared. On a general criterion of closeness of fit based on a discriminating information 
measure the predictive method is shown to be preferable. Explicit measures of the relative 
closeness of predictive and estimative fits are obtained for gamma and multinormal models. 
Some key words: Estimation of density functions;  Goodness of fit; Predictive distributions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that a class of parametric models with sample space Y, parameter set 0 and 
class 
9 =p(yjO):OE0} 
of density functions on Y, is postulated for some observational situationf. Suppose further 
that we have available data x from some experiment e, for example n replicates of f, de-
scribed by a class of similarly parameterized models (X, 0, p(x I 0)]. The 'fitting' of a model 
for f or the 'estimation' of the true density function p(y I 0) on the basis of the data x in- 
volves the choice of a density function, q(y I x) say, from some class - 	9 of density 
functions on Y. The intention is clearly that q(y I x) should in some sense be close to the true 
density function p(y 0), but in a variety of statistical activities where this idea is expli-
citly or implicitly used the criterion of closeness is seldom defined. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine the consequences of using a familiar measure of overall closeness. 
the Kuliback & Liebler (1951) discriminating information measure, and in particular to 
compare from this viewpoint two different methods of fitting models. 
The class .2 may be identical with 9, for example, when we fit the model by setting 
q(y Jx) = p(y I 0 = C(x)} (yE 1), 	 (1.1) 
where (x) is some efficient estimate of 0. Suppose, however, that we set 
q(y x)= fe p(yI 0)p(0 1x)d0 (yefl, 	 (1.2) 
where p(O I x) can be regarded simply as a weighting function based on the data x or a 
Bayesian posterior density function for 0 based on a prior p(0) and the data x. Here .2 
is larger than 9, a feature which may simply recognize that closeness to the true density 
function is a more compelling consideration ml some applicatiors than an insistence that 
the estimating density function belongs to.9. 
.25+ 
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Although (1.1) and (1.2) are not the only ways of fitting a model they are two quite 
different methods which are current competitors in a number of areas of application. To 
distinguish clearly between the two methods we term (1.1) an esiintative density function, 
since the true density function is estimated by the insertion of an estimate for the para-
meter; and we use the term predictive density function for (1.2) because of its already 
established role and terminology in statistical prediction theory. 
The rivalry between these two methods occurs in goodness-of-fit testing (Guttman, 
1967; Hager & Antle, 1968) and in a variety of direct prediction problems where prob-
abilistic statements about a future observation from fare to be made on the basis of the data 
x from e (Aitchison & Dunsrnore, 1975, p. 1). Much of this rivalry stems from differing 
asseSsfl)efltS of appropriateness of classical and Bayesian approaches to specific applicatioim. 
There are, however, important situations where some measure of overall closeness of the 
fitted density function to the true density function is a help in-  deciding which of the two 
methods is more realistic in its approach. For example, in the practical operation of a 
statistical discrimination or diagnostic system based on data on individuals of known types 
and with observed feature vectors, the assignment of type probabilities to a new individual 
of unknown type on the basis of his observed feature vector y is of primary importance. 
Irrespective of which method is adopted this requires estimates of likelihoods and so of 
the true probability density associated with each type. Applied to a number of new indi-
viduals with different feature vectors this technique effectively calls for the estimation of 
the true feature vector density functions for each type. 
Within this specific application Anderson (1958, p. 137) 
and the widely applied computer 
package described by Dixon (1970) use the estimative method, whereas Geisser (1964) 
and Aitchison & Kay (1975) use the predictive method. That the practical consequences 
of these different methods can be enormous has been shown by Aitchison & Kay (1975). 
It is therefore of considerable interest to pose the question as to which method yields the 
more realistic type probabilities. One purpose of the present paper is to explain why these 
results could be expected on theoretical grounds by a comparison of the relative merits of 
estimative and predictive density functions as estimates of the true density function. Note 
that we are here concerned with the provision of realistic type probabilities for example in 
clinical medicine as a diagnostic guide to the appropriate allocation of treatment to a 
patient, and not in the assessment of realistic misclassification probabilities as considered, 
for example, by Lachenbruch & Mickey (1968). 
As far as asymptotic properties of the methods are concerned it is obvious that under 
very general conditions (1.1) tends to the true density function, and Geisser 
(1971) IiIs 
established a number of similar consistency properties for the 
corresponding predicti't' 
form (1.2). For large samples, therefore, it is clear that the difference between estimflat1 
NT 
and predictive density functions will be of little practical importance. We therefore enipha 
size that the criterion we investigate in this paper is concerned with properties of samp1 
of finite size. 
.255 
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2. A GOODNESS-OF-FIT CRITERION 
In attempting to judge the goodness of fit of q(y I x) to the unknown p(y 0) we require 
some overall measure of the divergence of q(y I x) from the true p(y 1 0). Since the true 
p(y 0) is our target an appropriate measure is the Kuliback & Leibler (195 1) directed 
measure of divergence 
Dp(y0), q(y x)} =fp(yI0) log 	° dYi 	 (2.1) q(YIx)j 
which is positive unless q(y I x) coincides with 	1 0). 
If we have two contenders, say q(y I x) and r(y I x), for the role of estimate of p(y 0) then 
q(y I x) is closer than r(y I x) if 
M(p;q,r) = D(p, r) — D(p, q) 
f ~T(y
p(y0)log1Idy 	 (2.2) 
V 	 lx)J 
is positive. This measure depends on 0 and the particular x observed. If we are to avoid 
Bayesian arguments, at least for the present, then we are forced to attempt to assess the 
relative merits of q and r as methods of estimating p by considering their relative per-
formance in repeated applications against a background of replication of e. The long-run 
measure of relative closeness will then be represented by the expectation of 31 with respect 
to p(x 10): 
f
p(x 1 0)dxf p(y 0) log {"}dy. 	 (2.3) 
This still suffers from the drawback that in general it will depend on 0 but we shall see 
that there are important cases where (2.3) is independent of 0, in which case it provides a 
powerful criterion of closeness. 
Let us proceed with the general case and follow through formally the consequences of 
imbedding the estimation of p(y 0) in a sequence of recurring problems where nature 
produces 0 according to a density function p(0) and where the informative experiment e 
yields x with density function p( 0). The natural measure of relative closeness is then the 
expectation of (2.3) with respect to p(0) giving 
5
P(0) dOf p(x I 0) dxf p(y I 0) log 	} dy. 	 (2.4) 
Since p(0)p(x0) = p(x)p(Ojx) we can express (2.4), after a change of order of integration, 
as 
f_X 




the predictive density function described in § 1 and based on prior p(0) and data x. It 
follows immediately that on the basis of criterion' (2.4) the predictive density function (2.6) 
is unrivalled in its c1oness to p(y 0). For taking q(y I x) = p(y I x) gives as inner integral 
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in (25) a Kuilback & Liebler directed measure Dp(y I x), r(y I x)), and this is positive for any 
r(y I x) different from p(y I x). Hence (2.5), and so (2.4), is positive. 
The predictive density function p(y I x) is the natural Bayesian method of estimating 
the true density function. All we have so far established in the above optimality property 
of the predictive density function is the tautology that when faced with an essentially 
Bayesian situation, with given p(0), it is good sense to act in a Bayesian way. We shall 
see in the next section, however, that we can exploit this result to obtain an interesting 
extension of the good sense of predictive density function estimation. 
3. INADEQUACY OF ESTIMATIVE FIT 
Although the result of the previous section demonstrates the superiority of the predictive 
density function over all other contenders as a fit to the class of models when a specific 
prior distribution is known it gives no guarantee that some other density function may not 
be superior when no prior distribution can be assumed. In the absence of a prior distribution 
it is tempting to use the simply constructed estimative density function p{y j 0 = O(x)) as 
the fitted model. We can show, however, that in two important practical situations such a 
procedure is inadequate as measured by goodness-of-fit criterion (2.3). More specifically, 
given an estimative density function, say r(y I x), based on data x, we can construct another 
density function g(i I x), interpretable as a predictive density function, superior to 
r(y x) 
in terms of the positivity fQr all 0 of the goodness-of-fit criterion (23). We emphasize that 
this criterion makes no assumption about a prior distribution so that the density function 
q(y I x), although formally constructed by way of a p(0), 
is competing against r(y x) on 
the latter's terms. 
Gamma case. We suppose that the class of models to be fitted is Ga (K, 0), that is with 
p(y j 0) = 0KyK_1eY/F(K) (y>  0), 
with K known and 0 the indexing parameter. Suppose further that the informative experi-
ment, possibly summarized by an appeal to sufficiency arguments, can be described by a 
density function p(x 0) which is Ga (k, 0). 
The maximum likelihood estimate based on data x is (x) = k/x, so that as estimative 
density function we take 





For a prior density function p(0) of Ga (g, Ii) form, the posterior density function p(O I x) 
is Ga (0, H) with 
G=g+le, H=h+x, 	 (3d) 
and the corresponding predictive density function (26) is 
	
HG 	K-i 
I x) = B(K, G)(H+y)K 	(y> 0), 
	 (33) 
an inverse beta distribution, written Inbe (K, 0, H), say. Suppose that we compare r(y 1 
x) 
with any predictive density function of the form (33) with lz = 0 and g > 0 so that G 
in other words, we take 
x0 	yKl 	 3.4) 






0 	2 	4 	6 	8 	10 	k 
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Then 





- K log k + 	- (K+ G) log (i + ). 
	
(3.5) 
We note that this expression depends on x and  only through the ratio y/x. The distribution 
of z = y/x, for given 0, is Inbe(K, 0, 1) and so is independent of 0, say with density function 
p(z). Since E(z) = K/(G— 1) and since 
f
-p(z) log (1 + z) dz = (K+ 0)— Vf (G), 	 (36) 
Fig. 1. Relative closeness measures for the gamma case, with K = 1, 5, 10. 
where r(G) = F'(G)/F(G) is the digamma function tabulated by Abramowitz & Stegun 




(K,G,k) = log 
r(G) 	
KlOg k+ Kk G—I —(K+G){çi(K+ G)—i(G)}. 	
(37) 
Since (3.7) does not depend on 0 its value is unaltered by multiplying by the p(0) asso-
ciated with q(y I x) and integrating over 0. This leads us from (2.3) to a criterion of the 
form (2.5)  which we know to be positive. Thus (3.7) is positive and we note the inadequacy 
of the estimative fit relative to such a predictive form. The argument is, of course, hardly 
rigorous since the multiplying p(0)  is an improper prior, but the positivity of (37) could be 
established directly. We show in Fig. 1 the graphs of (3.7) against k for the cases K = 1, 
i.e. the exponential distribution, 5, 10 and for the 'vaguest' of priors, for which g = 0 and 
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so G = k. The superiority of the predictive over the estimative form is appreciable for 
small. If k is large relative to K then (3.7) is small. This is obvious kirlee, for fixed K, 
q(yIx)r(jx) (k-), 
and the increase in k 
can be interpreted in practical situations as an increase in the 'SjZ' of the informative experiment e. 
A1ultinorrn7 case. The argument for the multinormal case runs very Close to that for the gamma case. The class of models to be fitted is d-dimensional multinormal with 
p(y I it, Z) = (27r)-idjE j A exp 	—p)''(yp)}. 	 (3•8) 
We can suppose that the description of the informative experiment can be convenjeitl. 
condensed into the observation of x = (m, 8), where rn and S are effective mean and co-variance matrix estimators distributed with normal and Wishart forms with effective sample size n and effective degrees of freedom v. Then the estimative fit is 
r(yjx) = Nd(m,S) 	 (3.9) 
and predictive fits based on 'vaguest' prior information (Aitchison & Dunsmore, 1975,p. 21) 
take the form 
q(yx) =Std {v,m,[1+(1/n)}SJ 
 





F{(u+i)} 1 (r(yjx))bog 	 jd1og( v(1+ 1)) 
+v(1+)z_(v+1)1og(1+z), 	 (312) 
where 
z = (y -m)' (p8)-I (y - m)/(1 + (1/n)). 	 (313) 
The fact that (3.13) depends on m and 8 only through z and that z has an 
Inbe{d, 4(P—d+ 1), 11 
distribution, irrespective of p and Z, allows the evaluation 




in terms of the function defined in (3.7). The positivity of (3.14) is then established by an 
argument similar to that for the gamma case. 
We show in Fig. 2 the graphs of (3.14) against v for dimensions d = 1, 4, 8 and with n = '+ 1, corresponding to the case where rn and S are estimates of p and , both based 
on ii replicates of the multinormal experiment. Clearly as the dimensionality of the multi-
normal distribution increases the more suspect the use of the estimative method becoin es unless the extent v of the experimentation is sufficiently large to make the difference 
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between q(y I x) and r(y I x) small. In the more general case where v and 
n are not directly 
related, for fixed d and v the value of (3.14) increases as it decreases. 
We reemphasize that the inferiority of the estimative fit to a predictive fit is being 
assessed on a criterion, namely (2.3), which makes no assumption of knowledge of a prior 
distribution. For d > 3 it could, of course, be argued that the use of m as an estimate of 11 
may already be suspect on admissibility grounds (Stein, 1950) and that ford > 3 we ought to 








0 	5 	10 	15 	20 	 P 
Fig. 2. Relative closeness measures for the multinorrnal case, with d 	1, 4, 8 and V = n— 1. 
form. We have not attempted to do this although we might conjecture results similar to 
those already found simply because the predictive form will again retain the advantage of 
taking account of sampling variability. The admissibility argument, however, is concerned 
with the direct estimation of 1u, and appropriate loss structures for this are of doubtful 
relevance to the problem of density function fit. 
4. DiscussioN 
In their paper on nonparametric problems of estimating density functions Boneva, 
Kendall & Stefanov (1971, p.  3), in a passing remark on parametric estimation, say that for 
estimation of a univariate normal density function the obvious method is to estimate the 
two parameters in the standard manner. Although this may be so if the estimated density 
function is restricted to the given parametric class there is no need for such a restriction 
in many practical problems. From the viewpoint of obtaining a close overall fit to the true 
density function we have seen that such replacement of the parameters by estimates can 
be inadequate compared with adopting some suitable mixture of the basic models as is 
achieved by the predictive function. It can, of course, be argued that the use of the esti-
mative density function (14) is perfectly sound provided that we take account of the 
.26O 
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sampling variability of (x) by providing a confidence interval, say, for each density 
I 0) or probability pr (A 1 0). Unfortunately the proviso is all too easily ignored. When 0 
appears in a complicated way in the density function, as for example as mean vector and 
covariance matrix in a multinormal density function, the temptation to resort to the 
estimative density function, as by Dixon (1970), can be overwhelming, whereas the multi-
variate Student form of the predictive density function is easily computed. 
We have demonstrated the Kuliback & Liebler superiority of the predictive method for 
only two members of the exponential family, the gamma and normal. For the other main 
members, the binomial and the Poisson, we cannot even define the measure of divergence 
(2.1) for the estimative fits since the measure is infinite, 
The Kuilback & Liebler measure is only one possible measure of relative closeness of two 
competing estimates of density functions. For other measures the superiority of the pre-
dictive density function may well be i-educed or altogether overthrown. For example, if 
o is a mean parameter and the measure places emphasis on good estimation of densities in 
the neighbourhood of the mean the estimative could easily prove superior to the predictive 
method. But the lesson from the analysis of this paper must be to avoid the too facile  
insertion of O(x) in the density function as an obvious way of obtaining an estimate. The 
precise purpose of the density function estimation has to be considered and some appropriate 
measure of closeness introduced. 
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SUMMARY 
Important clinical differences arising in the application of commonly advocated 
discriminant or diagnostic methods demand a thorough assessment of the realism of 
Their different assessments. Recent theoretical work on the estimation of density 
functions provides reasons for these differences and suggests which methods should 
provide greater realism. These suggestions are strongly supported by a simulation 
study. Specific recommendations are made concerning statistical diagnostic practice. 
Keywords: ATYPICALITY INDEX; DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: ESTIMATION OF DENSITY FUNCTION; 
ESTIMATIVE DIAGNOSIS; INFORMATION DIVERGENCE MEASURE; PREDICTIVE DIAGNOSIS; 
SIMULATION 
1. PRACTIcAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN Two METHODS 
Wiiint two statistical methods applied to the same important practical problem provide 
answers of such enormous difference that they can commonly lead to radically different 
practical consequences—even to the difference between curing and harming a patient—it is 
high time to subject them to a critical comparison. Such is the current situation with two 
methods of statistical discrimination which we shall presently distinguish by the terms 
estimative and predictive. The purpose of this paper is to explain the reasons for these 
differences, to pose the question of which method is likely to yield the more reliable results 
and to go some way in answering that important question. 
These practical differences are well illustrated by the problem of differential diagnosis of 
Conn's syndrome and have been reported by Aitchison and Dunsmorè (1975, p.  231), Aitchison 
and Kay (1975). Their comparisons are summarized and extended in Figs 1 and 2. Coon's 
syndrome is a rare condition producing high blood pressure and is now known to have two 
quite different causes: (1) a benign tumour in one adrenal gland, curable by surgical removal, 
or (2) a more diffuse condition affecting both, adrenal glands with the possibility of control 
of blood pressure by drug treatment. Accurate diagnosis of type can only be achieved by 
microscopic examination of adrenal tissue removed at an operation. Since for most patients 
with type 2, surgery is inadvisable clinicians faced with a new patient known to have Coon's 
syndrome obviously require a realistic preoperative assessment of the relative plausibilities of 
the two types in order to help in their difficult treatment decision (Brown et al., 1971). For this 
purpose only a small basic set of past records consisting of 20 confirmed cases of type I and 11 
cases of type 2 is available (Aitchison and Dunsmore, 1975, Table 1.6) with eight measured 
aspects for each case: age, plasma concentrations of sodium, potassium, bicarbonate, renin 
and aldosterone; systolic and diastolic blood pressures. 
Because of positive skewness in the raw data logarithmic transformations were carried 
out and subsequently tests of multivariate normality -for each type along the lines of Andrews 
et al. (1973) were conducted. No significant departures from multinormality were detected. 
Although—as in all goodness-of-fit testing of parametric models and particularly for small data 
sets—lack of significance cannot be construed as actual support for the model, we follow 
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common practice in adopting a multinormal assumption for the transformed data of each 
type in what follows. Tests of comparison of some of the marginal variances for the two 
types do, however, show significant differences and these suggest that this multinormalassump-
tion should allow for possible inequality of the two covariance matrices. 
Io; o Kedalft od 
FIG. 1. Comparison of log-odds as assessed by 
estimative and predictive methods. 0, New case of 
type 1; A, new case of type 2; J, new case of 
unknown type. 	 - 
Im,zi,' 
FIG. 2. Comparison of atypicality indices as 
assessed by estimative and predictive methods. 
Arrows indicate indices "within previous experience". 
, New case of type 1; 1., new case of type 2. 
We suppose that prior to observation of a new patient there is an agreed assessment of the 
relative plausibilities of the two possible types. This would normally be taken to b the 
incidence rate at the clinic under consideration and would be based on previous experience 
in the clinic. The differences that arise between the two methods are in no way associated 
with different assessments of incidence and it is therefore convenient to compare the methods 
from a common starting point, say equal incidence rates for the two types. 
Under these identical assumptions of equal incidence and multinormality, after trans-
formation, of observation vectors two methods of obtaining the required relative plausibility 
assessments are available. We may follow the estimative method of, for example, Anderson 
(1958, p. 137) and Dixon (1970) in replacing parameters in appropriate likelihood ratios by 
their estimates. Or we may use the predictive method of Geisser (1964), Dunsmore (1966) 
and Aitchison and Kay (1975) which replaces likelihood .ratios by ratios of predictive density 
functions. These two methods are more fully described in Section 2;-  our immediate interest 
is to compare their practical effect. 
Fig. 1 shows, for each of a test set of 43 new cases, the plot of predictive assessment of log10 
(odds on type 1) against the corresponding estimative assessment, together with the accurate 
diagnosis for the 21 cases where treatment by surgery has allowed confirmation. The fewness 
of the confirmed cases of type 2 is due to surgery being contraindicated for most of such cases. 
The vast differences between the predictive and estimative assessments of odds are obvious and 
can affect decision about treatment. 
Both methods will, of course, assign plausibilities for a new case, even if it has been wrongly 
referred or if its observation vector contains some gross inaccuracy. A sensible precaution 
in the application of any diagnostic system is therefore the monitoring of new cases to ensure 
that they are not too atypical of all the possible types considered. For this purpose each case 
can be assigned atypicality indices for each of the possible types (Aitchison and Kay, 1975). 
'The observation vector of a given case will lie on a particular ellipsoid of concentration of the 
TWO METHODS OF STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 	 17 
underlying multinormal distribution of observation vectors associated with the type. An 
atypicality index of the case for the type is then simply an assessment of the probability content 
of the interior of this ellipsoid. Thus atypicality indices are measured on the interval (0, 1); 
the nearer the index is to I the more atypical is the case. If a case has all its atypicality indices 
near 1 then wrong referral or faulty measurement of features must be seriously considered. 
For a particular type atypicality indices assessed by the two methods are mathematically 
related and so their joint variation can be represented by a locus in the unit square. Fig. 2 
shows this locus for each of the types, 1 and 2. We can also show on this diagram for each 
type the most atypical cases in the basic set of 31 cases, the position of the point with greatest 
atypicality index denoting the limit of "previous experience". Note that there is a remarkable 
difference between the estimative and predictive assessments. For example, for type 2 the 
proportion of new cases we may expect within previous experience is on a predictive assessment 
008, whereas the estimative method puts this expectancy as high as 064. The corresponding 
proportions for type 1 are 044 and 084. For the 21 new cases for which the accurate diagnosis 
is known the atypicality indices relative to the known type are shown. Of the 4 new type 2 cases 
three are assigned type 2 atypicality indices of almost 1 by the estimative method. Of the-
complete test set of 43 new cases, known to have Conn's syndrome in some form, the esti-
mative method assesses that a high proportion, 14 out of 43, have both atypicality indices 
greater than 095, whereas the predictive method has no such doubly atypical case in its 
assessments. 
The differences in odds and atypicality indices assigned by the two methods clearly indicate 
that it is important to come to some verdict as to which are the more realistic. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE Two METHODS 
In its simplest form statistical diagnosis or discrimination is concerned with assessing to 
which of a given finite set T of possible types an individual or case belongs on the basis of a 
vector x of observations on that individual. Often for the user, as in the clinical situation of 
Section 1, such assessments are most conveniently expressed by the statistician in terms of 
the probabilities or plausibilities of the possible types, rather than the choice of a specific 
type; and we shall consider this assessment of plausibilities the aim of statistical diagnosis. 
For statistical diagnosis to be useful the distribution of observation vectors must differ 
from type to type. Suppose that some parametric form p(xJ t, 0) can be assumed for the 
probability (density) function of x for given type t, with the parameter 0 usually multidimen-
sional. For example, for the multinormal situation of Section 1, 0 = (j, j 'Z1,Z2),where 
and p.2 are the vector means and Z, and Z2  the covariance matrices associated with the two 
types. If we knew the true value of. the parameter, say 0, there would be no problem and 
no controversy. For a given incidence rate p(t) the probability p(t I x, 0), that we would assign 
to type I for a case with observation vector x, would be computed from Bayes' formula as 
p(tfx, 0)ccp(t)p(xt, 0), 	 (2.1) 
where the oc sign indicates that the scaling factor required to obtain equality does not depend 
on the argument t of the probability function. In practice we never know 0 but we usually 
have available data z, say, from a basic set of past case records consisting of observation vectors 
on cases of known types. The differences between the methods arise from different ways in 
which we make inferences about 0 from z and how we use these inferences in effect to replace 
p(xt, 0) on the right side of (2.1) to obtain a plausibility assessment p(t lx,z)  for the type of 
a new case with observation vector x. 
A popular method is to proceed as if these distributions were known, with the parameter 
value 0 replaced by some efficient estimate O(z), often a maximum likelihood estimate. Thus 
p(xlt, 0) on the right side of (2.1) is replaced by 
r(xjt,z)=p{x1t,0=U(z)}. 	' 	 (2.2) 
.25 
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For such a method which places emphasis on first obtaining estimates of the unknown para-
meters we use the term estimative diagnosis. Such methods are to be found in the Biomedical 
Data Processing package (Dixon, 1970), in the commonly applied likelihood ratio techniques 
(Anderson, 1958, p. 133); for example, the linear discriminant technique is often justified on 
these grounds (Anderson, 1958, p.  137). 
A more recent and radically different method replaces p(xf t, 0) on the right side of (2.1) by 
q(xt,z) = fe p(xlt,  C)p(0!z)dO, 	 (2.3) 
where p(0z) can be regarded either as some weighting function based on the data z or as a 
full Bayesian posterior density function for 0 based on a prior p(0) and on the data z. The 
form (2.3) commonly arises in Bayesian statistical prediction theory as the predictive density 
function for a "future" observation x on a case of type t as assessed on the basis of the data z; 
see, for example, Jeffreys (1961), Geisser (1964), Guttman and Tiao (1964), Aitchison and 
Sculthorpe (1965) and Zeliner and Chetty (1965). Because of this association the method has 
come to be known as predictive diagnosis (Geisser, 1964; Dunsmore, 1966; Aitchison and 
Dunsmore, 1975; Aitchison and Kay, 1975). 
The nature of the difference between the two methods can be well illustrated by the case 
wherep(xjt, 0) is multinormal, as in the medical diagnostic application of this paper. Suppose 
that p(xIt, 0) is a d-dimensional multinorrnal density function with mean iii and covariance 
matrix : we then write 
pxIt, 0) = N(jL1,E) = 	 (2.4) 
We collect here for convenience of reference only the essential results required later; for 
details and generalizations see Aitchison and Kay (1975). We suppose that the past case 
records contain n1 of type t with observation vectors x1, ...,x,1,, and that the prior p(0) from 
which the predictive density function is constructed is the vague prior used by Aitchison and 
Kay (1975). 
If we write in1 and S1  for the mean and covariance matrix for the sample x1, ..., x7 , then 
r(xlt,z)=Nd(mg,S), 	 (2.5) 
whereas 
q(xt,z)= Std (vlml(1+._)  Sill, 	 (2.6) 
a d-dimensional Student-type density function, where v1 n— 1, and St(v,b, c) is defined on 1= Rd  by the density at x: 
r{(v+1)} 	 1 	- 	
27 iif d r{(v_d+ 1)}I vcjk {1 +(x—b)'(vc) 1(x—b)}'+') 
Thus the picture of (2.2) and (2.3) is of two distributions both centred on the same vector 
mean in1  and with the same class of ellipsoids of concentration but with the q(x It, z) less 
concentrated than r(x I t, z) about in1. 
The relationship of (2.5) to (2.6) is of course the multivariate counterpart of the use of a 
univariate normal approximation instead of the exact t distribution in such familiar areas as 
significance tests and confidence intervals for normal means. Whereas in the univariate case 
the distinction between the two methods is often of little practical consequence even for 
moderately sized samples the distinction in the multivariate case can be of considerable practical 
significance, as has already been noted in Section 1. The fact that the two methods (2.5) and 
(2.6) are asymptotically equivalent for large basic sets should not delude the user of disc riminant 
analysis into the supposition that in his practical "finite" situation there is no substantial 
difference between them. 
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If in the analysis it is assumed that the covariance matrices Z, and Z2are equal then (2.5) 
and (2.6) become 
r(xt,z) = Nd(mL,S), 	 (2.8) 
q(xt,z) = Std IV, in1, 
(
1+4) s}. 	 (2.9) 
where 
v=n1+n2-2, vS=v1S1+v2S2. 
The use of (2.5), (2.6'), (2.8) and (2.9) as estimates ofp(vj t, 0) are thus four different methods 
of statistical diagnosis which we may conveniently denote by Pu, Eu, Fe and Ee where Eand P 
refer to the methods, estimative and predictive; and *e and u relate to the assumption about 
covariance matrices, equal or unequal. 
A convenient way to record the quantitative difference between (2.5) and (2.6) is the 
following: 	 - 
q(xft,z) 	ran,) 	n?-1 	 ( n1w1(x)\ log 
r(xl t, z) - lo 1 { ( fld)} 
210g 	+?2W(X) 2fllOg 




w(x) = (x—m1)' Sr1  (x—m) 	 (2.11) 
is the Mahalanobis distance with respect to the type t basic set. 
We say that a case with observation vector y is more typical of type t than a case with 
observation vector x if 
p(ytt, 0)>p(xt, 0). 
The set R1(x) of all observation vectors more typical of t than observation vector x is then 
.R(x) = {y:p(ylt,  0)>p(xl1, 0)}. 	 (2.12) 
An index of atypicality for t of a case with observation vector x may then be defined as the 
assessed probability i(x) of obtaining an observation vector more typical than y. Thus 
J(x)= PAW It,0}. 	 (2.13) 
The assessments of I(x) associated with the estimative and predictive distributions (2.5) and 
(2.6) are respectively 
	
r{d; jw(x)} 	. 	 (2.14) 
and 
B(kd. (n— 	w(x) ( 	J)J) 	
(2.15) 
where w(x) is given by (2.11), B denotes the incomplete beta function defined by 
B(a,b; c):= foUa—l(l _u)b_ldu/B(a,b)  (0,< C_<1) 	 (2.16) 
and tabulated in Pearson (1934), and P the incomplete gamma function defined by 
f(0 
e
P(a; c) = u c'du/P(a) (e 0) 	 (2.17) 
and tabulated in Pearson (1922). 
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3. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE COMPARISON 
The magnitude of the differences between the estimative and predictive odds obtained in 
Section 1 can be readily explained in terms of expression (2.10). Fig. 3 shows the graphs of 
3. Logarithm of the ratio of estimative and predictive densities plotted against Mahalanobis 
distance. 
(2.10) plotted against w for d= 8, n = 20 and for d = 8, ii = 11, the configurations of the type I 
and type 2 basic sets, respectively. The ratio q(x t, z)/rx 1, z) of the predictive to the 
estimative assessment of the true p(xIt, 0) can thus vary from approximately 10_1  to 10 
over the range 0w100. Consider a recent new case with w1 =21-2 and w. =73-8.  Since 
the values of 1og10(q/r) are approximately 0-94 and 995 at w1 = 21-2 and w2 = 738 respectively 
on the type 1 and type 2 graphs the proportional difference between the estimative and 
predictive odds is a factor of 109. Such proportional factors are common since for most 
cases the Mahalanobis distances w1 and w2 are appreciably different. 
Since the evaluation of atypicality indices essentially involves integration of either q(x jt, z) 
or r(xt,z) over appropriate regions it is clear from these graphs how huge discrepancies can 
also occur between estimative and predictive atypicality index assessments. For example, for 
the new case just considered the atypicality index with respect to type 2 is, for the predictive 
approach, by (2.15), 0-76. Since for w2>, 73•8 the estimative density is less than 10 9 times the 
predictive density the corresponding estimative assessment of atypicality index must be very 
close to 1. 
Although the graphs of Fig. 3 provide an explanation of how the differences arise, they do 
nothing to resolve the question of which method is to be preferred: Estimative methods can 
clearly be criticized on the grounds of ignoring sampling variability of g: if another basic 
set were available we would not necessarily obtain the same estimates of the parameters and 
some allowance ought to be made for this element of unreliability. Occasionally some lip-
service is paid to this feature, for example by the provision of standard errors of scores when 
using the linear discriminant. On the whole, however, the problem is ignored, particularly 
when, as in the case of Conn's syndrome where covariance matrices are unequal, the sampling 
distribution theory of the crucial estimated likelihood ratio 
q(xt = l,z)/q(xt = 2,z) 
proves intractable. The predictive method in a sense takes account of the unreliability of 
any estimate of 0 by giving each 9an appropriate weight in forming the mixture or predictive 
distribution (2.3), and from a sampling variability point of view tue predictive method has 
thus some advantage over the estimative method. 
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The main question of practical importance remains as yet unanswered. Which of the two 
methods is more realistic or gets nearer to the truth in the plausibilities it quotes? An answer 
based on theoretical grounds can be provided by the following argument. We recall from 
Section 2 that for a new case with observation vector x the main statistical problem is the 
assessment of the ratio of the true densities p(xi t,  6) for t = 1,2. The quality of this ratio is, 
however, strongly dependent on the quality of the individual density estimates. Since in the 
construction of a diagnostic system we envisage its application to a number of new cases 
with different observation vectors we are essentially faced with the problem of estimating 
whole density functions. In the assessment of atypicality indices we are directly concerned 
with estimating density functions. 
Aitchison (1975) has considered the relative merits of the predictive and estimative methods 
as methods of density function estimation by defining an appropriate measure of the relative 
overall closeness of q(xjt,z) and r(xlt,z) to the true p(xlt,  0). This measure, based on an 
information divergence measure of Kuilback and Liebler (1951), is 
f
q(xt,z) 
pzJ0dz p(x[t,0)log 	dx, 
z 	Ix . 	rxIt,z) 
the expectation of (2.10) with respect to the true density function p(xj t, 0), further averaged 
over basic sets z. For p(xI t, 0) multinormal Aitchison (1975) shows that this measure, with 
q(xt,z) and r(xlt,z) assigned by (2.6) and (2.5), is independent of 0 and positive, indicating 
greater overall closeness of the predictive density function estimator to the true density function. 
For the type 1 and type 2 configurations these measures with. logarithms to base 10 are 
respectively 058 and 14 corresponding to the large proportional differences we have already 
observed in the ratio of the odds assigned by the two methods. The largeness of the measure 
for the type 2 group arises from the fact that 11 observation vectors of dimension S are an 
extremely small sample in multivariate terms. 
Thus if the statistician wishes to have some measure of confidence in the reality of the 
plausibilities that he reports for the types he would be well advised on theoretical grounds 
to use predictive plausibilities. 
4. SIMULATIvE ASPECTS OF THE COMPARISON 
We pointed out in Section 2 that for given parametric forms for the observation vector 
density function p(xlt,  0) the source of the statistical problem in diagnosis is our lack of 
knowledge of 0. If we knew 0 then for a case with observation vector x we would know the 
true or realistic plausibilities we should assign to the types, namely those computed by (2.1). 
In ny investigation by simulation we must ourselves choose 0 in order to generate observation 
ctors; and so for any new case with observation vector x we-have available the "true" 
plausibilities against which to compare those assessed by any other method based on the 
simulated basic set. As indicated in Section 1 we can confine attention to diagnostic situations 
with equal incidence rates. 
For a simulation study, we consider a diagnostic situation with two types and where the 
vector distributions are d-dimensional multinormal Nd(.t j, E) and N(P), 2). Since we can 
find a non-singular linear transformation L such that LE1L' = 'd' L 2 L' = \, a diagonal 
matrix, we can clearly, by considering the transformation y = L(x—jJ, confine simulation 
without loss of generality to two distributions of the forms Nd(O, Id) and Nd(,  LX'). On an 
assumption of equality of E, and 2  we have further, without loss of generality, A = I. The 
generation of observation vectors from these distributions is then a simple routine matter. 
Generating n1 and n2 basic records of types 1 and 2, and N1 and N2 test records of types 1 and 2, 
provides a simulation situation which can be characterized by thz set 
(d,cç4,n,n,N1,N2). 
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In a simulation comparison of the four statistical diagnostic methods Fe, Ee, Pu, Eu, it 
is important to differentiate between simulation situations with equal covariance matrices 
(A = I) and situations with unequal covariance matrices (Ex/1). Table 1 provides details of 
TABLE  
Simulated situations included in the comparison of diagnostic methods 
d, cr, A configurations 
Equal covariance matrices, A = 	 Unequal covariance matrices 
a=O, d=1,..., 9 =O, A=41d, 	d=l,...,5 a= e, the vector ofunits, 	d= 1,2,3 	 c= e, A= 41a, d= I, ...,9 a1 =2, =...=od =O, d=I,...,9 a=O, A=16ld,d=I,2,3 
Sizes of basic and test sets 
d (s,2) 	 - d 	(NI, N2) 
1 (2, 2), (3, 3), (5, 5), (10, 10), (2, 5) 1, ..., 9 	(5, 5), (10,10) 
2 (3, 3), (5, 5), (9, 9), (10, 10), (12, 12), (3, 10) 
3 (5, 5), (9, 9), (10, 10), (12, 12) 
4 (5, 5), (10, 10), (14, 14), (18, 18) 
5 (10, 10), (20, 20) 
6,...,9 (10,10) 
the simulated situations which have been used to assess the relative merits of the four diagnostic 
methods Fe, Ee, Pu, Eu. Since substantive differences between estimative and predictive 
methods are known on theoretical grounds to be small for large basic sets we have concentrated 
attention on basic sets which are small in relation to the parameter dimension. 
Each simulated training set gives rise to five assessments of log-odds in favour of type 1: 
the "true" one, and one for each of the four diagnostic methods. We can now compare these 
log-odds (LO) assessments, both for the basic records and also for the test records associated 
with the simulation situation. 
The measure of performance of method i (with I = Ee, Eu, Pe, Pit) that we adopt for the 
basic set is the mean absolute deviation from the true log-odds: 
MAD(i) = -EJLO(i)-LO(true)f, a1 + 172 
summation being over the basic records, with a similar measure for the test set. 
The total number of simulation situations considered is 110; 68 with equal covariance 
matrices and 42 with unequal covariance matrices. The four methods are pairwise compared 
for each simulation situation, both for basic records and for test records. The results are 
given in Table 2. The mean absolute deviation, averaged over all situations, is given for 
each method in Table 3. 
For simulated situations with equal covariance matrices the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
(al) Fe is by far superior to the other methods. Only in a few situations were better results 
obtained by Ee and Pu. 
(a2) Eu is by far inferior to the other three methods. For no situation was the result better 
than for any of the other methods. 
(0) Pu and Ee are comparable both in the number of situations in which one method comes 
out better than the other (Pu: 33, Ee: 35) and in the manitude of the averaged mean absolute 
deviations from the true log-odds. 
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TABLE 2 
Number of simulated situations for which mean absolute deviation of row (colmun) method was 
smaller than column (row) method with e type situations in upper rig/it triangle and u type 





Fe 	Ec 	Pu 	Eu 
Fe Basic 651 (21) 62 	(6) 68 (0) 
Test - 67 (1) 67 (1) 68 (0) 
Ee Basic 19 	(22) 341 (33k) 68 (0) 
Test 12k (29k) 35 	(33) 68 (0) 
Pa Basic 24 	(18) 28 (14) 68 (0) Test 29k (12k) 34 (8) 68 (0) 
Eu Basic 2 	(40) 3 (39) 2 	(39k) - Test 2k (39k) 3 (39) 1 (41) 
TABLE 3 
Mean absolute deviation of log-odds for four diagnostic methods 
averaged over all simulated situations 
Simulation Nature 	 Method 




Fe 	Ee 	Pu 	Eu 
Basic 172 3-48 3-51 >100 e 	
Test 1-80 3-70 336 >100 
Basic 4-09 465 4-14 > 100 U 	
Test 443 5-44 4-27 > 100 
For simulated situations with unequal covariance matrices the following conclusions can 
be drawn: 
(bi) Pu yields the best results, but only slightly better than Fe for the basic set. 
Ee yields results that are worse than the Fe results. 
Eu gives by far the worst results of all four methods. 
Our overall conclusions can therefore be summarized as follows. 
(1) Eu yields much worse results than the three other methods, even for situations involving 
unequal covariance matrices. 
(ii) The predictive method is superior to the estimative method for both types of simulation. 
The Fe method is by far superior for situations involving equal covariance matrices. For 
situations involving unequal covariance matrices the Pu method is superior, though less 
markedly so. 
The conclusions are of course only valid for the range of situations considered here: an 
effectively small number of past records from approximately multinormally distributed 
observations. 
5. Discussion 
When a diagnostic or discriminant situation requires the statistician to provide plausibility 
assessments for the possible types we have seen that differences of practical importance can 
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occur between estimative and predictive methods. The theoretical considerations of Section 3 
and the simulative studies of Section 4 strongly support the use of the predictive method 
when the feature distributions can be transformed to multinormality. We can make this 
recommendation more specific as follows. 
When there is a high probability that the covariance matrices may differ appreciably use 
the Pu diagnostic method; otherwise use the Pe method. 
For other distributional forms further work is clearly necessary before any general use of 
predictive methods could be advocated. 
A common feature of the differences we have observed in applications to Conn's syndrome 
and other disease complexes is that predictive plausibilities are usually much closer to the 
equiplausible assessment than are the çstimative plausibilitics. It is an interesting phenomenon 
that while diagnosticians, such as clinicians, tend to act conservatively and underuse the 
information or data available to them (Taylor et al., 1970) the estimative methods advocated 
by many statisticians tend to read too much into the data by presenting obviously extravagant 
odds. The source of the estimative overstatements is undoubtedly the reluctance to take 
account of the sampling variability problem. It is interesting to observe that it is through an 
essentially Baysian approach that we have been able to overcome the sampling variability 
problem, usually regarded as a distinctly frequentist problem. 
The improper prior, which we have used in the example we have considered, is not an 
essential feature of the predictive method and could be replaced by any more appropriately 
assessed prior. We would, however, stress that the use of the improper prior in these medical 
diagnostic problems of limited data is a lesser fault than the ignoring of the sampling variability 
in the estimative approach. When the past experience is large, the difference between the two 
methods can lessen to an extent which leaves no practical difference; see, for example, the 
medical examples analysed in Hermans and Habbema (1975). But the question of what 
constitutes a large set of past records is particularly tricky when multidimensional space is 
concerned. A set of 100 case records involving 2-dimensional observation vectors is certainly 
large, but can the same be said for a set of 100 case records involving 85-dimensional vectors? 
Since the predictive method is just as simple as the estimative method there seems no real need 
to ask such a question? The answer is indeed simple: be sensible, be realistic, apply. the 
predictive method. 	 - 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors are grateful to Dr D. M. Titterington for helpful comments and for making 
available his tests of multinormality on the data of the illustrative example of this paper; and 
to the M.R.C. Blood Pressure Unit, Western Infirmary, Glasgow, for making available to us 
their data. This research was supported for one of the authors (3. W. K.) through a S.R.C. 
Research Studentship. We also wish to thank the two referees for helpful criticisms. 
REFERENCES 
AITCHISON, J. (1975). Goodness of prediction fit. Biometrika, 62, 547-554. 
AITCmSON, J. and DUNSMORE, I. R. (1975). Statistical Prediction Analysis. Cambridge University Press. 
ArrCmSON, J. and KAY, J. W. (1975). Principles, practice and performance in decision making in clinical 
medicine. Proceedings of the 1973 NA TO Conference on the Role and Effectiveness of Theories of Decision 
in Practice (D. J. White and K. C. Bowen, eds). London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
AITCHISON, J. and Scus.moape, D. (1965). Some problems of statistical prediction. Biomerrika, 52, 469-483. 
ANDERSON, T. W. (1958). An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis. New York: Wiley. 
ANnP.Ews, D. F., GNANADESIKAN, R. and WARNER, J. L. (1973). Methods for assessing multivariate 
normality. In Multivariate Analysis III (P. R. Krishnaiah, ed.), pp.  95-116. New York: Academic Press. 
BROWN, J. 3., FRASER, R, LEVER, A. F. and ROBERTSON, J. I. S. (1971). Hypertension: a review of selected 
topics. Abstracts of World Medicine, Vol. 45, No. 9. 
DIXON, W. J. (1970). BMD Biomedical Computer Programs. University of California Press. 
D1ThSMORE, I. R. (1966). A Bayesian approach to classification. J. R. Statist. Soc. B, 28, 568-577. 
Gaissait, S. (1964). Posterior odds for multivariate normal classifications. J. R. Statist. Soc. B, 26, 69-76. 
TWO METHODS OF STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 	 25 
GUTrMAN, I. and TIA0, G. C. (1964). A Bayesian approach to some best population problems. Ann. Math. 
Statist., 35, 825-835. 
HERMANS, J. and HABBEMA, J. D. F. (1975). Comparison of five methods to estimate posterior probabilities. 
ED Yin Med. and Biol., 6, 14-19. 
JEFFREYS, H. (1961). Theory of Probability, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press. 
PEARSON, K. (1922). Tables of the Incomplete r-function. Cambridge University Press. 
- (1934). Tables of the Incomplete B-function. Cambridge University Press. 
TAYLOR, T. D., AITCS-IISON, J. and McGnu, E. M. (1971). Doctors as decision makers: a computer-assisted 
study of diagnosis as a cognitive skill. Br. Med. J., 3, 35-40. 
ZELLNER, A. and CHErrY, V. K. (1965). Prediction and decision problems in regression models from the 
Bayesian point of view. J. Amer. Statist. Ass., 60, 608-616. 
['U 
273 
11 THE ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE IN 
INFERENTIAL TASKS 
Considerable light can be thrown on the intuitive or 
subjective processes by which individuals arrive at inferences. 
For example, it is possible to examine in some detail how clinicians, 
faced with the problem of making diagnostic assessments, differ 
in their as 	from those reached by a statistical diagnostic 
system such as predictive diagnosis. Such an analysis can serve 
two purposes: first, to reveal where the intuitive, subjective 
judgment may be falling short of the optimum or normative; secondly, 
by showing the clinician ways in which he may be misusing the 
information available to him, to exploit the neat expository 
aspects of the comparison to engage his interest in learning more 
of inferential principles and methodology. Such studies have been 
reported in the differential diagnostic problems of non-toxic 
goitre (Taylor, Aitchison and McGirr, 1971), and in a simulated 
diagnostic situation in the differential diagnosis of newmath 
fever in students (Aitchison and Kay, 1973; Aitchison, 1974), with 
illustrations of how the performance may be analysed and presented, 
possibly sequentially as each new feature of the patient is 
disclosed. Aitchison and Kay (15:1975) and Kay (1976) give details 
of the various measures of performance which throw light on the 
discrepancies between subjective and 'normative' performance. 
Where past experience is controlled by the presentation only of 
a training set then normative is taken to be equivalent to the 
predictive diagnostic assessment. 
If the set of possible diagnostic types is T then a 
diagnostic assessment about type is simply a probability density 
function p(t) on T. For any such assessment there is a degree of 
uncertainty remaining, namely 
U{p(t) } = - E p(t) log p(t). 
If from an established position p(t) a subject, on the basis of 
evidence x, moves to s(tx) instead of to r(tlx) then his inference 
discrepancy, a measure of his inability to make the correct 
inference, is 
r(tlx) 
I{r,s} ET r(tlx) log s(tlx) 
Moreover in his move from p(t) to s(tlx) the subject removes an 
amount of uncertainty U{p(t)} - U{s(tlx)} instead of the appropriate 
amount U{p(t)} - U{r(tlx)}. The difference in these 
I U{r(tlx)} - U{s(tlx)}  I, 
suitably signed, can then be used as a measure of whether the subject 
is underusing the data (negative sign) or reading too much into the 
data (positive sign). For more details of this information gain 
index (positive or negative) see Aitchison and Kay (15:1975). 
Part of the diagnostic task may be to choose, after each 
assessment, the next feature to be observed or the next test to be 
carried out from a still available set F of such features or tests. 
The gain of information from the choice of fcF and observing x, 
and hence updating from p(t) to rf(tlx) is UCp(t)} - U{rf(tjx)}. 




[U{p(t)} - U(rf(tlx)}]pf(x) dx. 
:75 
Let f* be a feature maximising G(f). Then if the subject chooses 
£ his feature selection discrepancy is measured as 
G(f*) - G(f). 
Thus there is a whole battery of measures which display different 
aspects of inference ability in relation to the quantified inference 
through the use of parametric model fitting. Experience suggests 
that these performance analyses are excellent means of motivating 
teaching and of exposition. There is no real evidence that subjects 
improve their subjective ability in making inferences by exposure 
to them. 
The form of performance analysis which has been illustrated 
here in a diagnostic setting applies equally for any other 
inferential task where the subject is required to specify the 
equivalent of a probability density function over a set T. For 
example, Aitchison (1980b) describes a calibration task. Similar 
concepts apply in the analysis of performance in decision-making 
tasks; see, for example, Aitchison et al (1973) and Aitchison and 
Moore (1976) 
A more recent development, which allows investigation of the 
detailed inferential statements rather than summary measures of 
them, is reported in §13. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Few people face, and have to resolve, a more intensive stream of important decision 
problems during a working lifetime than the clinician; and few are such inveterate 
collectors of data and such meticulous recorders of case histories. Clinical medicine 
therefore seems a promising area of human activity in which to study the role and 
effectiveness of decision theories in practice. Moreover, it is an area which differs in 
man)' respects from the more common target of decision theorists—the business and 
industrial world. For example, while, in business, an acceptable aim for a number of 
enterprises may be to maximise average profit over these enterprises, in clinical 
medicine, the Hippocratic oath precludes any criterion of average results over 
individual patients. Any sensible applied mathematician—and we hope that most 
decision theorists fall into this category—does not start with a theory and seek areas 
of application for that theory. Rather lie starts with a real problem, studies it until 
he feels able to abstract the essential relevant components, to recognise their 
interdependence, to express this in the language of mathematics and so build a 
mathematical model; he then develops his model mathematically in a sensible 
direction towards the resolution of the problem initially posed; and Finally he 
translates his mathematical answer back into real terms and so may be in a position 
to assess the effectiveness of his model-building. In comparing clinical medicine and 
business, therefore, we must not be surprised if we find differences in the decision 
model itself, in the emphasis of its component parts and in the mode of application. 
Three basic questions immediately arise. Can we find in clinical medicine any 
acceptable principles of action which may be formalised and translated into 
decision-theoretic terms? To what extent can we apply any such model of the 
clinical decision process in practice? In what meaningful ways can we compare the 
performance of the decision model with that of the clinician? While it is easy to 
speak speculatively of a decision system which embraces the whole of medical 
252 
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practice, its implementation is no more than a current pipedreani. To attempt to 
assess role and effectiveness, we must clearly limit ourselves to such sub-systems as 
are currently practicable. To accept such a delimitation lays us immediately open to 
the critical question: could you not arrive at better decisions by embedding the 
subsystem in a larger system? While this implied criticism is strictly unanswerable, 
we hope that the evidence we shall put forward of the remarkable discrepancies in 
practice and performance between different decision subsystems may persuade the 
reader that their study must shed some light on optimal decision-making. 
There are, in clinical medicine, two main ways in which subsystems traditionally 
arise. The first is the streaming of patients into specialities according to their 
suspected condition; all the specialist clinics, such as blood pressure, thyroid, renal, 
psychiatric, in our hospitals are a result of this partition. The second is the division 
of the management of a patient into traditional phases—examination, diagnosis, 
treatment, prognosis, after-care. While we shall recognise these two forms of 
subdivision, we shall not adopt them uncritically. We. shall keep watch on the first 
by a monitoring of each patient to check on the appropriateness of his streaming. 
We shall question the second by considering the synthesis of the traditional 
subdivisions and re-examining the appropriateness of these subdivisions within the 
synthesis. 
We must also recognise that, at any moment of time, we can discern two aspects 
within the medical decision maker—the doctor whose sole concern is for the patient 
he is currently managing, and the scientist who hopes to obtain from his patient 
some deeper insight into medical science, hopefully to the advantage of subsequent 
patients. In the event of a clash of objective between these two roles, the 
Hippocratic oath dictates that the role of scientist must be subordinate to the role 
of doctor. 
In outline, the development proceeds as follows. In section '2 we sketch the main 
components of clinical decision, making no attempt at precision but rather painting 
a broad picture of the subject and establishing some terminology and notation. A 
central problem in current medical practice is diagnosis, and we examine in detail 
the construction of a realistic diagnostic model—the predictive diagnostic model—in 
section 3, compare its effectiveness in practice with widely advocated alternatives in 
section' 4, and discuss its use as a basis or norm for measuring diagnostic 
performance in section 5. The closely related aspects of prognosis, treatment 
assessment and treatment allocation are examined in section 6 and a synthesis of the 
various phases of patient management considered in section 7. 
An impetus to the re-examination of clinical medicine in decision theoretic 
terms was given by Ledley and Lusted' ; see also Lusted' for a more extensive 
account and some interesting applications. We shall not attempt to provide a 
complete survey of the subject here or to trace the source of all the ideas presented. 
Rather we shall concentrate on problems which have come our way in the course of 
providing a consultative service to medical colleagues, and try to draw some 
conclusions from this experience. 
2. COMPONENTS OF CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
When faced with any problem man seems to find it an aid, or at least a consolation, 
to be able to give it a label. The medical profession is no exception; its concept of 
diseases is essentially one of classification. The clinician is regarded as facing a 
stream of patients each belonging to one and only one of a finite set C 
27 
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d I of disease categories. The 'only one' provision can be ensured by 
having separate categories for each feasible multiple pathology. Much energy is 
indeed expended in the formulation of the appropriate C for various specialties. A 
presenting patient is of unknown category K although the clinician, from his 
experience may have formed sonic view of the arrival pattern. This we can 
characterise by the arrival rate vector a of probabilities a, where a  is the 
probability that the next patient will be in disease category c. The clinician will not 
normally know a but may regard some a as more plausible than others. Conceptually 
any a in the simplex 
A = I a:a>O(c=l,...,d),ai +...+adl 	 (2.1) 
is feasible. We have placed the strict inequality on each ac  to ensure that no 
category can ever be ruled out with absolute certainty. 
In the diagnostic phase of patient management the clinician gathers information 
about some or all of a finite set F = I , . . .,g of features. Feature I might be sex, 
feature 2 presence or absence of headache, feature 3 pulse fate, feature 4 113 1 
24-hr uptake, and so on; in other words, observed features may be personal 
information and symptoms elicited from the patients, signs observed or measure-
ments made by the clinician at his examination of the patient, results of laboratory 
tests, etc. For this preliminary view of the process, we shall not dwell on the 
problem of which order and which stopping rule should be used in this 
accumulation of information. We shall assume that the whole of P has been 
observed, and that the appropriate sample space is XI.-, or more briefly X. We shall 
use suitably indexed x's to denote the observed feature vectors of patients of 
known category; for the current undiagnosed patient, we shall denote the observed 
feature vector by y. 
If the categories are really distinct and the features are to be of any value in the 
direction of category, we must envisage that the distribution of x depends to sonic 
extent on the category c of the patient. We can exhibit this dependence by writing 
p(xIc,O) for the probability (density) function associated with category c. The 0c is 
also introduced to emphasise that we do not know what this distribution is, but 
have to imagine it as one of some class of possible distributions indexed by 
elements of Oc.  We lose no generality, and we shall obtain some notational 
simplicity, if we write 8 = (O .....Od) for the structural parameter, and 0 = 
X - . .X 0d  and consider The feature vector distribution associated with category 
c 
as belonging to a class of distributions 
{p(-k,O):6E0 1 	 (2.2) 
on X. 
For convenience we use the term case record for the combination (c,x) 
associated with a patient whose feature vector is x and who has been classified 
firmly into category c. We suppose that there is available a number ii of such case 
records, n of category c, where n, > 0 for every c E C. We denote this set of past 
records briefly by 
z = I (c, 1) : il,...,n 1 	 (2.3) 
.2O 
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Within this framework diagnosis is the process by which the clinician uses 
whatever information he has concerning the unknown a and 0, together with past 





of the possible categories K = I .....d for the new patient. We deliberately 
introduce an ii into the notation to emphasise that this assessment must depend on 
certain assumptions or hypotheses and it is well to be reminded forcefully of their 
presence. We shall consider in detail in section 3 the diagnostic aspects of the 
process and, in particular, the hypotheses h underlying the process. 
Having hopefully reduced, in some sense, the dimensionality of the problem by 
this technique, the simple traditional view is to turn attention to the problem of 
allocating an appropriate treatment. While there may be situations in medicine 
where there is one-to-one correspondence between category and treatment, there 
are usually options open at the end of the so-called diagnostic process. We therefore 
recognise that there may be a set T of possible treatments, and since we regard 
diagnosis as a probability assessment rather than a decision on category, we assume 
that T contains any known treatment appropriate to any of the categories in C'. We 
also recognise that the response to the same treatment t of two patients, each with 
the same (c,x), will not necessarily be the same. Let us suppose that assessment of 
the effectiveness of a treatment is measured in terms of observations of a finite set 
R = 	1, . . ., s of responses or features, some of which may, of course, be the same 
as prior to treatment. It may also be that, between diagnosis and treatment, 
information additional to the diagnosticy information is required. We can, however, 
assume that this is absorbed in the y displayed. Suppose that the sample space 
associated with observation of R is WR, or simply W. 
In his search for an appropriate treatment for a patient with known case record 
(c,x), the clinician prognoses: if he assigns treatment t what is the response w likely 
to be, or more appropriately what is the probability density function(w,x,r) on 
W? In order to compare the effectiveness of different treatments, it is necessary to 
have some knowledge of this. To emphasise the fact that we may not know this 
exactly, we write it as 
p(w c,x, t, 0 	 (2.5) 
to indicate that we are dealing with one member of a family of possible 
distributions indexed by ii E 'I'. The response w may in some cases be measured in 
simple terms such as cure or no cure, or survival time, but there are clearly 
Situations where some much more complex measurement is more realistic. 
The distributions (2.5) describe the prognostic aspect of medicine and are 
conveniently called the prognostic distributions. The source of any firm inform-
ation on them or equivalently on i is undoubtedly the controlled clinical trial; and 
from such information, we would attempt to eliminate the nuisance index ,i' to 
obtain applicable prognostic distributions 
p(w I c,x,t;h) 
	
(2.6) 
for each possible c,x,r. Again we insert a cautionary h to remind us of the 
assumptions involved. 
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To allocate treatment t to a new patient (with feature vector), but of unknown 
category K), we have to have some overall view of the advantages and disadvantages 
Of the various possible outcomes. If the clinician could make explicit a general 
utility structure 
U(cy,t,w), 	 (2.7) 
the utility of getting a patient with K from unpleasant state .y by the discomfort and 
cost of treatment t to the more pleasant state w, then standard approaches to 
decision demand that we choose t to minimise 
U(,<,y,t,w) p(K Iy,z,;h) p(wK,v,t;h). 	 (2.8) 
W E W K E C 
3. A DIA GNOSTIC MODEL 
We now attempt to specify clearly the basic assumptions of statistical diagnosis. We 
have tried to reduce the assumptions to the absolute minimum and to express them 
in a form in which they have as far as possible a practical meaning. Certainly only 
by setting out precisely what the assumptions are is it possible to discuss the 
appropriateness of analysis that depends on these assumptions. It will be seen that 
with five such assumptions, hi to h5, some rather interesting consequences follow. 
The notation follows that of section 2. For a full discussion of the appropriateness 
of these assumptions see Aitchison and Kay.3  
hi: 	p(c I a,6) =p(cl a). 
p(xl c,a,O)p(xIc,O). 
For any set z of rn case records z (i = l . . ., rn) 
=f?1p(zIa,6). 
p(a,O) = p (a)p(0). 
We do not imply in the notation p(cla) that the cases considered as constituting 
past records have necessarily arisen at the natural arrival rate. We allow the 
possibility for instance that the informative experiment has been specially designed 
so that there are equal numbers of cases in each of the categories. The new case for 
consideration, of unknown category K, is however assumd to arrive according to the 
probabilistic pattern associated with a. 
p(K a) = a, where aK  is the K element of a. 
These assumptions, together with straightforward conditional probability argu-
ments, including Bayes' Theorem, allow us to obtain the form of the posterior 
plausibility assessment a, 6, K , based on the information y, z; for details see 
Aitchison and Kay.3 Thus, 
p(a, 6 ,K Ly, z;h) = p(aIc)p( a)p(O L')p(vI,<, 0) 
p(KIc)p(y, z) 	 (3.1) 
KEC 
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where c = (c1 , . . . , c,), x = (x1 	.), and 
p(alc) = p(a)p(ccr)/f,p(a)p(cja)da, 	 (3.2) 
P(01z) = p(0)p(xjc, 0)! 1 ep(0)p(xlc, 0)dO, 	 (3.3) 
p(i]c) = f Ap(da)p(aIc)da, 	 (34) 
p(yjk',z) = I ep0,k,0)p(0iz)d0. 	 (3.5) 
Although we shall be interested in other aspects of this posterior distribution, our 
first objective is to assess the different plausibilities of the various categories, that is 
p(y,c,x;h) = p([c)pO'k,c,x) 	 (3.6) 
p( c)p(yk,c,x) 
EC 
An interpretation of (3.6) is that it is simply the conversion of an assessment p(Ic), 
after the categories c of past cases are known, but prior to any information 
concerning the n+l feature vectors y,z, to a posterior assessment p(i< [y,c,x,/z) by 
way of Bayes' Theorem and with p(yk,c,x) or p(yk,z) playing the role of the 
likelihood function. Special interest then centres on p(K!c) and p(yIK,x). 
First we note that, from (3.4) and hS, 
p(KIc) = E(ac). 	 (3.7) 
Hence in so far as inference concerning the category of the new case is concerned, 
uncertainty about a is involved only in the form E(a Ic). We do not have to be able 
to provide a complete picture of the uncertainty in p(ajc) but only the mean vector 
E(ajc) of this distribution. 
The distribution p(yk,z) defined by (3.5) is the predictive distribution. For a 
new case in known category K it provides, on the basis of prior information p(0), 
the past records z and the assumptions h, an assessment of the probabilities of the 
possible feature vectors y we may observe on the case. The important role that 
predictive distributions have to play in statistical analysis has become increasingly 
recognised (Geisser4 ' 5  , Guttman and Tiao,6  Aitchison and Sculthorpe,7  Zeliner and 
Chetty,8 Dunsmore,9 ,1 0,11 Lindley' 2) and it is not new to the field of statistical 
diagnosis. The relation (3.6) is the basis of a method advocated by Geisser4 in 
relation to multivariate normal data and by Dunsmore9 in a decision theory 
approach to the general problem of identification. Neither gives applications to 
clinical medicine. As far as we are aware no such practical application has been 
made nor have the practical implications of the method been followed through. We 
have redeveloped the model so as to emphasise, and give meaning to, the underlying 
assumptions, to allow consideration in later sections of the full posterior 
dependence of a, 0 and to obtain some wider results, and to set the scene for the 
assessment of its effectiveness in practice and for the analysis of performance. 
Although the diagnostic phase is a means to an end it is undoubtedly an 
important phase, and it is possible at this stage to make some assessment of the 
model concerned, both from the practical viewpoint and from the performance. 
Such assessments are the subjects of the next two sections. 
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4. THE DIA GNOSTIC MODEL IN PRACTICE 
A few simple assumptions have led us inevitably to a particular form of diagnostic 
assessment, which we shall term predictive diagnosis because of its association with 
the predictive distribution. We now compare the practical effectiveness of this 
method with others commonly used. 
The statistical diagnostic methods currently widely advocated (for example, 
Dixon' 3)  are of estimative type and are generally supported by an argument of the 
following kind. If we knew the structural parameter U then we could easily arrive at 
appropriate plausibilities for the unknown disease category K of a new patient with 
feature vector)'. We would simply apply Bayes' Theorem in the form 
p(Ky)op(K)p(y,O). 	 (4.1) 
Recognising that we do not know 6, the estimative method simply replaces 0 by a 
suitable estimate '(z), for example a maimum likelihood estimate, based on the 
past records z. We could thus rewrite the estimative method as 
p(KLv,z) crp(Ic)p(yk,(z)). 	 (4.2) 
Using a simpler form of 3.6j for the predictive method, and for brevity dropping the h, 
p(KIy,z) op(Kc)p(y,z), 	 (4.3) 
where 
p(yk,z) = f,,p(jik,0)p(Olz)d0. 	 (4.4) 
That the difference between the two techniques can have a substantial effect in 
practice can be seen from the following example of the application of the two 
methods. Until fairly recently, a rare hypertensive syndrome (Conn's syndrome) 
ws believed to have as its sole possible cause an adenoma (benign tumour) in an 
adrenal cortex. At operation on a number of patients, several were found not to 
have an adrenocortical tumour but to have a more diffuse condition (bilateral 
hyperplasia) involving both adrenal glands. Since the assessment of treatment, 
which may range from total adrenalectomy, through removal of an adenomatous 
adrenal gland if locatable, to drug therapy, is now recognised to depend on the 
diagnostic assessment and on a number of factors external to the diagnostic 
assessment, what is required from the diagnostic process is a reasonable assessment 
of odds. There are eight features or diagnostic tests and the basic set z of past 
records consists of 31 case records, 20 in category a (adenoma) and 11 in category 
b (bilateral hyperplasia). There is appreciable evidence of non-equality of 
covariance matrices, so that the estimative method would be attempting to estimate 
an 88-dimensional parameter from 3 1 eight-dimensional vectors. It is clear that to 
use these estimates as if they were reliable is running a risk. A flrst indication of the 
remarkable extent of this risk is seen in figure 1, where the log, 0 odds (alb) based 
on the estimative and the predictive methods are shown for the 31 patients of the 
basic set. Odds of 1020  to I by the estimative assessment are slashed to 103 to I by 
the predictive assessment. The position with respect to new patients can be even 
more startling. Table I shows experience with new patients. The dramatic alteration 
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Estimative 
Predictive 
FIGURE 1 	Comparison of the log1 0 odds (alb) assigned by estimative and 
predictive diagnosis to the 31 basic case records 
of odds in some of the cases is due to the fact that they are, in a technical sense 
which can be well defined, outside the previous limited experience of both diseases, 
though not in any way atypical of the favoured disease. For such cases, the 
predictive method acts with more caution, which is again very reasonable. Cases N4 
and N5 are particularly interesting. Case N4 is in fact a now-confirmed case of 
bilateral hyperplasia, not the clear case of adenoma assessed by the estimative 
method. The true category of case N5 is as yet unknown but treatment on the basis 
of a diagnosis of bilateral hyperplasia is so far meeting with success. 





Estimative I 	Predictive 
NI 1012 / 1 64/1 
N2 1011 /1 56/1 
N3 1/245 1/80 
N4 3700/1 1/2 
N5 i/i 1/3 
In our introductory remarks, we indicated that some form of monitoring is 
desirable to ensure that the decision to stream a patient into the specialty 
characterised by C has not been unreasonable. A method of achieving this is based 
on the following argument. On the basis of past experience of disease category the 
probability distribution associated with the feature vector y of any new patient is 
simply the predictive distribution. Suppose we are concerned about how typical of 
disease category < a patient with observed feature vector y0 is? We can regard any 
case with feature vector y for which p(yk,z) ~p(y0 k,z) as more typical of  than 
patient y0, or equivalently y0 as less typical than y. We can thus construct for 
patient y0 a sensible index A,(y0) of atypicality relative to disease category K as 
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the probability (on the basis of past experience) that another patient is more 
typical than him. Thus 
A(y0) = f pvk,z)dy, 
y:pvk,z)p(y0 k,z). 
Thus A,( is measured on the scale (0,1) with 0 indicating the absolutely typical and 
1 complete atypicality. If we find 
min A(y0) 
EC 
near I , then we would be right to suspect that the patient may have been 
channelled into the wrong set C of categories, and take some appropriate action. 
5. MEASURIATG PER FORi'1AN6'E INDIA GNOSTIC TASKS 
We hope that by now we may have convinced the reader of the reasonableness of 
predictive diagnosis as a means of assessing the diagnostic position of a particular 
new patient. We propose shortly to use predictive diagnosis as a normative model 
against which to assess the intuitive performance of human decision makers in such 
diagnostic tasks. E''en for the reader who does not accept the predictive diagnostic 
model, it is easy to demonstrate the great variability of inferential ability and how 
it falls short of generally accepted inference. We can achieve this by ensuring that 
the decision maker knows the distributions associated with the three categories. 
TABLE 2 Composition of the three possible boxes a,b,c. The numbers shown are 
the numbers ot black beads in each compartment 
Box 1 2 3 4 
Compartment  
5 	6 7 	8 9 	10 
a 4 8 7 4 6 	5 3 	2 4 	1 
b 4 7 4 8 5 	9 5 	3 8 	5 
C 6 6 6 5 2 	4 8 	72 9 
A simple form of diagnostic task is in terms of a sdt of independent diagnostic 
binomial tests which can be described in terms of a box model. Suppose that a box 
is of one of three possible types a, b or c. Each box is divided into 10 
compartments, each compartment containing 10 beads some black some white. 
Table 2 shows the numbers of black beads in each of the compartments in each of 
the boxes, and this information is supplied to the subject or decision maker. The 
subject is then informed of the results of a single random drawing from each of the 
10 compartments of a box of undisclosed type; the results are given in sequence 
and he is asked to update his plausibility assessment after each result is disclosed to 
him. A convenient way to express the opinion that the relative plausibiities of a, b 
and c are ire , rrb, 	with ir + 	+ -r= 1, is in terms of the point rr in the 
equilateral triangle abc of unit altitude (figure 2). Rouahly speaking with this 
representation the nearer a point is to a vertex the more plausible the corresponding 
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FIGURE 2 	Representation of a plausibility assessment within a triangle 
box or disease category is regarded. Thus for each case presented to him the subject 
will produce a diagnostic path of 10 steps showing the development of his 
plausibility assessment as the evidence accumulates. Figure 3 shows diagnostic paths 
for a variety of individuals for three cases. It is clear that there is wide variation in 
ability and departure from the objective path computed by repeated application of 
Bayes's Theorem. 
For the case where the feature distributions are not known but have to be 
visualised from case records by the subject, the variability of diagnostic inference 
can again easily be demonstrated. At a recent conference on multivariate statistical 
analysis a diagnostic competition was held. The observed, vectors on a six-
dimensional feature on 48 patients, 16 in each of three disease categories a,b,c, 
were given to each contestant, with, for each category sample, the feature means, 
standard deviations and correlation coefficients already computed. The contestants 
were then asked to provide a diagnostic opinion on each of five uncategorised 
patients for whom the complete feature vectors were provided. They were informed 
that the diseases were equally prevalent. Figure 4 shows the plausibility points of 
the 55 participants for one of the cases, a picture which is typical of the other four 
cases. 
For the illustrative case of three diseases we have so far envisaged the decision 
maker as making his diagnostic assessments on a flat triangular plane. We can, 
however, give an added dimension to the picture and an added depth to our 
understanding of this phase of the decision making process by the introduction of 
information concepts. We shall do this through the familiar concept of degree of 
uncertainty (the so-called entropy of information theory) remaining about the 
unknown category 9 , when the plausibility assessment for K is ir (K EC). This is 
defined by 
ir 	log 7r,,, 	 (5.1) 
where the base of the logarithmic function determines the units. The greatest degree 
of uncertainty occurs in the equi-plausible case ir = 7T  = 7Tc3, when u(n) log 3; 
and the least approaches 0 when 17< approaches 1 for some xEC. 
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C 	 a 
b C 	b 
a 	 a. 
b C 	b C 
a 	 a 
b' 	 'c 	b' 	 'C 
FIGURE 3 	Diagnostic paths for three cases of trilemma. The objective paths are 
shown in the triangles on the left. The subjects whose paths are 
shown on the right are: 
Two consultant clinicians 
Two first-course statistics students 
10 year old boy 
- consultant clinician 
Each point in the triangle has therefore associated with it a degree of uncertainty 
and we can draw within the triangle the contours of uncertainty consisting of 
Points (7n1, 1n2, 7n3) for which u(ir) is constant (figure 5). If we take this extra 
dimension 'degree of uncertainty' as depth below the surface of the triangle, we 
obtain a picturesque view of the decision maker in his search for the unknown 
category. He is in a pit of uncertainty shaped like a triangular bowl, endeavouring, 
by his feature observations, to gain enough information so that he may climb 
sufficiently near the vertex corresponding to the true category and thus make the 
correct diagnosis. The concepts presented here for the case d = 3 extend without 
modification for other d, although of course the visual representation is lost. 
0' 
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FIGURE 4 	Plausibility points of 55 paiticipants in a diagnostic competition 
The question of how to obtain meaningful measures of the discrepancy between 
the personal inference of the diagnostician and the predictive diagnosis assessment 
has now to be tackled. We shall take as our general objective the reduction of the 
degree of uncertainty about the unknown categoryand we shall judge a decision 
maker's effectiveness in terms of his ability to select his features for this purpose, 
and also his skill in interpreting the feature observations as indicators of the true 
category. 
Suppose that at any stage in his diagnostic path the decision maker's assessment 
is represented by plausibiities 7Tg , ic E C, and that alter observing an additional 
feature, he quotes ir', instead of Pg  given by the predictive diagnostic model, as his 
new assessment (figure 6). 
The first measure of discrepancy is a general one which is positive except when 
= p for every K CC, when it assumes the value zero. We shall term it the 
inference discrepancy .9, defined by 
,f(ir,ir', P)= log (p/7r') 
KEC  
(5.2) 
This measure may be computed for each step in the decision maker's diagnostic 
path. At the beginning of each step, we place the decision maker in the most 
favourable position by accepting, in the computations for that step, his attained 
plausibility assessment. Each measurement .5 is therefore made relative to the 
particular step and does not contain any accumulation of discrepancies from 
previous steps. 
We now introduce measures of discrepancy for conservatism and liberalism. If 
the decision maker moves from 7r to ir', and ir' is below p on the uncertainty 
surface, then we can meaningfully say that he is acting in a conservative manner 
relative to the normative model. The extent of this conservatism can be measured 
by the difference in the uncertainty levels of p and ir', namely 
ME 




FIGURE 5 	Contours of uncertainty and triangular bowl 
'S 
where the difference has been expressed so that a conservative use of a feature 
observation is associated with a negative measure. If ir' is above p on the 
uncertainty surface, the decision maker is reading more into the feature observation 
than the normative model allows. This liberalism in the interpretation of the feature 
observation can be measured by u(ir') - u(p), the fact that this is positive indicating 
liberalism and not conservatism. 
The construction of this conservative-liberal index £ may be expressed as 
	
£(7r, 71', p) = 	u(p) - u(ir'), if u(7r) > u(p), 
= u(ir') - u(p), if u(7r) <u(p), 
and, if u(ir) = u(p), 	 (5.3) 
£(ir, iT', p) 	= 	u(p) - u(ir'), if u(71) 
= u(ir') - u(p), if u(ir) <u(ir'). 
Suppose that we take as our criterion of feature selection that of expected gain 
of information, or equivalently expected reduction of information from observing a 
feature or subset of features. Following Lindley,' we may then define G(JLvz), the 
2o 
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FIGURE 6 	Comparative steps in a diagnostic path 
expected gain of information about K from observing the subset J of features after 
y1  has already been observed in the subset I of features. In the normative model, we 
decide to observe the set of features J, which has maximum expected gain of 
information over all subsets J of F which have no features in common with I. 
Relative to this normative model, a measure .of feature selection discrepancy for 
a subject who chooses J after observingy1  is given by 
j) = G(J 1) - G(J 1). 
This quantity may be computed for each step (j = 1) in the diagnostic path. 
To illustrate the method of analysing performance we show in figure 7 the 
sequential diagnostic paths and the associated performance analyses of two subjects 
for a new case of the three-disease system referred to at the beginning of this 
section. Taylor et al. 	give an application in a medical setting and show similar 
discrepncies for clinicians, although they are self-critical of their assumption that 
for a given disease category features are statistically independent. No such 
assumption is made in the above analysis. 
6. PROGNOSIS AND TR EA TMENT 
The role of diagnosis in clinical medicine can be regarded as a preliminary phase in 
which an attempt is made to discover the category or type of the subsequent 
decision problem of patient management that next faces the clinician. Our emphasis 
on this phase has been conditioned not only by its obvious importance in current 
medical thinking but also because it is at present the best quantified phase of most 
medical problems. Let us now turn our attention to the complex of less-well 
quantified concepts and actions which are usually considered under the headings of 
prognosis and treatment. 
The main objective tool by which clinicians have attempted to compare and 
assess treatments is undoubtedly the controlled clinical triaL It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to go into a detailed appraisal of the development and organisation of 
such trials, the question of ethics and the relative effectiveness of sequential and 
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a 	 a 
FIGURE 7 
fixed-size trials. One general point concerning controlled clinical trials does, 
however, provide the motivation for our subsequent formulation of the decision 
problem, and we can here illustrate it by a simple example. Suppose that, in a 
clinical trial to compare two treatments t 1 and t2, 200 patients are allocated 
randomly, 100 to each treatment; that a check is made of the similarity of the 
composition of the two groups; and that the usual double blind requirements of 
management of patients and assessment of treatment are met. Suppose that the 
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The standard statistical analysis would then test the null hypothesis of no 
difference between the treatments by a standard chi-squared test. A significant 
difference between the treatments would thus be revealed and, if the sole criterion 
is to maximise the proportion of successful treatments, the accompanying 
recommendation would be that treatment t2 should be used. 
If we have to choose between using treatment t 1 for all patients and using 
treatment t 2 for all patients, we may be convinced that treatment t2 is to be 
preferred. But we may not have made fully effective use of all the information 
available. For consider the conceptual classification of patients into four mutually 
exclusive groups a1 1 , a 1 o, a0 1, a00 , where the suffices i, / are assigned for each 
patient by the following criterion: 
I 	1 , if treatment t 1  would/would not be successful with the patient, 
(6.1) 
/ 
	if treatment t2  would/would not be successful with the patient. 
It is of course impossible to assign a patient to these groups, but the concept allows 
us to make the following points. If p(c) denotes the proportion of patients in cjj in 
the trial, then the only restrictions determined by the results are 
p(e11)+p(e jo)O.5, 
p(e11)+p(e01)=O.7. 	 (6.2) 
It is clear that these can be satisfied by a number of specifications lying between 
two extremes: 
p(e1j)=0.5,p(eio)r0,p(eoi)0.2,P(eoo)O.3, 	. 	 (6.3) 
p(e11 ) = 0.2,p(e10)=0.3,p(e01)0.5,p(eoo)=0. 	 (6.4) 
If (6.3) is the case, then we cannot improve on the overall success rate 0.7 envisaged 
by the recommendation, whereas, if (6.4) is the case, and if we could identify 
patients in the various groups, we could clearly attain complete success with all 
patients. We ought therefore to investigate the patients in the four treatment x 
response categories to discover whether there are any features that distinguish 
among them. For example if the distributions of the sexes M and F were 
ti 	t2 
Success 50F 	50M 
20F 
Failure 50M 	30F 
then it would surely be sensible to consider allocating males to treatment t2 and 
females to treatment t 1 . 
Thus we consider shifting the emphasis in clinical trials from the customary 
question posed 'Which treatment is best?' to 'Which treatment is best for which 
patient?' In our illustrative example, we see that, for the latter question to be 
answerable, we require to know for each patient in the clinical trial the triplet 
.23 
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(y, t, w), where y (E Y) denotes an observation on a set of potentially useful 
indicating features (in our example, sex), where t (E 7) denotes the treatment 
assigned in the trial (here, t 1 or t 2 ) and w (E h is an observation on a recognised 
set R of response features (here, success or failure). 
A clinical trial will have achieved its purpose if it provides us with a clear picture 
of the variability of w for given t and y. For this is simply the quantification of the 
medical concept of prognosis for a patient in current state y if put on treatment t, a 
concept that is clearly necessary however implicitly it may remain in the formal 
decision process. To investigate its possible quantification, we may consider some 
suitable parametric form, say 
p(wjt, y, iii) (i,i E 'i'), 	 - 	 (6.5) 
for the prognosis distributions, and use the data 
V = (y1, t, w1): i = 1,.. ., n 	 . 	 (6.6) 
from the clinical trial to obtain, in the same kind of way as for the diagnostic 
assessment, the predictive forms of the prognosis distributions 
p(wlt, y, v). 	 (6.7) 
There have been some recent attempts to tackle this kind of problem 
quantitatively in an estimative rather than predictive way (see for example, Peel et 
,71., 16 Hughes et al., 1  Ginsberg and Offensend,' 8  Norris et ci. 1 9 with w a simnie 
binomial response, survival or death, and t for a single treatment, so that the 
statistical technique is indistinguishable from estimative diagnosis. 
An example of more sophisticated model-building is implicit in the discussion of 
prognosis and the effects of treatment in Pickering.2 0 There the many straight line 
fits to the plots of cumulative survival percentages against logarithm of time suggest 
that the basic family of prognostic distributions (6.5), with w logarithm of survival 
time and y a measure of current blood pressure, are well characterised by normal 
distributions with mean q. + y and variance o. It is easy to visualise circumstances 
circumstances in which it will be desirable to give different treatments at different 
current blood pressure levels; for example, if the at are the same but the f3 
different. 
MISCEL LAVEO US PR ORL EMS OF A SYNTHESIS 
The main obstacle to any attempt to bring together the various strands of clinical 
decision making is the difficulty of obtaining any clearcut picture of the clinician's 
(or the patient's and clinician's) assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of 
moving from a current state, assumed to be described by y, to a future state, 
assumed to be measured by w. Allowance must also be made for the cost of 
treatment, not only in monetary terms of treatment materials and manpower but as 
importantly in terms of discomfort to the patient. It is natural that clinicians must 
show reticence over such matters, for some decisions inevitably call for some 
assessment on the value of life itself, especially in problems where there is 
competition between patients for limited equipment, currently, for example, in 
renal dialysis and transplants. Yet decisions are undoubtedly made and imple- 
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merited, however implicitly any preference or utility structure enters into the 
decision making process. If a utility structure, ofthe type U(rg y, t, w), envisaged in 
(2.7), is assumed then one sensible way to arrive at a decision is through the 
expected utility analysis of (2.8). in some areas of medicine, attempts are being 
made to place even monetary assessments on certain states, for example on the 
extent of industrial disease, such as degree of pneumoconiosis, or of injury such as 
thalidomide deformity. We hope that we may make some direct headway in a 
cooperative effort to arrive at some utility structure for Coan's syndrome (section 
4). 
In the absence of any examples of direct assessment, we can turn our attention 
only to ways in which the decision theorist may make some contribution to 
improving the effectiveness of treatment. One such way is to ask whether it is 
possible to uncover the implicit utility structure of a clinician by observing his actions 
or decisions in practice. Aitchison' ' has discussed the feasibility of such reconstruc-
tion with different qualities of data, and here we comment on a Simple application, 
reported by Aitchison et ci. 22 
The treatment of thyrotoxicosis can take one of three forms, anti-thyroid drug 
therapy, surgery or radio-iodine therapy, and at present there appears to be HO 
method of determining with any certainty the appropriate treatment for a 
particular case. The question is therefore whether we can discern any inconsisten-
cies in the allocations of treatment made by clinicians. In the study referred to, the 
clinicians agreed that their allocations were affected by only five features—age, 
goitre size, an agreed index of general health, and two technical tests of thyroid 
function. Each clinician was presented with these feature vectors for 40 cases and 
asked to state what treatment he would advise. If we regard the three treatments as 
the three categories of the set C we see that a clinician's allocations effectively 
define a set of diagnostic case records. The extent to which it is possible to simulate 
the clinician is a measure of his consistency. Aitchison Ct aL 22  show that a suitable 
measure of inconsistency is the average degree of uncertainty associated with the 
predictive assessment. In this assessment, any case in which the predictive 
assessment differs from the actual allocation by the clinician is treated as if it were 
at the point of maximum uncertainty. 
It is shown that the clinicians differ considerably in their inconsistency 
measures. It is further shown, by a technique similar to the feature selection aspect 
of section 5, that effective use is made of only the first three components of  and 
the method of use varies from clinician to clinician. It is hoped that revelation of 
the detailed nature of these differences can help clinicians to formulate the decision 
problem in more formal terms and to arrive at some greater consensus. After 
feedback of the analysis to the clinicians, a further study of treatment allocations is 
in progress. 
We touch on a few further aspects of the synthesis of decision making in clinical 
medicine by posing questions to which we provide only partial answers. Should 
treatment be allocated on the basis of the most plausible disease category? The 
answer is clearly 'Not necessarily'. It is a well known feature of statistical decision 
theory that it is not necessarily optimum to take that action which is associated 
with the most plausible state of nature. In terms of (2.8), the maximising r for the 
double sum will not necessarily be the same as that maximising the single sum 
associated with the most plausible category, k say. In view of this answer, we may 
then be inclined to ask a more far-reaching question. 
To what extent is diagnosis necessary? The patient is largely unconcerned with 
a?5 
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the technical name given to his particular condition; his preoccupation is 
undoubtedly to move from an unpleasant current state y to a happier state w with 
as little discomfort to his body or his purse as possible. For the patient, therefore, 
the utility in (2.8) takes the form U(y, t, w), indepeddent of K. In evaluating (2.8), 
therefore, we could then take U(y, t, w) to the left of the inner accumulation and 
so rewrite (2.8) as 
2 	u(y, t, w) p(lt, y, 1)), 	 . 	(7.1) 
WEE IV 
where effectively p(iIt, y, v) is the predictive form of the prognosis distribution 
discussed at (6.7). Thus conceptually the diagnostic phase of the decision process is 
unnecessary. There is indeed some evidence that this is an-  approach which is 
becoming more and more acceptable in medicine; see for example, Knil-Jones et 
al. 23  
Flow does the Hippocratic oath affect clinical decision making? The first aspect 
of this question is really a continuation of a previous one. Many approaches to the 
diagnostic phase of clinical medicine have been obsessed by the objective of 
minimising the misdiagnosis rate. This criterion corresponds to a utility structure 
which sets equal the losses associated with all the different possible kinds of 
misdiagnosis. This is clearly a very special kind of utility structure, and to the 
extent that the true but implicit structure differs from it this statistical approach is 
inadequate. Until such time as a clinician is prepared to state explicitly the utility 
structure involved, the role of the decision theorist must be confined to advising on 
diagnostic assessment, prognosis assessment, and uncovering implicit utility 
structures. 
The second aspect concerns the tension between the roles of doctor and scientist 
within the clinician. Denote by G(), G(K, a), . . . the expected gain of information 
concerning <, (, a, . . . from the observation of a set of features on a new patient. 
Then on the basis of the assumptions Ii of section 3, and in particular using (3.1), 
we can show that 
G(K , a) 	= 	G() 	 (7.2) 
= G(a)+fAG(K!ap(a)da, 	 (7.3) 
G(, a, 6) 	= 	G(K) + 	G(O k) p(K). 
Now in the diagnostic phase, the only unknown parameter relevant to treatment of 
the new patient is K, and so, in choosing to observe features on him, 
WC are 
concerned with maximisation of G(K). The relation (7.2) shows that the choice 
which seeks to obtain maximum information concerning both K and a is equivalent 
to one that takes the Hippocratic action of maximising information concerning K 
alone; whereas (7.3) and (7.4) demonstrate that maximisation of expected 
information concerning a alone, or of expected information concerning 6, from a 
patient without regard to K are unhippocratic. 
There are many obvious defects and oversimplifications in the approach to 
medical decision making that we have presented here. Because of the difficulty of 
persuading clinicians to declare themselves sufficiently to allow some form of 
utility structure we have emphasised those aspects of their decision making that are 
most accessible, mainly the diagnostic aspect. By setting out principles of diagnosis 
carefully, we have demonstrated that, in practice, large differences do arise in the 
Section Four 271 
employment of different methods, and that performance in diagnosis differs widely 
in different individuals and fails short of reasonably objective criteria. Clearly the 
observation of features is an attempt to gain information about the category of an 
individual problem. However, the observation of features has associated costs, not 
only in financial terms but also in terms of patient discomfort and delay before 
treatment. In considering the diagnostic phase in isolation, how do we find 
common units for the measurement of information gain and such costs? Moreover, 
when we realise that the decision making process is taking place in time and calls 
for. sequential actions, we are faced with the awkward question of when to stop the 
diagnostic phase and proceed seriously to treatment? Moreover, in the process of 
treatment, there are in practice opportunities of adjustment, even of returning to 
the diagnostic phase because of information obtained in the process of treatment. 
In short, to describe the decision making process completely, we require something 
more akin to a control process. We are clearly a long way from achieving this even 
in simple cases. 
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12 PARAMETRIC MODELLING IN STATISTICAL DIAGNOSIS 
12.1 Introduction 
Much of the attention of statisticians in applications in 
medicine has been directed towards problems in medical research 
such as clinical trials. There are equally important problems 
arising from the uncertainties and variabilities in the clinical 
management of individual patients. Aitchison and Kay (15:1975) 
examine this process of patient management recognising and modelling 
various aspects of the problem such as past experience of the 
clinician, observation and measurement, diagnosis, prognosis, 
treatment allocation and assessment. There is little point in 
going into detail in this brief commentary. Greater quantification 
of the practice of clinical medicine must come, and will require 
the careful collection of data to allow the fitting of the various 
aspects suggested in this paper. In this section the discussion is 
confined to the main aspects of parametric modelling of more 
complex problems arising directly out of consultation in 
statistical diagnosis. 
12.2 Statistical diagnosis when basic cases are not classified 
with certainty 
The purpose of Aitchison and Begg (16:1976) is to provide a 
generalisation of statistical diagnostic techniques to situations 
where the basic data set consists of cases for each of which a 
feature vector x is available together with a vector u of the 
relative plausibilities of the possible types. The need for such 
a generalisation had been seen in a reexamination of the problem 
of the differential diagnosis of Conn's syndrome (Ferriss et al, 
1970), for which the training set was reduced from 34 to 31 cases 
because of some uncertainty, even at histopathology, of the types 
of three cases. 
In order to model this situation a number of new concepts and 
techniques had to be introduced. 
In straightforward diagnostic systems the diagnostic statement 
is simple in the form 'this case is of type t'. To model the 
pattern of variability of such statements we require distri-
butions over the set T of possible disease.typeS. When a 
basic case is classified with uncertainty the diagnostic 
statement is composite itself, being a probability distribution 
t T} over T. To model the pattern of variability of such 
statements we thus require distributions over the class 
of distributions over T, one step further up the hierarchy of 
distributional statements: simple, composite, distributional. 
The modelling of the variability of (u,x) thus requires 
parametric modelling of distributions on a space of the 
form S x Rd, where S is the positive simplex 
{u : u>O 	(i= 1'...,c) : 
and R 
d  is d-dimensional real space. This is an awkward 
intractable space, which, however, can be converted to an 
analysable problem in R 
c+d by use of the one-to-one 
mapping between S 
c 
 and R 
C  through the loglinear, logistic 
transformations 
v 	= log{u/(l - u1 - ... -u c 
	
u 	(t = 1,.. .,c), 
= exp(v)/(l+eXP(V1) + ... +exp(vc)} 	
(t 	c) 
We shall discuss further justification and developments of 
this transformation in 513. 
The transformed data D = {(v1 x) : i=1,...,n} are then 
analysed through the tools of multivariate regression 
analysis in its predictive form. Some of the predictive 
distribution results here involve conditional multivariate 
Student distributions and are extension of the results of 
Aitchison and Dunsmore (13:1975). 
For a new case with feature vector y the analysis leads 
directly to an assessment in the form p(vly,D), where v is 
related to the composite diagnosis u through the logistic 
transformation. There remains therefore the problem of 
reducing this essentially distributional diagnostic statement 
to a more usable and interpretable composite statement. 
Conditional probability arguments then lead to the evaluation 
of certain integrals. For example, for the case of two types 
10  and 2 we have 
cz 
I 
p(t=1y,D) = I 	ev p(vy,D)dv. 
J_cx: 1+e 
Approximate methods for the evaluation of such integrals are 
provided. Lauder (1978) discusses further the computational 
problems associated with integrals of this type. 
Aitchison and Begg (16:1976) had no data to illustrate their 
method, which was developed to show that composite diagnostic 
statements can be accepted as a basis for the construction of 
diagnostic systems, with a view to encouraging clinicians to use 
composite statements if they are at all uncertain. The method has 
since been applied to problems of differential diagnosis of 
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auditory malfunction and of pre-eclampsia by Begg (1976). 
12.3 The system transfer problem in statistical diagnosis 
The basic problem considered by Aitchison (18:1977) is one of 
modelling, how to link a diagnostic system devised from data 
1)1 = {(t1,x) : i=l,...,n} 
from clinic 1, through independent calibrative data 
C12 = I (Ylj,Y2j)  : j = 1,.. .,k} 
between clinics 1 and 2, to produce a diagnostic system in clinic 2. 
Aspects of importance are the following. 
The assumptions of the parametric modelling are set out 
carefully to take account of the nature of the data. This 
leads to the eventual use of the predictive density function 
p(x2 t,C12,Di) I 
f 
xl 
 p(x2 x1,Ci2)P(Xl t,D1), 
J 
where p(x2 xl,C12) is the calibrative distribution from clinic 
1 measurement to clinic 2 measurement and p(x1 t,D1) is the 
predictive distribution on which clinic 1 diagnosis is based. 
The discrepancy between the use of 'naive calibration', 
which uses a calibrated point estimate obtained by inverse 
regression, and the calibrative diagnostic assessment 
described in (1), is analysed for the case of perfect 
information where all the distributions are known with 
precision, in an attempt to locate the sources of these 
discrepancies. In particular, factors associated with the 
discriminating power of the diagnostic features, the 
unreliability of the calibration process and the standardised 
30Z 
distance of the naive calibrate from the centre of the feature 
distributions, are identified. The case of perfect information, 
where the naive calibration method is certainly wrong, allows 
us to explore the possibility of substantial differences between 
the full and the naive calibrative diagnostic methods. Two 
illustrative examples, quite possible in practice, show naive 
odds of 28 to 1 and 20,000 to 1 reduced to 9 to 1 and 25 to 1 
respectively. 
The detailed distribution theory required for the normal case 
is developed. 
Modifications are made for the case of partial calibration, 
where only some of the diagnostic features require calibration. 
S. 	The technique is applied to the differential diagnosis of 
Conn's syndrome for new cases, for which the method of 
measurement of one of the features has changed from that of 
the training set. Out of 43 new cases eight are found to have 
diagnostic assessments which differ so much between the 
predictive calibrative and the naive calibrative methods that 
they lead to substantial practical differences in patient 
management. 
The method is readily applied and the potential misrepresentat-
ions in ignoring the effect are so substantial that there is no 
real excuse for not taking full account of the need to calibrate 
when the occasion demands. 
12.4 The clinic amalgamation problem in statistical diagnosis 
Aitchison (19:1979) develops methods for a more complex 
calibrative-diagnostic problem in which two or more clinics wish 
to pool their diagnostic data in order to construct a more reliable 
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diagnostic system than any one clinic could produce by itself. 
The objective here is to provide each clinic with a diagnostic 
system with its own method of measurement. When only two clinics 
are involved the data consist of two diagnostic training sets 
D. = {(t,xij) : i = 1,.. 	(i = 1,2) 
and a calibrative set 
C 	= {(Y1j'Y2)  
There are many possible ways of modelling and which is chosen must 
depend on the nature of the data. Only the main features of one 
form of modelling need be reported to bring out new developments 
of the approach. The case of two types only is used, and the 
presentation is for the case where the calibration experiment 
allows calibration from clinic 2 to clinic 1. 
The 'diagnostic paradigm' is adopted, modelling the conditional 
distribution of type t for given feature vector x by 
p(t=1x,)= 	
T) 
A new feature here is the use of the normal rather than the 
popular logistic distribution function. The reason for this 
is that it yields explicit forms, through convolution 
integrals, for the diagnostic model for clinic 2. 
If the calibration model is set up in terms of a conditional 
multivariate normal density function 
p(x11x2,y) = 4(xilAx2,B) 
then the diagnostic model for clinic 2 has a parametric form 
indexed by -' = (A,B) and 5: 
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p(t=1Ix2,y,) 




where c = ATS// (l+TB6) so that the induced diagnostic 
paradigm for clinic 2 is also of the normal linear form. 
This completion of the model building allows us to write down 
the likelihood and then to obtain an approximation to the 
posterior distribution p(y,5 ICi212) through Bayesian 
maximum likelihood theory, with-a view to adopting a 
predictive approach towards the assessment of new cases. 
To illustrate this assessment suppose that a new patient 
with feature vector x1 is to be diagnosed in clinic 1. Suppose 










When the calibration experiment is a natural one diagnostic 
assessments for new cases in clinic 2 take a similar form. 
When the calibration experiment allows only calibration from 
X2 to x1 then for new cases in clinic 2 the diagnostic 




j f" 4 	
TATx 
	I ~(y,6jc,d;J)dyd 
r 	L 41+6TB) 
where y = (A,B) . This multiple integral requires for its 
evaluation numerical or Monte Carlo methods, reinforcing the 
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soundness of the advice to perform a natural calibration 
experiment wherever possible. 
For a simple illustrative example this diagnostic system is 
compared with three alternative methods, termed the single 
relevant clinic method, the system transfer method and the 
naive calibration method. All of these methods are open to the 
criticism of neglecting some aspect of the information 
available and it is again shown that substantial departures 
occur between the clinic amalgamation system and these other 
methods. 
The methods are applied to the amalgamation of two clinics 
for the differential diagnosis of Conn's syndrome. 
12.5 Statistical diagnosis from imprecise data 
In the actual construction of a statistical diagnostic system 
imprecision in the feature vectors, although often recognised, is 
seldom.taken into account. The reasons for the neglect of imprecision 
in general are presumably 
the lack of appropriate statistical methods in this 
kind of discriminant analysis, and 
the assumption that disregard of such imprecision 
has negligible consequences in practice. 
The purpose of Aitchison and Lauder (20:1979) is to remedy (i) and 
to investigate (ii) 
The main features of the modelling can be briefly described as 
follows. 
1. 	Model diagnosis is expressed in diagnostic paradigm form with 
the conditional distribution of type t on accurate feature 
vector x given in parametric form p(tx,6). 
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Suppose that we cannot observe x but only a possibly 
inaccurate vector y. Suppose, however, that we know from 
experience the nature of this imprecise measurement process 
and can in fact specify the conditional density function 
p(x[y) of x for given y. 
The diagnostic model in terms of the observable y is then 
p(ty,) = fXp(tlx,6)p(xly)dx. 
 -
The likelihood based on a training set 
D = 	(t.,x.) : i=l,...,n} 
can then be obtained, followed by some reasonable approximation 
to p(5D), so that the diagnostic assessment for a new case 
with observed feature vector y is given by 
p(tjy,D) = fA p(t ly, 6) p(6 I D) d6. 
Comparison is then made between adopting logistic and cumulative 
normal models for p(tlx,5), with the analytical advantage 
going to the normal model because a closed form can then be 
obtained for the diagnostic assessment integral. 
Means are provided for the operation of the system, and 
illustrative applications to a subproblem of the differential 
diagnosis of Gushing's syndrome and to a solution of the 
clinic amalgamation problem of Aitchison (19:1979). In 
particular, for the Gushing problem it is found that as the 
imprecision coefficient of variation is increased from 0 to 
its realistic value the application of the Newton-RaphSOfl 
method becomes more and more difficult until the whole basis 
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of the maximum-likelihood distributional aspect of p(6 1D) 
becomes suspect. 
7. 	The illustrative examples demonstrate that ignoring 
imprecision can given diagnostic assessments with a false 
appearance of firmness. Explicit recognition of imprecision 
can be incorporated in diagnostic modelling and has the expected 
effect of reducing the firmness of the diagnostic assessments. 
This effect can be so extreme that diagnostic assessments 
are practically the same whatever the feature vector. If 
the imprecision is appreciable standard procedures, such as 
Newton-RaphSofl iteration, which work readily under the 
assumption of precise data, fail completely for the degree of 
imprecision actually present. 
Aitchison (21:1979) examines the theory and practical appli-
cations for the structurally similar problem of calibration and assay 
when the standards have themselves an element of imprecision. 
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SUMMARY 
A need is identified for statistical diagnostic techniques based on data sets containing 
cases which have not been allocated to a single diagnostic type with certainty but for which 
only an assessment of the probabilities of the types is available. In order to construct a 
statistical diagnostic system applicable to new cases it is necessary to introduce even more 
complex diagnostic assessments and a central part of the analysis is concerned with the 
reduction of such assessments to simpler, more interpretable forms. The theory provides a 
generalization of current statistical diagnostic techniques, and its relationship to these is 
discussed. 
Sthne key words: Discrimination; Hierarchy of diagnostic statements; Logistic transform; Medical 
diagnosis; Predictive distribution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Diagnosis is often considered as the allocation of a case to a single type of a finite set 
T = {1, ..., r} of possible types on the basis of some observed feature vector x associated with 
the case. More generally and often more realistically it is the assessment of the relative 
plausibilities 'ui, ..., it, of each of the possible types for the case. Many statistical techniques 
such as discriminant analysis (Fisher, 1936; Smith, 1947), predictive discriminant analysis 
(Geisser, 1964; Dunsrnore, 1966; Aitchison & Kay, 1975) and logistic discrimination (Cox, 
1966; Day & Kerricige, 1967; Anderson, 1972) have been evolved. The insistence of all these 
techniques that the cases of the data base have a clear typing is a restriction commonly 
unfulfilled or only artificially satisfied in practice. Such difficulties of firm typing are well 
recognized in certain areas of medicine, for example in psychiatry, and in other areas they 
are often side-stepped. For example, in the differential diagnosis of Conn's syndrome (Ferriss 
et al., 1970), for which there are two types, the basic set of past records was reduced from 34 to 
31 because of some uncertainties, even at histopathology, of the types of three of the eases. 
If such doubtful cases are possible in the future then any statistical diagnostic technique 
based on the reduced set of 31 past cases could appear deceptively better in theory than its 
subsequent realization in practice. Attempts to justify the omission of such cases are based 
on the assumption that the typing has been determined by factors, such as histopathology 
of adrenal sections in the case of Conn's syndrome, other than the feature vectors, such as 
plasma concentrations of electrolytes, now under consideration; and that cases doubtfully 
typed on the basis of the factors will be more clearly separated by the feature vectors. Such 
reasoning can, however, be circular since the object of using the feature vector is often simply 
to avoid the use of the factors, for example, in Conn's syndrome, to avoid an unnecessary 
operation, but to arrive at results which would be attained by their use. Writers often report 
i-2 
310 
2 	 J. AITCHISON AND C. B. BEGG 
higher misclassification rates in application than those predicted from the basic set, even 
when due allowance is made for resimulation bias (Lachenbruch & Mickey, 1968) and 
sampling variability (Aitchison & Kay, 1975). The omission of such doubtful cases may well 
be a cause of this persisting phenomenon. 
On the other hand, particularly when past cases are in short supply, there is a temptation 
to impute firm typing to cases where some diagnostic doubt remains, in order that they 
meet the requirements of current statistical diagnostic techniques. Any such case, if wrongly 
typed, is likely to distort diagnosis much more seriously than it would within a system which 
allows some expression of doubt about its type. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a generalization of statistical diagnostic techniques 
to situations where the basic data set consists of cases for each of which a feature vector x 
is available together with a vector u of the relative plausibilities of the possible types. If 
such techniques were known to be available then diagnosticians in their consideration of the 
basic cases could be encouraged to express their findings in more realistic terms by stating 
explicitly their uncertainties. 
2. DIAGNOSTIC STATEMENTS 
A diagnosis of a case consists of a statement relating the case to one or more of the types 
of T. Diagnostic statements can take many different forms at different levels of probabilistic 
sophistication, And recognition of this hierarchy plays an important role in the develop-
ment of statistical techniques of diagnosis. We therefore first define these forms of diagnoses 
in ascending order of sophistication. 
A simple diagnosis t states that a case is of a specified type tET. 
A composite diagnosis u = {ut :t E T} states that a case is of type t with probability 
ut  (t E T), and is thus simply a probability distribution on the finite set T. We shall restrict 
u to the strictly positive r-dimensional simplex ST.= {uut  > 0 (tT), TUt = 1} so that 
a composite diagnosis never completely excludes any of the possible types. 
A distributional diagnosis iv attaches a plausibility to 'each possible composite diagnosis 
U E Sr and so iv is a density function u = p(u) on Sr. Thus w belongs to the class (Sr)  of 
density fimctions on 
We could even envisage a hyperdistributional diagnosis which assigns a probability 
distribution on (Sr),  assigning plausibilities to the possible distributional diagnoses. For 
example, if, for the basic set of eases, each of a panel of diagnosticians had made individual 
composite diagnoses we might express the panel's view as a distributional diagnosis; the 
natural statistical expression for the diagnosis of a new case would then be a hyperdistribu-
tional diagnosis. 
The probabilistic forms of simple and composite diagnoses are obvious. For the repre-
sentation of distributional diagnoses an immediate question is which parametric forms of 
density function commend themselves as practically relevant and tractably acceptable. 
For many problems the natural class of distributions to consider for a vector confined to 
the simplex Snis  the Dirichlet class. Such a choice is often dictated by the fact that the vector 
is a parametric vector of multinomial probabilities and by the convenient mathematical 
property of conjugacywhich the Dirichiet distribution bears to the rnult.inomial distribution; 
and the choice is usually justified by an appeal to the richness of the Dirichiet class in pro-
viding a variety of density functions. The present role of it in 5' is different since n is not an 
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unknown parameter but a directly observable composite diagnosis. In such circumstances 
the use of the Dirichiet class is unattractive; no conjugate prior class of density functions 
exists for its parameters. The basic difficulty with distributional diagnoses is the mathe-
matical awkwardness of handling the restriction of each Ut  to the interval (0, 1) and also the 
summation requirement Zut = 1. This difficulty can be removed, as in many other statistical 
contexts, by the convenient one-to;one correspondence between the r-dimensional simpler 
Sr and (r— 1)-dimensional Euclidean space R 1, through the equivalent logistic relation-
ships, fort= 1,...,r-1, 
Vt = log (uju), 	 (2.1) 
= 1+ 1, 	1 1+ &'}. 	 (2.2) 
	
Ut et't/( 
r-i \ 	 f-i 
i1 / =i / 
The mathematical reason for our restriction of u to the positive simplex is now clear since 
(2.1) is undefined if u has any zero components. Any composite diagnosis u E Sr can be charac-
terized through (2.1) in terms of its associated vector veR'-', and we shall use the term 
composite diagnosis to refer to both forms U and v; the notation and context will always 
make clear which form is intended. Similarly a distributional diagnosis can now be a density 
function for u on Sr or for v on Rr_1. 
We can then obtain a rich class of density functions to represent distributional diagnoses 
by taking v-forms which are (r— 1)-dimensional multinormal distributions. Indeed the 
associated distributions of U on Srare richer than the Dirichiet class. Consider first r = 2, 
when such a specification would assign v = log {u/( 1 - u)} a N(u, 2)  distribution. Compare 
this class with the class of beta density functions U(1 —U)fl_1[8(a,fl) (0 < U < 1), the 
Dirichiet class for r = 2. The number of parameters is the same, namely 2, and it is easy to 
verify that the good variety of U-shaped, i-shaped, flattish to sharpish unimodal curves for 
U furnished by the beta class can be obtained with suitablechoice ofa and o for the normal 
v-specification. For instance, choice of It near zero and cr large will yield large positive or 
large negative v with a resultant U-shaped distribution for u in the interval (0, 1); whereas 
choice ofu = —log 3 and small o will yield a distribution for u sharply peaked at u = 
Here, for r> 2, the number of parameters in the multivariate normal specification is 
(br— 1)(r+ 2) compared with r in the'Diriehlet specification. From this and by arguments 
similar to those for r = 2 the greater richness of the multinormal representation is easily 
verified. 
We emphasize that although no component of u can be unity or zero so that the possi-
bility of diagnosis with certainty is excluded, a simple diagnosis can be effectively achieved 
by assigning one of the components close enough to unity. In practical terms this means 
that the basic set could virtually contain cases diagnosed with certainty in addition to 
composite data. 
3. NOTATION AND DISTRIBUTIONAL RESULTS 
In what follows we shall require a convenient notation for some distributions associated 
with d-dimensional multinormal models and a4lso some results concerning properties of 
these distributions, We write: 
R', d-dimensional real space; 
9'd, the space of positive-definite symmetric matrices of order d; 
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r(g) = i7dd-1)r(g) F(g —) ... F{g-.(d- 1)), the Siegel (1935) generalization of the 
gamma function. 
The definitions of the multinormal, Wishart, normal-Wishart and generalized Student 
distributions are provided in Table 1. The multinormal distribution is specified for conveni-
ence in terms of its precision matrix r, the inverse of the covariance matrix. The dimensions 
of vectors and matrices are obvious from the context. 
Table 1. Definitions of standard distributions 
Distribution 
and notation Sample space Density function 
Normal xe Rd (27T)I"Jr 	exp  
Nod(/L, r) 
Wishart y eb°' 1 171 1"y 3-1> exp { — itr (ry)) 
Wi4(v, r) r4(iv) 
Normal-Wishart (x, y) eRa x.9'4 p(xIy) 	is 	No(b, cy) 
NoWi(b, c, g, h) p(y) is Wi(g, h) 
Student zR 
St4(k, b, c) dr{i(k_d+ 1)) Ikcl i {1 + (x—b)' (icc) 	(x_b)}i+' 
We shall also require marginal and conditional distributions associated with the general-
ized Student distribution. Suppose that x is Std(k,  b, c) and that we partition x into (x1, x2), 
where x, and x2 have dimensions d1 and d2 = d — d1. Let the corresponding partitioning of 
c and 'r = 	be 
b, 	C11
IC21 
Cii  012] IT21 r i ri2]
b2 	C22  
Then p(x1) is St51 {k - d2, b1, k(lc — d2)-' c1 J or St {k - ct2, b1, k(7,-  d2)' (r11 - T12TT21)'), 
p(x21x1)is 	 . 
Std, [k, b2  + c21cjj1(x, — b1), (r-22 — 021  Oil' 012) {1 + kQ(x1)}] 
or 
Std, [k, b2 - r' r21(x1 - b1), 22 T{1 + k'Q(x,)}], 	 (3-1) 
where 
Q(x1) = (x1  — b1)' cjj'(x1 - b1) = (x1 — b1)' (ri, — r127r21) (x1 -b1). 	(32) 
4. A DIAGNOSTIC MODEL FOR MULTINORMAL COMPOSITE DATA 
We can use the terminology of diagnostic statements to describe data sets. Thus past 
case records of the form (t, x) with t e T constitute simple data, whereas past case records 
of the form (u,x)- with it G Sr, or (v, x) with v e Rt 1, constitute composite data. To construct 
a statistical model for diagnosis based on a composite data set we have to make assump-
tions about theprobabilistic mechanism which generates case records. In § 2 we suggested 
the multinormal as a suitably flexible class of descriptions of the marginal distribution of v. 
If the feature vector space is Rf and if the distribution of the feature vector x is- multinormal 
then the natural additional assumption to consider is that the distribution of a case record 
(v, x) is also muliinorinal. We shall in this section follow through the diagnostic consequences 
of this basic assumption. In any potential application we would have to examine the validity 
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of the assumptions. For example, the feature vector may require transformation to satisfy 
the multinormal requirement; if some of the features are categorical in form, such as head- 
ache/no headache, then the multinorrnal assumption is clearly not valid. 
We now make explicit the assumptions of the model. 
Assumption. 1. The distribution of any case record (v, x) is No7_1+i(u,  r). 
Assumption 2. The distributions of any finite set of case records (v1, ;), ..., (vs)  x) are 
independent. 
Assumption 3. The prior distribution of (,u, i-) is NoWi7_11(b, c, g, h). 
Assumption 4. The data z available consist of case records z1 = (v1, x1), . . .,z = (vs, x). 
Assumption 5. The new case under consideration, with unknown composite diagnosis 
V E 	and known feature vector x E R, has arisen from exactly the same probabilistic 
mechanism as the past case records (v1, x1), ...) (va, x). 
For a fuller account of similar diagnostic assumptions with simple data and their 
relevance to clinical medicine, see Aitchison & Kay (1975), Aitchison & Dunsmore 
(1975, § 11-2). The advantages of realism of the resulting predictive diagnosis over the 
estimative rivals are indicated by Aitchison (1975) and will be more fully presented 
elsewhere. 
Note that Assumption 1 implies that the marginal distribution of feature vectors, that is 
over all cases, is multivariate normal. For those accustomed to visualizing diagnostic 
feature vectors as separating into clusters, one f3r each of the types, this may seem a 
heretical suggestion. The view of separate clusters is often encouraged by such factors as the 
exclusion of doubtful cases and by deliberate overrepresentation of rare types to allow 
satisfactory estimation of parameters. In a reexamination of the data for Conn's syndrome 
and some other disease groupings we have found no evidence against marginal multi-
normality. In situations where the feau.re vector distribution is polymodal the techniques 
described below are clearly inappropriate; for the necessary adjustment to allow for poly- 
modality see § 6. 
By adopting Assumption 5 we are envisaging a basic set of composite data produced by. 
a natural process which we anticipate is also going to operate for new cases. This assumption 
thus excludes from present consideration the situation where the data base has been de-
signed. For example, if some cothposite diagnoses are rare the clinician may have gone out 
of his way to collect more cases of these composite diagnoses than would arise naturally 
in his own clinic. We shall consider what adjustments are necessary for a designed data 
base in § 7. 





= v1/n, = xi/n, 
= (Vi -ii)  (Xi  -)', S = 
are sufficient for (,u, r) and, moreover, independently distributed as No. 1+1(jt, ur) and 
Wi,._11(n— 1,r). It follows (Aitchison & Dunsmore 1975, Table 2- 3) from Assumption 3 
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that the posterior density function p(JL,TIz) of (u,r) given the data base z is equal to 




B = C 1(cb+nm),. C = c+n, H = h+S+cn(c+n) 1 (rn—b) (rn—b)', 
g+n 	(c>O), 
g+n—1 (c=O). 
Hence, on integrating out (1u, r), we obtain the predictive density function p(v, xjz) for the 
new case record (v, x) given z as 
p(v, xlz) 
=r-a+f 
p(v, xI,  r)p(p,  rlz)d/uir 
= Str _i+i(G, B, D), 
where  = (1+C-1)H/G. 
We can immediately arrive at a distributional diagnosis p(v!x, z) by obtaining the appro-
priate conditional distribution from this joint distribution of (v, x). With an obvious par-
titioning of B and D, 
B=[
B.
], D=[ 	::1 
we have from (3.1), (3.2) and the above formulae that 
p(v x, z) = St,-,[G, B +DD;(x—i), (D— D,tx  D'D (1 + G 1Q(x)}], 	(41) xx 
where Q(x) = (x—)'DXX (x---). The density function (4.1) provides a measure of the 
plausibility of the possible composite diagnoses for a new patient with feature vector x and 
based on the experience embodied in the past records rand the prior information on It and T. 
In standard statistical diagnostic techniques based on "simple data the natural diagnostic 
statement for a new case is composite in form. Here, starting from composite data our 
statistical analysis arrives at a distributional diagnosis for a new case. This transition from 
a data set of one form to a diagnostic statement for a new case of the next higher form in the 
hierarchy of §2 is a consequence of the need to make probabilistic assumptions about the 
generation of the data of the basic set. This hicrarchial phenomenon leads naturally to the 
subject matter of §5. 
5. REDUCTION OF DIAGNOSTIC STATEMENTS 
Although a distributional diagnosis is the natural statistical expression of diagnostic 
assessment based on composite data it is too sophisticated a statistical idea for practical use, 
except possibly-for r = 2 where the distribution can be presented graphically. The practical 
way to express a diagnosis under uncertainty is through a composite diagnosis. Since a 
composite diagnosis is itself a probability distribution on the set T the reduction of a 
distributional diagnosis, say p(vjx,z), to a composite diagnosis, say p(tlx,z),  is a straight-
forward application of distributional calculus: 
p(ijxz)=f p(tv)p(vx,z)dv, 	 (51) 
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where for t= 1,...,r-1 
	
iIv) et;:/( 
r—I \ 	 r-1 \ 
= 	1+ 	e'i), p(rlv) = 1 1+ 
i=1 / 	 i=1 
as in (2.2). This natural reduction of a distributional diagnosis to a composite diagnosis thus 
involves an integration problem. It is easy to see that this natural reduction leads to the 
mean of the u-distributional diagnosis p(u!x, z) corresponding to the v-distributional diag-
nosis p(v!x,  z). 
Our motivating example for the development of the techniques of this paper has been 
the differential diagnosis of Conn's syndrome for which r = 2, and we shall study the 
natural reduction (5.1) fully for this situation only. The main method we consider for 
evaluating (5.1) for r = 2 extends, however, to provide a practical tool of natural reduction 
for r = 3 and r = 4, the other main eases of practical importance, through the use of tables 
of bivariate and trivariate normal integrals. We shall here only indicate results for these 
more complex problems, preferring to postpone a full discussion until the completion of the 
testing of more direct algorithms of numerical evaluation. 




where p(vix,  z) is St (k, b, c), can be readily evaluated by numerical integration with only 
modest computing facilities. Our own computations used a Simpson rule method over the 
range b - a,Jc, b + aJc where ak  is chosen such that all except e of St (k, 0, 1) is contained 
in ( — ak, ak), the order of accuracy required. There is however an excellent approximation 
expressible in terms of the standard normal distributionfunction l, and it is this form 
of approximation which can be extended to r 3, 4. 
The rationale of the approximation is as follows. The function ev/(1 + ev) is the distribution 
function of a logistic random variable, say L, and p(vjx, z) is the density function of a 
St (k, b, c) random variable, say S. Hence the convolution integral (5.2) can be expressed as 
the distribution function of L —5, evaluated at 0. Now, as pointed out by Cox (1970, pp. 27-- 
8), L can be extremely well approximated by a zero-mean normal variable with a suitably 
selected quantile in agreement with L. For our purposes agreement of 90 % quantiles 
seems empirically best, so that L is approximately N(0, 2- 942). Similarly Student random 
variables can be well approximated by suitably selected normal random variables and an 
adequate approximation is obtained by taking S to be approximately N{b, lcc/(k - 2)}, that 
is with mean and variance in agreement. Note that this latter approximation is simply a 
computational device and not a reversion to the estimative diagnostic method criticized 
by Aitchison & Kay (1975) which would use a smaller normal variance. Then L - S is 
approximately N( - b, 2.942 + kc/(k - 2)}, so that (5.2) is approximated by 
[b/V{2.942 + kcf(k - 2)1]. 	 (5.3) 
We now indicate the extension of the approximation (53) to r = 3. We have, for example, 
1 
p(t = lix, z)=55 	
p(vjx, z)dv1 dv2 
= f o- f_+ 	+1 + evi  + e 
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on making the substitution w1 = v, w2 = v1 - v2, written in matrix form as w = Mv, say. 
The first factor of the integrand is now conveniently expressed as the distribution function 
of a two-dimensional logistic vector, and p(w!x,  z) is a St2 (k, Mb, McM') density function. 
Table 2. Comparison, of natural reduction and two approximations for k = 20 
Approximations 
Natural 
b c reduction (5-3) (5-5) 
8 2 0999 1•000 0-999 
4 2 0956 0-961 0-963 
2 2 0-812 0-811 0-792 
1-0 2 0-673 0-670 0630 
0-2 2 0-536 0535 0-522 
8 4 0-997 0.998 0-999 
4 4 0-927 0-929 0-944 
2 4 0-771 0-769 0-703 
1-0 4 0-645 0-644 0-529 
0-2 4 0-530 0529 0495 
8 6 0993 0-995 0-999 
4 6 0-901 0-902 0-925 
2 6 0-743 - 	0•741 0-614 
1-0 6 0-628 0-627 0-428 
0-2 6 0-526 0-526 0-463 
The introduction of bivariate normal approximations for these distribution and density 
functions then leads by arguments similar to those used above to an approximation in terms 
of a bivariate normal integral over the negative quadrant in the w plane. 
An alternative and simpler approximation to natural reduction may be termed modal 
reduction since it involves approximation to the integral (5 1) by the use of a Taylor expan-
sion ofp(tiv) about the mode3 of the distributional di1gnosis p(vjx, z). Since for p(vlx, z) of 
Student form the mean and mode coincide, the approximation can be shown to be 
p(tj3) + 1  tr {"/"(vx, z) D2p(tj)}, 	 (5M 
where ^r denotes covariance matrix and where D2 denotes matrix of second-order partial 
derivatives with respect to the components of v. For r = 2, with p(vjx, z) = St(k, b, c) 
the approximation (5-4) becomes 
1 	e_'(l_e_b)kc 
1+e_b 2(1+e_b)2(k2) 	 (55) 
Table 2 shows for r = 2, k = 20 and a selectibn of b, c the exact natural reduction and the 
closeness of approximation (5-3) to the exact value and its superiority over the modal 
reduction. All methods are fairly insensitive to changes in k provided.k is not too small, 
which is unlikely in any practical situation. 
6. RELATION TO OTHER MODELS 
Aitchison & Kay (1975) have set out for simple data a set of axioms for statistical diagnosis 
which leads to the use of predictive diagnosis in the sense of Geisser (196 1) and Dunsmoro 
(1966). They envisage the generation of a case record (1, x) in a commonly accepted clinical 
way as a two-stage process in which the type t is first determined by a probabilistic mechan- 
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ism p(t l-);  the tr parameter is the vector of incidence rates of the pure types. Given the type 
t, the feature vector xis then determined by a conditional probability mechanism p(xjt, 0), 
where 0 denotes the collection of parameters associated with the relationships of feature to 
types and so may be called the structural parameter. Thus p(t,xr,0) =p(tl)p(xIt,0). 
On the basis of a set z of case records z1 = (t1, x1), . .,z, = (ta, x) and the assumption that 
the prior distribution p(,  0) for (r, 0) factorizes as p(r)p(0), the application of the laws of 
conditional probability lead to a composite diagnosis u = (u1, . .., ii,.) for a new patient with 
feature vector x: 
uccp(tz)p(xt,z).  
In (6.1), p(tlz) can be interpreted as the composite diagnosis for the new patient based on 
past cases alone, and p(xt, z) is the predictive density function for a feature vector of a case 
of type t evaluated at the actual observed feature vector x of the new patient. 
The model represented in §4 is capable of a similar interpretation because we could 
write p(v, xI1u, i-) as a product of a marginal distribution for v and an associated conditional 
distribution for x. We can express the density function for (v, x) in the form p(vI)p(xv, 0), 
where p(v) is No,_1(A, p) and p(xlv, 0) is No(8+  yv, 8). Parameters (v',  0) or (A, p,,3, y, 8) 
are related to the parameters (1u, r) of the model of § 4 through the one-to-one relationship 
A =X,  p = r,, —rrr, fi = 	 y = - TT and 8 = r. We can then 
consider a prior distribution on (, 0) as before leading to a predictive form of diagnosis 
analogous to (6.2) with 
p(vx,z)ccp(vz)p(xv,z). 	 (6.2) 
Thus our model effectively contains as a special case the natural extension of predictive 
diagnosis described by Aitchison & Kay (1975). For full agreement between (41) and (6.2) 
all that is necessary is the conformability of the prior distributions on cit. T) and (, 0). 
The form (6.2) allows the disengagement of v from the multinormal requirement of 
Assumption 1. If the basic composite diagnoses v1, ..., v, do not conform to multinormality 
we can retain multinormality of the conditional density function p(xv, 0) but adopt an 
appropriate alternative form for p(vb-). The marginal distribution of x is then not neces-
sarily multinormal so that with this approach polymodality of the overall feature vector 
distribution can be accommodated. 
With this approach we can also investigate a desirable limiting property of our diagnostic 
system. It is a condition of our diagnostic system that a composite diagnosis is a positive 
probability distribution on T. Hence our system does not directly contain as a special case a 
diagnostic system based on simple data, that is where u = 1 for some t e T. It can, however, 
be considered as a special limiting case where each it, (i = 1, ..., n) in the basic set of data 
tends to one of the set of certain composite diagnoses e1, ..., e,., where et has tth component 1, 
all other components 0. 
The other main way in which simple case records have been regarded as generated is by 
way of the approach of Cox (1966), Day & Kerridge (1967) and Anderson (1972). Again 
the generation of a case record (t, x) is envisaged as a two-stage process with the feature 
vector x being first determined by a probabilistic mechanism p(x), where 6 maybe termed 
the feature parameter. Given the feature vector t the type t is then determined by a con-
ditional probability mechanism p(tlx, ii), where r now plays the role of a structural 
parameter. Thus 
p(t,x,) = p(x})p(tx,). 
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From a statistical diagnostic point of view interest then centres on p(tlx,  ) and so the use 
of past records (ti, x1), ..., (ta, x,) really involves the regression of the categorical variable 
t on the feature vector x in some suitable way, usually by a logistic approach. In this ap-
proach there is thus no need to make any strong distributional assumption on x, an aspect 
which cannot be retained in our extension. 
Again the model presented in th previous section is capable of a similar interpretation, 
by writing 	
p(v,xp,r) =p(xJ)p(vx,), 	 (6.3) 
where in our distributional form p(x) is No1(A,p) and p(vx,'q) is No_1(a+18x,y). The 
parameters (, ) or (A, p, a,,8, y) are again related to the parameters (u, r) of the model of 
§ 4 through the relationship A = ,u, p = 	- r r;1,1 	a = 1u1, + T T/i, fi  
and y = r,. 
Since in our model v is related to u, the type probability vector, by a logistic relationship 
we have thus within this interpretation of our model a generalization of the simple-data 
logistic model of Cox, Day, Kerridge and Anderson to the composite-data case. One 
advantage of our extension is the purely technical mathematical point that the composite 
diagnosis variable v is continuous in R 1 compared with the discrete form of the simple 
diagnosis t, and so regression problems are very much simpler to handle. A second statisti-
cal advantage stems from this first mathematical advantage. The Cox, Day, Kerridge and 
Anderson approach is estimative in that they simply obtain maximum likelihood estimates 
(z) for 21 and then quote as composite diagnosis Ut = p{tjy, (x)}, and make no allowance 
for any sampling variability. The advantage of the predictive method (Aitchison & Kay, 
1975) can be easily obtained through the form (6.3), and a suitable conjugate prior distribu-
tion on (, ) or simply on = (a, ,8, y). With appropriate conformity of this prior to that of 
Assumption 3 we can obtain the same result as in (4.1). In short, our model extends the 
logistic regression. model approach from simple to composite diagnosis and also from the 
doubtfully valid estimative approach to the more relisti predictive approach. 
The philosophy of the first marginal-conditional apprGach discussed in this section is that 
in the basic data diagnosis is determined by factors outside the feature vector x whereas in 
the second approach diagnosis in the basic data is effectively determined by the feature 
vector. Our model is symmetric in (v, x) and so allows any relationship between v and x in 
the basic data to speak for itself. 
7. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
All the results so far considered have been on the assumption that new case records are 
arising by exactly the same probabilistic mechanism which produced the ease records of the 
basic set. It is in this sense that we have a natural informative experiment with case records 
arising from the natural experience or incidence pattern at the diagnostic clinic in question. 
In some circumstances the eases of the basic set -are selected and may not reflect the inci-
dence pattern expected in the future. For example, if one of the types is rare Ave may have 
had to seek out more than the natural frequency of cases in order to obtain sufficient 
information on the structural parameter. There is another way in which an informative 
experiment may turn out to be designed rather than natural. Although the basic ease re-
cords may have arisen in natural sequence at a clinic we may realize that there has been some 
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temporal chnge in the incidence pattern or that we wish to transfer the diagnostic tech-
nique to another clinic for which the incidence pattern is known to be different. 
An exact approach to accommodate this difference proceeds as follows. From the previous 
analysis we can extract the information concerning the variability of feature vector for 
given composite diagnosis, the predictive density function p(xlv,  z) of (6.2). This will apply 
unchanged by any alteration in incidence pattern. Suppose that the new incidence pattern 
is described by p(v). Then the distributional diagnosis appropriate to this new incidence 
pattern is given by p(vx,z) cc p(v)p(xv,z). It is unlikely thatp(v) and p(xv,z) will be so 
conformable as to allow a simple expression of p(vx, z) in one of the standard forms, so that 
direct computation is required. 
An alternative approximate but intuitively appealing technique is as follows. Consider 
the diagnostic distribution. 
p(vx,z) = Strj[k, b,, +c,,ç(x— b), (c—c0 c;c,,) (1 +k-'Q(x)}]. 	(7.1) 
Suppose that the new incidence pattern is characterized by a mean B,, and covariance 
matrix 6,,. Since a change in the incidence pattern has no effect on the correlation structure 
of x with v we can alter (7.1) to accommodate the mean and covariance structure for v in the 
following way. First, we determine square matrices a,, and A,, such that a,,a = c,,,, and 
A, A, = C,,,, and then replace the mean, b,, + a,, a 1  c,,,, c (x - b) by B,, + A,, a. 1 c,,,, c;(x - b) 
and the first factor of the variance parameter similarly by 
If the new incidence information is based on about the same number of, or indeed more, 
case records than the original basic set then the k could remain unaltered. If, however, 
we are aware that fewer case records were available on which to base the new incidence 
pattern then there would be an argument for the wisdom of reducing k by the deficit. 
We have expressed our results in § 4 and subsequent sections in terms of a general normal-
Wishart prior on (j&, r) as specified in Assumption 3. Often-in practice there will be no con-
venient way of deermining suitable parameters b, c, g and h and recourse will have to be 
made to the adoption of a vague prior. This is not a device of despair since it retains the 
advantages of predictive diagnosis indicated in §4. In our own applications of predictive 
diagnosis for simple data we have used the extreme vague prior, which in the context of 
composite data diagnosis takes the form p(u, r) TI1(7+D. For this case (4.4) takes the 
form 
p(vlx,z) = Str_1[n_1i3+SvzS;:'(x_)(1+1/n) 
1 
X — (S — S S 1S (1+(n— 1)_1Q(x)}], (7.2) 
n—i 	xx xvi 
where Q(x) = (X -71)'{(t  + 1/n) Sxj(n  1)}' (x 
The appearance of Q(x) in the variance parameter of the Student form (7.2) has the 
desirable effect that the larger is Q(x) the less certainty there is in the diagnostic statement, 
other things such as the mean parameter being equal. Roughly speaking, therefore, the fur-
ther a feature vector is from the centre of the basic set the more cautiously the system 
approaches the diagnosis. This is a particularly important precaution for new cases which 
fall 'outside previous experience'in the sense that their feature vectors are outside the basic 
data cluster. It is easily shown that such precaution is not exercised by the corresponding 
estimative method. 
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8. Disctissioi 
The generalization of § 4 gives insight into the diagnostic process, in particular the hier-
archical structure of diagnostic statements and the interrelationships of other diagnostic 
methods. Further work is clearly necessary: 
to produce direct algorithms for the evaluation of the natural reduction integral 
(5.1) to replace the approximate methods for the cases r > 3; 
to extend the analysis to data which are not multinormal; 
to discover the precise role and usefulness of hyperdistributional diagnoses as an 
expression of panel opinion; 
to evaluate the practical consequences of the availability of statistical diagnostic 
techniques for composite data. 
The traditional view of disease as an either-or phenomenon, i.e. that the aim of diagnosis 
is to separate patients into clearly defined types, such as normotensive and hypertensive, 
has been increasingly under attack in recent years from within the medical profession; see, 
for example, Pickering (lOGS, pp. 1-5). The admission of such concepts of degree of disease 
clearly reinforces the need for statistical diagnostic techniques based on composite data. 
The authors wish to thank Professor D. R. Cox for a helpful discussion and, in particular, 
for the suggestion of the normal approximation method for evaluating the natural reduction 
of (5.2). 
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Suirww 
A statistical diagnostic system devised for a particular clinic may require appreciable 
modification when either the method of measurement of any of the diagnostic features changed 
within the clinic, or the system is to be applied to another clinic where different methods of 
measurement are used. In either circumstance the transfer can be effectively made only on the 
basis of information from a calibration experiment designed to establish the relationship 
between the different methods of measurement. Even with such calibration information a 
naive method of calibration commonly adopted is shown to yield conclusions which can he 
radically different from those of a method taking full account of the calibration unreliability. 
An application to a particular problem of clinical diagnosis is used to illustrate the analysis. 
Some, key wordg: Calibration; Diagnosis; Discriminant analysis; Predictive distribution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The need to develop the statistical techniques of this paper arose directly from two particular 
and related problems in diagnosis in clinical medicine. For differentiating between two types 
of Conn's syndrome, a rare disease producing high blood pressure, a statistical diagnostic 
system, assigning odds on the 'basis of observations of eight features of a patient's condition, 
had been developed for a particular clinic A; see Aitchison' & Dunsmore (1 97) for both the 
data and an account of the system. After use of the system for some years the clinic has changed 
its method of measurement of one of the features, plasma concentration of the hormone 
aldosteroie; from a double isotope assay to a less expensive, more efficient radioimmuno assay. 
Any new ease of Coim's syndrome will therefore have this hormone measured by the new 
method only. 
Since the patients forming the diagnostic data base or training set have been discharged or 
are undergoing treatment which affects the hormone concentration it is impossible to find the 
radioimmunoassay counterparts of their original double isotope assay measurements in order 
to construct a new diagnostic system directly from these patients. Fortunately, however, 
although the concentration of hormone depends on the type of the syndrome the conditional 
distributions relating one hormone determination to the other are known not to depend on 
type nor indeed on the fact that the patient has the particular syndrome. We can therefore 
investigate the possibilities of calibrating from the 'new to the old by measuring hormone 
concentration by both methods on portions of blood from a number of portions not in the 
training set and not necessarily suffering from the disease. Such pairs of observations are 
available on 72 blood samples. It is tempting,to suppose that all that is then necessary is to 
plot a scatter diagram, to fit some form of regression line and, for a given radioinimunoassay 
measurement, to read off from the regression line the corresponding 'calibrated' value of 
double isotope determination, and finally to use this directly in the original statistical diagnostic 
system devised for clinic A. Unfortunately such a method, though simple, takes no account of 
i6-z 
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the unreliability of the calibrated value. A main aim of this paper is to analyze the extent to 
which this naive calibration method may differ from an approach which takes full account 
of the unreliability. 
The second problem arose when requests were received from another clinic B to process 
data from its patients through the statistical diagnostic system devised for clinic A. Uncritical 
application of the system to data sent from clinic B on its patients can give rise to serious 
failures with a subsequent loss of confidehce in the system in both clinics. The reason for such 
failures is almost invariably that the clinics use different methods of determining some or all 
of the features on which the statistical diagnosis is based. Again the circumstances and the 
methods in the particular example were such that calibration information could be obtained 
from blood samples on other patients. Thus statistically these system transfer problems are 
identical, clinic B being interpreted either as different from clinic A and with different methods 
of measurement, or as clinic A after it has changed to its new methods of measurement. It is 
also notionally and notationally convenient in our early discussion to suppose that the methods 
of measurement of all features differ from clinic A to clinic B. The adjustment required to 
rover the situation where only some of the methods of measurement differ is discussed in § 6. 
The data available for this system transfer problem arise from three sources: first, diagnostic 
data 
DA  = {( t,x); i = 
from clinic A consisting of known types t and known feature vectors x1 of n of its patients 
forming the diagnostic training set; secondly, calibration data 
CAB = {( A5, yB5);  
consisting of determinations of feature vectors made by both clinics on k individuals, yAJ 
referring to measurement by clinic A and YBJ  the corresponding measurement by clinic B. 
Thirdly, for a neW case of unknown type t, we have observed the feature vector XB by the 
methods of clinic B. The problem is then to model the situation so as to obtain a realistic 
assessment of the conditional or diagnostic probabilities p(tjxB , DA, CAB), the plausibffities 
we attach to the possible disease types for this new case on the basis of the diagnostic and 
calibration data and of the patient's own feature vector. 
This modelling is set out in § 3, but first we require in § 2 some comments on the nature of 
the separate problems of diagnosis and calibration. In the remaining sections the consequences 
of the model are worked out in §§ 4 and 5, leading to the resolution of the particular motivating 
problem in § 6. 
2. STATISTICAL DIAGNOSIS AND CAIJJ3RATION 
We adopt the view that the statistician's role in diagnosis is, for each referred patient, to 
present the clinician with a realistic assessment of probabilities for each of the disease types 
within the set T of possible types. Since the problem of adjusting an assessment of these 
diagnostic probabilities based on one incidence pattern of types to take account of a different 
incidence pattern is statistically trivial, requiring only proportional adjustments to the 
assessed probabilities, we can for convenience assume equal incidence rates for each type. 
For a patient in clinic A of unknown type t and known feature vector -CA the diagnostic 
problem is to assess the values ofp(tx, DA). Since with equal incidence rates 
p(tlx A,D f)ccp(xAIt,DA) 
the statistical problem can be considered as that of placing realistic values on P(XAIt, DA) for 
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each of the possible types. A common procedure is to suppose that the true density functions 
of feature vector for given type belong to some parametric class, say p(xAIt, 0), where the 
indexing parameter 0 E 0. Within this framework there are two main methods of assessment, 
given the training set DA.  The estimative method simply uses DA  to obtain an efficient estimate, 
say 9(DA), of 0 and then substitutes estimate for parameter in the parametric form, obtaining 
PfrAlt,0 = 
The predictive method first converts'a prior distribution p(0) on 0 through Bayes's formula 
to a posterior distribution p(0D4), which is then used as a mixture weighting of the parametric 
forms to obtain the predictive density function 
p(xjt,D) = f p(xt,0)p(0DA)do` 	 (2.1) 
Aitchison, 1{abbema & Kay (1977) point out the c5onsiderable differences between these two 
methods when the training set DA  is limited in size, and demonstrate the greater realism 
provided by the predictive method. We therefore adopt the predictive method in our diagnostic 
assessments and will indeed find that the differences between the two diagnostic methods can 
be accentuated by the presence of a calibration problem, and in particular by the use of the 
naive calibration method. 
We shall find in our later analysis that calibration in the context of the problem of § 1 
involves us in the assessment of the conditional density functions p(xJx, CAB). Statistically 
the calibration problem is formally similar to that of statistical diagnosis, except that a 
continuous set XB  now replaces the finite set T. How we carry out the assessment of the con-
ditional density function depends on the design of the calibration experiment, whether the 
(yM, YBI) arise in a natural bivariate way or whether one set of measurements, say the y, 
has been selected or controlled. Careful model formulation to conform with this design is 
therefore necessary to determine for example whether we arrive at p(xBlxA, OAR) directly by 
introducing a parametric form P(XBI XA, ) with 6 E\ and then setting 
P(XB1XA CAB) _—$ p(xB x,8)p(& CAB)  d8, 	 (2.2) 
or through Bayes's formula 
p(xB!xA, CAB) ccp(XBI CAB) p(xAlxB, C) 
and by introducing a parametric form p(XAIXB, &). For the motivating problem we shall find 
that (2.2) is the appropriate version and is in the form of predictive calibration. Estimative 
calibration, by analogy with estimative diagnosis, would replace by an efficient estimate 
(CAB) and use 
p{xB1xA,8=(CAB)} 	 (2.3) 
instead of (2.2). Naive calibration goes a step further along the road of throwing aside con-
siderations of reliability of inference assessments by replacing the estimative distribution 
(2.3) by a point estimate. In our criticism of naive calibration we shall again prefer predictive 
rather than estimative calibration as our main standard of comparison. 
3.Z5 
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3. A STATISTICAL MODEL FOR CALIBRATED DIAGNOSIS 
To model the clinical situation described in § 1 a first step is to postulate a sensible prob-
abilistic mechanism for the generation of a complete record (t, XA, XB) for an individual case, 
where t is the type of the case and x4 and XB are the feature vectors of the case as measured in 
clinics A and B, respectively. Postulating such a model does not imply either that complete 
records must be available in the data set or that we contemplate the determination of complete 
records for new cases. This basic model provides a conceptual link between type and the two 
clinics' methods of measurement. It simply consists of formulating the joint distribution of 
(1, ZA, XB) in terms of conditional distributions together with assumptions concerning separ-
ability of parameters and independence of data sets. To provide an operational model we must 
pay attention to a number of interrelated factors. 
The model should allow an expression of our understanding of the type-feature relation-
ship in clinic A. 
It should allow an adequate description of the nature of the calibration experiment. 
It must allow a derivation of a likelihood function for the observed data CAB, .DA and XB. 
It must allow the fulfilment of the purpose of the investigation, in our case, the assess-
ment of the probabilities p (tIxB , CAB, DA). 
For convenience of reference we first state six assumptions of a model for the system 
transfer problem, discuss their relevance to the particular problem of § 1, and then deduce from 
the assumptions the appropriate method of calibrated diagnostic assessment. 
Assumption 1. Any case has associated with it a unique type belonging to a finite set T 
of possible types, and possesses a feature vector belonging to a set X4 or XB  of possible feature 
vectors depending on whether the features are observed in clinic A or clinic B. 
Assumption 2. The model is parametric with parameter set 0, so that the model corresponding 
to (o E Q is specified by the density fimction 
p(t, XA, XB!&)) (t E T, XA EXA,XB EXB).  
Assumption. 3. In the conditional specification 
p(tlw)p(.xA!t ,o)p(XB!t, xA,o.) 
of p(t, XA1 XBIW) the parameter w and the parameter set Q can be factorized into w = (, 0,  ) 
and Q = x 0 x A in such a way that they are separable: 
p(1, XA, XBIW) = p(t)p(xAIt, O)p(xBtt, 	8). 
Assumption. 4. .'Te have p(x11Jt, XA, ) = p(XB IXA, 8). 
Assumption 5. Given , 0, 8 and the type tof the new case from clinic B the data sets CAB, 
DA  and XB are independent. 
Assumption. 6: There is prior independence in that p(i1r, 0,8) = p(r)p(0)p(8). 
In the clinical setting our first assumption is standard in statistical diagnosis, asserting that 
the disease types have been defined so as to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and that 
symptoms, signs and the results of diagnostic tests constituting a feature vector can be 
obtained for each patient. Our second assumption merely acknowledges that we are adopting 
a parametric model. 
In the third assumption the separation of and 0 in the first two factors follows the usual 
assumption adopted in diagnostic models (Aitchison & Dunsmore, 1975, Chapter 11) which 
recognize - as an incidence parameter and 0 as a structural parameter, in the sense that it 
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reflects the possible dependence of the feature variability on the disease type. The separation 
of a from 0 and Vr is also often reasonable. Its only implication is that if we know t and ZA 
then the distribution of XB  can be indexed by a separate parameter. For example, in the case 
where p(XA, XBIt, e) is multivàriate normal, this can always be achieved by 0 referring to 
marginal mean vectors and covariance matrices and & to the familiar and separable parameters 
of the regression distributions of XB  on XA. 
The fourth assumption is one whic4 will require careful scrutiny in any particular applica-
tion. It asserts that the calibration relationship does not depend on type. In the case of Conn's 
syndrome, although a patient's plasma concentration of a substance such as aldosterone 
certainly depends on type the relationship of radlioimmunoassay determination to double 
isotope assay determination is one which holds irrespective of type or indeed irrespective of 
whether the blood sample comes from a patient with Conn's syndiome. All that was necessary 
therefore was to select a range of blood samples to meet the obvious calibration requirements 
that they cover the set of future values likely to arise, and to make determinations by both 
methods on portions of these samples. If this assumption does not hold then we may be in 
great difficulty. For example, if XA  were the concentration, measured in mg/dl, of a hormone 
in urine and XB  were the urinary excretion rate, measured in mg/day, and if patients with 
disease type 1 had a tendency to retain body fluid compared with patients of disease type 2, 
then the relationship of x11 to XA  would clearly depend on type. To assess the density functions 
(xBIxA, 1, &) we would require to be able to observe the features in both clinics for patients of 
each possible type, and this maybe physically impossible. It is then only realistic to admit that 
no reliable system transfer can be achieved and that the only course open is to start building 
up a new diagnostic training .set within clinic B. 
Since the three data sets, CAB, DA  and the feature vector XB  of the new case from clinic B, 
are associated with completely different sets of individuals in our practical situations the 
fifth assumption automatically applies. 
Our final assumption is common in such Bayesian formlations (Aitchison & Dunsmore, 
1975, Chapters 10, 11) and asserts that any prior information conceruing , 0 and b arises 
from independent sources. The vague priors that we adopt in practice to ensure no overstate-
ment of odds satisfy this assumption. Its great merit is that of mathematical tractability by 
ensuring, with Assumptions 3 and 5, that the posterior distribution for these parameters 
separates in exactly the same way as the prior. 
The consequences of these assumptions can easily be worked through in terms of the 
likelihood for t, , 0 and ' given XB, DA  and C AB. We omit the tedious details so as to pinpoint 
the main steps in the derivation. Remembering our remark about the trivial nature of in-
cidence rate adjustment and also noting the separability of /r implied by Assumptions 3 and 
6 we can effectively ignore fr in the argument. Then the essential step in forming the likelihood 




p(xx, )p(xAIt, O)clxA 	 (3.1) xA 
by Assumptions 3 and 4. The likelihood can thus, by Assumption 5, be expressed in the form 
p(xBIt, 0, 8)p(D4 O)p(G' 51). Assumption 6 about the factorization of the prior distribution 
then ensures that the posterior distribution can be expressed in the form. 
p(t, 0, 81x,, DA, C45) ccp(x5 jt, 01  6)p(01D4)p(61C4s)1 
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invoking the equal incidence assumption Integration with respect to 0 and ô then gives 
p(t)zB, 1)4, C) CC f 
fA P(Xjt, 0, ) p(0JD4)p(Ia ) dO& 
0':f,,  p(B14, CAB)p(xAIt 1)4) dz4 by (3.1), where (3.2) 
P(XBIXACA=J p(xBIx4,)p(lCAB)A 	 (3- 3) 
p(z4 Jt, 1)4) 
fe p(x4It, 0)p(0JD4) dO 	 (3•) 
are the predictive calibrative and diagnostic distributions referred to at (2.2) and (2•1). 
ConVolutiofl.type inte The mathematical problem involved in calibrated diagnosis is thus the evaluation of the 
gral (3.2), and this is seldom standard since the cahbrative distribution 
P(BJX4) CAB) may involve x4  in a complicated way. We return to this problem in § 5 after consideration of an idealized form of the problem which allows us an insight into its nature 
without the encumbrance of the inferences involved in the constnjetio 
distributions (33) and (3.4). 	 n of the predictive  
4. THECASE OF PERFECT ThORMATrON ON CAT, 
ThRATION AND DIAQNOS rS 
Even if we know exactly all the conditional distributions involved in Assumption 3 the 
calibration problem remains. To simplify the notation we drop the dependence on Vf, 
0 and in these known distributions, and again work with equal incidence rates. Suppose that there are just two disease types I and 2, that the features measurable in c1nic§ A and B are each one-dimensional, and that the clinic A feature distribution p(x4 ) for given type t is of known form, normally distributed with mean/ and variance Note the common variance ass
ump-tion as an additional simplification here. Moreover for a 
Suppose that the conditional distribution 
P(X 	
given measurement x4  in clinic A 
BJ XA,tyof the corresponding measurement 
XB 
in clinic B 
has a normal linear regression model independent of disease type: 
p(XBJxAt) = N(+flx4,y2). 
To arrive at a diagnostic assessment 
p(tJxB) for a patient, whose feature measurement x3  has been recorded in clinic B only, we have, from (32), 
	
P(tIxB) 	(xJt) 
f P( BJxA, t)p(x 4t) 	= 0(xBJa +j 	+ft), 
where (xBJ/c,  2) denotes the iVCa, ) density fimetion. This assessment involves only 
Standard conditional probability arguments with lmoni distributions and hence i
s  exact. The naive calibration method drscribed in § 1 uses a calibrated point estimate 
part of Snd B, 	so arrives at a diagnostic assessment 
as the clinic A countei  
4Jt) = Then 
logi 	= (— i'2' [4H(1(j+JL,)1 
0 	/ ( 	. 	I, 	 (41 
= 
where A= (fioj42. 	P(2Jv) tq(2jXB)j 	' 	 (4.) 
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From (4.2) we see that the naive calibration method gives more extravagant odds since 
p(l!xB)/p(2IxB) is always further away than q(1jx)/q(2xB) from the equiprobable ratio 1. 
This is an intuitively obvious result since the naive calibration method is making no allowance 
for the unreliability of the calibrate A•  The form of (4.1) shows that the extent of the extra-
vagance depends on the combination ficr/y; the larger this quantity is the nearer the naive 
calibration method is to the exact method. The ratio fl/y  is a standard measure of the effective-
ness of a calibrative system; the larger this ratio the more reliable the calibration. The reason 
for the involvement of the factor 0. i simply that, for given It, and /L2, the larger the value o 
takes, the less effective is the diagnostic system and consequently the less there is to lose in 
using the naive calibration method. 
There is a multivariate analogue of the preceding analysis, best expressed in terms of a 
form easily derivable from (4.1) and (4.2): 
log 	
(1IXB)_ 10c,P(1Xi3) = (/1 —It 2 	{A_Cui+It2)} . 	(43) 
q(2x) 	p(2IxB) . 0.  / (i —+A) 
The first factor of (4.3) is the standardized distance between the two means, the second factor 
a measure of calibration unreliability, and the third factor the standardized distance of the 
naive calibrate from the centre of the feature distributions. We retain the notation of the 
univariatc case and let both x4 and XB be d-dimensional, with 
p(xAIt) = iu,E), p(xB x,t) = 
so that 
p(xBt) = Nd (a+B/t,F+BEB'). 
For naive calibration we assume that B is nonsingular so that ttA = B 1(xB -c) and 
= 	AI t) cc d(xBk + BJL, B>B'). 
The difference between the naive and exact log odds is then 
	
log
q(1 x) 	p(1IxB)' ——log  q(21 x) 
p(2!XB) - 
= {T1(u1 - iz)}' (I + T'BT-'BT)-1  jT'{ - 12  (ji +/L2)}], 	(4.4) 
where TT' = E. The expression (44) again has three factors. In these T' plays the same 
standardization role with respect to the covariance structure E as a' plays with respect to the 
variance 0.2.  The first factor is thus the standardized vector displacement between the two 
means, with squared length equal to the Mahalanobis measure (jt —u)  '(u1 —t2). The third 
factor is again the standardized vector displacement of the naive calibrate from the centre 
of the feature vector distributions. The middle factor is associated, with the unreliability of the 
calibration, the matrix A = T'B'F'BT replacing the univariate A of (43). 
We can obtain some insight into the possible consequences of having to calibrate by con-
sidering the special case where forgiven type the features are independent so that E = diag (o- ), 
and where each feature of clinic A is calibrated independently against the corresponding featur& 
in clinic B, so that B = diag (j3),  F = diag (y). Then 
(I+T'BT'BT)' = diag{(1 +A)-'}, 
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Each term in this sum is of the same form as (4.3) and it is obvious that separately moderate 
calibrative distortions can accumulate to give a pronounced effect. The extent of the difference 
between the naive and the exact assessments can be illustrated by two simple examples. 
Examples. For d =2 and 
P1 
= 
['2], /L = ['] Z= [ 	
_o.7] B = 1
2, 1' = diag (016, 0.16), 
the naive odds for XB Pi are 28 to 1 on type 1, whereas the exact odds are only 9 to 1. For 
d=3and 
1 	0 	1 —07 08 
/L= 1 , IL2 — 0 , Z= —0.7 	1 	—09 , B =I3 r=0.2513, 
1 	0 	0.8 —09 1 
the naive odds for XB = are 22026 to 1 on type 1, whereas the corresponding exact odds are 
only 25 to 1. 
Although illustrative examples cannot establish that such large differences will arise in 
practice they do suggest that any uncritical application of naive calibration in diagnostic 
problems should be viewed with some suspicion. It is worth emphasizing here also that the 
simplicity of the relationships between naive and exact odds depends crucially on the 
assumption of equality of the covariance structures of the feature distributions for given types. 
When the covariance structures differ, such as in the real application of § 6, it is difficult to 
provide any simple general statement of the nature of the relationship. The analysis of the 
present section must nevertheless prepare us to anticipate differences, and possibly substantial 
differences, between the odds assigned by the two methods in this more general situation. 
We must now consider whether these differences are aggravated or not when the diagnostic 
and calibrative distributions have to be inferred from datastich as DA  and °AB 
5. CALIBRATED DIAGNOSIS FOR THE NORMAL CASE 
Suppose that p(x4 It, O) is Nc,o-2)  and p(xBx,ô) is N(a+flxA,y2), and thatwe adopt the 
customary vague priors for the parameters and the notation of Aitchison & Durismore (1975, 
Chapter 2); in particular we say that a random variable it follows a generalized Student dis-
tribution St (k, b, c) if (n - b)/1c follows a standard t distribution with k degrees of freedom. 
Then we have the predictive calibrative density function 
p(xBxA, CAB) = St [k —2, a -- bxA, c2(1 + 1/k + (xA - YA)2/s 4}], 
where a, b are the usual regression estimates, c2 the residual mean square, YA  and SA  the mean 
and corrected sum of squares of the YM;  and as a basis of predictive diagnosis 
p(xAlt, DA) = St{n —1, m, s2(1 +1ç1)}, 
where 9 t  is the number of x 41 of type t, m t their mean and 3 2 the usual pooled sample variance. 
In contrast the effect of applying naive calibration and estimative diagnosis is to replace 
p(xBlt, D_4, CAB) by a, normal distribution N(a+bmL, b2s2). 
The integral (3.2) cannot be evaluated directly in ternis of known functions but we can 
obtain a useful approximation for comparison purposes by first determining the mean and 
variance associated with (3.2) by the usual iterated expectation method and then using a 
normal approximation with this computed mean and variance. This results in a normal 
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distribution with the same mean a+bmt as the naive-calibration estimative-diagnostic 
method but the variance is 
n-2 	 - 
—(1 +n') b2s2+ lc-2 _ _c2(1 +k +.flt !IA)2+8
2(fl-2) (1 +n1)f(n_4)} 	(51) 84  
instead of the bs2 of the naive-calibration estimative-diagnostic method. It is clear that the 
source of the difference between the naive and exact methods in the case of perfect information, 
namely the difference between the variances flo and ,8202 +7 2  is now considerably increased 
because of the additional factors in (5.1). 
This increase persists in a d-dimensional multivariate setting with r disease types, where 
the density function (3.2) is approximated by a normal density function with mean a+ Bin, 
and covariance matrix 
I n-r 
(n—r—d-- l)(1+nl)BSB'+k2d2) 
1+k 1 + (m—y4) S1(rn.t—Y4)+ 	
) (
1 +n) tr (S 1S)}, (5.2) 
where a, B are the usual regression estimates, 0 is the residual covarianco matrix, g4 and 84  
the mean vector and corrected sum of squares matrix of the YAJ'  mt the mean vector of the nt 
feature vectors xdi which are of type t, and S the usual pooled covariance matrix. The fact that 
appreciable differences could exist even in the case of perfect information strongly suggests 
that care must be taken in any real application. 
Before we consider such an application we must consider the ease of partial calibration. 
6. PARTIAL CALIBRATION: AN APPLICATION 
In many diagnostic transfer problems there will be a, number of features, such as age, for 
which we may safely assume that observation or measurement will lead to the same value in 
both clinics. We can thus partition x4 into two subvectors (x, x), where only x requires 
calibration. Then 0AB  need contain calibrative information only on the subveetors y}, y 
whileDA still contains information on the whole vector XAI.  Then if XB  is the complete feature 
vector of a new patient observed in clinic B we have as the basis of our diagnostic assessment 
the counterpart of (32): 
p(xBlt, 0AB D4) 
= p(x = z It, DA)l p(xjx, CAB) 1J(x)jt,x) = x,D4)dx, 	(61) 
Jx(2) 
A 
where the second factor of the integrand with its extra conditioning on x ) is easily derived 
from the previous p(x4lt, DA). 
We can now illustrate in the real medical setting of § 1 the consequences of neglecting the 
full statistical problem of calibrating for diagnosis. Clinic B is clinic A after it has switched 
from double isotope assay determination x to radioimmunoassay determination x) of plasma 
concentration of aldosterone, the techniques f determining the other seven features x 
remaining the same, so that 	= 	For multivariate normality considerations we work 
throughout in terms of transformed data, the natural logarithms of the feature observations. 
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set CAB of data from which we determine along the predictive lines set out by Aitchison & 
Dunsmore (1975, §25): 
p(xjx, C) = St1  {70, 0647 + O749x, 0187 + 000194 (xA — 2.7O)}. 
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log10 (naive odds) 
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au New case 
2 	 New case for which differences in odds 
would lead tp different post-diagnostic 
actions 
—3 	 t Illustrative case 
Fig. 1. Comparison for 43 new cases of Conn's syndrome of the predictive diagnostic odds as 
determined by naive and by predictive calibration. 
illustratethe calibr.atjon problemwe considerthenewun(liagnosed case of Table 16 of Aitchison 
& Dunsmore (1975) for which 
p(xjIt = 1,xj,DA) = St, (19,342,0483), 	 (62) 
p(xIt = 2,x,DA) = St1 (10,274,00583). 	 (63) 
The theoretical comparison of § 5 has been most conveniently expressed in terms of the 
contrast between the naive-calibration estimative-diagnosis method and the predictive-
calibthtion predictive-diagnosis method. To emphasize that it is the naive attitude to the 
calibration problem which can be largely responsible for these differences we compare in our 
real diagnostic problem the naive and predictive calibration methods within the framework 
of predictive diagnosis. For both methods the first factor p(xj = xVlt, D 4) of (0-1) takes the 
same seven-dimensional Student form, so that the difference in the methods lies in the treat- 
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me4 of the second factor. The naive calibration method replaces the second factor of (6.1) by 
p(x T = 	t, Di), 
where > = (4) - 0.647)/074 is the naive calibrate corresponding to zW. 
For the particular case under discussion this naive method leads to odds of 310 to 1 in 
favour of adenoma. The predictive calibration method requires the numerical evaluation of 
the integrals associated with the right side of (6.1). This can be easily achieved by numerical 
integration even on a simple desk calculator such as the Hewlett-Packard 9810, and for this 
particular case leads to odds of only 2 to 1 on adenoma. The difference between these two sets 
of odds would lead to quite different treatments for the patient. Statisticians must therefore 
be careful they do not, by using naive calibration, read too much into interdilnic data but 
take full account of the extent of the unreliability of the calibration process. 
This already published case has been used simply as a convenient and dramatic means of 
illustrating the contrast in the naive and predictive calibrative methods of resolving the 
system transfer problem in diagnosis. For it the assay method was in fact identical to that 
used in the training set so that the above analysis is only a pointer to what might happen. 
In the analysis of 43 unpublished new cases where the assay methods differed from that of the 
training set, the odds assigned by the naive and predictive calibrative methods are shown 
in Fig. 1. We note here that the 'variance parameters' of the conditional feature distributions 
(6.2) and (6.3) associated with the published case are substantially different. The same is true 
for the conditional feature distributions of these 43 unpublished cases. For these cases there-
fore we recall the comment in § 4 that we cannot anticipate any definite relationship pattern 
between naive and predictive odds. There are, however, obviously appreciable departures 
from the line of equal odds assessments. Where both naive and predictive odds both exceed, 
or are both below, unity by a substantial factor such differences would have little effect on the 
treatment of the case. Although there is no case displaying as extreme a difference as the 
illustrative case, there do remain eight cases, identified by open circles in Fig. 1, where the 
naive and predictive calibrative methods are sufficiently different to lead to important 
differences in the assessment of the next step in the clinical management. 
7. Discussiox 
Although we have presented the system transfer problem in a medical setting it is clear 
that for any problem of discriminant analysis, where different techniques of measurement may 
have been used by different investigators or laboratories, the effects of calibration unreliabffity 
should be carefully studied. That such effects can be of practical significance has been amply 
shown by the clinical cases of this paper. Particular aspects needing further work are: 
investigation of the extent to which the approximations suggested in (5.1) and (5.2) are 
adequate alternatives to the numerical evaluation of the integral (3-2); 
modelling the situation where clinic B selects the cases for the calibration experiment, 
so that the conditioning adopted in Assumption 3 is inappropriate; 
combining limited diagnostic data from several clinics, by the use of calibrative 
information, to produce an effective diagnostic system for each clinic; 
removing the limitation of the ideas illustrated here to the multinormal feature dis-
tributions by considering more general feature distributions involving binary, discrete and 
continuous measurements. In this much more difficult problem a useful approach may be to 
assess such distributions through the general kernel technique proposed by Aitchison & 
Aitken (1076, §5). 
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SUMMARY 
To obtain a sufficiently large diagnostic training set for differential diagnosis it is often 
necessary to use cases from two or more clinics. Important questions that then arise are 
whether there are any differences between clinics in their methods of measuring the diagnostic 
features of cases, to what extent ignoring such differences invalidates any diagnostic system 
devised for these clinics and in what manner in-terdilnic calibration information may be 
employed to make efficient use of the complete set of calibrative and diagnostic data. 
The modelling of such complex diagnostic situations is discussed, problems of statistical 
methodology arising are resolved, and the methods devised are illustrated by a particular 
problem of amalgamation for diagnostic purposes of data from different clinics. 
Some key words: Calibration; Diagnosis; Discriminant analysis. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When diagnostic problems involve two or more clinics in which methods of measurements 
of diagnostic features differ then important problems of the appropriate form of calibration 
between clinics arise. For the simplest of these problems, that df system transfer where a 
diagnostic system devised wholly within one clinic is to be applied to a patient measured in 
another clinic, Aitchison (1977a) has shown that considerable care in statistical modelling is 
required if misleading results are to be avoided in practice. In particular, any method which 
ignores the inherent imprecision of the calibration process may provide assessments of 
diagnostic probabilities differing substantially from those assigned by methods which fully 
recognize this aspect of imprecision. In the present paper we develop methods for a more 
complex calibrative-diagnostic problem in which two or more clinics wish to pool their 
diagnostic data in order to construct a more reliable diagnostic system than any one clinic 
could produce by itself. Indeed when the differential diagnosis of a set of rare diseases is 
involved it may be impossible for any one clinic to obtain enough cases to make construction 
of a diagnostic system a feasible proposition. When methods of measurement of diagnostic 
features differ from clinic to clinic or have changed over time within a clinic then we have a 
calibrative problem of diagnosis which we can conveniently term the clinic amalgamation 
problem. This problem was posed by Aitchison (1977a) and an indication of how it may be 
modelled is given in abstract form by Aitchison (1977b). Here we develop these indications 
and demonstrate the method in simple applications. 
2. A CLINIC AMALGAMATION MODEL FOR TWO CLINICS AND TWO TYPES 
The nature of the clinic amalgamation problem can be clearly seen from its very simplest 
form involving only two clinics, labelled 1 and 2 and faced with the problem of differential 
diagnosis between just two mutually exclusive disease types, say types 1 and 2. This simple 
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form is appropriate for the application which motivated this paper, and we leave discussion 
of the extensions to more than two clinics and to more than two disease types until § 6. 
We suppose that we have two independent diagnostic training sets D1 and D2 in the two 
clinics, with 
D=((t,,x1j);j= i,...,nil (i= 1, 2), 
where t denotes the disease type and x the feature vector of the jth case in the ith clinic. 
Moreover we have available also a calibrative set of data Cl., assumed independent of D1  
and D2  for reasons similar to those set out by Aitchison (1977a), with 
C12 = {(Yij'iij); j = 11 ... ,n}, 
where y1j and yj  are associated measurements on the jth calibrative case by the methods 
of measurement in clinics 1 and 2 respectively. 
As explained by Aitchison (1977a), model-building in this particular area requires careful 
consideration of the circumstances of the collection methods of the diagnostic training sets 
and the calibrative data. Rather than turn this paper into a philosophical discussion resulting 
in a long catalogue of models to cover the complete range of possibilities we concentrate on 
one particular structure which fits the application we have in mind. This involves the use 
of the diagnostic paradigm (Dawid, 1976), where effort is concentrated on the conditional 
distribution of type for given feature vector, in contrast with the sampling paradigm approach 
of Aitchison (1977a), where emphasis is laid on the assumed stability of the conditional 
distribution of the feature vector for given type. Since, as we shall see later, the clinic 
amalgamation model contains the system transfer model as a special case this paper thus 
provides the opportunity of describing a diagnostic paradigm alternative to the sampling 
paradigm version of system transfer of Aitchison (1977a). 
Our objective is, in general, to provide each clinic with a diagnostic system for use with 
its own method of measurement. Since modelling of the links between the two clinics depends 
on the nature of the calibration experiment we take this aspect as our starting point. If the 
calibration experiment is a natural one in terms of the definition of Aitchison & Dunsmore 
(1975, P.  184) we have sufficient information to adopt a symmetrical approach, postulating 
conditional parametric models p(x1  I x2, Yi)  and p(x2 x1, Y2)  for calibrating from x2 to x1  
and from x1 to x2, respectively, where Yi  e F1, V2  E F2  are the indexing parameters for the two 
classes of calibrative models. Because of this symmetry we need only show the construction 
of a diagnostic system for clinic 1. Clinic 1 wishes to relate, disease type t to its own feature 
	
measurement x1  through a diagnostic paradigm p(t I x1, ), where 	is the indexing 
parameter of the class of diagnostic models. For example, a typical parametric model often 
advocated is the logistic discriminant model which sets 
pr (t = 11x1,Sj) = 1—pr(t = 2Ix1,1) = exp(3,x1)/(1+exp(&jx1)}. 	(2.1) 
To use the diagnostic data D2  from clinic 2 for the construction of the diagnostic system for 
clinic 1 we require to obtain, from the calibrative and diagnostic models for clinic 1, namely 
p(x1  I x21 Yi) and p(t I x1, ), an induced model 
p(t I  x21 )'i' i) = I p(t j, 1)p(x1 x21  y) dx1 	 (2.2) 
J Ii 
for the explanation of the variability of the data D2 in terms of the clinic 1 parameters Yi 
and 6. 
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We can then focus our attention on the likelihood function L(71, & 1 012, D1, D2) for Yi  and 
for the given calibrative and diagnostic data 012, D1, D2: 
n2 	 n  
IC, D1, D2) = H p(t1  I xij,  ) H _02j I x21, y, 	!' P(Yii I 1I2j' Vi) 
1=1 	 J=1 	 5 1 
= L1( 1) L2(y11 ) L3(y1) 
	
(2.3) 
in an abbreviated notation which emphasizes. the extent of the dependence of the three 
factors on the parameter components Yi  and 5,. 
Adopting a Bayesian predictive approach for the reasons set out by Aitchison, Habbema 
& Kay (1977) we may resolve the statistical problem of making assessments of the diagnostic 
probabilities within clinic 1 as follows. First from the likelihood and with, if necessary, an 
almost vague prior on yj and 81, we obtain the posterior distribution p(yi,  81  1 C12, D1, D2) 
for y  and &. Then, for a new case of unknown type but with known feature vector x1  
measured in clinic 1, we compute the diagnostic assessment 
p(t I x11  012, D1, D2) = J' P(tI x1, 	p(l I C, D1, D2) d 1, 	 (2.4) 
where the marginal density function P(i I 012, D1, D2) is obtained by integrating out y in 
the full posterior distribution. The provision of an appropriate system for clinic 2 follows 
exactly the same procedure with x1 and x2 interchanged and Y2  and 52  replacing y, and 8. 
If the calibration experiment is not natural but designed, so that we can consider only one 
of the conditional models, say P(X11X21Y1)1 then the above symmetrical treatment is 
impossible. The diagnostic system for clinic 1 remains (2.4), but we have to be content with 
a much more indirect method of arriving at a diagnostic system for clinic 2. The induced 
diagnostic model (2.2), previously used only to make clinic 2 data available to clinic 1, 
has now, because of the absence of information on the conditional model p(x2  I x11 	to 
serve as the basis of arriving at a diagnostic assessment 
p(t I x21  012, D1, D2) = J J 
p(t I x21 y, 1)p(y 	0121 D1, D2) dy1  d 1 	(25) 
for a new case of unknown type but with known feature vector x2 measured in clinic 2. 
Note that when we do have a natural calibration experiment we would not use (2.5) as an 
alternative to the clinic 2 counterpart of (2.4), since (2.5) does not then use all the available 
calibrative information. For this reason also we would not expect the two assessments to 
coincide. In the interests both of good statistical practice and of avoiding awkward doubly-
multiple integrals of the form (2.5) we should choose natural calibration experiments when-
ever possible. 
3. THE NORMAL LINEAR CALrBRATIVE-DIAGNOSTIC MODEL 
We now consider the implications of adopting particular parametric forms for the 
calibration and diagnostic components of our model. For the diagnostic paradigm for 
clinic 1 we adopt the normal distribution function form with argument a linear form of the 
feature vector: 
pr (t = 11x1,8) = 1— pr, (t = 21x1,3) = 1('x1), 	 (3.1) 
where L is the standard univariate normal distribution function and allowing the first 
component of x1 to be 1 for the usual purpose of simplified notation and yet recognizing the 
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necessity of a constant term in the linear form 8'x1. Note that for simplicity we have now 
dropped the suffix notation in the parameters y and S. This model, identical in form to an 
additive multistimulus version of probit analysis, is preferred to the more popular logistic 
model (2.1) because its convolution-integral properties give the advantage of simple 
evaluation of (2.2). A detailed comparison of such logistic and normal diagnostic paradigms 
in a different context is given by Lauder (1978). 
For the calibrative paradigm we adopt the normal linear regression model 
p(x11x21y) = (x1 jAx2,B), 	 (3.2) 
where q(. 1 p, ) is an appropriately dimensioned multivariate normal density function with 
mean a and covariance matrix Z, and again allowance is made for a regression constant in 
the presence of a unit in the first component of x2. With these particular normal linear forms 
(3.1) and (3.2) the awkwardness of modelling, namely the multiple integration (2.2) involved 
in formulating the induced diagnostic paradigm for clinic 2, is easily resolved by reduction 
to a simple one-dimensional integral through the transformation v = 8'x1, giving 
pr (t = flx2,y,8) = f 	(v)c(vI6'Ax2,6'B6)dv = (e'x2), 	 (33) 
where e = A'8/..J(1 +S'B8). Thus the induced diagnostic paradigm for clinic 2 is also of the 
normal linear form (3.1) with parameter e instead of S. 
The simple forms of the factors (3.1)—(33) provide an easily computable likelihood function 
from which, by the Newton—Raphson iterative technique, expressible in a modified probit 
analysis form, we can arrive at maximum likelihood estimates (c, ci) for (y, 8) and also at the 
information matrix inverse J. The details are omitted here. By the standard Bayesian 
counterpart of maximum likelihood large-sample theory and in order to take advantage of 
the predictive over the estimative approach we adopt the approximate posterior forms 
p(y,t5C12, DI, D2) = (y,8jc,d; J) and p(6C12, DI, D2) = (81d,G), where 0 is the appro-
priate submatrix of J. 
For a new case of unknown type but with known feature vector x1 measured in clinic 1 
we have, by (2.4), the diagnostic assessment 
Pr (t = fl x11 C12, D1, D2) = f"(D(S'xj) 0(6 1 ci, 0) d8 = t{d'x1JJ(1 + x 0x1)}. 	(34) 
When the calibration experiment is a natural one diagnostic assessments for new cases in 
clinic 2 take a form similar to (3.4) by the symmetrical analysis of § 2. When the calibration 
experiment allows only calibration from x2 to x1 then for new cases in clinic 2 we would have 
to resort to the diagnostic assessment (2.5) which for the normal linear model takes the 
form 




+8'B8i ch(y,Slc,d; J)dyd8, 	(3.5) 
where y = (A, B). This multiple integral is of complex structure and requires for its evaluation 
numerical or Monte Carlo methods, reinforcing the soundness of the advice of § 2 to perform 
a natural calibration experiment wherever possible. 
4. AN ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISON WITH SIMPLIFIED METHODS 
We can easily illustrate the appreciable differences in diagnostic probability assessments 
that may arise between the use of the full clinic amalgamation model as described above and 
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other. simplified methods which ignore certain important aspects of the situation in terms of 
the illustrative data set of Table 1 involving a univariate feature. For the diagnosis of new 
cases in clinic 1 three main alternative methods are of particular interest for comparison 
purposes. 
Table 1. Diagnostic and calibrative data for the illustrative example 
Clinic 1, data D1  Clinic 2, data D. Calibration, data C12  
ii X15 t j  X25 Yii Yzi 
1 2•04 1 1•69 045 072 
1 —013 1 060 040 140 
2 022 1 018 —036 —106 
2 0•49 2 038 —065 —031 
2 —085 2 —014 
2 —092 2 —092 -. 
The single relevant clinic method. Construct a normal linear diagnostic system based on 
the diagnostic training set D1 alone, thus avoiding any need to calibrate. This method may 
not be possible when the number of cases in clinic 1 is too small in relation to the dimension 
of the feature vector. For this particular set of data the method is applicable. 
The system transfer method. Construct a normal linear diagnostic system based on the 
diagnostic training set D2 alone and use the system transfer technique (Aitchison, 1977a) 
based on the calibrative data C121 to allow application to the new cases in clinic 1. This 
method ignores the information in the diagnostic training set D1 and so can be investigated 
as a special case of the clinic amalgamation model with D1 the empty set. 
The naive calibration method. Convert the features of the training set D2 to corre-
sponding point calibrates in clinic 1 to produce through this naive calibration (Aitchison, 
1977a) an augmentation, say .b2(C12), to the clinic 1 training set D1. From the combined 
training set (D1, b2(C12)} construct a clinic 1 diagnostic system based on the normal linear 
model and apply this directly to the new cases in clinic 1. 
On theoretical grounds (i), (ii) and (iii) are all subject to criticism. Systems (i) and (ii) 
ignore completely the diagnostic information contained in one of the clinics and so offend 
the principle of using all available information. System (iii) in its use of naive calibration 
is open to all the criticisms of possibly bad misrepresentation made by Aitchison (1977a), 
in particular the effects arising from ignoring imprecisions in this form of calibration. 
For a univariate feature it is simplest to show the differences between the methods 
diagrammatically since we can present the graphs of the probability of type 1 assigned by 
each of the four methods against the measured feature value in clinic 1. The anticipated 
consequences are clearly demonstrated. The system transfer method, making use only of the 
data D2 and C12, arrives at probability assessments which are naturally less firm, that is 
nearer the value 1, than the full clinic amalgamation method which uses all of D1, D2 and 
C12. On the other hand, the naive calibration method gives the appearance of providing 
firmer assessments than the full clinic amalgamation method. This firmness is, however, 
unjustified in the sense that the method is based on the false supposition that the naive 
calibrates are known precisely and without error. See Aitchison (1977a) for a more detailed 
criticism of this mistaken assumption. The merits of the single relevant clinic method are 
more difficult to assess. If the calibration process is not very precise as in this example then 
the additional information provided by D2 through C12 towards the diagnostic process in 
clinic 1 may not provide firmer assessments for all cases than the use of D1 alone. This is 
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borne out in Fig. 1 but we reemphasize that the clinic amalgamation model is principally 
directed towards situations where the data are insufficient to allow the application of the 
single relevant clinic method. 
10 
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Fig. 1. Comparison of type 1 probabilities assigned by four different diagnostic systems. 
A fourth, and more acceptable, alternative is to build up a diagnostic system for clinic 1 
by an augmentation of the diagnostic training set D2 but replacing each naive calibrate 
by a full calibrative density function, say p(x1  I x21  C12), as defined by Aitchison & Dunsmore 
(1975, p.  186). The augmented set then consists of two qualities of data, the original (tfl, xu) 
with feature vectors x1 (j = 1, ..., n1) known and the transferred cases {t251 p(x1 x21, C12)} 
with the feature vectors not known exactly but with knowledge of the nature of their 
imprecision. Such training sets do not form the basis of any standard diagnostic analysis 
but a general method of statistical diagnosis based on features observed with variable 
precision has been developed recently in an unpublished report by J. Aitchison and I. J. 
Lauder, who in their illustrative examples provide an application in this area of calibrative 
diagnosis. Since the calibrative density function p(x1  I x2, C12) would be formed by the 
process 
P(Xi  I x21  C12) = 	I x21  y) p(v I C12) dy, 
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there is some loss of information in separating the calibration problem from the diagnostic 
one, but the distortion is likely to be small compared with either the complete ignoring of 
D2 or the naive calibration approach. 
5. AN APPLICATION 
Aitchison (1977a) showed how a statistical diagnostic system had to be adapted for 
application to cases in another clinic or in the same clinic where the methods of measure- 
ment of some of the features had been changed. The system transfer application there was 
to the area of the preoperative differential diagnosis of two types of Conn's syndrome and 
the transfer problem arose because the method of measurement of one of the features had 
been changed. Since the new method of measurement is now used on all new cases the 
designation of 'clinics' using the new and old methods of measurements as clinic 1 and 2, 
respectively, means that we need only aim for diagnostic assessments of the form (3.4) for 
new cases in clinic 1. The original training set D2 in clinic 2 consists of 90  eases of type 1 
and 11 cases of type 2 with an eight-dimensional feature vector, and clinic 1 has now, on 
the basis of cases diagnosed by the system transfer method of Aitèhison (1977a) and with 
type subsequently confirmed histopathologically, another training set D1 consisting of 17 
cases of type 1 and 4 cases of type 2. For the illustrative purposes of this paper we used only 
the three most discriminating of the eight features, namely the plasma concentrations of 
potassium, renin and aldosterorie, the last of which is the feature involved in the calibration 
aspect of the problem. This reduction of the feature vector also helped to avoid the awkward-
ness of the diagnostic paradigm which arises when there is complete hyperplane separation 
of the two types in the sense of Anderson (1972). 
The calibration data C12 arising from a natural calibration experiment consist of 72 blood 
samples, each divided into two, one being determined by the old double-isotope method of 
clinic 2 and the other by the new radioimmunoassay method of clinic 1 with respect to one 
of the features, the concentration of aldosterone. We have thus (Aitchison, 1977a) a partial 
calibration problem and following the notation there we use superscript 1 to denote that 
part of the feature. vector not requiring calibration and superscript 2 for that part requiring 
calibration. We then simply rewrite (3.1) as 
pr (I = 1x1,8) = )(So+xj1) +5a x12) ) 
and confine the calibration regression model to the appropriate component by writing 
p(x2) Ix 2 ,y) = 	 u2) 	 (5.2) 
Then (3.3) provides the basis for handling the diagnostic data D2 in clinic 2 by becoming 
Pr 	= 1 X21 Y, = t[{6o+8x')  +5a(c+x 2 )}/aJ(1 +6c72)]. (t 	 (5.3) 
Because of the small number, only 4, of cases of type 2 in clinic 1, it was not considered 
sensible to attempt to apply the single relevant clinic method of § 4 in this situation. The full 
clinic amalgamation method, the system transfer method and the naive calibration method 
were, however, each applied to obtain diagnostic assessments for the 21 training cases in 
clinic 1, by resubstitution, and for 22 new cases of unknown type. Figure 2 provides, for 
each of these 43 cases, a comparison of the probabilities of type 1 assigned by the clinic 
amalgamation and the system transfer methods Note that on the whole the full clinic 
amalgamation method gives assessments of greater firmness than the system transfer method, 
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It is not possible to show the results of the naive calibration method on the same diagram 
since there is practically no difference from those of the full clinic amalgamation method, 
in contrast to our illustrative example of §4, and also in contrast to the warnings against 
naive calibration by Aitchison (1977a). Some explanation of this contrast is called for. The 
explanation has two components. First, naive calibration here is directed towards producing 
a diagnostic system for clinic 1 in contrast to the assessment for a new case in clinic 1 as in 
Probability assigned by clinic amalgamation 
Fig. 2. Comparison of type 1 probabilities assigned by full clinic amalgamation and system 
transfer methods: Th clinic 1 case of known type 1; s, clinic 1 case of known type 2; •, new 
case in clinic 1 of unknown type. 
system transfer. The calibration experiment is sizeable and so produces reasonably reliable 
estimates of the regression parameters. Although for transfer of a single case the naive 
calibrate has an appreciable unreliability, ignoring this unreliability may yet produce, 
because of averaging over a number of cases, a satisfactory diagnostic system for clinic 1. 
Secondly, since new cases have features measured in clinic 1 there is no need for any 
additional calibration technique to be applied to the diagnostic assessment stage, in 
contrast to the situation in system transfer where each new case requires individual 
calibration. 
Despite the fact that we seem to have succeeded with naive calibration in this particular 
application, we hope that the illustrative example of § 4 will serve as a reminder that there 
can be substantial differences. Unfortunately it is virtually impossible to give any simple 
set of instructions as to when we can resort to naive calibration. Such factors as the 'quality' 
of the calibration as discussed by Aitchison (1977a), the sizes of the diagnostic training sets, 
the extent of the diagnosibility of the types for the given diagnostic features, play a compli-
cated and interrelated role as determinants. Since computations for the full clinic 
amalgamation method are not essentially any more difficult than those of naive calibration 
we would advocate playing safe and applying the full clinic amalgamation system. 
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6. EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The theory and applications of the preceding sections have been confined to the case of 
two clinics and two types. Extension from two to k clinics with diagnostic training sets 
D1, ..., D. can be reasonably straightforward provided that the calibration experiment is 
suitably designed. We briefly consider two versions. 
Suppose that the calibration experiment consists of n cases, independent of D1, ..., D,, 
measured in every clinic with resulting measurements of x1, ..., xA, for a typical case. Suppose 
further that the joint variability of (x1, ..., x) is modelled by the parametric class 
I y). Then all pairwise conditional distributions are available so that the symmetric 
analysis of § 2 can be applied. For example, starting with a diagnostic paradigm p(t I x1, ) 
for clinic 1 we obtain k— 1 induced diagnostic models corresponding to (2.2), with 
p(tIx,y,) = ip(tlxi,y)p(xiIxc,v)i
xi 
for clinic c = 2, ..., k. The likelihood for diagnosis in clinic 1 is then easily formed and, for 
normal linear diagnostic calibrative paradigms, gives normal linear diagnostic paradigms 
for each of the clinics. Though the computations are more complex because of the more 
complicated nature of y,  they are certainly feasible. 
Independent calibration experiments of each clinic with a central clinic, say clinic 1, 
could be modelled unsymmetrically by separate conditional models p(x1 ;, v) relating 
clinic 1 to clinic c (c = 2, ..., k), with this conditional density formation replacing p(x1  I x, y). 
Extension from two to three types is straightforward. Where the univariate cumulative 
normal distribution function provided a mechanism for two types the corresponding 
standardized bivariate distribution function, say (1)21 provides the mechanism for three 
types through the modelling for clinic 1: 
pr (t = 1Ix11) = 
pr (t = 21x1,8) = 1(8x1)-1)2(8x11 x1), 
pr (t = 31x1,) = 1-1)1(6x1). 
See the unpublished report by J. Aitchison and I. J. Lauder for further details of the 
usefulness of this model. Along with the calibrative models already used it leads through 
(3.3) to factors for the likelihood involving at worst bivariate normal integrals over 
rectangular regions, whose computation is available through standard algorithms. 
Extension to r types is conceptually straightforward but depends on the availability of 
methods for computing (r-  1)-dimensional multivariate normal distributions over cuboidal 
regions of (r - 1)-dimensional space. The logistic discriminant analysis alternative provides 
no means of escape since even for only two types the counterpart of integral (33) requires 
the use of approximate methods. 
Finally, all the considerations of this paper could have been formulated in terms of the 
sampling paradigm, which concentrates attention on the conditional distribution of feature 
vector for given type, rather than the diagnostic paradigm we have used. Indeed the sampling 
paradigm has considerable advantages of tractability for more than three types. Particularly 
in situations where different clinics are involved, however, the use of the sampling paradigm 
is open to the substantial criticisms set out by Dawid (1976) and so we have preferred to 
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Statistical diagnosis from imprecise data 
By J. AITCHISON AND I. J. LAUDER 
Department of Statistics, University of Hong Kong 
SUMMARY 
The fact that diagnostic measurements are often subject to error, with the extent of the 
imprecision varying from case to case, is largely ignored in current methodology of statistical 
diagnosis. Models taking full account of such imprecision are proposed and the necessary 
methods developed. In particular, a useful combination of a cumulative-normal diagnostic 
model with a normal error model is studied. Applications to two specific medical diagnostic 
problems illustrate the differing extents of the misrepresentation that may be involved in the 
use of techniques that ignore imprecision. 
Some key words: Calibration; Cumulative normal-normal model; Diagnostic paradigm; Logistic-normal 
model; Measurement error; Medical diagnosis; Sampling paradigm. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recorded features or measurements of cases arising in statistical diagnostic problems 
are often imprecise for a variety of reasons, such as physiological variability (Ferriss et at., 
1970), assessment by assay techniques (Cost & Vegter, 1962), calibration between sources 
such as different clinics (Aitchison, 1977) and subjective measurement or observer error 
(Buckton et at., 1976; Smyllie, Blendis & Armitage, 1965). 
Such imprecision in feature vectors, although often recognized, is seldom taken directly 
into account in the actual construction of a statistical diagnostic system. To the extent that 
calibration problems in diagnosis are a subclass of the problems studied here the considerable 
effects that neglect of known imprecision can have on clinical practice have already been 
shown by Aitchison (1977). For the simple univariate case with known normal distributions 
of features for given disease type, Good & Card (197 1) point out that the effect of neglecting 
error can be appreciable. 
The reasons for the neglect of imprecision in general are presumably 
the lack of appropriate statistical methods in this kind of discriminant analysis, and 
the assumption that disregard of such imprecision has negligible consequences in 
practice. 
Our purpose in this paper is first to remedy (i). It is relatively simple to model diagnostic 
problems for degrees of imprecision varying from component to component of the feature 
vector and from case to case. Only by so modelling is it possible to investigate the validity 
of the assumption (ii). 
2. DIAGNOSTIC MODELS FOR IMPRECISE DATA 
For diagnostic modelling purposes we follow Dawid (1976) and adopt the diagnostic 
paradigm, which concentrates on the conditional distribution of type for a given feature 
vector, in preference to the sampling paradigm, in which the conditional distribution of the 
feature vector for a given type plays the central role. For a case (t, x) of diagnostic type t 
belonging to a set T and with true feature vector x belonging to a set X, a parametric model 
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of the diagnostic paradigm specifies the conditional distribution p(1 I x, ), where 8 is a vector 
parameter be 	to a set A. Instead of the true feature vector x we can observe only a 
possibly inaccurate vector y. We suppose that we can assess the conditional distribution 
p(x I y) of x for the observed y. The parametric model with respect to the observable feature 
vector y then takes the form 
p(lIy) = fX p(t I x, 8) p(x I y) dx. 	 (2.1) 
Information about the unknown parameter 8 is obtained from a training set 
D = {(t1,y); i = 1, ...,n) 
consisting of the known type and observed feature vector for each of n cases. We suppose 
that this information can be summarized in terms of a posterior distribution p(8 1 D) so that 
the practical advantages and greater realism of the predictive diagnostic approach (Aitchison, 
1976; Aitchison, Habbema & Kay, 1977) can be exploited. For a new case of unknown type t 





1D)dxd5. 	 (2'3) 
Three, components of the statistical problem can be recognized. 
The likelihood problem: for data D the likelihood of 8 is 
n 
L(81 D) = fJp(t1Iy) 
i=1 
and so for an effective analysis we clearly require a ready means of evaluating integrals of 
the form (21). 
The posterior distribution problem: the complicated form of the likelihood rules out 
the possibility, whatever the nature of any prior distribution p(6) over A we care to invent, 
of obtaining a neat, tractable form for p(  D). The problem is thus to decide what additional 
simplifying assumptions will provide a balance between realism and the development of an 
operational tool. 
The diagnostic problem for a new case: mathematically this involves obtaining 
numerical values for multiple integrals of the form (2.2) or 'doubly multiple' integrals of the 
form (2.3). 
3. THE CUMULATIVE NORMAL-NORMAL AND THE LOGISTIC-NORMAL 
MODELS FOR TWO TYPES 
For the remainder of this paper we confine attention to continuous features. In this 
section we restrict consideration to situations where diagnosis between only two types, 1 and 
2, is required; possible extensions to more than two types are discussed in § 5. 
As parametric model of the diagnostic paradigm we adopt the cumulative normal form 
pr(t = 1Jx,) = 1—pr(t = 21x,) = I('x), 	 (3.1) 
where s1 is the standard univariate normal distribution function, in preference to the more 
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popular logistic discriminant form 
pr (t = lJx,3) = 1—pr(t = 2Ix,) = e'x/(l+e). 	 (3.2) 
The great advantage of (3-1) over (3.2) is undoubtedly the availability of a parametric form 
of the error paradigm which allows the explicit evaluation of the convolution-type integrals 
(2'1). For if 
	
p(xly) = (xI By, S), 	 (33) 
where q(. I pE) is the density function of a multivariate normal distribution with mean 
and covariance matrix Z, then (2.1) based on (3.1) and (33) can be expressed as 
1)(x8'By, 1+'83). 	 (34) 
We know of no form p(x I y) which in combination with (3 -2) gives such an explicit evalua-
tion of (2.1). Moreover, in terms of another important aspect, namely quality of fit, there is 
seldom any significant difference in terms of separate family comparisons (Cox, 1962) 
between the two forms. Mainly on grounds of tractability we therefore favour form (33). 
For a study of the computational problems associated with the normal and logistic forms, 
see Lauder (1978). 
Form (3.3) with B = I is appropriate if y is quoted as an estimate of x with computed 
variance S or, in the multivariate situation, estimated covariance matrix S. We have retained 
in (3•3) the more general B since information about x is sometimes obtained through some 
indirect form of measurement such as calibration and assay. 
Note that from (3.4) the simply established inequality 
p(1 y, ) - I <I p(l x = By, 5)-j-1 	 (3.5) 
verifies the intuitive modelling requirement that knowledge of inaccurate y rather than true 
x must lead us to diagnostic probabilities which are closer to 1, the diagnostic assessment 
expressing the greatest uncertainty. 
In general, individual cases of the training set will have B1 and S (i = 1, . .., n) differing 
from each other and from the B and S of a new case, so that the precise form of the diag-
nostic model (3.4) varies from ease to case. The likelihood problem (1) of § 2 is, however, 
easily resolved for the cumulative-normal model since the integrals of form (2.1) take the 
explicit and easily computable farms (3.4). It is tempting to hope that the problems of taking 
account of imprecision are thereby automatically resolved but we shall see in § 4 that 
imprecision in clinical situations can cause substantial, and at times insurmountable, further 
difficulties. 
To arrive at diagnostic assessments for new cases through the evaluation of integrals of 
the form (2.2) or (2.3) some simple form for p (5 ID) must be obtained. We assume the a5plic-
ability of the Bayesian form of large-sample maximum likelihood theory (Lindley, 1961); in 
other words, 5 is assumed to be approximately multivariate normally distributed as 
N{, V()}, where 8 is the maximum likelihood estimate and V(s) the usual asymptotic 
estimate of the covariance matrix of 8, evaluated at 8. The algorithm to obtain 8 and V(s) 
by the Newton—Raphson method is only slightly more complicated than a straightforward 
probit analysis, each iterative step being expressible in weighted regression form. Write 
uj = S'S j Co = q!2/{D(1_0)}; 	 (3•6) 
define the weights w as v(u), and the regressor vector X and the regressand Y by 
= 	 Y = 
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The iterative relation determining the rth iterate S> is then 
5(r) 
= 	w X X) 1 (Y_ i to1 X, Y), 	 (3.7) 
where the right-hand side is evaluated at the (r— 1)th iterate 51)• At convergence = 5(r) 
and V(s) is the inverse matrix, the first factor of the right-hand side. 
This resolution of the posterior distribution problem (2) allows us to proceed to problem 
(3) of § 2, the evaluation of the integral 
pr (t = lIy,D) = J)t8'B!f//(I+S'S5)}(SI&V(')}dS. 	 (38) 
For a new case with an exact feature vector, and so with S = 0, this multiple integral can be 
evaluated explicitly as 	
+ y'B' V(s) By)], 	 (3-9) 
but for a new case with S + 0 there is no closed form.- for (3.8). Since numerical integration of 
such multivariate integrals is difficult and since it is possible to simulate an independent 
sequence S} of N{& V()} vectors, Monte Carlo techniques are appropriate. 
The Monte Carlo technique of importance sampling (Hammersley & 1-landscomb, 1964, p. 57) 
adapted for the evaluation of (3.8) by Lauder (1978) can be improved by the control variate 
technique (Hammersley & 1-Iandscomb, 1964, p. 59) in the following way. We can reexpress 
(3.8) as the sum of an explicit, easily computed, control term 
cl?['By/J{1 +'S+y'B'V()By}] 	 (3.10) 
and the integral 
f
F(S) ~{S 18, V()}d8, 	 (3.11) 
where 
F(S) = II{8'By/.J(1 + S'SS)} - )(5'By/J(1 + 
the integral (3.11) being approximated by importance sampling. In our experience of cases 
so far the contribution from the integral (3-11) has been negligible to two significant digits, 
so that the control term (3 10) itself may prove to be an adequate approximation in practice. 
If there is a need to improve upon this approximation one possibility is to note that, in a 
series expansion of F(S) about 8, the first nonzero term arises from the Hessian matrix, H(S) 
say, of second order derivatives of F, and can be expressed as tr {H() V()}. 
4. APPLICATIONS 
41 Preliminaries 
The two objectives of this paper are to draw attention to the possible consequences of 
ignoring imprecision in features and to illustrate the simple methodology of § 3 which takes 
full account of such imprecision. One of our motivating problems, which is the diagnosis, 
and differential diagnosis of four forms, of Cushirig's syndrome, is too complex to present in 
detail here and so we have selected the simplest subproblem which will fulfil these objectives. 
42. Differential diagnosis of Gushing's syndrome 
Cushing's syndrome is a condition involving high blood pressure with involvement of the 
adrenal glands, and we confine attention here to the problem of differentiating between its 
two benign forms, adrenal adenoma, type 1, and adrenal hyperplasia, type 2. Such differentia-
tion is of practical importance because the treatments are quite different for the two types. 
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A training set of 7 type 1 and 27 type 2 cases is available, each case, for our limited illustra-
tion, having a two dimensional feature vector, consisting of urinary excretion rates of two 
steroid metabolites, ailo-tetrahydrocortisol and tetrahydrocortisone, determined by the 
paper chromatography method of Cost & Vegter (1962), who state that their method has a 
20% coefficient of variation. To take account of a coefficient of variation equal to c the error 
model (3.3) takes the form 
p(xjy,S) = ç{xy,{cdiag(y)}2], 	 (4.1) 
where diag (y) is the diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the components of the 
vector y. 
We reemphasize that our main purpose here is to investigate for new cases the extent to 
which admission of this factor of imprecision alters the diagnostic assessments which we would 
obtain using the excretion rates as if they were precise. A general study of the effects of 
imprecision requires the evaluation of the multiple integral (3.8) for various degrees of 
imprecision in the training set and in the new case. To avoid any possible confounding of 
imprecision effects with the accuracy of the approximation (310), we can conveniently 
approach the general study in two stages. At the first stage we ask what is the effect of 
recognizing imprecision only in the training set, with S = 0 for a new case, when (38) takes 
the exact form (39). The second stage is then simply to let S increase from zero and to use 







Coefficient of variation c 
Fig. 1. Changes in the diagnostic probabilities of typical cases as the coefficient of variation 
increases. 
To study the first stage, model (3.4) with error ffistribution (4.1) was fitted by the iterative 
procedure (3.7) with coefficient of variation c = 0, that is considering the training set as 
accurate, and then with increasing values of c up to 5%. For each c, after convergence, the 
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predictive diagnostic probabilities (39) were determined for 40 new cases. For all cases but 
one the diagnostic probabilities changed substantially as illustrated by typical cases in 
Fig. 1, the probabilities moving towards . 
At the second stage we investigated the additional effect of increasing the coefficient of 
variation for a new case up to 5% using the approximation (3.10). The further reduction in 
the diagnostic probabilities was smaller than 2% in all cases. 
Our investigation has been restricted to a maximum coefficient of variation of 5% instead 
of the actual 20%. As the coefficient of variation increases past 5% it becomes increasingly 
difficult to obtain convergence by the Newton—Raphson method. We return to this difficulty 
in §5. 
43. A two-clinic problem in differential diagnosis 
A second application involves an alternative to the clinic amalgamation problem discussed 
by Aitchison (1979). Here, two clinics wish to amalgamate their training sets but one of the 
features, plasma concentration of aldosterone, is determined by different techniques in the 
two clinics. In presenting this example to illustrate the new methods, we have used the same 
three features for the differential diagnosis of the two types of Conn's syndrome as used by 
Aitchison (1979). In brief, the training set is here considered to consist of 21 cases from 
clinic 1, with 17 of type 1 and 4 of type 2, whose feature measurements, by the latest method, 
are regarded as exact; and 31 cases from clinic 2 with 20 of type 1 and 11 of type 2, whose 
first feature, because of its calibration to the first clinic standard, is imprecise but whose 
other two feature measurements are exact. The B and S of § 3 then take the forms 
B=I4, S=O (i=1,...,21), 
B = I
a 	1, 
S = diag[0,c{D+E(y—F)2},0,0] ( = 22,...,52), 
í b 0 	 -. 
where a and b are the calibration regression coefficients, c is the residual mean square of the 
calibration regression and y is the aldosterone measurement in clinic 2; Aitchison & Duns-
more (1975, §2-5) and Aitchison (1977, p.  470) give further details. Our approach here thus 
completely separates out the calibration problem from the diagnostic one, producing asingle 
training set with a mixture of precise cases and imprecise, calibrated cases, whereas Aitchison 
(1979) retains the two training sets using a calibration paradigm as the binding element. 
Where the calibration experiment is large, as in the present problem, the two approaches are 
likely to give similar results. 
Here new cases are measured by the new technique so that B = 14, S = 0 and only the first 
stage defined in § 42, involving the effects of imprecision in the training set, need be con-
sidered. The degree of imprecision in this example is represented by c and so we can again 
study the effects of ignoring the imprecision by setting c = 0 as well as to its actual value 
o = O184. For both assumptions about c, there were no practical problems of numerical 
convergence in fitting the cumulative normal model (3.4), and (39) was applied to obtain the 
predictive diagnostic probabilities for 22 new cases. Our findings are identical with those of 
Aitchison (1979). The differences between the odds assigned on a basis of ignoring imprecision 
and those taking account of the calibration imprecision are negligible. This is in sharp contrast 
to the substantial differences in the application,to Cushing's syndrome. A possible explana-
tion is that precise cases are sufficiently frequent in the combined training set to prevent the 
imprecise, calibrated cases from causing much of an effect at their actual degree of impreci-
sion. If, however, we let the degree of imprecision increase well beyond its actual value, up to 
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c = 1, the odds do change by a factor of 3 in a substantial number of cases. From this result 
it is fairly safe to conclude that it is the frequency and the magnitude of imprecision that 
dually affect the assessments. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Our illustrative examples have demonstrated that ignoring imprecision can give diagnostic 
assessments with a false appearance of firmness. Explicit recognition of imprecision can be 
incorporated in diagnostic modelling and has the expected effect of reducing the firmness of 
the diagnostic assessments. This effect can be so extreme that diagnostic assessments are 
practically the same whatever the feature vector. If the imprecision is appreciable standard 
procedures, such as Newton—Raphson iteration, which work readily under the assumption of 
precise data, fail completely for the degree of imprecision actually present. 
This effect of imprecision can be easily demonstrated by a simple illustrative model. 
Suppose that there is a one dimensional feature, a one dimensional parameter S with model 
pr (t = fly, 8) = (Sy), and that the training set D consists of four cases 
(2, —1), (1, —05), (2, 0-5), (1,2) 
With S = 82 (i = 1, ..., 4). Figure 2 shows the graphs of the log likelihood for s = 0, 1, 1-4, F8, 
and illustrates two points of difficulty. First, a maximum likelihood estimate may not even 
=1 
05 	1.0 	15 	O 
Fig. 2. Log likelihood graphs for illustrative example of § 5. 
exist for some degrees of imprecision. Secondly, even when a maximum likelihood estimate 
exists it is clear that as s increases and the graphs flatten the determination of 8 becomes a 
more and more difficult numerical task and, moreover, the asymptotic normal approxima-
tion of maximum likelihood theory must eventually deteriorate. These difficulties obviously 
can persist for higher dimensional 8, as we have encountered in the application of § 41. 
26 
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Two aspects of our modelling suggest that it may be interesting to consider the role of the 
EM algorithm of Dempster, Laird & Rubin (1977) for maximum likelihood estimation from 
incomplete data. First, the observable y is incomplete in the sense of being an imprecise 
form of the unobservable and precise x. Secondly, the similarity of the cumulative normal 
diagnostic model to probit analysis with its connotation of an unobservable tolerance which 
determines the type of binary response suggests that we might regard type t as incomplete in 
relation to a latent indicator variable v. 
More specifically, define a complete pair (v, x) with p(v Ix, 8) of N(6'x, 1) form and related 
to incomplete (t, y) through a conditional distribution p(x I y) of N(By, S) form and the rule 
that t = 1 if v> 0 and I = 2 if v < 0. Then 
pr (t = fly,S) 
= fX p(v>Ojx,6)p(xjy)dx = {6'By/V(1+6'S8)}, 
and so (v, x) bears the relationship of complete data for the diagnostic model (34) with 
observable data (t, y). The EM algorithm for its rth step then takes the following simple form. 
E step: with given 8(r) compute, taking + for t = 1 and - for 1 2, 
= 8(r)' y1i± V(1  + 6(r)' S 8(r)) h( ± Ur)), x = y ± (1 + 6(r)' 	6(r))_ S 6' ) h( ± Ur)), 
where h is the function /I and ui is as defined in (3.6). 
.2I step: regress v on Xr>  to obtain 3(r+1)  as regression coefficients. 
The algorithm, though attractively simple, is disappointing in its convergence properties 
(Lauder, 1978), not surprisingly in a situation where Newton—Raphson iteration can be 
ineffective. The concept of a latent indicator variable v essential to this xi'i algorithm approach 
does, however, open up ways of overcoming the difficulty of extending the modelling to 
more than two types. For k types we consider a (k— 1)-dimensional indicator vector v for 
which p(vjx) is _1(Ax,I). To produce a specific diagnostic model all that is required is to 
partition the (k - 1)-dimensional v-space into k regions R (t = 1, .. ., k), each associated with 
one of the types. For example, the standard version of logistic discrimination for precise 
feature vectors, as given by Anderson (1972), essentially uses 
B 
- {v: 	v = max(v1) 
- {v: v;<0 (i = 1,...,k--1)} 	 (I = k). 
To a large extent the method of partitioning through the use of Ic -I linear forms Ax is 
arbitrary and dictated by the tractability of the ensuing analysis. Such a view encourages 
the exploration of other forms of partition. The partition suggested by Aitchison (1 979) for 
the extension of the clinic amalgamation problem to Ic = 3 uses 
B1 = {v; v1  < 0, v2 < 0}, B2 = {v: v1  < 01  v2 0}, R3 = {v: v1 0} 
but considers the components of v correlated so that bivariate normal distribution functions 
are involved. With a partition of this type the added assumption adopted above that, for 
given x, the v are uncorrelated yields, for any Ic, expressions for p(t I x, 6) involving only 
products of univariate D functions. This allows for tractable combination with an error 
paradigm and with computations no greater in complexity than for ic = 2. We are currently 
exploring this very simple extension. 
In this paper we have concentrated on the diagitostic paradigm. Modelling for the sampling 
paradigm is also straightforward if we take p(x It, 6) as N(j, ) and the error model, now 
conditionally p(y I x), in the form IV(Bx, 8). Then so far as the observable feature vector y is 
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concerned the sampling model takes the form 
p(y t,), = fX 
p(y I x) p(x , )dx = N(B 1, 8 + B 
so that the likelihood can be obtained explicitly. The subsequent posterior distribution 
problem and the diagnostic problem for a new case are resolved in much the same manner as 
for the diagnostic paradigm except that to convert p(x It, D) to p(t I x, D) through Bayes's 
formula we require to insert an assumption concerning the incidence rate for a new case. 
There are clearly many unanswered questions raised by the explicit modelling of impreci-
sion in statistical diagnosis. Two related questions which would seem worth early con-
sideration are the following. To what extent should knowledge of imprecision affect some of 
the standard methods of feature selection? To what extent does the retention of features 
which would be discarded under a selection procedure which ignores imprecision features 
provide a necessary redundancy to compensate for imprecision effects? 
REFERENCES 
AJTCHISON, J. (1976). Goodness of prediction fit. Biometrika 63, 547-54. 
AITcHI50N, J. (1977). A calibration problem in statistical diagnosis: The system transfer problem. 
Bioinctrika 64, 461-72. 
AircHIsoN, J. (1979). A calibration problem in statistical diagnosis: The clinic amalgamation problem. 
Biornetrika 66, 357-66. 
AITcIusoN, J. & DuNsIaoRE, I. R. (1975). Statistical Prediction Analysis. Cambridge University Press. 
AITdHIsoN, J., HABBEMA, J. D. F. & KAY, J. W. (1977). A critical comparison of two methods of statistical 
discrimination. Appi. Statist. 26, 15-25. 
ANDERSON, J. A. (1972). Separate sample logistic discrimination. Biornetrika 59, 19-35. 
BUCKTON, K. E., O'RIoRDAN, M. L., JAcoBs, P. A., ROBINSON, J. A., HILL, R. & Ev.ns, H. J. (1976). 
C. and Q.band polymorphism in the chromosomes of 3 human populations. Ann. Hum. Genet. 40, 99-112. 
COST, W. S. & VEnTER, J. J. M. (1962). Quantitative estimation of adrenocortical hormones and their 
a-ketolic metabolites in urine. Acta Endocr. 41, 571-83. 
Cox, D. B. (1962). Further results on tests of separate families of hypotheses. J. B. Statist. Soc. B 24, 
406-24. 
DAWID, A. P. (1976). Properties of diagnostic data distributions. Biometrics 32, 647-58. 
DEMPSTER, A. P., LAIRD, N. M. & RUBIN, D. B. (1977). Maximum likelihood from incomplete data via the 
EM algorithm (with discussion). J. B. Statist. Soc. B 39, 1-38. 
FERRISS, J. B., BROWN, J. J., FRASER, R., IC&y, A. W., NEVILLE, A. M., O'MUIRCHEARTAIGB I. G., 
ROBERTSON, J. I. S., SYMINOTON, T, & LEVER, A. F. (1970). Hypertension with aldosterone excess and 
low plasmarenin: Preoperative distinction between patients with and without adrenocortical tumour. 
The Lancet 2, 995-1000. 
GOOD, I. J. & CARD, W. I. (1971). The diagnostic process with reference to errors. Meth. inform. Med. 
10, 176-88. 
HAHMERSLEY, J. M. & HANDSCOMB, D. C. (1964). Monte Carlo Methods. London: Methuen. 
LAUDER, I. J. (1978). Computational problems in predictive diagnosis. Compstat 1978, 186-92. 
LINDLEY, D. V. (1961). The use of prior probability distributions in statistical inference and decisions. 
Proc. 4th Berkeley Symp. 1, 453-68. 
SMYIlIE, H. C., BLENDIS, L. M. & ARMITAGE, P. (1965). The observer disagreement in physical signs of 
the respiratory system. The Lancet 2, 412-5. 
[Received December 1978. Revised May 1979] 
353- 
AITCHISON, J. (1979) 
Calibration and assay from imprecise data 
Reprinted from Bull. Inst. mt. Statist. 48, 4, 9-12 
S6 
CALIBRATION AND ASSAY FROM IMPRECISE DATA 
J. AITCHISON 
University of Hong Kong 
Sumary 
Calibration and assay involve the assessment of some unknown 
index of a specimen, not by direct measurement, but by inference 
from a comparison of the value of some related indicant of the 
specimen with the indicants of a training set of standards with 
known indices. The assumptions of most calibration models, namely 
that the indices and indicants of the training set and the indicant 
of the specimen are precisely determined, are often unr'ealistic. 
This paper indicates how such imprecisions can be incorporated 
into model-building and so provides a means of investigating the 
effects of imprecision in calibration and assay. 	 - 
1. 	Calibration and assay with precise data  
In a calibration or assay problem interest is in inferring 
for a case (blood sample, foetus, archaeological specimen, nuclear 
explosion) the value of some quantitative characteristic or index 
(plasma concentration of an antibiotic, length of pregnancy, age, 
nuclear yield). For reasons of cost, inconvenience, the time 
involved or even the destructiveness of the method of measurement 
we often hesitate to measure the index directly and would rather 
infer the index by measuring some related aspect, supplementary 
measure, or indicant (clearance diameter of droplet applied to an 
infected medium, crown-rump length of foetus in a sonar picture, 
radiocarbon count, magnitude of earth wave). The way in which an 
indicant x is related to the index t is seldom mathematically 
or even statistically known and usually has itself to be, inferred 
from a calibration experiment, consisting of 'standards' or calib-
rative training set 
D = {(t.,x.) 	i=l,...,n} 	 (1.1) 
of n cases of known indices t. c T, the set of possible indices, 
and known indicants x. e X., ihe sets of possible indicants 
(i=l,...,n). The si?nples problem of calibration is then to make 
an inference about the unknown index u of a new case for which only 
the indicant y has been determined. 
For the usual form of designed calibration experiment, which 
provides information only on the conditional distribution of 
indicant for given index, we adopt the assumptions and approach 
of Aitchison and Dunsnore (1975,.§10.3) with inferential aim the 
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provision of a realistic calibrative density function p(uy,D) 
(ucT). This involves the adoption of parametric forms p(x. 
(irl,...,n) and p(yju,8), where 8 c 0, for the appropriate cn-
ditional density functions, with (y,D) the data and (u,8) the 
parameter, 8 being a 'nuisance' parameter. 
To provide a backcloth against which to study modelling for 
imprecisions in the measurement of (y,D) we first draw attention 
to four basic questions which must be answered on the route to-
wards the calibrative density function when all the components 
(y,D) are measured with precision. 
Likelihood evaluation. Can we evaluate the likelihood 
11 
L(u,OJy,D) = p(ylu,8) IT p(xjt.,e) 	(2.1) 
i=l 	1 
and its derivatives with reasonable ease? 
'Nuisance' parameter assessment. Can we obtain a realistic 
assessment of p(OjD), assigning relative plausibilities to the 
possible values of the nuisance parameter 0 from the data D of 
the training set? 
Construction of the predictive density function. Can we 
evaluate the 'predictive' density function (Aitchison and thins-
more, 1975, §2.3): 
p(yIu,D) = 	p(yju,0) p(8D)d8? 	 (2.2) 
0 
Inversion of predictive to calibrative density function. 
For a given prior density function p(u) on T can we evaluate the 
integral denominator in the- application of Bayes's formula: 
p(uy,D) = p(u)p(yu,0)/ p(u)p(yju,8)du? 
T 
For the case of precise (y,D), where the conditional distri-
butions follow normal linear forms 
p(x.Jt.,e) = N(ci+8t.,02), p(yu,0) = N(a+u,a2), 	(2.3) 
Bayesian analysis leads straightforwardly to a predictive density 
function of general Student form ST(K,A+Bu,C+Du+Eu2) where K,A,B, 
C,D,E depend on (y,D). With precision of measurement therefore 
it is only in part (d) that any computational problem arises, and 
there only a simple quadrature is required to evaluate the 
denominator. 
2. 	Calibration modelling for imprecise data 
Imprecisions in the measurements of the data (y,D) of calib-
ration and assay problems are common but are seldom recognised in 
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statistical modelling. Since the effects of analogous imprecisions 
in the structurally similar problem of statistical diagnosis, in 
indices by Aitchison and Begg (1976) and in indicants by Aitchison 
(1977, 1979), Aitchison and Lauder (1979), can be substantial it 
seems advisable to recognise the existence of any imprecisions in 
modelling for calibration. In the use of the indicant crown-rump 
length of foetus measured by sonar-screening to infer as index the 
age or 'menstrual maturity' of a new case of pregnancy imprecision 
in the indices of the training set may clearly arise due to in-
accurate recording or faulty memory. Again, when the indicant itself, 
both in the training set and in the new case, can be measured only 
by another calibration or assay process then the recorded indicant is 
subject to imprecision, and we have what could be termed a problem 
of 'calibrating the calibrated'. Situations with imprecisions in 
all the components of the data (y,D) may arise, and so we attempt 
to model for all these eventualities. 
First we suppose that imprecision in the true index u. of a 
training case for which the recorded index is t may be expl'essed 
as a density function p(u. It.) on the index set T. For example, if 
t. is an estimate of u. with 1standard error s. it may be a reasonable 
device to take p(u. jtj = N(t. ,s2). Similarlyif the measured 
indicants x. (i= 	and 'y Ire imprecise indicants of the 
true indicants, say w. (i =1,...,n)  and w, we may be able to express 
this imprecision in terms of known conditional density functions 
p(x. 
1 1 1w.) (i=1,...,n), p(yw). 	 (2.4) 
If the parametric models for the conditional density fundtions of 
true indicants on true indices are 
	
p(wju.,e) (i=l,...,n), p(yu,o) 	 (2.5) 













P(ylw)p(wlu,O)dw, 	 (2.7) 
and then the problems (a) - (d) have to be faced with these more 
complex parametric models. 
With normal linear regression forms for all the conditional 
density functions it is easy to show that p(x. t.,@) and p(yju,O) 
take N(ct-ft.,A.+B. 2 -'.cy2) and N(a+u,B 2+i2) f6rmi with A., B. and 
and B known. 	or'precise data A. = B1 = B = 0. 
Thus, with known imprecision, problem (a) of likelihood eval- 
11 
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uation presents no difficulty. For the resolution of problem (b) 
resort has usually to be made to asymptotic Bayesian maximum-
likelihood theory, taking p(81D) as N{O,V(e)}, where 0 is the 
maximum-likelihood estimate and V(8) the usual estimate of the 
covariance matrix of the maxiinumlikelihood estimator. Problem 
(c) then involves the evaluation of a triple integral. Although 
this can be readily reduced to a single integral by a straight-
forward integration out with respect to a and a the resulting 
integral requires numerical integration. Since there remains 
yet a further integration step at problem (d) it is worth con-
sidering an approximation which avoids numerical integration at 
this stage. An appropriate approximation which retains-the effects 
of all the sources of imprecision may be p(xlu,D) ' N(a(u),b(u)}, 
where 
a(u) = E(xlu,D) = 	+ 
b(u) = V(xju,D) = 2+B 2+V() +BV() +V(&) +2C(&,)u+V()u2  
Problem (d) then involves, as for precise data, the only and simple 
numerical quadrature in the stages leading to the calibrative 
density function. 
The procedures developed here are currently being applied to 
a number of calibration problems involving imprecision, and the 
results will be reported elsewhere. 
RLdsumLs  
Dans des problmesde calibrage et d'essai il faut 6valuer l'indice 
inconnu d'un specimen au moyen d'une comparaison d'un indiquant 
du spcinen avec les indiquants et les indices connus d'une ensemble 
d'instruction. Dans cet article on indique une méthode d'incorporer 
dans des modles de calibrage et d'essai des imprécisions qul se 
prêsentent souvent dans ces indices et ces indiquants, et ainsi 
fournit un moyen d'tudier .les effects d'imprcision. 
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13 LOGISTIC NORMAL MODELS 
13.1 Background 
Some statisticians would argue strongly that all the worthwhile 
and tractable parametric classes of models have already been 
discovered and almost exhaustively developed. It is perhaps 
appropriate therefore to close this record, which started with 
a review and developments of the centenarian lognormal class, with 
a report on a new parametric class of models, the logistic-normal 
models. The emergence of this class has an interesting background. 
The one-dimensional version is a special case of the Johnson (1949) 
four-parameter lognormal distribution. A few uses of higher-
dimensional versions are implicit in Bayesian multinomial analysis 
(Lindley, 1964; Swe, 1964; Bloch and Watson, 1967; Leonard 1973), 
in biometric shape-and-size studies (Mosimann, 1975a,b) and in the 
reconciliation of subjective probability assessments (Lindley, 
Tversky and Brown, 1979). The first traceable explicit definition 
of the class appears as a tentative suggestion in Johnson and Kotz 
(1972, p.20) where the idea is ascribed to Obenchain in a personal 
communication, but there seems to have been no subsequent develop-
ment of the idea. Aitchison and Begg (16:1976) give independently 
a formal definition, recognising the class as a tractable substitute 
for the Dirichiet distribution for their particular application. 
Faced with a number of consultative problems involving compositional 
data, that is vectors whose components sum to unity, Aitchison and 
Shen (22:1980) realised the potential for statistical modelling 
of this class of models and first used the natural nomenclature of 
logistic-normal. 
The importance of this class of models is that it provides 
for the first time a rich class of distributions on the simplex to 
replace the very highly structured Dirichlet class. For example, 
Darroch and James (1974), in pointing to the almost-independence 
structure of the Dirichlet class, regret the fact that there seems 
to be a scarcity of distributions capable of describing situations 
which have any real structure of association. The logistic-normal 
class removes this scarcity. 
Distributions over the simplex are fundamental to the study 
of compositional data, such as the chemical compositions of rocks 
in petrology, the composition of sediments, pollen compositions 
in palaeoecologY, steroid compositions in blood sample analysis; 
and in the study of probabilistic data such as in the diagnostic 
statements of Aitchison and Begg (16:1976) and in inferential 
statements in studies of subjective performance in inferential tasks, 
as in Aitchison and Kay (14:1975), Aitchison and Shen (22:1980) 
and Aitchison (1980b). 
13.2 Definition 
Let Rd denote d-dimensional real space, P d the positive orthant 
of Rd  and 
S  the d-dimensional positive simplex defined by 
= 	: xl+...+xd < l}. 
Suppose that y follows a multinoi'mal distribution Nd(p,E) over Rd 
The exponential transformation from R to P , namely z = exp(y), 
or its inverse the logarithmic transformation y = log(z) , is the 
familiar device for defining a corresponding lognormal distribution 
with z distributed as Ad(p,E), say. In a similar way the logistic 
3&2 
transformation from Rd  to Se', or its inverse logratio transformation: 
d 
x = exp(y)/{(l+ E ex(Y)} y = 1og(x/x 1) 
j=1 
where 
Xd+l 	E xi = 
- jl 
can be used to define a logistic-normal distribution over S with 
density function 
d+ 1 
I2EI 	( H x )1 
	 (X E: Sd). 
j=1  
13.3 Properties 
Aitchison and Shen (1980) first set out to encourage the use 
of the logistic-normal class by enumerating some of its very attract- 
lye properties. 
In situations where the proportions in the conosition in 
can be regarded as arising from actual quantities of a (d+l)-
dimensional vector or basis, there is a simple relationship 
between logistic-normal compositions and lognormal bases. 
Moment properties are easily derived. 
There are interesting class-preserving transformations, includ-
ing the permutation transformation. 
The distribution of a subcomposition is readily related to the 
full compositional distribution. 
The conditional distribution of a subcomposition, given another 
subcomposition, is also readily obtained. 
The close relationship to the multivariate normal distribution 
ensures simple statistical analysis. In particular statistical 
prediction analysis is available, and gives rise to other 
distributions on the simplex, such as the logistic-Student 
distribution. 
7. 	The relationship of the logistic-normal class to the Dirichlet 
Dd(ct) class can be explored. In particular the following aspects 
are shown. 
The Ld(p,E) closest to Dd(a) in the sense that the 
Kullback-Liebler (1951) measure of directed divergence 
of Ld(p,E) from Dd(a) is least, has 




) + c(a 	) 	(i= 1,...,d), 
Ojj = c(a) 	
(ij), 
where 5 and c are the digamma and trigamma functions. 
A preliminary study of the extent of this closeness 
suggests that in practice any Dirichlet distribution 
can be effectively replaced by a logistic-normal. 
It is shown that the above result gives a global version 
of an approximation used by Bloch and Watson (1967) 
in a study of logarithmic contrasts in the analysis 
of contingency tables. 
:13.4 Applications 
As indicated in §13.3 the direct relationship of the logistic-
normal class to the normal class opens up all the available statisti-
cal analysis associated with normal theory. In particular, 
Aitchison and Shen (22:1980) provide a selection of possible 
applications. 
3(c,4 
The application to the study of log contrasts in the analysis 
of multinomial distributions and contingency tables, as 
mentioned above. 
Applications to the analysis of compositional data, including 
a discriminant problem involving a new predictive density 
function, the logistic Student-Siegel, hypothesis testing 
problems involving two logistic-normal distributions, the 
evaluation of atypicality indices and conditional compositions 
through the use of the new logistic-Student predictive 
distribution. 
Whereas Aitchison and Kay (15:1975) and Kay (1976) analyse 
subjective performance in inferential tasks in terms of real-
valued constructs of the diagnostic statements, such as 
inference discrepancy and information gain index, it is now 
possible to analyse the inferential statements as probabilistic 
vectors. An illustrative example compares the performance of 
two groups of students, one group being unfamiliar with, the 
other familiar with, Bayes's formula. 
An application to, logistic discriminant analysis provides 
a picture of the unreliability of the discriminant process. 
Two further specific applications are considered in Aitchison 
(23:1980a, 24:1980b) 
There is a now considerable literature on the spurious 
correlations that may arise in proportions comprising a composition, 
even although the basis of quantitative measurements has statisti-
cally independent components, the paper by Pearson (1897) probably 
being the earliest. Over the last two decades there has been quite 
intensive study (Chayes, 1960, 1962; Chayes and Kruskal, 1966; 
Mosimann, 1962, 1963; Darroch, 1969; Darroch and Ratcliff, 1970, 
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1978; Darroch and James, 1974; Bartlett and Darroch, 1978), 
mostly in the area of geological applications, into the nature 
of these 'null correlations' arising from an independent basis, 
and attempts to construct tests of departure from these null 
correlations. Unfortunately these attempts are unsatisfactory 
since the distributions of the test statistics are not known 
(Mosimann, 1962, p.81; Chayes and Kruskal, 1966, p.696), the tests 
of null correlations are carried out separately for each pair of 
proportions rather than as one overall test (Chayes and Kruskal, 
1966, p.696), and even when the tests detect non-null correlations 
it is by no means safe (Miesch, 1969) to conclude that the 
corresponding quantities in the basis are uncorrelated. 
Aitchison (21:1980) suggests that the unsatisfactory features 
of the above theories can be largely remedied by realising that 
there is a simple and exact relationship between the covariance 
structure of the logarithms of the basis components and the 
covariance structure of a composition. In particular, if the basis 
has independent components with variances of the logarithms 
d+l then the covariance matrix of the logratio proportions 
is 
diag(w1,...,w) + Wdl Ud,  
where U  is a dxd matrix of units. It is then possible to 
construct from standard statistical theory using the logistic-
normal distributions as the class of composition models a reasonable 
test of whether compositional data conform to this structure, that 
is whether the hypothesis of basis independence is tenable. Complete 
details of this test are provided and applications are given to 
fossil pollen counts, volcanic rock compositions in Taupo and Skye, 
and sediment variability. 
It is emphasised that, while the logistic normal provides a 
satisfactory means of testing for basis independence its great 
strength lies in its flexibility for the investigation of 
dependence structures. 
When a composition xc sd is formed from a basis of d+l 
measurements y1,. . ' d+l' as 
x 	y./(y1 + 	+ d+l 	
(i = 1, . .. 
the question of whether the composition is independent of additive 
size z 	Yl + •.. +Yd+l is an important one. This independence is 
the additive isometry of Mosimann (1975) in his shape and size 
studies in biometric allometry, and the proportional invariance 
of Darroch and James (1974) in discussing the validity of 
compositional analysis. So far no satisfactory test of such 
independence seems to have been devised. Aitchison (24:1980) 
provides an explanation of why this lack has persisted and 
proceeds to remedy it. 
The explanation suggests that Mosiinann's (1975b) characteri- 
sation property of the lognormal distribution, that any lognormal 
basis with additive isometry is necessarily degenerate, has seemed 
to rule out the use of the most tractable lognormal class from 
considerations of modelling in compositional data analysis. 
Aitchison (24:1980) points out that there is no great merit in 
insisting on a lognormal basis and that it is quite possible to 
have a logistic-normal composition, a lognormal size and additive 
isometry. Moreover, the pattern of joint variability of 
composition and additive size can be so modelled that additive 
-3 &7 
isometry or proportional invariance becomes a parametric hypothesis 
testable through standard hypothesis testing methodology. The 
test is illustrated by application toaproblem of additive isometry 
in measurements of heart shape and size, and to a problem of 
proportional invariance in the steroid metabolite composition in 
urinary excretion. 
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Stnriw 
The logistic transformation applied to a d-dimensional normal distribution produces a 
distribution over the d-dimensional simplex which can sensibly be termed a logistic-normal 
distribution. Such distributions, implicitly used in a number of recent applications, are here 
given a formal identity and some useful properties are recorded. A main aim is to extend the 
area of application from the restricted role as a substitute for the Dirichiet conjugate prior 
class in the analysis of multinomial and contingency table data to the direct statistical 
description and analysis of compositional and probabilistic data. 
Some key word8: Compositional data; Directed divergence measure; Dirichiet distributioii; Logistic 
discrimination; Logistic-normal distribution; Log normal distribution; Multiple contingency table; 
Probabilistic data. 
1. DEFENITION 
Most statisticians if asked to list the distributions they know over the unit interval (0, 1) 
and its generalization, the d-dimensional simplex 5d,  would start and end with the class of 
beta distributions and their higher-dimensional counterpart, the Dirichiet distributions. 
Another useful and richer such class, the logistic-normal distributions, has arisen usually by 
implication in a few widely differing applications: 
for the case ci = 1 as a Johnson (1949) four-parameter log normal distribution with 
the two range parameters determining the interval (0, 1); 
in the Bayesian analysis of multinomial and contingency table data in the use of 
normal approximations to log contrasts by Lindley (1964), by C. Swe in a Liverpool Ph.D. 
dissertation, and by Bloch & Watson (1967); and as the first stage in the construction of 
exchangeable prior distributions by Leonard (1973); 
in studies of size and shape in biological allometry, for example by Mosimann (1975), 
as the distribution of ratios of log normally distributed measurements; 
in statistical diagnosis where classification of the basic cases is subject to uncertainty, 
as discussed by Aitchison & Begg (1976), who provide an explicit definition of the class of 
logistic-normal distributions; 
in the reconciliation of subjective probability assessments, where Lindley, Tversky 
& Brown (1979) use normal log-odds models to describe assessments. 
The class has, however, gained no clear identity. Our purpose here is to provide such an 
identity, to describe enough of its properties and a sufficient variety of new applications to 
encourage further exploration of what, in our view, is a promising tool of statistical analysis. 
Let Rd denote d-dimensional real space, P5 the positive orthant of R5 and 55  the d-dimen-
sional positive simplex defined by 
55 	Pd : U, k... + u5< 1}. 
For any d- vector u and any real-valued function f, let f(u) denote the d—vector with ith 
component f(u) (i = 1, ..., ci). Suppose that v follows a multinormal distribution iV5(ji, ) 
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over Rd. The exponential transformation from Rd to  Pd, namely w = ev, or its inverse the 
logarithmic transformation v = log w, is the familiar device for defining a corresponding log 
normal distribution with w distributed as A5(p.1  E), say. In a similar way the logistic trans-
formation from B4 to 5d,  or its inverse log ratio transformation: 
4 







d+1 = 1— EL5, 
	 (1.2) 
5-1 
can be used to define a logistic-normal distribution over S, and we can say briefly that 
u is L, ). The density function of L4(t, ) is then 
/4+1 \ —1 
27r 	( [1u11 exp [— log (u/a4+1) - t}T 1{109(/ud+1) — p.}] (u e Sd). 	(1.3) 
Note that the density function is defined on the strictly positive simplex. This is necessary 
because of the logarithmic transformation involved. 
We first look at properties of the logistic-normal distribution in § 2, compare it in § 3 with 
its competitor, the Dirichiet distribution, describe applications in § 4, and finally in § 5 draw 
some conclusions and point the way to further research and applications. 
2. PROPERTLES 
2.1. Compositions 
Throughout this section the d-dimensional random vectors u and v have L4(ji, E) and 
E) distributions. Most of the properties of logistic-normal distributions derive from 
corresponding properties of multinormal distributions but usually require adjustment to 
provide useful practical results. For example, normality of the marginal distribution of 
(v1, ..., v +1) over BC  does not provide a simple result about the distribution of (ni, ..., 
over 5C+1,  that is about u1, ..., 	and the residual 1 — u1 - ... — u +1, but rather about the 
relative structure within the subvector (u1 , . .., 
This and other properties are most simply expressed in terms of the concept of the compo-
sition and sub compositions of a vector. The composition of any positive (d + 1)-vector w 
is the d-vector u defined by u = w /(w1+... +wa+i) (i = 1, ..,d), is written C(w), and is an 
element of 5d  The 	 'u composition of any subvector of , such as (u1, ..., u 1 ) is then a sub- 
composition of u or of w, and is an element of Sc. 
Proofs of the following properties are straightforward and are therefore omitted. 
2.2. The composition of a log normal vector 
If w is A41(, Q) then C(w) is L5(A , A4T), where the d x (d+ 1) matrix A = ['4 - Cd], 14 
is the unit matrix of order d and 54 is a d-vector with unit components. 
This result is of particular interest in § 4 where we study problems concerning the analysis 
of compositional data. 
2.3. Moment properties 
Although moments of all positive orders E(u) (a> 0) and the geometric moment 
exp E[log u5]} exist the integral expressions for them are not reducible to any simple form. 
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This is no great loss since interest in practice is often more naturally in the ratios Ui/Uk or 
their logarithms. From normal-log normal theory, with a denoting the (j, k)th element of 
	
and with the convention that p = 0 and 	= 0 (j= 1, ..., d+ 1), we have that 
E{log (Uj/Uk)} 	- !Lk, coy {log (US/Uk), log (Ui/Urn)} = a51  + Ork. - aim - 
E(uj/Uk) = exp { 	/L + 	- 2 k + akk)}, 
COV (Ui/Uk, Ui/Urn) = E(uJ/uk) E(Ui/Urn) {exp (a + a - aim - 	1}. 
2.4. Class-preserving properties 	- 
The well-known linear transformation property of multinormal distributions, that if 
v is I%T(, >) and B is a c x d matrix then By is N(Bp, B Z BT),  has the following counterpart 
in logistic-normal theory. If u is L(p, ) then the c-vector t, defined by 
dc d 
ti = fl (v/u 1)bi 1 + E 11(u5/u5+1)boJ 	(i = 1, ..., c), 	 (2.1) 
5=1 	 i1j=1 
is L(Bii, BE BT). Two special cases of this property are of particular importance. 
We first consider the permutation property. In our definition of the logistic-normal 
distribution over S', u,+1  was the common divisor in all the ratios of the transformation (1.1). 
A first application of(2.1) with  = d, b1 = 1 (i + h), b h  = — 1 (i = 1, ...,d), b15 = 0 otherwise 
shows that the d-vector t defined by ti = u (i h), th = Ud+l, t1 = u5 is also of Ld  form, with 
ratio denominator td+1 now effectively the original Uh. This class preservation property is 
reassuring for any work in the simplex, where obviously it is a matter of no consequence 
which d of the d + 1 positive quantities u1, ..., Ud+l are chosen to define the simplex of interest. 
A second application of (2- 1), with B the d  d permutation matrix associated with the 
permutation (1, ...,d)-.(j1, ...lid) so that b 5 = 1 (i = 1, ...,d), b, = 0 otherwise, gives 
t = u5 (i = 1, ..., d). This shows that the logistic-normal form is preserved under a permuta-
tion ofu1, ... ,u. 
Combination of these two preceding results establishes that the logistic-normal class of 
distributions is closed under the group of permutations of the components u1, ..., U, 
This is particularly reassuring in many statistical investigations of vector data, where we hope 
that the analysis is invariant with respect to the ordering of the vector components. 
For the subcomposition property, a useful counterpart of the multinormal marginal 
property is obtained from (2.1) with B the c  d matrix defined by b 1 = 1, 
b2, +1 = — 1(1= 1,...,c), 
b15 = 0 otherwise. Then t = u1/(u1 +... + u+1) (i = 1, . .., c) and the property is simply that 
the subcomposition Cu1, ..., u + ) is L(B,a, BE BT). 
2-5. The conditional subcomposition property 
The multinormal conditional property can be adjusted to provide a useful conditional 
distribution property for subcompositions. Suppose that the subcomposition C(u +1, ..., u) 
is known, expressed most conveniently for our purposes in terms of specified values r of 
uC+j/ud+j i = 1, ..., d - c). The conditional distribution of the subcomposition C(u1, ..., u"1) 
given the above subcomposition C(u +1, ..., u + ) is then 
- e log r1  + 12  E (log r - P-2)' 	- E12 2 	211 
where ( 1,j 2) is the (c, d—c) partition of and El.,  Z121 E22 are the obvious submatrices in the 
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corresponding partition of 1. From this the conditional distribution of C(u1, ..., u) given 
u 1) can easily be obtained from the subcomposition property of § 2'4. 
26. Statistical properties 
For the analysis of compositional data, such as independent vectors ui'>, ..., u' with each 
UM E 5d (1 = 1, ..., n), the class of logistic-normal distributions provides, through its close 
relationship to the multinormal class, a ready means of tractable statistical analysis. In 
addition to simple estimation and hypothesis testing of the ji and Z parameters, tests of 
logistic-normality, linear modelling of E(u')) (i = 1, ..., n) to take account of experimental 
design and possible concomitant factors, and all the special multivariate techniques such as 
discriminant analysis, Bayesian statistical analysis is directly available through the normal-
Wishart class of conjugate prior distributions for ju and T = E-'. In particular, predictive 
density functions are easily derived in terms of new and easily defined classes of distributions 
such as logistic-Student distributions over 5d•  We shall see applications of such predictive 
distributions in § 4. 
3. COMPARISON WITH THE DIRICHLET CLASS 
31. Closeness 
No study of a proposed class of distributions over the simplex can fail to make comparisons 
with the well established Dirichlet class, with typical distribution Dd(cj, ..., 	or D4() 
defined by a density function proportional to 
d+1 
i 1 
where Ud+j = 1 - -... -Ud  as before. 
Aitchison & Begg (1976) suggest that the greater richness of the Ld  class with its d(d+ 3) 
parameters compared with only d + 1 for the Dd class, may allow any Dirichlet distribution 
to be closely approximated by a suitably chosen logistic normal distribution. Their suggestion 
can be investigated more quantitatively by means of the Kuliback & Liebler (1951) measure 
of directed divergence of a density function q from a target density function p: 
I(p,q) = fP(U) log P(u) d.. 
For p(u) of D(a) form the closest q(u) of Ld(, E) form in the sense that I(p, q) is minimized 
is given by 
Iii = 8(a)-8(a+i), crjj = E(cx1) +e(a+i) (i = 1, ...,d), 	ij = e(ad±1) (ij), 	(3.1) 
where 8(x) = r'(x)/F(x) and r(x) = 6'(x) are the digamma and trigamma functions. 
For Dd(a) with d = 1, 2, 3, and with components of a in the range 5 to 100, the minimized 
divergences range from 2 x 106  for a = (5, 5) to 5 x 10_2  for a = (5, 5, 5, 100). 
Some indication of the degree of closeness of these approximations can be provided by 
directed divergences for more familiar situations: For example, the directed divergence of 
a N(A, 1) from the N(0, 1) distribution also ranges from 2 x 10-6  to 5 x 10_2  as A ranges from 
0002 to 0316. 
We can also try to judge success for given D(a) by finding a neighbouring Dd(fl) distri-
bution with the same directed divergence as the minimized logistic-normal divergence. 
Confining attention to neighbouring distributions with differing from in a single com-
ponent we have the following results; When the components of a are equal the increase in a 
373 
Logistic-normal distributions 	 005 
single cxi never exceeds 06. When the components are unequal, the more asymmetrical the 
component values are, the greater, roughly speaking, is the increase in these single component 
values, the greatest increases being 0-7 in 5, 14 in 20 and 86 in 100, the last occurring for 
d = 3 and a = (5,5,5,100). 
Whether or not such results are acceptable approximations must clearly depend on the 
particular application. We shall see in § 4-1 that minimized-divergence logistic-normal 
distributions are indeed close to an already widely accepted approximation to Dirichlet 
distributions. 
3-2. Comparison of properties 
Some comparison of the Dirichlet and logistic-normal classes with respect to the properties 
of § 2 is required. 
The Dirichlet composition property analogous to § 2-2 relates a Dirichlet-distributed 
composition u to a (d+ 1)-vector with gamma-distributed components (Wilks, 1962, p.  179). 
The fact that the gamma components are independent and have equal scale parameters 
indicates that the components of a Dirichlet composition have a special and near-indepen-
dence structure, with correlations between components arising solely from the division by the 
common wi in the formation of the composition u. Thus Dirichlet distributions may be too 
simple to be realistic in the analysis of compositional data where the underlying wi's are 
dependent. 
The Dirichlet class has simple analogues to the class-preserving properties of § 2-4. Note 
that the subcomposition property of § 2-4 is not a result about (u1, ..., u +1, 1 - u1  —... — 
but about the distribution of u1/(u1 + ... + u 1), ..., u/(u1 + ... + u j). In other words the 
logistic-normal subcomposition property is not a class-preserving property allowing 
addition of components of a composition. The Dirichlet does possess such a component-
additive property ('Wilks, 1962, p.  181): for example (u1, ...,u 1, 1—u1 — ... — u +1) is 
c±i' ±2 + - - + 	This is, however, a direct consequence of the compositional 
relationship to independent gamma variables and so, as an advantage over the logistic-normal 
class, may be buying mathematical elegance at the price of realism. Moreover, if Dirichlet 
distributions are truly appropriate to an analysis involving additions of compositional data 
then the logistic-normal distributions that we mistakenly use may yet prove to be satisfactory 
understudies through the closeness property. 
The Dirichlet counterpart of the conditional subcomposition property of § 2-5 reinforces 
this caution in the use of Dirichlet distributions in the analysis of compositional data. For 
the Dirichiet distribution the conditional distribution of C(u1, ..., u) given C(u +1, - u) 
is the sane as the unconditional distribution C(u1, .. ., un). In other words in Dirichlet model-
ling C(u1, ..., u) and C("±1, - - . u ± ) are independent, a very strong assumption to impose, 
without investigation, on the nature of any compositional data. 
Although the Dirichiet class may possess admirable qualities of mathematical tractability 
in its role as the conjugate prior class for the Bayesian analysis of multinomial and contin-
gency table data, and as an essential tool in the determination of distribution-free statistical 
tolerance limits it has many disadvantages as a direct describer of patterns of variability. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of oe, for example, requires solving equations involving 
digamma functions so that Newton—R.aphson or some equivalent numerical method is 
required; and the distributional propel-ties of the estimators must also be approximated. 
Moreover the absence of a class of conjugate priors makes the possibility of tractable Bayesian 
analysis and statistical prediction analysis remote. 
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4. SOME APPLICATIONS 
41. Bayesian analysis of contingency table8 
For the (d + 1)-category multinom.ial distribution with category probabilities 
the conjugate class of distributions on the parameter space Sd  is the Dirichlet class. When the 
multinomial distributions relate to contingency tables then interest is often concerned with 
contrasts, linear combinations of log 01 such as 
5±1 
kh = :chi logOj  
i =1 
with ZiChj = 0. From the logistic-normal approximation (3.1) it follows immediately that 
kh  is approximately distributed as N{E1  Chi 8(), E c2, e()} and moreover that k9 and kh are 
approximately distributed binormally with means and variances as determined above and 
with covariance 
Bloch & Watson's (1967) approximation to such contrasts, essentially derived from a 
component by component choice of expressions for means and variances of the logarithm of 
gamma random variables, uses Stirling's approximation to the log gamma function and so 
could easily have led to a digamma-trigamma approximation coincident with our own, whose 
derivation is based on a global approximation to th6 Dirichiet distribution. Presumably their 
determination to arrive at approximate means and variances expressible in terms of logarith-
mic and reciprocal functions was motivated by a wish to avoid digamma and trigamma 
functions. Our global approximation provides overall support for the component-wise method 
used by Bloch & Watson. The directed divergence of their approximation from Dd(cx) is 
greater than that of the minimizing logistic-normal distribution (3.1) by less than 0.1% 
when the components of a are all greater than 2, which will almost always be the case in 
applications. 	 - 
42. Analysis of compositional data 
There are many disciplines, for example, sedimentology, petrology, biochemistry, palaeo-
ecology, where interest is in compositional data such as proportions of sand, silt, clay in 
sediments, of chemical constituents of rocks, of serum proteins in blood, of pollens of different 
species at different levels in sample borings. For illustrative purposes we here adapt a problem 
posed by McCammon (1975, p.  162) to demonstrate the simplicity of statistical analysis with 
logistic normal tools. 
Figure 1 shows in terms of triangular coordinates the sand, silt, clay composition of 17 
sediments, 7 of which are identified as nearshore, type I, and the remaining 10 as offshore, 
type H. Four new samples, all from the same site and hence of the same type, have been 
analysed and theproblem is to assess this unknown type. We adopt L2(1 1, ) and L2(p, z) 
distributions for the nearshore and offshore data. The statistical problem is assumed to be the 
assessment of a reasonable factor for the conversion of prior odds to posterior odds for type. 
With such a small data set we adopt a predictive approach to the typing or diagnostic 
problem, for the advantages argued, for example, by Aitchison, Habbema & Kay (1977). 
The unusual feature of this example, in contrast to the more familiar area of application 
of predictive diagnosis, namely medical diagnosis, is that for the new case we have four 
replicate observations. For the purposes of predictive diagnosis the predictive problem can 
then be condensed into obtaining a predictive density function for M and V, the mean 
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vector and matrix of corrected cross-products of the four, in general N, vectors of log ratios. 
The appropriate theory is summarized by Aitchison & Dunsmore (1975, Table 2.3) and leads 
to predictive distributions p(M, V I D) for M and V of Student—Siegel type based on data D: 
St Si2 	- 1, mj
,( + 
	S; N—i, (n 1) Si  
where n, m1 and Si are the number, the mean vector and covariance matrix of the log ratios, 
of vectors in the data set Di for tpe i. In this assessment we have used the vague prior 
suggested by Aitchison & Dunsmore (1975) for the reasons given by Aitchison (1976). 
Straightforward computation then gives p(M, V I D1)/p(M, V I D 2) = 019 as the converting 
factor from prior odds to posterior odds on type I. Thus if type I and II are equally likely 
a priori our evidence leads to odds of 5 to 1 in favour of type II. 
Sand 
Fig. 1. Sand, silt, clay compositions of 17 sediment specimens of known type and four sediment 
samples of unknown type. 
The predictive method can be contrasted with the estimative method (Aitchison, Habbema 
& Kay, 1977) which would simply replace the parameters p, , P 	by their estimates. 
This is equivalent to replacing the previous p(M, V I D) by a normal-Wishart density function 
NoWi2(rn, S1/N, N - 1, S) as defined by Aitchison & Dunsmore (1975, Table 2- 1), leading to 
the replacement of the odds of 5 to 1 by odds of approximately 80 to 1. Examination of Fig. 1 
suggests that these latter odds are extravagant, illustrating the tendency of estimative 
methods to read too much into the data. 
The proposition of the specimen labelled A in Fig. 1 raises the question of whether it is 
atypical of the identified offshore standards. To examine this its atypicality index, defined 
by Aitchison & Dunsmore (1975, p.  226) as the probability that a case has a higher predictive 
density than the case under scrutiny, may be evaluated from formula (11.20) of Aitchison 
& Dunsmore (1975). The atypicality index is only 062 and so the specimen can hardly be 
regarded as atypical. 
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This example can be further used to illustrate the nature of the conditioning property. 
Suppose that for an offshore specimen we wish to study the variability of the composition of 
(sand, clay) for a given silt/clay ratio. We can proceed as follows. First find the predictive 
distribution for a new complete vector based on D2. This will be two-dimensional logistic-
Student with 9 degrees of freedom. We can then easily derive the predictive conditional 
distribution of (sand, clay) for given value v of log (silt/clay) as logistic-Student with 9 
degrees of freedom. In more familiar terms the conditional distribution of log (sand/clay) is 
St1{9, - 329 + 166v, 210+ 0422(v— 2.71)2} 
in the notation of Aitchison & Dun more (1975, Table 2.2). Figure 2 shows the considerable 
differences in this logistic Student distribution for three silt/clay ratios spanning the range 





06 	;O.S 	10 
- Sand/clay ratio 
Fig. 2. Conditional density functions of (sand, clay) composition for given value r of silt/clay 
ratio. 
4•3. Analysis of probabilistic data 
Data in the form of probability vectors arise in a variety of applications such as answers.: 
to multiple-choice questions (de Finett.i. 1972, p.  30) and in the study of subjective perform-
ance in inferential tasks (Taylor, Aitchison & McGirr, 1971). Provided that the probabilities 
are all positive we then have data in the form of vectors in Sd. 
To obtain a simple illustration we presented 24 students with exactly the same diagnostic 
problem, the differential diagnosis of newmath syndrome (Aitchison, 1974), and asked them 
to assess subjectively the diagnostic probabilities they attached to each of three possible 
types. Conditions were identical for all students except that 12, randbmely selected, per-
formed the task before, and the remaining 12 after, they had encountered the appropriate 
statistical tool, Bayes's formula. The diagnostic assessments form two sets of probabilistic 
data, which can conveniently be presented in triangular coordinates in Fig. 3. A question of 
interest is then whether there is any significant difference in performance in the after and 
before groups. Adopting logistic-normal distributions L2(aA, A) and L 2( 1kB, EB) to describe 
the variability in the after and before data we can then test differences in terms of standard 
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multinormal tests (Anderson, 1958, Chapter 10) of p,, = tLB and E4 EB.  No significant 
differences are found. 
Fig. 3. Diagnostic assessments of 24 subjects. 
This particular inference task has an objective answer P = (0-14,0-02,0-84) shown on 
Fig. 3. We can then investigate the extent to which the subjective inferences depart from this 
by testing the hypotheses ji = p and B = where p 	1.79, 3.74), the log ratio vector 
associated with P. Both these tests give significant departure from p, at the 1% significance 
level for jt4 and at the 5% significance level for PB• 
4•4. An application in logistic discriminant analysis 
For simplicity we confine attention to discrimination between two types. In logistic 
discriminant analysis the probability that a case with given vector x of diagnostic features 
is of type t (t = 1, 2) is expressed in the parametric form 
p(t = 1Jx,) = 1—p(t = 21x,) = exp(PTx)/{1+exp(8Tx)}, 
where fi denotes the parameter. - 
Standard practice here is to use the diagnostic training set D = {(t, xi): i = 1, ..., n} of n 
cases of known types t j  and corresponding features vectors x first to estimate fl by its maxi-
mum likelihood estimate P. To produce diagnostic probabilities for a new case with feature 
vector x a common procedure is then simply to quote the estimative probabilities p(t I x, 
or even to leave these in their transformed or log odds versions, commonly termed the scores 
x. There is usually little attempt to quantify in a meaningful way the reliability of such a 
diagnostic assessment other than to make some comment about the possibilities of producing 
standard errors for the scores. One way of taking account of the unreliability of the estimation 
process in reaching diagnostic probabilities is through the predictive diagnostic device 
(Aitchison, Habbema & Kay, 1977) of weighting each possible assessment p(tJx,) by a 
378 
010 	 J. AITCHISON AND S. M. SHEN 
suitable posterior distribution p(fl I D) to obtain diagnostic probabilities fp(t I x, fi)p(  D) d, 
where the integral is over the range.B which is the set of possible parameters P. Although this 
device does take account of the unreliability it is sometimes criticized because its presentation 
of a single set of diagnostic probabilities gives the impression that these are the diagnostic 
probabilities rather than the result of a weighting process. For more than two types this 
weighting process is probably the only realistic way of presenting a comprehensible and 
practically useful overall view. For two types, however, a middle course can be steered which 
gives an impression of the extent of the unreliability of the diagnostic probability assess-
ments for a new case with feature vector x. The approach follows the Bayesian device of 
using p(,8 I D) as a vehicle for carrying the unreliability of the estimation process. The distri-
bution p(P ID) in its asymptotic Bayesian form is multivariate normal and so, for a given x, 
induces a multivariate normal distribution, say N{1a(x), a2(x)} on the score gT x. This in turn 
induces, through the inverse logistic transformation (1.1), a logistic-normal distribution for 
the diagnostic probabilities Ut = p(t I x,  fi). 
For a case with given feature vector x the above argument leads to a predictive diagnostic 
probability for type I: 
f-0. 1 	{v I  L(x), c/2(x)}  dv. 
For any specified value, say 09, of this diagnostic probability there must be a relationship 
between corresponding p(x) and a2(x) and using Lauder's (1978, formula 37b) approxima-
tion this can be shown to be 
(x) = 2.20/{1 +O346a(x)}. 
It is thus possible for cases with the same predictive diagnostic probabilities to have widely 
different tk and cr2 values and so different induced logistic-normal distributions for u1. That 
such differences can reflect very different reliabffities of the diagnostic probability assertion 





Fig. 4. Logistic normal distribution functions of the diagnostic probability u1 for two new cases: 
case 1, (a = 29, a = 1.4), shown by solid line; case 2, (ii. = 105, a = 81), broken line. 
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of u1 for two actual cases, with 1L = 2.9, a = 14 and p. = 105, a = 81, each with predictive 
diagnostic probabilities of 09 for type 1. The first case gives a fairly reliable diagnosis for 
type I since there is little chance of u being less than 05. The second case has obviously a 
very unreliable diagnosis since the logistic-normal probability distribution is almost entirely 
concentrated in the neighbourhoods of u1 = 0 and u2 = 1. Thus these induced logistic-normal 
distributions do give some insight into the diagnostic process. 
5. Discussio 
Although we have shown that the logistic-normal distributions provide a flexible tool for 
statistical analysis of a variety of applications a number of problems remain for future 
consideration. 
How can the techniques be adapted to cope with zero components in u vectors? 
Can we develop satisfactory tests of the separate families, Dirichiet and logistic-
normal, along the lines of Cox (1962)? In particular, to what extent are current tests of 
multivariate normality powerful against a Dirichiet alternative? 
To what extent may logistic-normal distributions possess the component-additive 
property in some approximate form which would allow us to apply logistic-normal analysis 
to complete vectors of compositional data and to vectors collapsed through addition of 
components? 
How worth while is it to widen the logistic-normal class, from the use of the logarith- 
mic transformation to the complete Box & Cox (1964) class of transformations: 
Vi = {(ut /ud+l )A_ 1})c1 (i = 1 ...,d)? 
We are currently investigating applications in such widely differing areas as petrology, 
soil compositions, fresh-water ecology and the analysis of subjective performance in inferen-
tial tasks. The answers to some of the above questions will clearly be conditioned by the 
particular needs of such practical problems. 
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SUI&&R1 
Much work on the statistical analysis of compositional data has con-
centrated on the difficulty of interpreting correlations between 
proportions with an assortment of tests for null-correlations, for 
independence except for the constraint, F_independence of bounded 
variables, neutrality in the mean and in the median. This paper 
questions the appropriateness of characterising the dependence 
structure of proportions in terms of such concepts, suggests an 
alternative method of modelling, develops necessary distribution 
theory and tests, and illustrates the methodology in applications. 
KEY WORDS: closed and open array, compositional data, correlations 
between proportions, Dirichiet distributions, logistic-normal distri-
butions, petrogefleSiS, tests for basis independence. 
I 
INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
Some twenty years ago misinterpretations of correlations 
between proportions in the analysis of modal or compositional data 
became a matter of concern almost simultaneously in geology (Chayes, 
1960, 1962; Krunibein, 1962; Chayes and Kruskal, 1966) and in biology 
(Mosimann, 1962, 1963). And still the debate continues (Butler, 
1979). The difficulty arises because a basis or open vector of un-
correlated positive quantities x1,. ..,Xd+1 leads to a composition 
or closed vector of proportions yx/(x1+...+x 1) (i=1,...,d+l), 
which are necessarily correlated. How then are any apparent corre-
lations in compositional data to be interpreted: as indicative of non-
zero correlations in the basis or as merely induced through the process 
of forming a composition from an uncorrelated basis? The early work 
on this problem concentrated on determining the values of the induced 
or null correlations under a variety of model assumptions and on 
suggesting significance tests for comparing computed correlations 
against the null values. These tests were always presented with 
some hesitation for three important reasons. 
The distributions of the test statistics are not known 
(Mosimann, 1962, p.81; Chayes and Kruskal, 1966, p.696) and do not 
fall within the framework of any standard testing approach such 
as generalised likelihood ratio tests. 
The tests of null correlations are carried out separately for 
each pair of proportions. This procedure therefore is open to 
the same kind of criticism as the application of all ½k(k -1) 
t-tests of pairwise comparison of k treatments without a preliminary 
-'A 
overall F-test. The theory lacks the analogue of such an overall 
test (Chayes and Kruskal, 1966, p.696). 
(3) When the tests detect non-null correlations it is by no means 
safe (Miesch, 1969) to conclude that the corresponding quantities 
in the basis are uncorrelated. Thus, despite the fact that the 
battery of pairwise tests, criticised in (2), is not designed as 
an overall test of the hypothesis that all correlations of the 
basis are zero this hypothesis is the only one which the battery 
effectively tests. No satisfactory analysis of the non-null case 
is available. 
More recent work has largely been an attempt to introduce new 
concepts of non-association for proportions and relevant tests 
of significance: neutrality of one proportion with respect to another 
(Connor and Mosimann, 1969), neutrality in the mean (Darroch, 1969; 
Darroch and Ratcliff, 1970; Bartlett and Darroch, 1978), F-. 
independence (Darroch and James, 1974), neutrality in the median 
(Darroch and Ratcliff, 1978). It remains to be seen whether these 
concepts, naturally more sophisticated than the concept of open 
correlations, prove straightforward enough for geologists to 
interpret. There is, however, a more fundamental difficulty. The 
properties of F-independence and neutrality lead almost inevitably 
to the description of variability through the Dirichiet class of 
distributions. The fact that, in the words of Darroch and James 
(1974, p.419), 'the Dirichiet distribution is almost the only one 
defined for continuous, positive, bounded-sum random variables which 
is easily handled for inference and descriptive purposes' then 
leads to the awkward question of how F-dependence and non-neutrality 
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are to be analysed. 
This paper suggests that the unsatisfactory features of the 
above theories can be largely remedied by concentration on three 
fundamental aspects. 
A fuller appreciation of the relationship of closed to open 
variables or, in the terminology of this paper, of compositions 
to bases, and in particular the extent to which inferences can be 
made from compositional data to basis models. 
The introduction, as a consequence of (a), of a form of 
modelling which more simply, directly and tractably connects 
independence and non-association of the components of a basis to 
properties of the corresponding composition. 
The identification of a rich enough parametric class of dis-
tributions for compositional data which allows the description of 
both non-association and association within a single framework. 
Since the measures of dependence used are covariances the main 
thrust of the paper may be seen as an attempt to resolve some of the 
difficulties of the null-correlation approach. As a bonus the 
resolution of (c) provides a tool which opens the way to further 
developments of the other approaches. For a more detailed discussion 
of some of these developments, see Aitchison (1980a). 
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THE RELATIONSHIPS OF BASES AND COMPOSITIONS 
Algebraic considerations 
From any (d+1)-dimensional vector x of positive quantities a 
d-dimensional vector y defined, by 
yi = xi/(xl+...+xd+l) 	(i=1,...,d) 
can be formed. We then write y = C(x) and call y the composition 
of the basis x. We note that y is a vector of bounded sum 1 in the 
sense of Darroch and James (1974), since ey < 1, where ed  is the d-
dimensional vector of units. Moreover, it is clear that y adequately 
describes the proportions of the constituents of x since the pro- 
portion of the (d+1)th constituent is d+l = 	 The 
use of y rather than the augmented {y,y 1} is mathematically more 
convenient since a composition is a d-dimensional rather than a 
(d+l) -dimensional entity, belonging to the d-dimensional simplex 
d 
= {y : Yi >0 	(i = 1,.. .,d), i=1 
	
< 11. 
It is well recognised that in many, probably most, geological 
applications an underlying basis is more conceptual than real, a 
convenient peg on which to hang discussion of non-association of 
proportions. What seems less clearly understood is the rather 
limited nature of the inferences possible about such conceptual 
bases from information on compositions. Starting at a purely 
algebraic level we see immediately that, given a composition y 
there is no way of uniquely reconstructing its basis. For if x 
is such a basis so that y = C(x) then,since C(zx) = C(x), where z 
5 
is a constant scalar or a random variable, we see that zx is also 
a basis. In fact the class of bases leading to a composition y 
is characterised by this multiplicative property, and the property 
of common composition defines-equivalence classes of bases. In 
geometric terms for d =1 the bases are points in the positive 
quadrant and compositions can be represented by points on the line 
segment from (1,0) to (0,1). The equivalence class of bases corres-
ponding to a given composition y is formed by points on the ray 
from the origin through y. 
Since a composition is uniquely, and most simply, specified 
by the values of yi, 	d and hence d+l = 1 - y - 	- d the 
main thrust of the correlation approach to dependence has been in 
terms of correlations between y and y  and the complications of 
interpretation. But the composition could equally well be specified 
in terms of any other d-dimensional vector v related to y through 
a one-to-one transformation. In searching for a sensible such 
transformation we should surely recognise the ability of a composit-
ion to determine a basis only up to a multiplicative factor. This 
immediately suggests the use of the ratio transformation v1 = 
(i = 1,... ,d) or even, better, the logratio transformation 
= log(y/Y
+1
) = fog y1  . - logyd+l (i=l,...,d), 	(1) 
since differences are usually simpler to handle than ratios.. The 
inverse transformation of (1), from v to y, is the generalised 
logistic transformation 
d 




This may seem at first sight an exotic tool for the analysis of 
compositions leading to very complicated interpretation problems. 
The opposite is the case, the transformation providing a natural 
and simple link between compositions and their equivalent bases and 
so probing to the root of the proportion correlation problem. The 
reason for such a simplification is not hard to find. The algebraic 
difficulty of compositions is their confinement to the simplex sc, 
a difficult set to handle mathematically, whereas the corresponding 
space Rd of v vectors, the whole of d-dimensional real space, is 
a simpler space for analysis. 
Expectation relationships 
The relationship between the dependence structure of a basis 
x and its composition y takes a simple form when we work in terms 
of the equivalent v specification of the composition. In particular, 
if u = logx = {logxl,...,logx d+l } then we can find very simple 
relationships between 
A = E(u), 	ç2 = V(u) 
and 
i-i = E(v), 	= V(v). 
Note that the dimensions of the vectors A and p are d+l and d, and 
the dimensions of the matrices Q and E are (d+l) x (d+l) and dxd. 
Let A be the d x (d+l) matrix 'd - edi where I and ed  are the identity 
matrix and vector of units, each of dimension d. Then 
	
ii =AX, E =MAT . 	 (3) 
7 
For a given p and E we cannot find unique A and 0 since, as we have 
seen earlier, there is an equivalence class of bases corresponding 
to a single composition. We can, however, easily identify the class 
of A and Q corresponding to agiven p and E. For the vector 
{Y1/Yd+1'.• 'd'd+1" 	
forms a basis of y and so the general form 
of bases with composition y is x = 	{zyl/yd+l,. . .,zy/y +1 z} 
where 
z is any positive random variable. Since A = E (log x) and Q = V(logx) 
we can see that the degree of arbitrariness is 1 for A, represented 
by the arbitrary mean a of log z; and is d+l for 0, represented by 
the covariances 	 between log z and 
and by the variance y  of log z. The appropriate expressions are then 
r 	+ aed 1 	[+edT+e+YUd 	+1ed1 
[ a 	 a +yed 	 I j 
where U   is the d x d matrix of units. 
Particular interest has been shown in the past in two related 
questions. 
What is the extent of the correlation or covariance structure 
induced by the constraining process of forming a composition from 
a basis? To what extent are correlations observed in compositions 
real or just induced by the constraint? 
How can we recognise from the covariance structure of a com-
position that it could have been produced from a basis of uncor-
related or independent components? 
The strength of the present approach lies in the simplicity of 
the relationship for the circumstances described. For if a basis 
has independent components, then the logarithms of the components 
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are also independent and so 9 = diag(w1,...,w 1). Then the 
corresponding Zj takes the form 





_ W1 W2+Wd+l 	 . 	 (4) 
[
W 	 w 	w+w 
d+l 	d+l ... d 
Since W1•Wd+l are all positive we see that any composition 
corresponding to an independent basis must have equal positive 
covariances of the logratios v and that this common covariance 
must be less than every variance of a logratio v. We shall see 
later how we can construct from standard statistical theory a 
reasonable test of whether compositional data conform to this 
structure, that is whether the hypothesis H0 of basis independence 
is tenable. 
We reemphasise that even if we know that a composition has this 
special covariance structure all we can say is that the basis be-
longs to the equivalence class which contains an independent basis. 
Possible bases then have a covariance matrix of the special form 
	
W 1 +2 1 +1i)d+l 	12d+1 ... 
	
1+ d d+l 
+w 	1d+1 
4- U) 	. . 	2 4-8  - -w d+l 	 d+1 d d-'-1 2 d+1 
+U) 	.. w +2 -- 
dd+1 	2 d d+1 . 




Distributions for compositions 
For a full analysis of compositional data some parametric class 
of distributions to describe the pattern of variability would be a 
clear advantage. Since compositions are elements or vectors in the 
simplex S the modelling problem is to find suitable distributions 
over this mathematically difficult space. The most, indeed the only, 
familiar class of distributions over 
S  
is the Dirichlet class with 
probability density functions 
d+l c.-1 
r(a1) ... r(adl) • Y
i  
1=1 
where a = 	'd+l is the parameter. The main difficulty with 
this family is its known mathematical property that such a composit-
ional distribution can always arise from an independent basis, whose 
components are independent and gamma-distributed with equal 'scale' 
parameters. 
Thus although the Dirichiet class can serve a useful purpose 
in providing a picture of the unavoidable and spurious correlations 
that arise simply out of the process of closure of an independent 
basis it cannotby its very nature be used to study proper covariance 
between components. For the description of real covariance a class 
of distributions over the simplex sd with a much richer covariance 
structure is required. It is only recently (Aitchison & Shen, 1980) 
that such a class has been fully identified. A clue as to how 
to devise such a class and why the class turns out to be tractable 
in statistical analysis has been touched upon earlier. Since the 
awkward space 
8  
and the simple space R are related to each other 
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through the logistic and logratio transformations the following 
question immediately poses itself. If we start with a nice class 
of distributions in Rd,  and what can be nicer than the multivariate 
normal class, and transform this to 
S  
through the logistic trans- 
d formation, do we obtain a usable, tractable class in S , rich 
enough to describe distributions of real compositional data? We 
claim that the answer is certainly yes, and have set out the main 
interesting properties and some simple applications to compositional 
data in a previous paper (Aitchison E Shen, 1980). Since considerat-
ions here are directed towards presenting a new perspective on the 
problem of correlations in compositional data only the properties 
of this logistic-normal class of distributions which are of immediate 
interest for this particular problem are recorded. 
If v in Rd  is Nd(ii,),  that is d-dimensional multivariate 
normal with mean vector p and covariance matrix E then y in sd, 
related to v through the logistic transformation (2), is said to 
follow a logistic-normal distribution, written Ld(P,)  with 
parameters p and E. Following a previous line of development we 
can show that the composition y of a basis x which is multivariate 
lognormally distributed, say Ad+l(A,c2)  in the notation of Aitchison 
and Brown (1957), is Ld(p,)  where p and E are related to Aand 0 
through (3). Indeed since multinornial, lognormal and logistic-
normal are all defined in terms of these first and second-order 
moments (possibly of logarithms and logratios) all the comments 
on covariance structure of compositions and independence of bases 
carry through into this distributional form. In particular a 
logistic-normal composition Ld(p,)  arising from a lognormal basis 
10 
-"3 
with independent components must have E of the form (4). Thus 
we see that we have here, the possibility of formulating a test of 
whether compositional data could be regarded as having arisen from 
independent bases. The question is translated into asking whether 
the covariance structure of the logratios of the proportions is 
consistent with, or is contrary to, the special structure (4) for E. 
These two classes of distributions over sd,  the Dirichlet and 
the logistic-normal, are not unrelated. The logistic-normal is 
by far the richer and provides a stronger tool of statistical analysis 
and yet at the same time can be used as a substitute for any Dirichlet 
distribution. For Aitchison and Shen (1980) show that any Dirichlet 
distribution Dd(o) can be closely approximated by a logistic-normal 
distribution Ld(P,) 	 -d+l' a1=i) 	(ad+l),  
= 	(i 	j) where 6 and c are the digamma function 
r' (-)/r(•) 
and the trigamma function 51(), respectively. Closeness is here 
judged in terms of the Kuliback-Liebler (1951) measure of directed 
divergence of one density function from another. Not surprisingly 
the E for this closest logistic-normal distributes takes the basis-
independence form (4). Thus we see that any statistical test of this 
particular covariance structure can be regarded as not only a test 
of the feasibility of an independent basis but also a test of whether 
the Dirichlet, the archetypal independence distribution, or the more 
general form of logistic-normal distribution is required. 
Mosimann (1975b) has pointed out a property of lognormal bases 
which may have prevented previous consideration of the logistic-
normal as a serious alternative to Dirichlet distributions. He 
shows that any lognormal basis x with a Ad+l(X,c) distribution 
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with a composition having additive isometry (Mosimann, 1975b, p.223) 
or equivalently proportional -invariance (Darroch and James, 1974, 
d+ 1 
p.476), that is with a composition independent of E x., must be 
i=1 1 
degenerate. At first sight i therefore appears that logistic-
normal distributions should be applied only to situations where we 
are assured that the compositions need not satisfy such additive 
isometry; and as Darroch and James point out the use of compositional 
data often presupposes satisfaction of proportional invariance. It 
is perfectly possible, however, to have a non-degenerate logistic-
normal distribution for a composition with the proportional invariance 
property satisfied, provided we do not insist on the basis itself 
being lognormal. There seem to be no strong grounds for insisting 
on such lognormality in the components. For example, it. is easy to 
devise a petrogenetic model in which Ex turns out to be lognormal 
and the associated compositional distribution logistic-normal with 
additive isometry. More specifically the distribution with density 
function 
Ex 	 x. 	 x. 




(2)½dx . . 
	
exp{ 	G 3 (log 
d+1 	
Xd~l - 	 Xd+1 - 
- ½(log Ex. - 
1 
where 	= [o fl), satisfies these requirements. There is no need 
even to insist on Ex. having a lognormal distribution. The way 
therefore seems open for an investigation of the use of logistic-
normal distributions in the analysis of compositional data. 
Aitchison and Shen (1980) have shown an application to discriminant 




AN OVERALL TEST OF BASIS INDEPENDENCE 
The analysis of the previous section has led us inevitably to 
the problem of testing a null hypothesis H0 that the covariance 
structure of EQ is diag(w1,..,w) + wd 111d' where w. >0 
(i=1,...,d+l), the hypothesis of 'basis independence', against the 
alternative hypothesis that E takes a general positive definite 
form. The problem is similar to many considered in psychometric 
analysis, for example in Mukherjee (1970), except for the constraints 
on the positivity of the w. The method adopted is the generalised 
likelihood ratio test, whose computation requires a simple iterative 
procedure. The simplicity depends on the special structure of the 
covariance matrix E0 under the null hypothesis H0. It is easy to 
show that 




----+ ... + 	), Q+j. W1 W2 	Wd1 
-1 . 	 r d+1 -1 T EO = d1ag(T1...,T) 
- ( L 	TT 
i=1 
where T = w 	(i=1,...,d+1) and T is the d-vector with components 
T1 , ... , Td. 
Suppose that the data D consist of n compositional vectors 
and that the matrix of corrected cross-products 
of logratio vectors v 	 is v = [v..]. The loglikeli- 
hood function, already maximised with respect to p, can be 
expressed in the following way: 
log L = -½nlog II - ½ trace (EV). 
Under the alternative hypothesis the maximising E is = (1/n)V. 
Under the null hypothesis H0 the maximising process can easily be 
studied through the use of the standard Newton-Raphson iterative 
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methods, taking precautions to investigate the possibility that the 
maximising w may be on one of the boundaries. The computational 
details are set out in the Appendix. 
Let A0(D) denote the generalised likelihood ratio test statistic 
so obtained. Although there is little possibility of determining 
the exact distribution there is at least recourse to previous work 
on asymptotic distribution theory of generalised likelihood ratio 
test statistics. Since the constraints imposed by H0 involve in-
equalities the standard results of Wald (1943) are not directly 
applicable, but require adjustment along the lines of chernoff (1954) 
and Feder (1968). These adjustments are perhaps too complicated 
for general use and so we have chosen a simpler approach which 
allows us to wedge our problem between two other problems for which 
the standard theory applies. 
Consider the two hypotheses 
H1 : 	= diag(w1,.. .,wd) + Wd+lUd 
without the restriction Ad+1 > 0 on Adi;  and 
H2 : Z2 = diag(w1,...,w), 
that is with X 	= 0. It is clear that H2 implies H 0 and that 
H0 implies H1 so that the corresponding generalised likelihood ratio 
test statistics satisfy 
A1(D) < A0 (D) < A2 (D) 
for all data sets D. The hypothesis H1 is a special form of a 
covariance structure studied by Mukherjee (1970) within the frame- 
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work of Wald (1943) theory. In the form here it places ½d(d-1) - 1 
constraint equations on the elements of E. Similarly H2 falls 
trivially within general theory placing 1-2d(d-1) constraint equations 
on the elements of E.. As already mentioned the appropriate asymptotic 
theory of A0 under the null hypothesis is difficult, following the 
line of argument of Gleser and 01km (1973) and involving mixtures 
of x2{1-2d(d-1) - 11 and x21-2d(d-1)} distributions. In order to avoid 
such complications and obtain a readily applicable test we appeal 
to the argument of embedding H0 between H1 and H2 and use a playsafe 
critical value, namely the x2  value associated with ½d(d-1), the 
greater number of degrees of freedom. 
Thus the asymptotic test we advocate computes A0(D) along the 
lines set out in the Appendix and then rejects the hypothesis H0 
of basis independence at significance level (at most a) when 
A0(D) > x2{½d(d-1);ct}, 
where x2(;ct) is the upper a point of the x2() distribution. 
A simpler alternative to the above will often be sufficient 
for the practical purpose of rejecting basis independence. Since 
H0 C H1, rejection of H1 implies rejecting of H0, and so we may 
content ourselves by attempting to use the data D to reject the 
hypothesis H1. The test statistic A1(D) is easily obtained by a 
modification of the A0(D) procedure in the Appendix, by removal of 
the insistence that wi > 0 (i= 1,.. .,d+1). 
398 
.L %J 
SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE TEST 
To illustrate the test of basis independence we use a number 
of applications which have appeared repeatedly in the literature 
to illustrate tests of null correlation. Because of the pairwise 
nature of the previous tests these have all tended to be low-
dimensional; we therefore also undertake the analysis of some 
higher-dimensional data sets to emphasis the simplicity of the 
test procedure. 
Fossil pollen counts. Mosimann (1962) has analysed data of Clisby 
and Sears (1955) giving 73 sets of the four proportions of fossil 
pollen grains of pine, fir, oak and alder. He tests for null 
correlations under a compound multinomial hypothesis and suspects 
that some of the correlations are significant but emphasises the 
rather tentative nature of his test procedures. In so far as the 
relation of oak and pine are concerned these data are also analysed 
through the concept of neutrality in the median by Darroch and 
Ratcliff (1978). One awkwardness of the logistic-normal analysis 
is that it cannot be applied to data with zero proportions. This 
difficulty has been circumvented by the admittedly ad hoc device of 
replacing zeroes by 0.005, and then readjusting the proportions 
to sum to unity. Application of the overall test of basis inde-
pendence to this adjusted set of data with n= 73, d =3 leads to 
comparison of the test quantity A0(D) =11.01 against critical 2(3) 
values of 7.81 at 5 per cent and of 11.34 at 1 per cent. Thus 
there is sufficient evidence at the 5 per cent significance level 




If we concentrate on pine and oak, amalgamating fir and spruce, 
following the kind of neutrality investigations of Darroch and 
Ratcliff (1978), we find that the covariance matrix of log{pine/ 
(fir +spruce)} and log{oak/(fir+spruce)} conforms to the basis 
independence pattern. Thus if interest is really in the composition 
of pine, oak and (fir + spruce) we cannot argue against the feasi-
bility of basis independence. As we shall show elsewhere (Aitchison, 
1980) this finding is not contrary to the finding of non-neutrality 
in the median by Darroch and Ratcliff (1978). The counterpart of 
their ideas within the logistic-normal framework is in the idea of 
conditional subcompositions, and basis independence does not in 
general imply independence of subcompositions. 
Taupo volcanic rocks. Darroch and Ratcliff (1970, 1978) and Snow 
(1975) apply tests of neutrality in the mean and the median to two 
of the chemical components, Si 02 and M203 , of 45 rock samples of 
the Taupo volcanic association reported by Steiner (1958). The 
nearest comparison with these analyses is an application of the 
test of basis independence to the 45 vectors of three proportions, 
Si 02 A2,203 , remainder, so that d=2. The test statistic 
A0(D) = 44.8 is to be judged against 2(1) values. There is thus 
overwhelming evidence against the possibility of an underlying 
independent basis, a result in agreement with the earlier findings. 
But there is no need to confine ourselves to two of the components 
and the consequent lumping together of all the other components, an 
unnatural action if one raises the question of whether the lumping 
should be by weight or by volume. We have applied the test of H0 
4.. 
to 44 of the vectors, omitting specimen no 10 because of its missing 
data, and lumping only the very minor minerals where none or only 
a trace was recorded. This procedure results in 13 components so that 
d= 12. Here A0(D) = 763 to be tested against 2(66) values, 
so that again we have no hesitation in rejecting H. 
Chemical variation in the Eocene lavas of the Isle of Skye. Thompson, 
Esson and Duncan (1972) present in their Table 2 chemical analyses, 
showing 10 components, of 32 basalts. Analysis of these for testing 
for the possibility of basis independence is readily carried out 
by the procedure of the Appendix and leads to a test quantity AO (D) =329, 
to be compared against upper 2(36) values. Again there is highly 
significant evidence against the basis independence hypothesis. 
Sediment variability. McCaminon (1975) sets a problem involving two 
data sets of (sand, silt, clay) compositions for (i) seven 
specimens of nearshore sediments, and (ii) ten specimens of off-
shore specimens. The first set yields a test quantity of A0(D) =0, 
seen to be absolutely reasonable when we note that the covariance 
matrix of the two logratios v1 = 109(x1/x3), v2  = 109(x2/x3) is 
	
[0.731 	0.216 
[ 0.216 0.494 
readily conforming to the pattern 
i +W3 	U)3 
, 
+ U)3 
with w, w2 , U)3 all positive. 
For the offshore specimens the covariance matrix 
	
2.978 	0.754 
[ 0.754 0.453 
does not conform to the above pattern, but still the test quantity 
A0(D) = 1.10 is not sufficiently large to allow rejection of H0. 
Thus for both nearshore and offshore data we cannot refute the 






The test of basis independence developed and applied in this 
paper has several advantages over previous attempts at analysis. 
It is based on a simple and natural way of linking the dependence 
structures of open and closed models, it provides an overall test 
of the complete structure as opposed to separate pairwise tests, 
its critical value is relatively well based in asymptotic test 
theory compared with the tentative nature of many previous tests. 
More important, however, is that the development does not stop at 
the test of basis independence but allows further investigation 
in the event of rejection of the hypothesis. There are many 
possibilities of further investigation through logistic-normal 
distributions. There may be other patterned covariance structures, 
depicting some special forms of dependence, which could be next 
investigated, along lines similar to those investigated by psycholog-
ists; see, for example, Mukherjee (1970) and Gleser and 01km (1973). 
Interest may be directed towards subcompositions of the whole vector 
in the sense of Aitchison and Shen (1980), and the investigation 
of whether the subcompositions could have independent bases. Alter-
natively we may be more concerned with some form of statistical 
principal component analysis and investigation of the effective 
dimensionality of the pattern of variability. All of this is in 
striking contrast to other formulations which fail to provide any 
statistical framework for the quantitative investigation of truly 
correlated proportions. 
We have concentrated on one aspect of the value of the new-
approach, a clearer understanding of the nature of null correlations 
403 
and a practical tool for their analysis. There are many other clarifi-
cations and methodology which emerge immediately. For example, 
the relation of basis independence to other forms of non-association 
throws some interesting light on modelling. We can actually devise 
a simple test for proportional invariance, size homogeneity, or 
additive isometry (Aitchison, 1980b). Finally since the logistic-
normal has a limit law similar to the central limit theorem for 
normal distributions, interesting questions can be raised about 
the possibility of providing a genetic explanation, along the lines 
of the lognormal genesis by breakage for particle size distributions, 
of the occurrence of logistic-normal compositional patterns. 
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APPENDIX: THE COMPUTATION OF THE TEST STATISTIC 
Let D denote the data set consisting of n compositional 
vectors xi,...,x in sd,  with corresponding logratio vectors 	
- T . 	Let v denote the mean vector and V = E (v. - v)(v. -v) 
i=l 1 
	1 
the matrix of cross products. As pointed out in the main test, in 
§3, the likelihood under the logistic-normal model is maximised 
at p = V-, = V/n, and the only awkward problem is the maximisation 
under the basis independence hypothesis that the covariance struct-
ure is of the form: 
a.. = 	+ Wdl  
a.. = Wd+l 	 (i 
with wi > 0 (i1,...,d+l). 
As far as investigating the region w. >0 (i=l,...,d+l) is 
concerned we can show, after some tedious algebra, that the (d+l)-
vector d(X) of derivatives of the loglikelihood has ith component 
	
d+l 	 d+l d+l 
d.(w) = ½n(w. - T) - ½v.. + T I v../w. - 
where rW1 + ... + w 1, and that the (d+l) x (d+l) information 
matrix is 
B(w) = 	 +TUd}. 
The usual iterative procedure leading from rth iterate w(r) 
(r =0,1,...) to the (r+l)th iterate w 	is: 
W 
(r+ 1) =w 
	+ [B 
Cr) ((r))Jl d(W(r)). 
40.5 
Recommended initial values are 
(0) - 	(0) 
d d 
d+l 	 v /{½nd(d-1)},w. 1 	- v.. 	d+l /n-w 	(i=1,...,d)(5) 11 i=lj=i+l 
if these are all non-negative. Otherwise, if the above w 	< 0 set 




d+1 1 	ii 
and if 	in (5) is non-negative and 	is the minimum negative 
value of 
(0) 
 (i =1,...,d), set 
w 
(0) 	 (0) - 0001 
	
(0) 	
•. - 2v. +v..)/n. (ij,d+1) = v /n, w. 	
- d+l j3 	3 • 	, w 
- (v 
- 11 	13 	33 
As each iterative stage is completed it is easy to check 
whether all w 
(r+1) 
 are positive. If not set, any which are negative 
to 0.001 before the next iterative cycle. If the maximisation is 
on the boundary, that is with some w i (i = 1,... ,d+1) zero then the 
above procedure picks up this fact by the corresponding iterate 
becoming smaller and smaller. As a check on this, any case where 






and for wi 
 (i d+l) = 0 
= v../n, w. = (v.. -2v..+v..)/n. 
d+l ii 3 11 13 33 
A simple program for the test procedure has been written in 
BASIC and implemented on the Wang 2200S minicomputer systeni. A 
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Sumary 
A reevaluation of the property of additive isometry in size 
and shape studies, and of proportional invariance in the analysis 
of compositional data is undertaken. Particular emphasis is placed 
on correcting a generally held view that the lognormal model can 
only sustain the hypothesis of additive isometry or proportional 
invariance at the expense of complete degeneracy. A new non-
degenerate lognormal, or more correctly logistic-normal, model is 
formulated which not only allows additive isometry and proportional 
invariance but also provides a simple test of these hypotheses 
within the model. The model and the test are illustrated on two 




In the study of size and shape associated with a set of d+1 
measurements Y11•••'d+1 
 shape is usually defined as the measure-
ment-dimensionless vector x =.(x1,...,xd),  where 
d+1 
X. = 	 (i = 1,.. .,d) 	 (1) 
or some simple one-to-one transformation of it such as 
w. = x./(l - x1 - ... - Xd) 	(i = 1,... ,d). 	(2) 
When size is regarded as z = yl + 	Yd+1 then additive isometry 
(Mosimann 1975a) is defined as the statistical independence of shape 
x and size z. Sprent (1972) presents a survey of such ideas and 
relates them to their historical development, while Mosimann (1970, 
1975a, 1975b) considers the mathematical modelling of this and 
related aspects. 
A conceptually similar problem occurs in another common area 
of application, the analysis of compositional data, where some 
total such as the total urinary excretion of steroid metabolites 
in 24 hours, say z, is broken down into the quantities excreted of 
d+l component steroid metabolites Y1..-Yd+1.  Here the total 
excretion z is the obvious counterpart of size while the proportional 
Key Words: Additive isometry; Compositional data; Logistic-normal 
distribution; Lognormal distribution; Proportional invariance; 
Size and shape. 
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composition x1 = Y/(Yi + 	Yd+1) (i = 1,. ..,d) corresponds to 
the shape vector. Again interest may focus on whether composition 
is independent of size. This question of proportional invariance 
(Darroch and James, 1974) is often very important, taking practical 
expression in such questions qLs the following. If we concentrate 
our analysis on the variability of composition are we in fact losing 
information by neglecting size? Can we discriminate between types 
of disease through the use of compositional proportions of steroid 
metabolites, or should we also take into account the absolute 
magnitude of the excretions? 
One of the major hurdles to the statistical analysis of size 
and shape, and equally to compositional data, has been the absence 
of a versatile - enough class of distributions to describe the pattern 
of variability of shape x, as defined in (1), or w as defined in (2), 
and its relationship to additive size z. In the x form we are 
concerned with distributions over the d-dimensional simplex 
d 
= {x: x. >0 	(i = 1,... ,d), 	x. <1}, 	 (3) 
and the popular Dirichiet class is unrealistic in that it is 
essentially associated with independent Gamma-distributed measure-
ments y1""'  y d+l 
 . Darroch and James (1974) regret the fact that 
there seems to be a scarcity of distributions capable of describing 
situations which have any real structure of association. In the w 
form the multivariate lognormal model has been considered parti-
cularly by Mosimann (1975a, 1975b) but, as far as additive isometry 
is concerned, dismissed because of a degeneracy property that add-
itive isometry implies. This is unfortunate since a very minor 
41- 
modification to the modelling removes this defect and provides a 
rich class of distributions, closely related to the lognormal class, 
to describe the joint distribution of x, or w, and z. Whether 
or not x is additively isometric with respect to z depends on some 
parameters of the distributior and hence the way is open for the 
development of a test of the hypothesis of additive isometry. In 
the event of the distribution having the additive isometry property 
there is no necessity for it to be degenerate. 
In §2 we present the model explaining carefully how it avoids 
the force of Mosimann's theorem on degeneracy. In §3 we devise a 
test for additive isometry, in 94 show how it applies in two bio-
logical situations, and in §5 indicate a development of this form of 
analysis. 
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2. Logistic-Normal and Lognormal Models 
A central result on lognormal models is that reported by 
Mosimann (1975b) as his Theorem 1: if y = (yr,.. 'd+l 	
s 
 multi- 
variate lognormal and the d-vector x defined by (1) is independent 
of z = y + 	d+l then the distribution of y is degenerate, the 
covariance matrix of log y being proportional to a (d+1) x (d+l) 
matrix with all elements equal to 1. As indicated in §1 the dis-
covery of this result has apparently removed lognormal distributions 
from modelling considerations when additive isometry or proportional 
invariance is required. 
Let us, however, reconsider the essential features of the 
lognormal model. If y is (d+l)-dimensional lognormal then x follows 
a logistic-normal distribution Ld(v,E)  on the simplex 
sd,  as defined 
by Aitchison and Shen (1980), with density function of the form 
p(x) = (2) dI(xl ... xd+l) l  
(4) 
where £n(x/xd+l) is the d-dimensional vector with ith component 
2.n(x./xd+l). The change in modelling strategy now advocated is to 
take this shape or compositional distribution p(x) as starting 
position. Then, if q(z) is any density function over the positive 




is non-degenerate and obviously possesses the property of additive iso-
metry. This has been achieved simply by not insisting that y = zx 
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(i = l .. . ,d+1) are lognormal, and, of course, there is no funda-
mental reason why in practical modelling we should insist on y 
being multivariate lognormal. Historically the lognormal distri-
bution has been seen as a convenient starting point in modelling 
because of its familiarity, but. now that the logistic-normal class 
on 
S   is defined and available to describe shape or composition 
there is no theoretical reason why it should not form the basis of 
modelling. With the model (5) we can, by using the transformation 
yi = zx. (i = 1,... ,d+l) with Jacobian Dy/D(x,t) = z d = 
()d 
arrive at the corresponding density function 




We can even bring the model closer to Mosimann's lognormal 
model by supposing that the size z = Ey. follows a lognormal distri-
bution, say A1 (y,62), in the notation of Aitchison and Brown (1957). 
The density function (6) for y then takes the form 
(2½(d)1 	½Ey  (y1. . .YdYd+1) 
d 
x exp[-½ I 
ol3{iog(y./y1)_p}{log(y./y1)_ t}_½(logEyj_Y) 2/52 ],(7) 
where cr13 is the (i,j)th element of E. This seems as attractive 
a modelling assumption as the multivariate lognormal distribution 
assumption. In biological terms we are first saying that the overall 
size of the organism or object of study varies according to a log-
normal pattern, and there are many explanations - law of proportionate 
effect, theory of breakage - in support of such a possibility. 
Secondly we are saying that the internal structure, the division 
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of total size into its d+1 components, follows a logistic-normal 
distribution. It is possible to devise a random mechanism, similar 
to the central limit property; which generates logistic-normal 
distributions (Aitchison, 1980). Briefly this envisages a process 
with internal composition perturbed in a series of stages, with the 
(r+1)th stage components x 	arising from the rth stage components 
through a relationship 
(r)(r) 	
(8) 
where the random vector 	of perturbations does not necessarily 
consist of independent components. Thereis, of course, no way of 
verifying such a formative action, but this is equally a problem 
with the multivariate lognormal model. All we are claiming here is 
that there could be plausible reasons for investigation of this new 
form of model. 
Our modelling so far has provided only for additive isometry 
and proportional invariance within a non-degenerate model. There 
is, however, no reason why at (5) we should not adopt as a starting 
point a pattern of variability for x conditional on z, with condit-
ional density function p(xz), so that the joint distribution of 
x and z is 
p(xz)q(z). 	 (9) 
It is then natural to continue to take p(xlz) of logistic-normal 
form, with mean dependent on z, say Ld(ct+z,). 	The case = 0 
corresponds to additive isometry and proportional invariance and 
so the testing of the hypothesis that a = 0 forms an extremely con- 
venient method of testing the hypotheses of additive isometry and 
proportional invariance. 
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3. A Statistical Test for Additive Isometry 
and Proportional Invariance 
We suppose that we have a data set D consisting of n shape or 
compositional vectors x1 , . . . ,x and corresponding (additive) sizes 
The problem is then how to use this data set D to test 
the hypothesis that the d-vector = 0 on the basis of a logistic-
normal model Ld(c+z,)  for the conditional distribution of x for 
given z. The great advantage of the logistic-normal distribution 
is its tractability in statistical analysis since a logratio trans-
formation 
V ij 
.. = log{x../(1 - x 1 - ... - xid) } (j = l .. . ,d) transforms 
each c. to a corresponding v. which is Nd(c+z,E).  In terms of 
the transformed-data vl,...,vn we are faced with standard testing 
of a linear hypothesis within the context of analysis of dispersion 
in multivariate normal theory (Rao, 1965, Chapter 8). Write = 
the matrix of cross-products R = E(vj_)(v_)T, and the maximum 
likelihood estimate 	= E(z - z) (Vi - v)/E(z - z) 2 of . Then 
standard test theory (Rao, 1965, Table 8c.58) leads to an exact 
test of = 0 by comparison of 
IR - IR- 	
T( 	




against critical values of the F distribution at d and n-d-1 degrees 
of freedom. 
To demonstrate the simplicity of the test we present in the 
next section two applications, the first to the investigation of 
additive isometry in a shape and size analysis and the second to 





4.1. Radiological Heart Measurements 
The ratio of 'heart width' to 'thorax width' as seen on a heart 
X-ray is considered by some radiologists to have appreciable 
diagnostic value in detecting certain types of hypertensive condit-
ions, and attempts have been made to quantify the ratio by radio-
logists actually making measurements on heart X-rays as displayed 
on a viewing screen. In any consideration of the diagnostic value 
of such a ratio it is obviously of some interest to know whether 
or not its distribution is independent of size of person, normal or 
hypertensive. If there is such isometry then the use of the ratio 
is well founded, provided of course that its distributions for normal 
and hypertensive persons have a reasonable degree of separation. 
If there is no such isometry then it may well be more appropriate 
for diagnostic purposes to take both measurements into consideration 
rather than reduce them to the ratio. 
Fig. 1 shows the scattergram for 75 heart X-rays, with the 
measurements yj = heart width and Y2 = thorax width - heart width, 
so that z = x1 + x2 = thorax width is being interpreted as size. 
Of the 75 patients 20 were normal and 55 were hypertensive. The 
diagnostic ratio x = y1/(y1 y2)  is constant along rays through the 
origin. Tests of additive isometry as described in §3 have been 
carried out separately on the normal and hypertensive groups and 
also on the combined group of 75 patients. Here the three models 
involved are respectively that x is L1 (e.1+ 1z,cJ), L1 (a2+ 2z,a), 
L1 (cz+z,a2). The test quantities (10) for these three groups are 
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Heart width (mm) 
Figure 1 
Two measurements of heart X-rays for 20 normal 
and 55 hypertensive persons 
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critical values, and so there is significant departure from the 
hypothesis of additive isometry at the 5,5 and 1 per cent signi-
ficance levels. 
Also of some interest is whether the lack of additive isometry 
is identical in the normal andhypertensive groups: in other words, 
is the hypothesis that c.1 = a2(=) and 	= 2(=) tenable. A test 
of this is equivalent to a standard normal linear regression test 
of the equality of two regression lines, since log{x/(l -x)} is 
N(c + 	(i =1,2). The appropriate test quantity is 5.35 
to be compared against F(2,71) critical values and so the forms 
of dependence on additive size are significantly different at the 
0.1 per cent level. This difference suggests that the diagnostic 
ratio has some diagnostic merit, but the absence of additive isometry 
further suggests that there is a possibility of an improved diagnostic 
system if we take account of both measurements y1 and Y2 rather than 
their ratio. Sihce our purpose is the limited one of illustrating 
a simple test of additive isometry within the lognormal and logistic-
normal framework we shall not pursue this possibility further here. 
4.2. Urinary Steroid Metabolite Excretions 
As part of a study into the differential diagnosis of Cushing's 
syndrome the amounts of 14 steroid metabolites excreted in urine 
over 24 hours have been recorded by Nielsen (1271) in Cushing syndrome 
patients and in 37 normal adults and in 30 normal children. A 
successful differential diagnostic system has been built-up on a 
training set based on adult amounts but this is obviously not 
applicable to children since their excreted amounts are on average 
appreciably less than the corresponding amounts for adults. Direct 
4.23. 
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application to 'outlier' children is unsound statistical practice. 
For example, one two-year old child processed through the adult 
diagnostic system is placed with almost certainty into the adenoma 
(benign tumour) class when in fact the correct diagnosis is a 
carcinoma of the adrenal gland.. A question which therefore arises 
in such applications is whether absolute amounts are really 
necessary or whether proportions would be adequate, that is whether 
the compositions satisfy proportional invariance. To undertake a 
discussion of this in the full differential diagnostic context would 
take us well beyond the scope of this present paper and so we 
confine ourselves to the examination of the problem of proportional. 
invariance in relation to the set of normal adults and normal 
children. Moreover, in order to be able to present a complete picture 
of our tests here we condense the data for each case into a three-
dimensional vector with three natural groupings of metabolites, 
(1) total cortisol metabolites, (ii) total corticosterone metabolites, 
(iii) remainder (pregnanetriol + -5-pregnentriol). The data are 
given in Table 1. 
The test applied to normal adults produces a test quantity 
1.35 to be compared against F(2,34) critical values; also for normal 
children the test quantity is 1.85 to be compared against F(2,27) 
critical values. In neither case can we reject the hypothesis of 
proportional invariance. This is perhaps, to be expected since 
within each of these groups there is not large variability in size, 
certainly not in relation to the differences between the groups. 
Moreover, the motivation for the proportional invariance study 
is to see whether this property extends to the combined group of 
adults and children. For this combined group of 67 persons the test 
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TABLE  
Urinary Excretions (mg/24hr) of Steroid Metabolites for Normal 
Adults and Normal Children 
Adults 
2.47 0.29 0.40 
2.96 0.39 1.10 
4.09 0.26 0.90 
3.27 0.24 1.80 
2.30 0.51 0.50 
5.06 0.50 1.30 
2.86 0.42 1.50 
3.38 0.51 0.60 
3.18 0.12 0.50 
3.49 0.31 1.30 
3.56 0.57 1.20 
5.24 0.51 0.48 
3.62 0.29 0.50 
2.99 0.38 0.50 
2.18 0.34 0.60 
3.86 0.37 0.60 
3.04 0.35 0.40 
2.82 0.29 0.60 
2.40 0.38 0.90 
4.73 0.35 1.40 
3.49 0.40 0.80 
6.32 0.86 2.30 
3.88 0.37 0.90 
3.79 0.42 1.20 
9.95 1.00 0.80 
7.03 0.56 1.10 
4.23 0.48 1.20 
5.60 0.48 	. 1.80 
4.30 0.36 0.60 
9.74 0.76 1.10 
4.54 0.29 0.60 
6.33 0.92 0.90 
6.65 0.66 2.00 
5.96 0.50 1.90 
1.86 0.50 0.50 
1.33 0.13 0.20 
5.42 0.46 0.60 
Children 
(i) 	(ii) 	(iii) 
1.78 0.29 0.075 
1.77 0.21 0.065 
2.01 0.37 0.045 
1.17 0.25 0.025 
1.29 0.17 0.055 
2.80 0.26 0.305 
1.36 0.30 0.205 
3.31 0.28 0.205 
0.52 0.07 0.005 
1.97 0.14 0.005 
2.10 0.23 0.125 
2:41 0.36 0.055 
1.60 0.26 0.065 
1.14 0.066 0.015 
1.44 0.163 0.075 
1.96 0.21 0.145 
2.01 0.27 0.105 
0.83 0.12 0.045 
1.58 0.12 0.105 
1.82 0.20 0.105 
1.49 	. 0.25 0.045 
1.96 0.23 0.115 
1.97 0.29 0.105 
0.831 0.10 0.105 
1.58 0.08 0.215 
2.84 0.09 0.105 
1.77 0.14 0.085 
3.02 0.34 0.505 
1.17 0.17 0.205 
1.69 0.27 0.085 
Total cortisol metabolites 
Total corticosterone metabolites 
Pregnanetriol + &-5-pregnentriol 
quantity is 15.1 to be compared against F(2,64) critical values. 
This is highly significant (P <0.001) and so the hypothesis of 
proportional invariance for this overall set of data must be firmly 
rejected. As we have said earlier it is not our purpose here to 
discuss the consequences of thi,s for the differential diagnosis 
problem. 
We should perhaps also make the comment that when the full 
14-dimensional compositional structure is analysed it is found that 
the hypothesis of proportional invariance is rejected for each of 
the groups normal adults and normal children separately, each at 
the 1 per cent significance level. Investigation of the combined 
group reinforces this conclusion, rejecting the hypothesis of 
proportional invariance at the 0.01 per cent level. 
13 
5. Discussion 
We have shown how the advent of the class of logistic-normal 
distribution opens the way to an extremely simple test of additive 
isometry and proportional invariance, achieved through the simple 
relationship of the logistic-normal to its associated multivariate 
normal counterpart. This relationship can indeed be further ex-
ploited if there is any possibility that shape or composition may 
be dependent on some concomitant variable or vector u. Within a 
general model which specifies the distribution of shape or com-
position x, conditional on size z and concomitant information u, 
as Ld(ct+z+ru,E)  we may proceed to test a lattice of hypotheses 
such as 
r = 0, the hypothesis of no dependence on the concomitant 
information; 
= 0, the hypothesis of conditional additive isometry, 
that is, for given u, shape or composition x is inde-
pendent of additive size z; 
= 0, r = 0, the hypothesis of complete independence 
of shape or composition on additive size and concomitant 
variables. 
Since the testing of such a lattice of hypothesis falls completely 
within the context of standard multivariate normal linear theory 
there is no need to pursue this development of testing here. 
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This commentary has not only ranged over a wide spectrum of 
general theoretical problems such as estimation, hypothesis testing 
and multiple hypotheses problems, optimum experimental design, 
tolerance regions, decision theory and prediction but has also 
shown the relevance to practical problems such as diagnosis, 
calibration, treatment allocation, sampling inspection, economic 
demand analysis, analysis of compositional data. Moreover 
particular classes of distributions have been studied in relation 
to predictive analysis and their use in modelling especially in the 
more complex aspects of the practical problems of calibration and 
diagnosis. And some classes, for example the lognormal and the 
new logistic-normal, have been picked out for intensive treatment 
because of their relevance to a large number of consultative 
problems. 
There are, of course, other methods of statistical analysis - 
non-parametric and distribution free methods, the search for 
robust methods, kernel methods of density function fitting - 
which are highly successful for many situations. In some of the 
more complex areas of modelling, however, such as decisive 
prediction, statistical diagnosis with problems of calibration, 
imprecision and uncertain diagnostic assessments, and the 
distributional problems of compositions, it is difficult to see 
how parametric statistical modelling can be replaced in the 
foreseeable future. This is not to imply, however,, that 
parametric statistical modelling has as yet all the answers. For 
example, in the modelling of the pattern of variability of 
431 
of multivariate binary data the available models, such as 
loglinear models, are still not entirely satisfactory. 
The challenge to continue research in parametric statistical 
modelling remains. 
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